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Introduction
During the two decades beginning from the collapse of the com­
munist bloc in Central and Eastern Europe, Hungary was recognized 
as a reforming country of former socialist transition economies in the 
international community. In fact, this country had always been a 
leader in terms of the progress in transition to a market economy and 
in nation-building based on democracy and the rule of law.
To maintain a favorable course in the sweeping transformation of 
the socio-economic system in Hungary, a large influx of foreign capital 
and advancement of western multinational enterprises (MNEs) played 
a crucial role. The active investment activities by foreign companies 
lowered hurdles for Hungary to overcome a capita! shortage that is a 
serious impediment to structural reforms in a transition economy, 
boosted the domestic corporate sector, and greatly improved the posi­
tion of Hungary in the world economy through the substantial expan­
sion of exports. In other words, the reform-promoting effects of for­
eign direct investment (FDI) and MNEs were remarkable in Hungary.
In recent years, however, heavy dependence on FDI and MNEs 
has been found to have several side-effects. They include (a) the emer­
gence of technological economic dualism’ (Farkas, 2000: 2004) between 
domestic and foreign corporate sectors: (b) the tendency to increase 
in profit repatriation by MNEs and consequent current account defi­
cit: (c) regional disparity in income and unemployment: and (d) the 
vulnerability of the national economy to changes in the global strategy 
of major international corporations. To tackle these new challenges for 
the Hungarian government and citizens, reconsideration of the 
national development strategy is required in order to promote the sta­
ble settlement of MNEs and deepen ties between these foreign compa­
nies and local industrial resources, given the substantial presence of 
foreign capital in the country.
A Hungarian-Japanese joint research project, ‘Multinationals and 
Local Resources,’ was conducted to provide scientific evidence for 
drawing policy implications for the above purpose. This book is based 
on the major findings obtained from this international project.
As the project title suggests, we originally aimed to empirically 
investigate the relationship between MNEs and local industrial
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resources (i.e.. domestic firms, universities and other research institu­
tions, and regional economies) in transition Hungary. In the course of 
the project, however, our research interest was extended to include 
organizational innovation, which is now regarded as one of the most 
important issues regarding the industrial restructuring in the Hungar­
ian economy.
From the end of the last century, the service sector in general, 
and the knowledge-intensive business service sector in particular, 
became the key driver of new job creation in Europe and outpaced 
manufacturing. In addition to the fact that the service sector’s share in 
the GDP ranges from 70-80% in the developed countries and 58-63% 
in the post-socialist countries in the Central and Eastern European 
region, we still have a poor understanding of the factors shaping inno­
vation and sustainable competitiveness in this sector.
The explanatory factors of this knowledge deficiency are the fol­
lowing. First, in spite of the fact that information and communication 
technologies are extremely important, in both the service and manu­
facturing industries, non-technological innovation is dominant in the 
service sector and receives less attention than technological innova­
tion. Secondly, there is a consensus among policymakers and academ­
ics that innovation and learning are the key sources for success of the 
national economies within the context of intensive global competitive 
pressure. However, this consensus on the importance of innovation 
and learning generally ignores the fact that innovation is embedded 
into social and organizational relations in the workplace. For example, 
the U. S. has been more successful in technological innovation and, also, 
in non-technical fields than Europe (Mako et al, 2006). In this respect, 
we agree with the following observation of Arundel et al. (2006) :
“The bottleneck in improving the innovation capabilities of Euro­
pean firms might not lie in the low level of R&D expenditure, 
which is strongly determined by industry structures and there­
fore difficult to change, but the widespread existence of working 
environments that are unable to provide a fertile environment for 
innovation" (pp. 28-29).
Thirdly, the European economy is characterized by a great vari­
ety in the forms of work organization, reflecting various degrees of
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learning and innovation capacity of the firms. The European compari­
son indicates that the learning and innovation oriented forms of work 
organization, which are characterized by a high level of autonomy in 
work, learning and problem-solving capabilities, and task complexity, 
are more widely diffused in the North European countries than else­
where in Europe, The position of Hungary and Slovakia, which are at 
the heart of our empirical research within the EU-27 countries, is 
rather unbalanced. This means that, in Hungary and Estonia, the 
share of learning or innovative organization is the highest among the 
post-socialist countries of the region. However, on the other hand, the 
work organization of mass production (the Taylorist model), character­
ized with a minimum learning and innovation capability, exceeds the 
EU average. A similar pattern is observable in Slovakia, where the 
share of ‘lean organization’ having limited learning and innovative 
capability is higher than the EU average, but at the same time, the 
rate of a Taylorist work organization also exceeds the EU average1.
With the above motivation, we designed the book as an investiga- 
tion of the major aspects of the industrial restructuring closely linked 
with FDI and MNEs as well as the organizational innovation within 
the service industry gleaned from the results of company surveys con­
ducted in Hungary and Slovakia, which were aimed at developing a 
more comprehensive picture of the economic transformation in Hun­
gary.
The book has eight chapters. The first two in Part I deal with 
economic reform and the role of FDI in Hungary. Chapter 1 is a com­
prehensive survey of the studies of the impacts of FDI on the Hungar­
ian economy from 1989 through 2004 with emphasis on corporate 
restructuring. In this chapter, we maintain that large-scale FDI and 
intensive business activities by MNEs have played a crucial role in 
Hungary's transition to a market economy. Indeed, the massive inflow 
of foreign capital has supported the national economy by spurring 
effective demand, contributing substantially to its long-lasting and 
stable economic growth and to the drastic changes in the corporate 
sector through the conversion of ownership structure, improvements 
in the production system, strengthening of market competitiveness,
1 For more details, see Valeyre et al. (2009).
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modernization of management systems, and revitalization of R&D and 
innovation activities. In spite of all this, Hungary still has many prob­
lems with corporate restructuring even though several years have 
passed since EU accession. We maintain that the Hungarian govern­
ment and the business sector should reconsider their passive strategy 
of economic transformation and devote more effort to promoting the 
stable settlement of MNEs and stronger ties between these foreign 
companies and local industrial resources.
Chapter 2 examines the effects of ownership transformation from 
the state to the private sector on firm performance in the post-privati­
zation period. In this chapter, we empirically assess the advantage of 
foreign acquisition in comparison with company buy-outs by domestic 
investors. Among researchers of transition economies, there is a con­
sensus that, in Central and East European countries, the effects of 
enterprise privatization have been mostly positive on the ex-post per­
formance of former state-owned enterprises. Earlier research works, 
however, do not report whether these effects are due to the privatiza­
tion process itself or to other factors. In fact, the empirical results 
regarding the relationship between ownership changes and firm per­
formance in Hungary are mixed. Using annual census data of Hungar­
ian enterprises for the early 2000s, we reexamine this issue. In this 
chapter, we propose a new empirical methodology on the basis of 
meta-analysis techniques2 to overcome the data limitations arising 
from an insufficient observation period. As a result we effectively cap­
ture restructuring efforts by new owners and company managers and 
provide strong empirical evidence of the close relationship between 
ownership transformation and firm performance. More specifically, we 
document that there are clear differences in the performance improve­
ment effects among privatization implemented with no lower limit on 
the scale of ownership transformation, privatization with strategic con­
trol rights, and full privatization. We also report that ownership trans­
formation to foreign investors has greater positive impacts on firm 
performance than that to domestic investors.
2 Meta-analysis is a precise scientific method to combine the resuits from indi­
vidual studies for the purpose of integrating the research findings. There are 
various approaches from the vote-counting method to meta-regression analysis. 
See Section 2.5 in Chapter 2 for more details.
As the two chapters discussed above focus on the direct impacts 
of FDI on the economic reform and corporate restructuring in Hun- 
gary, the next two in Part H present an examination of the indirect 
effects or externalities of foreign capita! inflow from the viewpoint of 
efficiency improvement in domestic firms. That is to say, technology 
and knowledge transfer from MNEs to indigenous companies. The 
issues concerning the relationship between MNEs and local firms in 
the host countries raised in the 1960s witnessing the advent of the age 
of internationalization are still of great interest to researchers today, 
and, consequently, a number of microeconomic research works that 
empirically examine so-called 'FDI spillover effects’ have been pub­
lished in recent years with the remarkable enhancement of firm-level 
datasets worldwide. We contribute to the literature from the stand­
point of the Hungarian transition economy.
To ensure this end. Chapter 3 scrutinizes the impact of FDI on 
productivity of domestic firms. In this chapter, we present a new 
empirical model with respect to the productivity spillover effects of 
horizontal FDI by focusing on the multi-layered structure of industrial 
classifications (i.e., NACE). In this model, the market presence of hori­
zontal FDI in a host country is expressed using multiple spillover vari­
ables with a nested structure corresponding to the aggregated level of 
industrial classification. Empirical models that comprise these nested 
spillover variables of horizontal FDI in the right-hand side of the esti­
mation equation are called ‘nested variable models’ to distinguish them 
from the models having a single horizontal variable as an independent 
variable. Using large-scale firm-level data from Hungary, we estimate 
the nested variable model and verify horizontal FDI spillover effects 
that cannot be captured with the conventional model having a single 
horizontal variable.
Chapter 4 examines the impact of FDI on the export decision of 
domestic firms. It is argued that domestic firms in a host country 
might be able to more easily overcome various trade barriers associ­
ated with new entry into export markets by observing and imitating 
the advanced export operations of foreign companies. This positive 
externality of FDI is considered to have originated mainly in the 
reduction of information costs that domestic firms would have had to 
bear without the MNEs, and, hence, it is called the ‘information spill­
over effect’ (Aitken et al, 1997) that is the main subject of this chap­
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ter. Based on the results of empirical analysis, we report that in com­
parison with the conventional model that expresses the export propen­
sity of MNEs with a single variable, the nested variable model more 
precisely specifies the source, extent, and direction of information spill­
overs from MNEs to indigenous firms. We also verify the close rela­
tionship between the information spillover effect and the heterogene­
ity of FDI and domestic firms.
The two chapters in Part HI represent our research regarding the 
organizational innovation in Hungary in comparison with that in Slova­
kia. In these chapters, we bring the knowledge-intensive business ser­
vice (KIBS) into focus. In Chapter 5, we report that, at the end of the 
20th Century, the service sector became the dominant engine of 
employment creation worldwide over manufacturing. Even in the 
post-socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, service 
employment accounts for more than half of the total employment. In a 
comparison of the employment share and growth potential of the ser­
vice sector of Hungary and Slovakia, Hungary is in a better position 
from both static and dynamic perspectives. According to the results 
from our company surveys conducted in Hungary and Slovakia during 
the period of 2008-093, the overwhelming majority of firms surveyed in 
both countries belong to the de novo category: they were established 
in the post-socialist period (after 1990). With regard to the size of the 
firms investigated, the Slovakian KIBS firms are more balanced than 
the Hungarian ones. A great majority of the Hungarian firms are small 
(i.e., employing fewer than 50 people). In contrast, although small 
firms are predominant in Slovakia, there are a significant number of 
medium'size and large ones. With regard to the organizational struc­
ture or architecture of the firms in both countries, a lean work' organi­
zation with one or fewer hierarchical levels is dominant. There are 
noticeable differences between the two countries, particularly with 
regard to the ownership structure. Domestically owned firms are pre­
dominant in both. However, the share of foreign-owned companies is 
three times higher in Slovakia. The research reported in Chapter 5 
shows that innovation in individual firms is less than that in company 
groups and networks, where a premium is placed on innovation and
3 See Section 5.4 in Chapter 5 and Mako et al. (2011) for details of the company 
Surveys.
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[earning. It is noteworthy in this regard that less than one fifth of the 
firms in Hungary belong to a company network, in contrast to more 
than two fifths in Slovakia, where the majority comprises members of 
international networks. The degree of complexity of services was mea­
sured by the customer-tailored and the high value-added content of 
services. Furthermore, basic similar patterns were evident in that the 
majority of firms surveyed provided customer-tailored and high 
value-added services to their clients. With regard to competitiveness, 
both countries place a high value on reliability, quality, flexibility/ 
speed, and experience. However, the role of the variety of services is 
significantly greater in the Hungarian than that in the Slovakian firms.
Chapter 6 conducts a comparative analysis of the Hungarian and 
Slovakian KIBS sectors in terms of organizational innovation in detail. 
Compared to the U. S. and Southeast Asia, Europe lags behind in com­
petitiveness and innovation. The primary reason for Europe’s third- 
place position is the lack of organizational innovation to support the 
transformation of research results into market advantage rather than 
a lack of emphasis on R&D, Organizational innovations are critically 
important in the service sector, where technological innovation has a 
less significant role than manufacturing. Therefore, in Chapter 6, we 
present a brief overview of the various types of organizational innova­
tion prevalent in Hungarian and Slovakian KIBS sectors and their 
drivers and obstacles at the firm level. According to our survey 
results, the so-called structural organizational innovations,' which 
require the modification of the organizational structure, e.g., the power 
and interest relations of firms, such as project-based work, lean orga­
nization. or inter-professional working groups, are more diffused 
among the Slovakian than the Hungarian KIBS firms. Insight is also 
presented in this chapter into the use of information and communica­
tion technology (ICT) and competence development practices of the 
Hungarian and Slovakian KIBS firms, as these are prerequisites for 
sustaining and strengthening their positions in the face of global com­
petitive pressure. We report that ICT is used more extensively in 
Hungarian than in Slovakian company practices. Hungarian firms per­
form better, especially regarding the ICT-based development activi­
ties. In relation to company knowledge development practices in both 
countries, various forms of experience-based knowledge development 
(e.g., on-the-job training) are more important than participation in
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formal education and training schemes. In the case of Slovakia, how­
ever, KIBS firms rely more intensively on external sources of knowl­
edge, such as higher education or training institutions, than do their 
Hungarian counterparts.
The last two chapters in Part IV focus on a relatively new 
research subject for the study of transition economies, namely, the 
concept of industry cluster5. In the epoch of globalization, small or 
medium-sized national companies have great difficulties in finding an 
appropriate place for themselves in global labor division systems. 
They most frequently apply strategies that help them become part of 
global value chains as regular suppliers, or they try to locate where 
they might cooperate with other small companies in industrial clusters 
to compete with larger MNEs. In both cases, communication, knowl­
edge transfer, and cooperative actions among companies are essential 
for improving competitive capacities. Since this type of cooperation 
relies heavily on close, regular contact and face-to-face interaction, the 
spatial concentration of actors can improve the chances for success. 
Literature on the topic of supplier networks and spillover effects, as 
well as that on industrial clusters, emphasizes the importance of a 
‘critical mass' of companies and other organizations and institutions. 
From this standpoint, we look at the emergence and subsequent 
development of industry clusters in transition Hungary and analyze 
their impact on regional economies. Namely, in Chapter 7, we define 
and describe the types of synergies that stem from the collocation of 
cooperating market actors. In addition, the potential linkages among 
the two types of networks, supplier chains and clusters, are explained. 
After a brief overview of the related literature, we introduce a new, 
refined measurement method of spatial concentration of industry and 
then present a new cluster mapping for Hungary5.
In Chapter 8, relying on the same methodology developed in the 
previous chapter, we test major hypotheses of spatial economic theo­
4 According to Michael Porter (1990). "[Industry] clusters are geographic con­
centrations of interconnected companies, specialized suppliers and service pro­
viders, firms in related industries, and associated institutions (for example uni­
versities. standards agencies, and trade associations) in particular fields that 
compete but also co-operate" (p. 199).
5 See Table 7.4 and Figure 7.1 in Chapter 7.
ries focusing on the impact of industrial and market concentrations on 
regional economic growth. More precisely, the aim of this chapter is to 
show how the geographic concentration of industry and market affects 
employment and production growth in regions of Hungary. The 
empirical results in this chapter confirm that both industrial and mar­
ket concentrations have a significant positive impact on production 
growth. This finding strongly supports the Mar shall-Arrow-Romer 
model of local knowledge externalities, suggesting that investment- 
driven regional development prevails in Hungary. Our empirical evi­
dence also indicates the possible synergy of monopolistic market 
structure and the presence of big companies for regional production 
growth. Overall, the two chapters in Part IV demonstrate that an 
industry cluster is a key element for a more thorough understanding 
of the industrial restructuring in Hungary's transition economy.
Finally, the concluding chapter summarizes the major results of 
this study and discusses a possible agenda for future research.
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Part I
Economic Reform and Foreign Direct 
Investment

(  Chapter 1 )
Corporate Restructuring and Foreign 
Direct Investment
1.1 Introduction
In May 2004, Hungary joined the European Union with seven 
other former socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 
and the Baltic region, materializing the countries long-cherished 
dream of re-integrating with Europe. The fifteen-year reform efforts 
to tackle systemic transformation by the Hungarian government and 
its citizens finally paid off after their decision to break away from the 
socialist regime. The road to the EU accession has not been easy since 
the 'European Agreements’ , which proclaimed that the European club 
would allow membership from CEE countries, were signed in Decem­
ber 1991. However, Hungary had always been a ‘front runner’ in the 
process of the EU enlargement towards the east1.
One of the main reasons why Hungary has been able to promote 
its systemic transformation is that this small country attracted rela­
tively large amounts of foreign direct investment (FDI). The Hungar­
ian government has been making great efforts to increase foreign 
investment from the very early stages of its economic transformation 
including the end of socialist era. In fact, Hungary had been a leader in
■ See Iwasaki and Suganuma (2009) for more details of the accession negotiation 
between Central and Eastern European countries and the EU.
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the region in terms of the total accumulated FDI inflows through to 
1997. Although Poland and the Czech Republic have ranked higher 
than Hungary since 1998 in that category, the country received 40.7 
billion USD as FDI during the twelve years from 1992 to 2004, 
accounting for 25.3% of the total in Central Europe and 19.8% of the 
total in CEE region (UNCTAD, 2005). This vast influx of foreign capi­
tal strengthened the Hungarian economy by spurring effective 
demand, contributing significantly to the restructuring of domestic 
firms through the conversion of corporate ownership structure, 
improvements in production system, strengthening market competi­
tiveness, modernization of management systems, revitalization of R&D 
and innovation activities. In other words, FDI has been a powerful 
driving force’ for Hungary to create an effective market economy, 
which was one of prerequisites for joining the EU. As Karpati (2003) 
states, the success of the Hungarian economy during this period was 
largely dependent upon foreign investment.
As reported above, in the period from the collapse of the socialist 
regime to EU accession, the role of FDI and multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) was noteworthy in transition to a market economy in Hun­
gary. Hence, this chapter examines economic development and corpo­
rate restructuring in this country from 1989 through 2004, with special 
attention to FDI Section 1.2 presents an overview of the roles of FDI 
in the growth and stability of the macro-economy. Section 1.3 
describes the effects of foreign investment and business activities of 
MNEs on reforms of corporate ownership and governance and on the 
improvement of efficiency in the management and production systems 
in the Hungarian firms. Section 1.4 examines the contributions of for­
eign companies to R&D and innovation activity. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Roles of Foreign Direct Investment in the Stabilization 
and Growth of the National Economy
Hungary has enjoyed positive economic growth for fifteen straight 
years through 2008 after coming out of a debilitating economic slump 
which had continued until 1994 due to the confusion arising from the 
abandonment of its planned economy. According to official statistical 
data issued by Hungary's Central Statistical Office (KSH), the 15-year 
average of the real GDP growth rate from 1994 through 2008 stands
14
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Figure 1.1 Changes in GDP real growth rate and contribution of demand compo­
nents, 1989-2009
(%  changes to previous year)
Source '■ Authors' illustration based on KSH, Magyrorszag Nemzeti Szamlai (various years) and 
the Hungarian Central Statistical Office Website (http://portal.ksh.hu/).
at 3.2%. This long-lasting economic boom has steadily pushed up Hun­
gary’s national income, leading to a remarkable increase in its per 
capita GDP on a purchasing power parity basis from 6,800 EUR in 
1990 to 13,700 EUR in 2004 and, further, to 15,700 EUR in 2008 (WIIW, 
2009).
Investment activities have been a key factor in Hungary’s long­
term and stable economic growth. In contrast to its flagging private 
consumption, domestic investment has continued to expand at a rapid 
pace after reaching its lowest point in 1992, and, in 2004, it had grown 
55% larger than in 1989, the last year of the socialist period2. As a 
result, according to Figure 1.1, fixed capital formation contributed to 
economic recovery from 1993 through 2000 by pushing the GDP real 
growth rate by an annual average rate of 3.6%. It is no doubt that 
Hungary’s booming economy in this period has been driven by these 
intensive investment activities with their multiplying effects. More-
2 Authors’ calculation based on KSH, Magyar Statistiai Evkdnyv 2004 (2005, p. 12).
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over, even it was possible that foreign enterprises have contributed 
significantly in the form of FDI with positive crowding-in effects that 
have led to additional investment by domestic corporations (Misun and 
Tomsik, 2002 )3.
The concentration of FDI in Hungary during the early 1990s is 
considered the result of political efforts to broadly open up its domes­
tic market to foreign investors and intensely involved them in the 
privatization of state-owned enterprises. According to some analysts, 
such policies may have been taken not because the Hungarian govern­
ment was prescient about the future of its national economy, but 
largely because of Hungary's political and economic situation at the 
time, such as the large amounts of foreign debt, serious current- 
account and budget deficits, mounting pressure from international 
organizations that feared the government would default on the official 
aid loans, and active lobbying activities by MNEs and by their sup­
porting governments in order for the corporations to take part in the 
privatization program. Regardless of the above factors, however, it is a 
fact that the Hungarian government succeeded in attracting large 
amounts of foreign capital especially in the privatization of the state- 
owned enterprises by continuously offering investment incentives 
such as large scale corporate tax holidays and the establishment of 
custom-free zones in line with the basic principle of opening up the 
market and letting foreign investors participate in privatizing state- 
owned businesses4. In fact, 66% of the total amount of FDI for Hun­
gary between 1990 and 1999 was invested in privatizing state-owned 
enterprises (Antaloczy and Sass, 2002). The Hungarian government’s 
decision to sell off its largest public corporations to strategic foreign 
investors led to the expansion of greenfield investment as well as to
3 YliSun and TomSik (2002) verified FDI’s spill-over effects on domestic investment 
in Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland by using panel data and investment 
models based on the mix of the stock adjustment theory and the adaptive 
expectation theory regarding investment for economic growth, which revealed 
that Hungary from 1990 to 2000 and the Czech Republic from 1993 to 2000 both 
enjoyed FDI's crowding-in effects while Poland from 1990 to 2000 had crowding- 
out effects.
1 Regarding the policy measures taken by the Hungarian government to enhance 
investment incentives, see Antaloczy and Sass(2003a)and Iwasaki and Sato(2004).
16
Chapter 1
export-driven economic growth, as noted by Mihalyi (2001)5. More­
over, as Antaloczy’s (2004) detailed case study of the FDI promotion 
activities in Tatabanya City suggests, local goverments carried out 
various industrial policies to attract foreign investments and MNEs as 
well6. Indeed, their measures were manifold and included (a) the forma­
tion of a special local agency for FDI promotion, (b) the maintenance 
of roads and the sewerage system for foreign customers, (c) human 
resource training, (d) the establishment of a transportation system for 
the labor force between the city and remote areas, (e) soil improve­
ment for the sites of former state enterprises, and (f) site development 
and mediation for new factories. It can be asserted that the political 
efforts made by both the central and local governments had remark­
ably synergistic effects on the inflow of foreign capital and the entry of 
MNEs into Hungary.
As Oblath and Richter (2002) and Szanyi (2004) stress, foreign 
companies in Hungary are now actively reinvesting the earnings they 
obtained within the country (i.e., reinvested earnings)'. As a result, the 
gap between the amount of capital inflow from the outside and that of 
investment by foreign companies, including those in Hungary, has 
been widening. In fact, as shown in Table 1.1, such reinvested earn­
ings from 1995 to 2004 accounted for as much as 37.5% of the total 
amount of annual FDI inflow during the same period. The share of 
reinvested earnings maintained almost the same level (33.8%) from 
2005 to 2009. This means that investment by foreign companies in
a The ratio of FDI to the total amount of privatization earnings obtained by the 
Hungarian government had rapidly declined as follows : 1996 ■ 32.3%, 1997 : 
15.1%. 1998 : 0.8%, 1999 : 0% (Antaloczy and Sass, 2002).
' Tatabanya is the largest city in the Komarom-Esztergom region, and its total 
population as of 1 January 2005 is 71,000 (KSH, 2005). At the begining of the 
transition, Tatabanya fell into economic difficulties due to the closure of a coal 
factory, the key indusrty of the city in the socialist era, and other problems. By 
grace of successful policy efforts, however, the Tatabanya government attracted 
22 foreign manufacturing firms by the beginning of 2004 and created new jobs 
for about 6,000 workers, or 15 percent of the total labor force in the city.
' ‘Reinvested earnings’ are ■ (a) earnings of Hungarian affiliates/subsidiaries of 
foreign corporations that are not allocated to investors as dividends: and (b) 
earnings of Hungarian branch offices of foreign corporations and those of for­
eign non-corporate entities that are not directly remitted to investors.
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Table 1.1 Selected indices of the foreign direct investment in Hungary. 1990-2009
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 19% 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Annual FDI inflow (million 
EUR)*"
244 1.186 1.142 2,039 966 3.696 2.625 1681 2.988 3,106 2.998 4291 3.185 1587 3439 6172 5.454 2552 1596 1.495
Reinvested earnings < mil­
lion EUR)
*  164 397 1.155 1.009 1.054 1,135 1,479 1.911 1.788 2227 1.918 1259 2274 1237 163
Accum ulated  FD I stock 
I million EUR)*6
244 1.430 2572 4510 5576 9272 11597 15578 18566 21572 24571 29.062 32247 34134 37573 43745 49.199 52.051 56.947 58.442
Annual FD] inflow per cap­
ita (EUR)*C
24 114 110 197 93 358 254 357 291 303 293 430 313 186 340 611 541 283 487 149
Accumulated FDI stock per 
capita (EUR)"'
24 138 248 445 539 897 U53 1512 1506 2.114 2.414 2549 3J69 3566 3.714 4532 4582 5.171 5,669 5526
Direct investment income 
(million EUR)*
*  19 *  26 * 3 4 *  -18 * 9 8 *  119 *  698 *  1519 *  1.888 *2.057 *2.117 *2 5 7 0 *  3275 *  3£44 *3 5 5 6 *  4224 *4 53 4 *5.797 *  5,145 *  3200
Number of foreign affiliated 
enterprises
5.693 9.117 17.182 20.999 23.557 24.612 25.670 26.083 26265 26.435 26.634 26509 26.796 26.793 26.475 26.019 25.796 27,177 28.988 29266
Total equity capital (bil­
lion HOF)-
2742 4756 713.1 1.1132 12982 1.994,0 2.467.9 42603 4.9942 6.603.6 7.109.7 7313.1 8.692.4 10.0682 13.053.0 157115 175982 20.6525 18.002.6 18572.0
Total foreign capital par­
ticipation (billion HUF)-
932 215.0 4018 662.9 8335 1432.1 1582.7 3202.3 3.9135 5.0315 5576.6 6292.1 7.019.9 8.7162 9.9413 11.7943 13.6352 14510.0 15.0912 15.976.6
Foreign capital participa­
tion rate (% )-*
34.0 452 562 595 59.6 715 76,3 752 78.4 762 784 795 805 866 762 75.1 775 71-7 832 86.0
Soles : "Net figures based on a balance-uf-payments basis.
'’Figures from 1990 to 1994 exclude reinvestment earnings.
‘Calculated by the author based on total number of population of each year,
"Figures from 1990 to 1994 are on a subscribed capital basis.
'Share of foreign capital in total equity capital.
Source • Compiled by the authors based on KSH. M agyar S la la tlik a i £vkonyv (various years). KSH (2005. p. 166). official statistics available at the Magyar Nemaseti Bank website (http//wwwjnnb.hu/) and the 
Hungarian Central Statistical Office website (httpr'/portal.kshJiu/).
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Hungary is still active enough to stimulate economic growth by shor­
ing up effective demand on the same large scale as that of the mid- 
1990s, although sources of capital investment are becoming more 
sophisticated as foreign companies expand (Belyacz and Kuti, 2011) .
1.3 Foreign Direct Investment and Corporate Restructur­
ing
Large-scale and continous foreign capital inflows have completely 
changed the supply side of the Hungarian economy, that is, the corpo­
rate sector. As Table 1.1 shows, in the period from 1990 to 2004 
(2009). the number of Hungarian companies with foreign participation 
increased 4.7 (5.1) times, and the amount of investment by foreign 
investors and their capital participation rate in these firms reached 
9.942 (15,977) billion HUF and 76.2 (86.0) %. respectively, during the 
same period. In this regard, we can confirm in Table 1.2 that the role 
of foreign enterprises has rapidly expanded in the production, employ­
ment, investment, and trade activities while the accession negotiation 
proceeded actively between Hungary and the EU from 1995 through
2003. In addition, as shown in Table 1.3 indicating the sectoral brake- 
down of FDI in 2004. foreign capital has made inroads into every area 
of the Hungarian economy, especially in manufacturing, wholesale and 
retail trade, and real estate and renting businesses.
The same can be said about the financial sector. The share of the 
FDI of the total subscribed capital in the financial service sector 
expanded from 44% in 1996 to 89% in 2001 (Hamar. 2004). According 
to Varhegyi (2001: 2004), by the end of 2000, foreign capital increased 
to 66.6% of the total subscribed capital in the banking sector, and the 
number of banks with a foreign participation rate of more than 50% 
surged to 68.1% of all Hungarian commercial banks. This active for­
eign participation remarkably mitigated the high market concentra­
tion in the banking sector from 1991 to 2002 and encouraged the com­
petition between banks, especially in corporate deposits and financing 
services8.
8 Varhegyi (2004) confirmed that, during this period, the market share of the 
largest three (five) commercial banks decreased from 58 (76) to 45 (59) per­
cent and the Herfindahl index notably fei! from 1565 to 986.
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Table 1.2 Position of foreign companies in the corporate sector. 1995-2003
(%)
1995 19% 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Net sales revenue 38 41 43 45 47 47 49 47 45
Added value 33 36 41 43 44 44 44 43 43
Employment 25 24 27 27 27 27 26 25 25
Investment 51 53 53 52 51 53 50 43 41
Exports 51 62 69 75 77 73 81 83 80
Imports 56 62 68 70 72 71 79 79 75
Mote '■ Figures indicate share of foreign-affiiiated enterprises with 10 percent or more 
of foreign ownership in the overall corporate sector.
Source ■ KSH. A Ktilfoldi MukodS Toke Magyarorszdgon (various years).
In Hungary, 'foreign companies’ (kulfoldi erdekeltsegu vallalkozas) 
are defined as those with a foreign participation rate of more than 
10%9. Almost all foreign companies in the country, however, far 
exceed such standard, as seen in the fact that the share of 100% for­
eign-owned enterprises in the total number of Hungarian foreign com­
panies increased from 1.8% in 1989 to 61,8% in 2000 while the share of 
joint venture companies with a domestic participation rate of over 
50% sharply fell from 86,7% to 17,2% during the same period (Inzelt, 
2003). By the end of the 1990s. 76 of the top 100 of the world's largest 
corporations had entered the Hungarian market in some form (Anta­
loczy and Sass, 2003b). Currently, establishing a 100%-owned subsid­
iary is the most common way of doing business in Hungary for major 
MNEs. This trend can be seen also for Japanese companies operating 
in Hungary. In fact, as of March 2003, 61 or 70.1 % of 87 Japanese-capi­
tal-affiliated enterprises in Hungary were wholly owned subsidiaries 
of Japanese parent companies or those of Japanese companies’ affili­
ates in Europe (Table 1.4). This trend has been gaining momentum 
against the background of an increasing number of Japanese compa­
nies coming to the country as suppliers for European affiliates of Japa­
nese electronic and auto manufacturers. Hungarian affiliates of these
!) More exactly, a direct investment enterprise is defined as an incorporated or 
unincorporated enterprise in which a foreign investor owns 10 per cent or more 
of the ordinary shares or voting power of an incorporated enterprise or the 
equivalent of an unincorporated enterprise.
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Table 1.3 Foreign direct investment by industrial sector, 2004
Industry, branch
Enterprises Total equity capital FDI share in 
total equity 
capital (%)Number Share(%)
Billion
HUF
Share
(%)
Agriculture 774 3.0 48.1 0.4 81.5
Mining and quarrying 69 0.3 14.0 0.1 98.6
Manufacturing 3,364 13.2 6,316.9 49.5 68.2
Food, beverages and tobacco 
products
401 1.6 575.2 4.5 89.3
Textiles 346 1.4 87.4 0.7 91.4
Leathers 76 0.3 13.6 0.1 97.1
Wood and wood products 147 0.6 48.9 0.4 95.1
Pulp, paper, paper products and 
printing
354 1.4 154.6 1.2 90.9
Fuel and chemical products” 125 0.5 2,208.7 17.3 31.2
Rubber and plastic products 251 1.0 166.3 1.3 95.8
Other non-metallic mineral prod­
ucts
137 0.5 171.4 1.3 95.2
Basic metals and fabricated 
metal products
461 1.8 342.4 2.7 84.1
Machinery and equipments 309 1.2 272.1 2.1 96.5
Electrical and optical equipments 436 1.7 1,162.8 9.1 74.4
Transport equipments 116 0.5 1,088.0 8.5 97.6
Others 205 0.8 25.5 02 94.5
Electricity, gas and water supply 75 0.3 530.6 4.2 74.5
Construction 950 3.7 97.8 0.8 76.7
Wholesale, retail trade and repair 10,308 40.4 1,005.3 7.9 95.1
Hotels and restaurants 1.175 4.6 82.8 0.6 93.4
Transport, storage, post and tele­
communications
753 3.0 1.492.9 11.7 66.0
Financial intermediation 209 0.8 1.122.3 8.8 92.8
Real estate and renting and busi­
ness activities
7,019 27.5 1,817.2 14.2 90.4
Others 810 3.2 235.9 1.8 96.7
Total 25,506 100.0 12.763.8 iOO.O 76.5
Note '■ “Includes coke, refined petroleum products, nuclear fuel and man-made fibers. 
Source '■ KSH, Magyar Statisztihai Evkdnyv 2004 (2005, pp. 298-299).
Japanese corporations such as Panasonic. SONY. SANYO and 
SUZUKI, as well as those of other MNEs such as Audi. Philips, Nokia, 
GE, Opel and Samsung, have become the leading companies in Hun­
gary. For this reason, at that time, Hungary was recognized, along 
with Ireland and Malaysia, as a country whose industry was over-
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Table 1,4 Types of Japanese enterprises in Hungary by industrial sector, as of 
March 2003
Corporate Restructuring and Foreign Direct Investment
(No. of enterprises)
Manufacturing Trade Finance Others* Total
Subsidiaries/Affiliations 33 33 1 7 74
Wholly owned Japanese corpo­
rations
19 11 0 3 33
Joint venture enterprises 5 5 0 3 13
Othersb 9 17 I 1 28
Liaison offices 5 5 0 3 13
Total 38 38 1 10 87
Notes '■ “Includes construction, consulting services and software development.
bInc!udes corporations in European countries.
Source '■ Compiled by the authors based on JETRO Budapest Office (2003).
whelmingly dominated by foreign capital (Hunya, 2002).
As mentioned in the previous section, the priority of selling off 
state-owned enterprises to strategic investors, as well as greenfield 
investment activities by MNEs, has led to the emergence of strong 
corporate ownership of Hungary’s core businesses. In fact, of the top 
100 non-fin a ncial corporations in terms of net annual sales in 2000, 63 
were owned by MNEs, and their majority was incorporated as non­
listed joint-stock companies or limited liability companies and oper­
ated under a very rigid ownership structure (Mihalyi. 2004). Direct 
corporate control by these new types of owners has been effective in 
alleviating so-called ‘agency problems' and has prevented Hungary 
from being troubled by serious corporate governance woes, especially, 
those arising from heavy insider-control ownership, which other post­
communist countries have confronted. In this context, it is remarkable 
that Torok (1998) presented the view that, in Hungarian companies, 
management and supervisory organs, including the Board of Directors, 
do not have a substantial influence on corporate strategies except for 
daily management issues. Moreover, according to Perotti and Ves- 
naver (2004), who closely examined the relationship between invest­
ment activities and financial constraints of 56 listed Hungarian firms in 
the period of 1992-98, foreign participation relaxed the dependence of 
these firms on internal reserves as the source of investment and 
enabled them to increase their fixed capital much more than compa­
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nies that were 100% domestically owned. In this sense, foreign capital 
played a positive role in restructuring Hungarian firms also from the 
viewpoint of corporate finance. Considering that, in the first half of the 
1990s, Hungary was mired in a credit crisis triggered by a vast quan­
tity of non-performing loans in the state banks, the effects of FDI 
should not be underestimated.
Foreign companies, thus, formed a 'mega economic sector’ in 
Hungary (Nishimura, 2001) and brought about significant changes in 
the corporate ownership and governance structure of Hungarian firms. 
The increased number of foreign-owned companies has had a remark­
able influence on Hungary's industrial and trading structures in the 
transition period, especially in its manufacturing sector, and greatly 
contributed to the improvement of its productivity.
The penetration of foreign capital has resulted in drastic changes 
to Hungary’s industrial structure. From 1996 to 2004, the share of the 
manufacturing sector in the total industrial production increased by 
8.8% to 89.8%. During the same period, the machine industries, in 
which about half of Hungary’s total FDI has been concentrated, 
jumped phenomenally to 28.8% in terms of the share in the total 
industrial production, while the share of traditional industrial sectors in 
the socialist era including food, wood and papar, and light industries 
combined declined by as much as 12.9%L0. The market environment 
also greatly changed during this time. For example, according to esti­
mates by Elteto (2001. pp. 6-10), the market share of 100% domesti­
cally-owned enterprises was completely surpassed by that of foreign- 
affiliated companies during the seven years from 1993 to 1999. The 
share of foreign enterprises in the manufacturing sector and in the 
export market increased to 71.8% and to 88.6% respectively in 1999. 
Based on a review of financial data of Hungarian manufacturing com­
panies from 1996 to 2000, Hamar (2003) points out that there was a 
significant positve relation between these companies' foreign participa­
tion rates and their degrees of export orientation, which is consistent 
with the findings of Elteto (2001)u.
10 Calculated based on KSH (2005, p. 254) and official statistics available at the KSH 
website (http://portal.ksh.hu/) .
11 The ‘degree of export orientation' is defined as the share of exports in total net 
sales.
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Under these circumstamces, the total trade volume of Hungary in 
US dollars surged 6.3 times from 1990 to 2004, while that with 15 old 
EU members rose at a more rapid pace, marking a 13.3 times increase 
over the same period12. It is obvious that such dominance of foreign 
enterprises over the export activities is closely related to the fact that 
the affiliates of MNEs in Hungary have continued to actively supply 
their products to EU markets in line with their global marketing strat­
egies.
Many previoius studies indicate that foreign firms greatly contrib­
uted to the improvement of productivity of the Hungarian corporate 
sector. For example, Hunya (2002) estimates that labor productivity of 
foreign companies was as much as 3.1 times higher than that of 
domestic firms in 1999, the largest difference noticed among ten Cen­
tral and Eastern European countries13. The statistical office also recog­
nized that a significant labor productivity gap does exist between the 
two groups (KSH, 2003a). They estimate that the average added-value 
per employee of foreign firms was 1.8 times higher than domestic cor­
porations, adding that much larger gaps were observed in several 
industrial categories (Table 1.5). Moreover, Hamar (2004) estimates 
that the difference between foreign corporations and domestic firms in 
productivity, added-value, wage level and capital equipment ratio per 
employee reached 2.9 times, 4.0 times. 1.6 times and 3.2 times respec­
tively in 2000.
There also have been many quantitative empirical evidences on 
this topic. By estimating Cobb-Douglas production functions based on 
cross-section data of 1994-1997, Szekeres (2001) showed that total fac­
tor productivity (TFP) tended to improve in proportion to the growth 
of the foreign participation rate. Using a large-scale database covering 
about 90% of all Hungarian manufacturing and construction firms, 
Sgard (2001) confirmed that TFP showed a significant increase of 
38.5% on average when the foreign ownership rate was expanded 
from 0% to 100%. By performing regression analysis of the productiv­
ity of foreign-owned corporations through estimation of three quanti­
tative models, including a simultaneous equation model designed to 
treat the endogeneity of the investment decision-making process of
12 Calculated based on KSH, Magyar Statisztikai Evkdnyv.
13 Judging the context, the estimation was conducted only for manufacturing firms.
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Table 1.5 Labor productivity by industrial sector and by forms of corporate 
ownership. 2000 (average added-value per employee of foreign-affiii­
ated enterprises = 100)
100% Foreign companies
domestically-owned (Foreign ownership rate)
enterprises 100% 50-99% Less than 50%
Overall corporate sector 56.7 90.0 119.9 92.1
Food, Beverage 42.5 126.3 98.8 70.9
Chemical 35.1 106.8 99.6 94.4
Electronics 63.1 99.0 96.8 124.3
Transport equipment 20.5 112.5 86.4 23.5
Power generation 84.3 101.1 99.9 101.2
Agriculture 47.8 115.1 81.5 75.8
Construction 49.8 900.6 50.0 86.9
Wholesale 44.2 104.2 90.3 91.6
Retail 83.3 111.6 60.5 101.8
Land transport 52.9 97.5 161.9 67.9
Post/T elecommunications 11.6 33.9 87.4 243.6
Real estate 18.9 142.6 37.4 144.2
Services 51.9 97.6 111.3 87.8
Source '■ KSH (2003a, p. 29).
foreign firms, Novak (2002) also found that Hungarian corporations 
with a foreign ownership rate of over 50% probably succeeded in 
improving their productivity at a faster pace than other enterprises. 
Furthermore, conducting panel-data analyses based on enterprise- 
level data of manufacturing firms in 1986-2002, Brown et al. (2006) 
verified that former state enterprises that were more than 50% for­
eign-owned improved much more in productivity after ownership 
transformation than privatized firms owned by domestic investors.
The above-mentioned research strongly suggests that there is a 
close relationhip between the facts found by Oblath and Richter
(2002). according to which the productivity of the Hungarian manu­
facturing sector rose at an average annual rate of 15.4% from 1993 to
2000—a much faster pace than that of any other CEE countries—, and 
the large inflows of foreign capital into Hungary during this period. 
However, the dichotomy of categorizing Hungarian firms into only two 
groups, ‘foreign-affiiiated corporations' and ‘other domestic corpora­
tions, is insufficient. As Halpern and Korosi (2000) and Novak (2003) 
noted, it is impossible to strictly verify the relationship between the
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growth of foreign investment and the improvement of productivity, 
considering the selection bias that foreign investors may choose 
domestic companies for investment, because such companies have a 
significantly greater potential to improve their own management effi­
ciency and productivity than their competitors11. In fact, the empirical 
evidence provided by Brown et al. (2006) confirms that former state 
enterprises that were more than 50% foreign-owned significantly out­
performed other privatized firms and remained state companies in 
terms of an average productivity of the pre-privatization period. Thus, 
it is quite likely that a selection bias of this kind did exist in Hungary. 
In addition, attention must be given to the possibility that the 
improvement of profitability and productivity of foreign corporations 
in their accounts might be largely due to preferential investment 
incentives given to foreign investors by the Hungarian government.
A way to mitigate these problems is to compare newly estab­
lished FDI-based companies and major domestic corporations. Here, 
we discuss Hungarian affiliates of MNEs. As already mentioned above, 
those local subsidiaries—almost all of which were established in the 
framework of greenfield investment—can fully utilize management 
know-how and production technologies devised by their parent com­
panies. Therefore, such wholly owned companies of multinationals 
could easily dominate privatized, formerly state-owned enterprises 
and other domestic corporations—both of which have been afflicted 
with a negative legacy from the socialist era—in terms of management 
efficiency and productivity.
The results of our empirical analysis support the above presump­
tion. Table 1.6 compares 153 of Hungary’s major corporations listed in 
the Figyelo magazine in 2003 by using representative management 
and financial indices. This comparison reveals that there is a clear dif­
ference with statistical significance at the 1% level in the average per-
M While Halpern and Korosi (2000) state, based on their estimates of Dynamic 
Cobb-Douglas frontier production functions using dataset from 1990 to 1997, 
that selection bias effects can be observed only during the initial few years of 
the transition period. Novak (2003), who came up with estimated production 
functions in fixed effect models by using 1992-1998 panel data on industrial 
firms, suggests that selection bias effects are universal. In this way, there are 
different views on selection bias effects over time.
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Table 1.6 Performance of 153 largest Hungarian enterprises, FY2003
Annual sales 
per employee 
(million HUF)
Operating 
profit per 
employee 
(million HUF)
Gross pretax 
profit per 
employee 
(million HUF)
ROE3
(%)
ROAb
(%)
AH 153 enterprises 156.09 5.30 4.26 21.08 5.71
Subsidiaries of multi­ *245.83 *8.71 *6.71 18.46 *8.43
national enterprises1 
Other enterprises 101.29 3.22 2.77 22.67 4.05
Notes '■ ^Return on equity = current profits/equity capital, 
bReturn on assets = current profits/total assets.
'* : Statistical significance of difference in mean values from domestic enter­
prises at the 1% level.
Source '■ Authors' estimation based on FigyelG (2004),
formance between multinational-affiliated corporations and other com­
panies except for return on equity (ROE), demonstrating that affiliate 
companies of MNEs enjoy a remarkable advantage in terms of labor 
productivity and profitability over foreign-owned and domestic com­
panies.
Next we examined the effects of the organizational form as a mul­
tinational affiliate company on TFP by regression analysis. Following 
Szekeres (2001), we estimated log-linear Cob-Douglas production 
function with a constant dummy (MNEs), which controls the recogni­
tion of being a 100% multinational-affiliate, and checked its value and 
statistical significance. Here, an unbalanced panel of 277 corporations, 
which are listed on Figyelo magazine's leading corporation rankings 
through to 1999, were used for estimation. We conducted cross-section 
analyses for each of the 1999-2003 data and panel data analyses using 
all observations. In the latter case, individual effects of samples were 
taken into consideration by estimating ramdom and fix effects models.
The main results shown in Table 1.7 are almost satisfactory, 
because signs of explanatory variables are consistent with theoretical 
assumptions and the hypothesis of constant returns to scale is virtu­
ally met in ail cases. The impact of MNEs on TFP is positive through­
out the analysis period with statistical significance. In addition, the 
panel-data estimations of RE H and FE indicate that there is the 1% 
level of significant difference between the above two sampling groups 
regarding the mean of individual effects. That is to say. MNEs had
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Table 1.7 Regression analysis on efficiency of local subsidiaries of multinational enterprises3
Estimation period 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 1999-2003
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Pooled OLSs RE I b REHC FEC
Const 7.691*** 7.949*** 8.320*** 7.857 * * * 8.276*** 7.807*** 7.459*** 7585*** 7.014***
(22.68) (24.12) <28.71) (27.43) (24.97) (52.81) (43.46) (45.32) (29.38)
In UO 0.286*** 0.214* ’ * 0.200* * * 0228"* 0.224*** 0228* * * 0.168*** 0.168*** 0.164***
(5.41) (4.25) (4.71) (5.37) (4.94) (11.08) (10.18) (1017) (9.00)
In tt) 0.705 0.899* 0,735* 0.724** 0.615 0.715* * * 0.865” ’ oair** 0.813***
(1.17) (1.62) (1.64) (2.29) (1.31) (323) (7.68> (7.43) (822)
MNEs 0.398*** 0.336* * 0.316*** 0.303*** 0.205* 0305*** 0.282*** — —
(2.80) (2.50) (2.83) (2.93) (1.82) (5.77) (3.02)
OOD — — — — — 0.148* 0.203*** 0203*** 0.200***
(1.79) (9.48) (9.49) (9.32)
01D — — — — — 0282*** 0.356*** 0356**" 0.351***
(3.54) (16.78) (16.79) (16.41)
02D — — — — — 0254*** 0.395*** 0.396*** 0.3®***
(322) (17.84) (17.87) (17.58)
03D — — — - — 0334*** 0.470*** 0.471*** 0.466***
(4.06) (19.78) (1932) (1923)
Mean of individual effects
Multinationals’* — — — — — — 0.000 0.180* 0.166T
Other firms — — — — — — 0.000 -0.092 -0.153
N 144 161 189 202 169 865 865 865 865
R2 0.329 0.297 0279 0.345 0.272 0.321 0.809 0.805 0.969
Adjusted R2 0.315 0.283 0267 0335 0258 0315 0.808 0.804 0.955
F- test' 22.920* * ' 22,089* * * 23.846* * * 34.806 ‘ * * 20.511*** 57.836*** 520.004*** 590.422*** 72712***
Notes '■ aThe estimation equation is formulated as follows - In (F) = u + a\ * In (K) + «2 * In (Z.) + 03 • MNEs [ + 04 * 00D+ a$ * 01D+ • 02D+ 07 •
03D] + £ : Y is total annual sales (million HUF). K is total equity capital (million HUF). L is annual average number of employees adjusted 
differences in average work hours per employee based on Fazekas and Koltay (2003. pp. 216-217). MNEs is a dummy of multinational enter­
prises. OOD, 01D, 02D and 03D are year dummies, u and a; are constant terms, c is an error term.
bBreusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test lor the specification of the pooled estimation and random effects model I (RE I) - 1290.11,/)
=  0.000.
cHausman test for the specification of the random effects model II (RE II) and fixed effects model (FE) ■ x2= 15.88, p=0.014 
d t  : Statistical significance of the mean differences from domestic enterprises at the 1 % leveL 
eNull-hypothesis : All coefficients are zero.
The /-statistics are given in parentheses. *** : significance at the 1 % level, * * ■ significance at the 5% level, * : significance at the 10% level 
Source ■ Authors' estimation based on Figyel5 (various issues).
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much larger individual effects than other companies15. These findings 
verify the superiority of local subsidiaries of MNEs as production orga­
nizations over other Hungarian enterprises. Therefore, our empirical 
results—which strongly suggest that the expansion of MNEs contrib­
uted to the improvement of efficiency in the overall corporate sector in 
Hungary—supports assertions by preceding studies by Hunya (2002) 
and others.
From the above consideration, it is evident that the large-scale 
FDI inflow and massive embarkation of MNEs changed the corporate 
ownership and governance structure in Hungarian firms as well as 
played a crucial role in improving export competitiveness and stream­
lining its management and production activities from the collapse of 
the socialist regime to EU accession. The next section will further 
demonstrate FDI effects by focusing on R&D and innovation activities, 
both of which are also important aspects of corporate restructuring.
1.4 Foreign Direct Investment and R&D/Innovation  
Activities
In the late 1980s, Hungary spent 2.5% of its GDP on R&D, which 
is a large percentage by international standards of the time (Balazs. 
1994). However, the ensuing full-fledged transition to a market econ­
omy brought about a drastic reduction in Hungary’s R&D activities. 
According to Table 1.8, by 1996. the R&D expenditure as a percent­
age of GDP dropped to 0.6%, and the total number of researchers fell 
by 22,437 or 37.6% from 1990 to 1996. In particular, the number of cor­
porate researchers diminished sharply by 10,948 persons or 63.9% in 
the same period. Even during the high economic growth after 1997. 
R&D activities stagnated at low levels. In 2004, the year of EU acces­
sion, the R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP was almost 0.9%. 
which is much lower than that recorded during the socialist era, and 
this modest level was maintained until 2009. As illustrated in Figure 
1.2, this scale is much smaller than the average of developed countries
15 The results of cross-section analyses show that the explanatory power of MNEs 
declines yearly. This finding is regarded as a good sign of progress in the 
restructuring of Hungarian firms because it indicates that the TFP gap 
between the MNEs and others is steadily diminishing.
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o  Table 1.8 Selected indices of R&D activities in Hungary and its corporate sector, 1990-2009
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 19% 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Total staff number 59.723 51218 43879 40.999 39510 38.088 37286 39.626 41517 42,088 45525 45.676 48.727 48.681 49.615 49.723 50.411 49.485 50279 52522
in R&D institutions 19802 16598 13749 11.886 9966 9512 11.015 10.781 10.174 9995 11255 10.461 11,767 11.474 11,483 11527 11.498 10429 9.996 10.100
in R&D units of higher educa­
tion
in R&D units of enterprises
22.787 22.607 22296 22.029 21.765 20.699 20,085 22,434 24,750 24411 25.972 26543 27532 27.769 29262 28,702 27.165 25.923 26240 25,934
17.134 12.013 7.834 7.084 8.079 8.077 6.186 6.411 6593 7.682 8.098 8572 9,428 9.438 8570 9594 11.748 13.133 14.043 16.488
Share  of e n te rp r ise  R& D 
staffs (%)
287 235 175 172 202 212 16.6 162 155 18.3 17.9 19.0 195 19.4 17.9 18,9 235 265 27.9 31.4
Total number of R&D units 1.256 1257 1287 1580 1.401 1.442 1.461 1.679 1.725 1.887 2020 2537 2.426 2.470 2541 2516 2.787 2540 2521 2598
R&D institutions 142 133 118 124 112 107 121 131 132 130 121 133 143 168 175 201 208 219 195 197
R&D units of higher educa- 940 1.000 1X171 1.078 1JG6 1,109 1.120 1502 1535 1363 1.421 1574 1.613 1.628 1.697 1566 1552 1.496 1,471 1.394
R&D units of enterprises 174 124 98 178 183 226 220 246 258 394 478 630 670 674 669 749 1,027 L12S 1.155 1507
Share of R&D units of enter­
prises (%)
13.9 9.9 7.6 12.9 131 15.7 15.1 14.7 15.0 20.9 23.7 27,0 27.6 275 265 298 365 39.6 40.9 45.1
Total R&D expenditure (HUF/ 
million)
33.725 27.100 31.600 35500 40289 42510 46.027 63591 71.186 78.188 105588 140.605 171.470 175.773 181525 207.764 237.953 245.693 266588 299.159
From state budget 28240 9.100 11.000 12.000 14.700 23277 23558 34554 38.930 41.624 52207 75586 100592 102.008 94049 102.666 106538 109.117 111.401 125595
From other domestic sources 538 1,744 3.172 2.929 2.022 2J31 £189 3517 2569 991 1534 974 1.497 1574 1.600 2.052
By international organizations 346 1.997 2.076 2655 3575 4563 1)202 12.918 17.773 18517 18,791 22.171 26577 27233 24.704 32.620
By enterprises 13.075 13.085 10.921 9.891 10.096 11563 17221 23.153 26559 30.070 39.790 48.984 50.936 53.926 67551 81.954 103.040 107.769 128.683 138592
Share of R&D expenditure by 
enterprises 1%)
38.8 483 34.6 28.0 2S.1 275 37.4 36.4 37.7 38.5 375 34.8 29.7 30.7 37.1 394 435 43.9 485 46.4
Total R&D expenditure to 
GDP (%)
1.6 U LI IjO 09 0,7 0.6 0L7 0.7 0.7 05 09 1.0 0.9 0.9 09 1j0 15 1J0 12
Total number of national patent 
applications
2591 2.305 2112 1.409 1.144 1.910 1.030 1.189 1257 1.881 1.605 1.445 1278 1.421 977 1.126 1.089 637 551 415
By Hungarian residents 1205 1.068 896 ,687 536 534 352 346 263 300 176 182 209 310 E58 130 140 112 109 86
By non-Hungarian residents 1.386 1237 1216 722 608 1576 678 843 994 1581 1,429 1263 1,069 1011 819 996 949 525 442 329
Source '■ Compiled by the authors based cm KSH, Magyar StatisztiAai Itvkany (various years), official statistics available At the Hungarian Central Statistical Office website f http://portal.ksh.hu/) and informa­
tion available at the WIPO websic (httpW www.wipa.int/ipslats/).
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Figure 1.2 R&D expenditure by country
(Total expenditure to GDP: %)
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Notes '■ Figure for Hungary is in 2001. Figures for Greece. Ireland, Italy. Belgium, Netherlands. Den­
mark and Spain are in 1999. Figures for the average of 15 EU nations and other countries are in 
2000.
Source '■ Authors' illustration based on Nifrszabadsdg. 2003. Aprilis 12. p, 5.
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as well as that of 15 EU nations. As indicated in Figure 1.3, although 
R&D activities in Hungary have been on the rise since 1996, the 
growth rates have been very moderate. The national R&D expendi­
ture for 2009 was still below the 1990 level.
The full-scale transition to a market economy, the disappearance 
of the COMECON market and the drastic reduction in the govern­
ment's R&D spending including those for corporate subsidies were 
grave ‘external shocks' which led to the rapid downsizing of the 
national R&D sector. At the initial transition stage of economic trans­
formation, the Hungarian government did not initiate consistent poli­
cies to stimulate R&D and innovation activities due to the lack of clear 
recognition regarding the linkage between economic growth and tech­
nological development—which also accelerated the stagnation of its 
R&D sector (Havas, 2002).
Meanwhile, as many researchers point out Hungary’s R&D sys­
tem during its socialist era was far from effective, since it did not 
strongly motivate researchers to pursue their R&D and innovation 
activities11’. In addition, the size of R&D sectors in CEE countries 
including Hungary was too large in relation to their economic scales1'. 
Therefore, it is no surprise that those countries had to reorganize and 
downsize their R&D units to suit their national wealth along with 
changes in their socio-economic systems. Inzelt (1998: 2003), Szalavetz 
(1999), and Nikodemis (2003) emphasize the importance of the ‘spon- 
tanenous adjustment processs’ relative to ‘external shocks’ in the 
modanization of the industrial technology, recognizing that a substan­
tial reduction of R&D expenditure and research staff at the corporate 
level had produced restructuring effects necessary for the Hungarian 
firms to adapt to a market economy. As already clarified in the previ-
16 For more details, see Tanaka (1993), Balazs (1994), Matsui (1996), and Inzelt 
(1998). These researchers point out the following as causes of the previous inef­
fective R&D sector in Hungary : (a) Localized division of roles by academic 
research institutions, high educational insitutions and industrial research institu­
tions ; (b) Domestic enterprises' low consciousness of the benefits of R&D 
activities: (c) Non-availability of economic institutions and agents able to build 
a bridge between the R&D sector and the industrial sector.
17 According to Knell (2000), as of 1990, scales of R&D activities in CEE countries 
and in Russia were comparable to those of Western developed nations, such as 
Germany and France.
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Figure 1.3 R&D activities in Hungary and in its corporate sector, 1990-2009
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 !999  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Source '■ Authors' illustration based on official statistics available at the Hungarian Central Statis­
tical Office website (http://portal.ksh.hu/) and Table 1.8.
ous section, FDI and foreign-affiiiated companies played a crucial role 
in the revitalization of the Hungarian economy. Therefore, the preced­
ing studies gave considerable attention to the relation between owner­
ship forms of enterprises and their R&D/innovation activities in the 
first 15 years of transition.
According to these studies, foreign-affiiiated corporations may 
have been more engaged in R&D activities than the wholly domestic 
enterprises from the early stage of transition. For instance. Inzelt 
(1998) already refers to the strong link between foreign ownership 
rates and R&D expenditure based on the enterprise survey conducted 
by the statistical office in 1996. Furthermore, she suggests that foreign 
investors have been constantly utilizing many of R&D units of Hun­
garian companies they bought with the aim of introducing new pro­
duction licenses and know-how. Moreover, Nikodemis (2003) points 
out that MNEs in Hungary boosted their R&D spending by five times 
in real terms over the six-year period from 1995 to 2000. As a result, 
the share of MNEs in the total R&D spending in the corporate sector
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increased from 22% to almost 80% during the period. The proportion 
of R&D spending by these multinationals in the Hungarian corporate 
sector is extremely high by international standards. Nikodemis (2003) 
states that this is further highlighted by the fact that domestically- 
owned corporations, especially small and medium size enterprises, 
were substantially cutting or restraining R&D expenditures in that 
period.
The same trend can be seen for innovation activities. The survey 
by the statistical office (KSH, 2003b) covering 26,495 manufacturing 
companies reveals that there is a certain gap between domestic and 
foreign companies in terms of achievements in innovation activities. 
Table 1.9 shows that 3,441 or 15,1% of 22,186 wholly domestically- 
owned corporations surveyed conducted innovation activities during 
1999 to 2001, while 1,055 or 28.7% of 3,679 foreign - affiliated enterprises 
carried out such activities during the same period, which is about 1.9 
times larger than that of the former on a percentage basis. Meanwhile, 
the statistical office obtained similar results to the above based on 
another enterprise survey for 1997 to 1999 (KSH. 2001). Hence for- 
eign-affiliated enterprises may have been continuously more active in 
innovation activities than domestic corporations.
Szalavetz (1999), who conducted an in-depth interview survey of 
fifteen manufacturing companies under the control of German capital, 
advocates that “the technological benefits of being owned by MNEs 
can be summarized by the fact that domestic firms were able to accel­
erate their technology accumulation process with the help of foreign 
direct investment", adding that the “Hungarian economy has been 
modernized at a remarkable scale as a result of technology transfer 
through foreign investment”.
In addition to this paper, there are many other studies focusing on 
the achievements of technology transfer and spillover effects stem­
ming from R&D and innovation activities by foreign corporations. For 
example, Antaloczy and Sass (2003b) found the effects of technology 
transfer in qualitative changes in Hungary's export structure from the 
late 1990s, As indicated in Table 1.10, Hungary’s top 10 export goods 
for 2002, five of which were high-tech products, are products of for- 
eign-affiliated enterprises that carried out greenfield investments 
within custom-free zones. The total export volume of high-tech prod­
ucts increased by as much as 5.3 times on a US dollar basis from 1992
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Table 1.9 Innovation activities by form of corporate ownership, 1999 2001
Innovative enterprises
Innovation activities completed
Products Processes Products and 
only only processes
Total
Unfinished or 
cancelled 
innovation 
activities
Total
Non-innova tive 
enterprises
Grand
total
100% domestically- U30 669 1.169 3.068 373 3.441 19.375 22.816
£
e
owned enterprise 
Enterprise with for* 279 122 255 656 56 712 1,368 2.080
c
1
tJ
eign participation3 
100% foreign-owned 123 40 118 281 62 343 1256 1.599
< enterprise
Total 1,632 831 1542 4.005 491 4.496 21.999 26,495
100% domestically- 5.4 2.9 5.1 13.4 1.6 15.1 84.9 100.0
owned enterprise 
Enterprise ^ with for­ 13.4 5.9 123 315 27 34.2 65 j8 100.0
iJ
-CIf.
eign participation* 
100% foreign-owned 7.7 25 7.4 17.6 3.9 215 785 100.0
enterprise
Total 62 3.1 5-8 15.1 1.9 17.0 83.0 100,0
Note '■ "Excluding 100% foreign-owned enterprises.
Source '■ Compiled by the authors based on KSH (2003b. p, 23. 29).
to 2002. The total imports of high-tech products also expanded by 7.6 
times during the same period partly due to foreign corporations' rising 
demand for plant and equipment investment. Based on statistical data, 
Hamar (2004) examined the role of foreign capital from the viewpoint 
of Hungary's technological catching-up and confirmed that industrial 
sectors requiring higher technologies have larger foreign participation 
rates (Table 1.11). These findings indicate the benefits of technology 
transfers brought about by FDI.
Szanyi (2002) focused on technological spillover effects arising from 
outsourcing contracts and from supplier agreements between MNEs 
and domestic companies, which has been rapidly spreading among 
Hungarian industrial firms in recent years. He found that small and 
medium size firms are actively involved in businesses outsourced from 
MNEs, and aim to adapt to a market economy as well as undergo 
restructuring. That is, these domestic enterprises regard outsourcing 
contracts with MNEs as "the most important sources of technologies, 
competitive products and markets, each of which is necessary for their 
modernization" (p. 20). Meanwhile, MNEs are also actively promoting
35
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Table 1.10 Top 10 export commodities, 2002
Rank/Commodities
Export 
volume 
(1.000 USD)
Share in 
total export 
volume
(% )
Manufacturing
by
fore ign-affiliated 
enterprises
Greenfield
investment
Production in 
custom-free 
zones
High-tech
products
1 Mobile communication devices 2.691,198 7.84 /X A O O
2 Piston engine-type manufac­
turing
2,114,963 6.16 o O o X
3 Passenger vehicles 1.481,180 4.31 o o A X
4 Input/output devices 766,262 2.23 A A o 0
5 Pans for TV sets, radios and 706,874 2.06 o O o X
communication devices
6 Computer memory devices 550,146 1.60 o o o o
7 TV sets 533,894 156 o o o X
8 Video recorders 529.641 154 o o 0 o
9 Autom atic data processing 508,393 1.48 A A o o
equipment/units
10 Conductors 431.424 1,26 A o A X
Total for 10 commodities 10.313.975 30.04 8.0 8.5 9.0 5.0
Notes ■ O  indicates 'applicable'. x indicates ‘not applicable' and A  indicates ‘partially applicable'. For the numerical 
estimate of the total for 10 commodities, each O  mark is given 1.0 point, A  mark 0.5 point and * mark 0.0 point 
Source ■ Antaloczy and Sass (2003b. p. 26).
their subcontractors to introduce new management techniques and 
carry out other organizational innovations (Havas, 2002). In addition, 
these domestic corporations are devoting themselves to renewing 
their production facilities, developing new products, preparing to meet 
domestic needs, streamlining production systems, and improving 
designs on the basis of outsourcing contracts.
There have also been several empirical works on technological 
spillover effects brought about by foreign capital. For example, Novak
(2003) confirms the existence of the FDI spillover effects by detecting 
a significant positive correlation between the TFP and the share of 
MNEs in the total sales in each industrial sector18. Furthermore. Sgard 
(2002) shows the high statistical significance of these spillover effects
18 The coefficients of spillover effects had a positive sign with statistical signifi­
cance regarding enterprises with 100 or more employees throughout the ana­
lytical period, while with enterprises with fewer than 100 employees, it had a 
negative sign with statistical significance for the first half of the 1990s and had 
no significance for the second half of 1990s.
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Table 1.11 Shares of foreign companies in manufacturing sector by technological 
level. 2001
Number of 
enterprises Fixed assets Sales Exports
Number of 
employees
High-tech industries 10.4 80.5 91.5 97.5 66.5
Upper medium-tech indus­ 11.7 86,0 84.9 93.9 58.4
tries
Lower medium-tech indus­ 10.7 746 71.6 73.7 42.5
tries
Low-tech industries 8.2 58.3 57.0 71.8 36.3
Total 9.5 74.5 75.1 89.2 46.1
Notes '■ The following industries are included in each sector. (The numbers in paren­
theses are OECD industrial classification codes.) High-tech industries : aircraft and 
spacecraft (35.3), pharmaceuticals (24.4). office and computing machinery (30), com­
munications equipment (32), and medical, precision and optical instruments (33.1). 
Upper medium-tech industries ■' electric machinery and apparatus (31). motor vehi­
cles (34). chemicals (excluding pharmaceuticals) (24 excl. 24.4), railway locomotives 
and other transport equipment (35.2 + 35.4), general machinery and devices (29), 
Lower medium-tech industries: manufactured fuels (coke, refined petroleum products 
and nuclear fuel) (23). rubber and plastic products (25). non-metallic mineral prod­
ucts (26), basic metals (27). fabricated metal products (28) and ships and boats (35.1). 
Low-tech industries : Food, beverages and tobacco (15 + 16), textiles, apparel and 
leather products (17+ 18 +19), wood products, paper products and printing (20 + 21 + 
22), other manufacturing (36 + 37).
Source ■ Selected by the authors from Hamar (2004, pp. 48-49).
by introducing the share of foreign capital in the total equity capital 
by sector into the production functions59. On the other hand, he also 
reports that the northwest region between the border of the EU and 
Budapest is enjoying more positive spillover effects than the southern 
and eastern regions, which might have widened the regional gap in 
the productivity of local enterprises. This is noteworthy from the 
viewpoint of the role of FDI in the regional development in Hungary, 
as reported later.
As reported above, the FDI spillover effects originating from tech­
nology and knowledge transfer from MNEs to domestic companies 
became an important research subject regarding the relationship 
between advancement of foreign capital and restructuring of domestic
19 However, from the panel-data analysis of 882 firms for the period of 1993-97, 
Bosco (2001) could not find positive spillover effects at all. Thus, this subject 
could be examined further.
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firms in Hungary. Therefore, we examine this issue again in Part II of 
this book.
The above preceding studies highlight the major role played by 
foreign capital and MNEs in the restructuring process of industrial 
technologies in the corporate sector. As mentioned in the previous sec­
tion, drastic structural changes in the Hungarian manufacturing sector 
as well as the significant improvement of its export competitiveness 
were leveraged by the introduction of foreign capital. In addition, it is 
clear that foreign-affiliated corporations supported the overall indus­
trial sector in terms of R&D and innovation activities. It is also a 
noticeable trend that in recent years, foreign companies in Hungary 
have been actively hiring Hungarian researchers and strengthening 
ties with domestic universities and research institutes, as pointed out 
by Havas (2002)20.
However, the above series of positive moves does not suggest that 
an internationally competitive R&D sector was and is now emerging in 
Hungary. Firstly, the quantitative analyses performed by Torok and 
Petz (1999) and Knell (2000) show that R&D activities are not a strong 
explanatory factor for Hungary’s enhanced export competitiveness 
and its improved productivity in the late 1990s21. Secondly, the num­
ber of national patent applications by Hungarian residents per 100 cor­
porate researchers, a common indicator of productivity of R&D and 
innovation activities, dropped by 74.7% from 7.03 in 1994 to 1.78 in
2004, and this dismal trend continued until 2009, reaching 0.52. Thirdly, 
the already mentioned enterprise survey (KSH, 2003b) indicates that
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2(1 Nevertheless, the collaboration among industry, universities, and government in 
the R&D sector is far from the desirable level. Therefore, Inzelt (2004) presses 
the Hungarian government for policy intervention to strengthen the ties of 
these entities.
21 Torok and Petz (1999) regressed the export-prientation ratio (ratio of exports 
to imports) to the R&D input ratio {ratio of R&D expenditures to GDP), skilled- 
labor ratio and foreign capital investment ratio, while Knell (2000) conducted 
regression analysis using the labor productivity improvement rate as a depen­
dent variable and the R&D imput ratio and the manufacturing productivity 
growth rate as regressors. As a result, the former research confirmed that the 
coefficient of the R&D input ratio does not have economically-significant 
explanatory power, and the latter led to the conclusion that the R&D input ratio 
has no statistical significance.
3H
Chapter 1
83% of manufacturing companies polled did not carry out any innova­
tion activities from 1999 to 2001, almost the same percentages as that 
recorded in the previous investigations by the statistical office (Inzelt 
1994: KSH, 20011 Nagaoka and Iwasaki, 2003). The inactivity of domes­
tic companies in innovation is regarded as a serious economic problem 
in Hungary, even after EU accession (Inzelt and Szerb, 2006: OECD, 
2008). In summary, these findings strongly suggest that Hungary has 
a long way to go before achieving rationalization and revitalization of 
R&D and innovation activities. FDI and MNEs are expected to make a 
further contribution to this field.
1.5 Conclusions
This chapter presents analysis of the roles of FDI in the corporate 
restructuring in Hungary from a multilateral standpoint during the 
process of the EU accession of Hungary after the abolition of the 
socialist planned economy. From what has been discussed above, we 
can say that foreign capital and MNEs made a significant contribution 
to this development. Namely, active investment activities by foreign 
corporations lowered hurdles for Hungary to transform its economic 
system to a market economy by overcoming capital shortage, boosted 
the domestic corporate sector, and greatly improved the position of 
Hungary in the world economy through the substantial expansion of 
exports (Szekeres, 2001).
Notwithstanding, relying on the FDI to carry out economic trans­
formation and to promote corporate restructuring poses many prob­
lems, First, there has been an increasing amount of profit repatriation 
by MNEs in recent years, which might further increase the current 
account deficit. In this sense, as indicated in Table 1.1, the direct 
investment income balance has tended to show a large deficit and to 
exceed the total FDI gross inflow in the past 10 years. The Hungarian 
government takes this situation very seriously.
Secondly, financial strains on domestic corporations and on the 
public arising from the preferential measures for foreign-owned enter­
prises have been distorting resource allocations and generating eco­
nomic inequity between those who can enjoy the benefits of the FDI 
and those who cannot. Thirdly, regional disparity in income and unem­
ployment has been widening due to the concentration of the FDI in
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particular regions. Fourthly, behind the rapid growth of the foreign 
corporate sector, technology networks and inter-industrial relations 
forged during the socialist era have been completely abandoned, lead­
ing to the emergence of ‘technological economic dualism' (Farkas, 
2000: Farkas, 2004: Fink, 2006). Szanyi (2004) reports that the alliance 
between domestic companies and MNEs through supplier contracts 
and others is still a long way from being desirable in terms of scale 
and depth. Hence, resolving this problem remains a difficult policy 
challenge for the Hungarian government. Fifthly, the national econ­
omy’s dependence on foreign capital has been creating anxiety among 
Hungarian citizens about the future of the country, putting them in 
fear of losing their national identity. And finally, the large-scale for­
eign capital inflow cannot solve many problems related to corporate 
restructuring in the country, as suggested by the analyses in the pre­
vious section referring to R&D and innovation activities. The remain­
ing problems that have not been examined in this chapter include: (a) 
the underdevelopment of small and medium-size enterprises, (b) the 
unbalanced corporate capital structure heavily dependent on retained 
earnings, and (c) the insufficiency of supervision activities over manag­
ers by shareholders and financial institutions.
The following remarks were made by Szalavetz (2002) regarding 
policies to be taken up by the CEE countries after EU accession : "The 
transforming countries, in the "long transition decade-, have achieved 
remarkable success with minimal state intervention. By adapting a 
passive policy approach, they have allowed themselves to be driven 
forward by the modernizing effects of foreign direct investment. How­
ever, the challenges that follow EU accession will compel them to 
adopt an approach of more active state involvement Local economic 
policy decision-makers will need to work out how to redefine the posi­
tion of their countries in the world economy" (p. 5). We believe that 
her statement is still accurate even though Hungary's economic trans­
formation has been in progress for 20 years.
Inspired by recommendations such as those presented above, 
more people in Hungary are calling for the modification of the current 
policies that focus on attracting foreign capital in order to achieve sus­
tainable economic growth over the medium and long term. Currently, 
the revision of the development strategy is beginning to assume an 
urgent character in Hungary. The decline in attractiveness of Hun­
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gary in comparison with other host countries, such as China, sharply 
reflects the decision-making process by foreign investors and MNEs 
that has resulted in the failure of the realization of new greenfield 
investment projects and continuous closure of big factories established 
by internationally famous foreign companies. Therefore, it seems rea­
sonable to conclude that the Hungarian government and the business 
sector should reconsider their passive strategy of economic transfor­
mation and devote more effort to promoting the stable settlement of 
MNEs and deepening ties between these foreign companies and local 
industrial resources.
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Privatization, Foreign Acquisition, 
and Firm Performance
2.1 Introduction
The privatization of public enterprises is becoming increasingly 
common throughout the world due to the globalization of market prin­
ciples. This process began in the West with the U. K. as it adopted a 
denationalization program under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher, 
and it then spread to other industrialized states and developing coun­
tries. At the end of the 20th Century, when state socialism came to an 
end. privatization became an overriding trend in the international 
political and economic arena. The perception of the boundary separat­
ing public and private enterprises has changed considerably in the last 
20 years. The denationalization process has grown steadily, even in 
such sectors as post services and social securities services, which were 
once believed to be traditional state-run businesses.
The philosophical foundation of the widespread privatization of 
public enterprises currently observed in many countries lies in the 
high degree of trust in the overwhelming advantage of private over 
public ownership in terms of efficiency. Many citizens now expect that 
the transfer of public firms to private owners could alleviate the finan­
cial burden of the state as well as significantly improve the manage­
ment efficiency of privatized firms themselves, remarkably contribut­
ing to the betterment of society. Accordingly, it has become an impor­
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tant subject of contemporary economics to ascertain whether such an 
expectation is feasible. In response to this demand, many studies pio­
neered by Megginson et al. (1994) and Boubakri and Cosset (1998) 
have been conducted, which repeatedly verified the positive change in 
firm performance before and after privatization through case analyses 
of industrialized and developing countries. Furthermore, it is almost 
certain that the effect of privatization was observed in enterprise 
privatization in the post-communist states. In fact, reviewing the 
recent literature on privatization in transition economies, Estrin et al. 
(2009) conclude that the effect of privatization has been mostly posi­
tive in Central and East European countries (CEECs). In contrast, it 
has been negligible or even negative in the Commonwealth Indepen­
dent States. Nevertheless, privatization to foreign owners resulted in 
considerable improvement of the performance of former state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) virtually everywhere.
On the other hand, however, most previous studies fall short in 
identifying whether these effects are due to the privatization process 
itself or to other factors (Omran, 2004). Furthermore, many studies 
focusing on the effect of a new ownership structure on a firm's perfor­
mance following privatization fail to identify a statistically significant 
relationship between the two elements. This is particularly so for stud­
ies covering transition economies (Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001; 
Harper, 2002; Megginson, 2005: Aussenegg and Jelic, 2007). Therefore, 
despite the strong belief of economists in the superiority of the private 
sector over the state regarding ownership structure, no empirical 
study on privatization has presented a definitive conclusion regarding 
this point.
Using annual census-type data of Hungarian enterprises for the 
early 2000s, we analyze the impact of ownership transformation from 
the state to the private sector on firm performance in the post-privati­
zation period. Unlike the early transitional period, which witnessed an 
economic crisis triggered by the collapse of the COMECON system 
and large-scale institutional changes leading toward a market econ­
omy, the early 2000s is a suitable time to investigate the relationship 
between the privatization and firm performance in Hungary because 
of the stability of the social and economic circumstances and the legal 
system at the time. Furthermore, as explained later, the data we 
employ cover almost all business firms, including SOEs, therefore
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suring the representation of the Hungarian corporate sector. The 
ita available, however, limits any study of performance among these 
impanies to two years after privatization. An insufficient observation 
*riod poses a significant obstacle to empirical analysis of the effects of 
'ivatization policies.
To deal with this problem, we present a new empirical approach, 
hich nearly ensures the identification of the impact of ownership 
ansformation even if short-term data are used. The essence of the 
roposed methodology is to reject the null hypothesis, in which the 
ffects of ownership transformation are zero, by regressing a variety 
f performance indices into the scale and the type of ownership trans- 
armation and then synthesizing the estimates (effect size) using meta- 
malysis techniques in order to fully capture restructuring efforts by 
lew owners and managers of privatized enterprises. Meta-analysis is 
i precise scientific method to combine the results from individual 
studies for the purpose of integrating the research findings. There are 
plenty of examples of applications of meta-analysis in the fields of edu­
cation. psychology, and the biomedical sciences (Hartung et al., 2008). 
Meta-analytic work can be broadly classified into two categories : (a) 
tests of the statistical significance of combined results and (b) methods 
for synthesizing estimates across studies (Hedges, 1992). Owing to 
great efforts by statisticians, we now have a variety of approaches 
from the vote-counting method to meta-regression analysis1.
As the empirical literature grows, economists increasingly apply 
meta-analysis as a quantitative method in literature reviews with the 
aim of drawing a general conclusion on a targeted research topic. 
Although there are only a handful of studies, meta-analysis has also 
been applied to the literature on transition economies, such as Djankov 
and Murrell (2002) on enterprise restructuring, Fleisher et al. (2004) 
on returns to schooling and the speed of reforms, Egert and Halpern 
(2005) on equilibrium exchange rate, Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2006) 
on the business cycle correlation between the Euro area and the 
CEECs, and Iwasaki (2007b) on enterprise reform and corporate gov­
ernance in Russia.
As described above, meta-analysis is a statistical method designed
1 For more details on the meta-analysis methods, see Hedges and Olkin (1985). 
Hunter and Schmidt(2004), Keef and Roberts(2004)and Kulinskaya et al.(2008).
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primarily to combine empirical results across studies conducted by dif­
ferent researchers and institutions. It is also quite effective, however, 
for summarizing various tests conducted within a single study (Boren- 
stein et al., 2009). The approach in this study focuses on this latter 
function of meta-analysis. More concretely, we perform more than 
4,000 regression trials using a large-scale panel data of Hungarian 
firms and integrate this large correction of estimation results by vari­
ous meta-analysis techniques to test the hypothesis on the effect of 
enterprise privatization and foreign acquisition. Because everything is 
self-contained when conducting meta-analysis, we can prevent the 
so-called publication bias and other problems from occurring due to 
the lack of commonality of model structures and variables. Moreover, 
the researcher’s arbitrariness can be effectively eliminated by setting 
no limitations on the firm performance to be analyzed.
Our empirical analysis confirmed that the ownership transforma­
tion from the state to the private sector has statistically and economi­
cally significant impacts on post-privatization firm performance in 
Hungary. We also found that there are clear differences in the perfor­
mance improvement effects among privatization implemented with no 
lower limit on the scale of ownership transformation, privatization 
with strategic control rights, and full privatization. Moreover, we 
found that ownership transformation to foreign investors has greater 
positive impacts on firm performance than that to domestic investors. 
These results were obtained with due consideration to the selection 
bias of the privatization decision by the Hungarian government and 
acquisitions by foreign investors and by controlling other potential 
determinants on firm performance in the post-privatization period. 
The advantage of using regression coefficients in meta-analysis over 
using odds rates or single correlation coefficients is that multivariate 
regression makes it easier to take such analytical measures when esti­
mating the effect size of ownership transformation.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows : Section 2,2 
reviews the privatization policy in Hungary, Section 2.3 contains test­
able hypotheses. Section 2.4 describes the data employed for this 
study. Section 2.5 explains our empirical methodology, and Section 2.6 
presents the empirical results. Section 2.7 concludes.
Chapter 2
2.2 Overview of Privatization Policy in Hungary
Unlike Russia and the Czech Republic. Hungary avoided, as much 
as possible, giving away public assets to private interests and, instead, 
thoroughly pursued the direct sale of public assets to strategic inves­
tors, including foreigners. This privatization strategy was, in principle, 
applied to all industries across the country. As a result, almost all of 
1,859 former socialist enterprises designated in 1990 as to-be-priva­
tized firms had become completely privately owned or liquidated by 
the end of the 1990s2.
The'policy approach during the large-scale privatization period 
was substantially passed on to the privatization process in the early 
2000s or even strengthened under strong pressure from the European 
Commission to balance the national budget before accession to the EU 
(Iwasaki and Suganuma, 2009), leading to the steady privatization of 
dozens of government-owned companies left in the portfolio of the 
Hungarian Privatization and State Holding Company (APV Rt.) and 
other public firms, mainly through open bidding. In fact, due to this 
firm policy of the Hungarian government the share of SOEs in the 
total number of employees and total added-value for 2002 (2005) 
shrank to 15.0% (12.0%) and 17.6% (15.6%), respectively, suggesting 
that the state sector is now playing only a supplementary role in the 
Hungarian national economy (KSH, 2003c: KSH, 2006).
It is argued that one major bias when identifying the effect of 
privatization on changes in firm performance could be a deliberate 
policy to reserve better performing SOEs and concentrate privatiza­
tion on weaker ones. The rationale in such a case is that revenues 
from state ownership can be redistributed according to political power 
rather than market mechanisms. The risk of this type of state failure
2 There are many studies of enterprise privatization Ln Hungary during its early 
transition period : for the institutional framework and history of the privatiza­
tion policies in Hungary, see Mihalyi(1998), Macher(2000), Szanyi(2000), Major
(2003). and Voszka (2003), and, for the evaluation of the privatization policies, 
see Bartlett (2000), Mihalyi (2001), Hanley et al. (2002), and Bager and Arpad
(2004).
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has been emphasized by several authors3. However, this behavior did 
not determine Hungarian privatization in the 1990s. Many studies on 
Hungarian privatization contain general information on this issue stat­
ing that the primary aim of privatization was to gather as much cash 
revenue as possible to renovate the shaken state budget. This main 
policy aim limited the risk of this kind of bias, since the quickest and 
highest cash returns could be expected from the sales of the best com­
panies. On the contrary, 'cherry picking’ of foreign investors was a 
strong argument of the critiques of the Hungarian privatization way1. 
However, no systematic analysis and comparison of the privatized and 
the remaining state assets was carried out.
There is also some indirect information in the literature support­
ing our view that any existing bias, if at all, could influence compari­
sons of firm performance in the opposite direction during the 1990’s, 
Mihalyi (1997), for instance, referred to the 1995 Privatization Act, 
which listed items of long-term state property. The list contained 
companies that were regarded as strategic for some reason but had 
obviously not been selected because of their profitability. Eva Voszka, 
who regularly reviews Hungarian privatization policy, argued that, 
until 2001, privatization policy was determined by the intense desire of 
the central government for quick cash revenue to relieve the state 
budget deficit. For example, state ownership was drastically reduced 
in such ‘cash cow’ companies as the Hungarian Oil Company (MOL) 
and the National Savings Bank (OTP) (Voszka. 1998). When tensions 
in the state budget decreased, state asset management considerations 
changed. The privatization process slowed down, and long-term asset 
management priorities emerged (Voszka, 2001). However, this change 
in asset management and privatization happened exactly at the time 
of our sample observation: hence, selection bias did not occur prior to 
the observed period. Moreover, Voszka (2005) closely examined the 
recent privatization process in Hungary and concluded that state own­
ership should remain intact only in classic cases of market failure, sug­
gesting that the room for political maneuver by the Hungarian gov­
ernment was extremely limited in the early 2000s.
3 See De Alessi (1980), Yarrow and Jasinski (1996), and Stiglitz (2000), among 
others.
1 For example, see Bovco et al. (1996, p. 309) and Stiglitz (2000, p. 221).
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2.3 Ownership Transformation and Firm Performance ■ 
Testable Hypotheses
Theoretically, privatization gain originates in the context of the 
relative inefficiency of the state compared with the private sector. 
From a political viewpoint, public enterprises should pursue strategies 
to achieve the public or political objectives of the politicians and 
bureaucrats who control them. However, such management goals often 
conflict with profit maximization, distorting the incentive structure 
and the constraints regarding company managers (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1994). As seen in the fact that government subsidies are more 
likely to be criticized by tax payers and opposition parties when they 
are paid to specific private firms than when they are provided to pub­
lic entities, privatization raises transaction costs for the use of political 
influences over firms' decision-making, thereby inhibiting intervention 
by politicians and bureaucrats and promoting firm restructuring (Sap- 
pington and Stiglitz, 1987).
From the viewpoint of corporate finance and firm organization, 
the governance structure in SOEs is particularly problematic. For 
instance, the lack of transferability of the property rights of public 
firms inhibits the capitalization of future consequences into current 
transfer prices, resulting in damaging incentives for managerial super­
vision by residual claimants(De Alessi. 1980). In addition, although the 
cash flow of SOEs ultimately belongs to the taxpayer, each share is 
trivial, which prevents citizens from organizing to overcome the free­
rider problem and, hence, from exercising their influence over control- 
holding managers (Bennedsen. 2000). Moreover, compared with pri­
vate firms, public companies are effectively protected from the threat 
of takeover and bankruptcy. As long as the government, announces 
that no financial crisis is at hand, management discipline and budget 
constraints in SOEs are inevitably looser (Haskel and Szymanski, 
1992: OECD, 2005). Furthermore, the fact that SOEs are remote from 
both capital and managerial markets poses a serious impediment to 
the development of managerial discipline and to securing effective 
monitoring from the outside. Transfer of ownership to the private sec­
tor greatly alleviates these governance problems and thus functions as 
a political measure for creating more effective control (Goldstein,
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1997).
Nevertheless, some argue that private companies do not always 
outperform public ones (Boardman et al„ 1986: Kole and Mulherin. 
1997: Kwoca, 2005: Ang and Ding. 2006). It is also likely that some 
state regulations and administrative measures may make it possible 
for SOEs to achieve better performance than private firms operating 
in the same product market, and the fact that SOEs are fully govern­
ment-dependent may give more confidence to markets and customers 
than private firms do. ceteris paribus. Normally, privatization is 
involved with the partial or complete removal of favorable conditions 
to state firms. There is no guarantee that privatized firms can achieve 
the same performance as they previously did under state protection, 
even after facing the worsening of the managerial environment in the 
above sense. As La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999) suggest, the 
financial and operating performance of privatized enterprises tends to 
converge to that of private firms. This rule is also assumed to be 
applicable when SOEs have an advantage over private firms. Accord­
ingly. we present a neutral hypothesis with respect to the effects of 
ownership transformation on firm performance :
Hypothesis H[: Ownership transformation from state to private owners 
changes the financial and operating performance of privatized firms 
towards reducing the gap between the state and the private sector.
On the other hand, the effect of ownership transformation on 
post-privatization performance is not a monotonic increasing function 
for the degree of privatization even if there is room to seek privatiza­
tion gains. Boycko et al. (1996) argue that privatization works when 
strategic control rights transfer from the state (or politicians) to man­
agers. To achieve this goal, private investors must acquire at least a 
majority of ownership'1. In fact, many earlier studies report that priva­
tized firms exhibited stronger performance improvements after their 
majority control was sold by the government (Eckel et al., 1997: Bou-
3 As in other OECD countries, the Corporate Law in Hungary stipulates that 
simple majority voting is the standard decision-making procedure, except for 
matters requiring an extraordinary resolution (2006. evi IV . torveny—a gaz- 
dasdgi tarsasagokrol 20 §  (6)).
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bakri et al., 2005: Omran, 2007: Chen et al, 2008). Renunciation of stra­
tegic control by the state sends a good signal to company managers 
and private investors that it has no further intention of intensive polit­
ical intervention and future re-nationalization, increasing the motiva­
tion of managers and private owners for firm restructuring.
Nevertheless, the retention of strategic control rights by private 
entities does not provide a satisfactory solution, although it makes it 
significantly easier for private investors to resist government inter­
ventions that are likely to damage the corporate value or to have a 
negative impact on profit maximization. Partial privatization is still not 
sufficient to eliminate conflicts of interest between the government 
and the private sector (Boardman and Vining, 1989: Hanousek and 
KoCenda, 2008). Empirical evidence that private firms outperform not 
only SOEs but also mixed enterprises is considered to support this 
statement (Vining and Boardman. 1992: Majumdar, 1998: Konings, 
1997). Based on the above discussions, we derive the following hypoth­
esis with respect to the effects of ownership transformation on the 
financial and operating performance of privatized firms :
Hypothesis H3 : The effects of the transfer of strategic control rights 
on post-privatization firm performance are larger than those of own­
ership transformation without a lower limit, and the effects of full 
privatization surpass those of partial privatization.
The effects of ownership transformation are also greatly affected 
by the types of new ownership. In this regard, foreign participation 
can be a strong driving force for the restructuring of newly privatized 
firms. Foreign investors have a great deal of potential to provide 
enterprises acquired from the state with sophisticated expertise, 
including management know-how and production technologies accu­
mulated in developed countries, as well as with greater access to new 
markets and new capital resources. In addition, they have a strong 
tendency to demand accountability in accordance with international 
standards from company managers in an effort to assess their perfor­
mance on the basis of strict criteria (Dyck, 2001: D’Souza et al, 2005). 
With these advantages, foreign owners are highly likely to make 
remarkable positive contributions to former socialist economies, which 
are characterized by poor management and production techniques, a
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dosed domestic market an underdeveloped financial system, and a 
weak corporate governance system. In fact, many researchers find a 
positive causality between foreign participation in management and 
firm performance in transition economies (Frydman et al., 1999: 
Kocenda and Svejnar, 2002: Weill, 2003: Yudaeva et al., 2003: Hanousek 
et al., 2007). As argued in Chapter 1, there are also many studies 
reporting similar empirical results with respect to Hungary (Szekeres, 
2001: Novak, 2002: Hamar, 2004: Hasan and Marton, 2003: Perotti and 
Vesnaver, 2004: Mako, 2005: Brown et al., 2006: Colombo and Stanca, 
2006).
In contrast to foreign investors, domestic investors in the post­
communist states are more sensitive to political influence from 
regional governments and local magnates as well as more prone to be 
motivated by interests other than profit maximization, such as the 
attainment of social prestige or a relationship with local citizens. Fur­
thermore, it has been repeatedly pointed out from both the theoretical 
and empirical perspectives that insiders, who often buy out privatized 
enterprises in transitional countries, are quite problematic as key play­
ers in corporate restructuring aimed at the improvement of profitabil­
ity and productivity (Aoki and Kim, 1995: Blanchard and Aghion, 
1996: Li, 1998: Filatotchev et al., 1999: Megginson and Netter, 2001). 
We, therefore, will test the following hypothesis with respect to the 
relationship between types of investors and firm performance :
Hypotheses H3 : Ownership transformation to foreign investors has 
larger positive impacts on improvement in the financial and operating 
performance of privatized firms than that to domestic investors.
From the next section onwards, we will verify the three hypothe­
ses discussed above by combining large-scale panel data of Hungarian 
firms and a new empirical methodology.
2.4 Data
The data underlying our empirical analysis are annual census- 
type data of Hungarian firms, which were compiled from financial 
statements associated with tax reporting submitted to the National 
Tax Authority in Hungary by legal entities using double-sided book­
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keeping. The observation period is four years from 2002 through 2005. 
The data cover all industries and contain basic information of each 
entry, including the General Industrial Classification of Economic 
Activities within the European Communities (NACE) 4-digit industrial 
classification, annual average number of employees, and total assets, 
sales, and other financial indices. In addition, the locations of firms are 
identical to the extent that they are divided into the capital region, 
including Budapest and Pest County, the western region, made up of 
nine counties, and the eastern region, comprising nine counties6.
Information about ownership structure includes the total amount 
of capital (subscribed equity) at the end of the calendar year and its 
share of state, domestic private investors, and foreign investors. The 
data, therefore, allow us to know the timing and scale of ownership 
transformation from the state to the private sector. In this chapter, the 
following definition applies : privatization has been carried out in year 
t if there was a relative decrease in the proportion of state ownership 
between the previous and current years.
All nominal values are deflated with the base year being 2002. As 
Sgard (2001) and Claessens and Djankov (2002) indicate, firm-specific 
price indices are not available in Hungary. Hence, following the steps 
taken by these two studies, we use the consumer price index, the 
industriaJ producer price index, and the investment price index 
reported by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office as alternative 
deflators.
Although the data are basically reliable, a number of values are 
missing, and unrealistic or inconsistent input values are included. To 
correct this problem, we carefully cleaned the data to remove inconsis­
tencies and to eliminate samples containing missing values and, hence, 
posing an impediment to our empirical analysis.
The data form an unbalanced panel having additional new entry 
and exit of enterprises during the observation period. Since we have 
no information concerning these firms, none of these samples was used 
in the empirical analysis. In this regard, nothing was found to indicate 
that samples containing missing and abnormal values and newly enter­
1 For details, see notes in Table 2.1. Due to the state regulation on the disclosure 
of official census data, more specific location information is not available for this 
research.
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ing and exiting enterprises were much more biased toward certain 
categories of firms in terms of industrial sector, firm size, location, and 
financial performance than other samples.
With regard to the sample group for 2002, Table 2.1 shows the 
total number of enterprises, the basic statistics of the number of 
employees and equity capital, and the composition by region and 
industrial sector for both private firms and SOEs. This table also 
reports the frequency distribution of the proportion of state ownership 
in the latter. One-man companies are excluded because ownership 
structure is not a crucial issue for corporate management in these 
firms. As a result of the extensive data cleaning and exclusion of one- 
man companies, 99,315 firms remain in our dataset. This is about half 
the number of samples in the original data. According to official statis­
tics, the 98,367 private firms and 948 SOEs covered here account for 
84.2% of all private firms and 81.6% of all public enterprises in Hun­
gary, respectively, in terms of the total number of employees in 2002.
In Table 2.1, we can also confirm the following : first, the average 
size of SOEs is larger than that of private firms in terms of both the 
number of employees and the amount of equity capital: second, the 
degree of geographical concentration of SOEs in the capital region is 
slightly moderate compared with that of private firms; and third, the 
share of the agriculture, forestry, and hunting and fishing sector in the 
industrial composition of SOEs is as much as 20% higher than that of 
private firms, whereas the share of wholesale and retail trade compa­
nies in the total number of SOEs is 18% lower than that of private 
firms. Furthermore, Table 2.1 reveals that more than half of SOEs are 
100% government-owned and firms with less than 50% state owner­
ship account for only 27% of all SOEs. We take these facts into 
account in the empirical analysis.
2,5 Empirical Methodology
As pointed out by Kocenda and Svejnar (2003), using a small and 
unrepresentative samples of firms as well as a short observation 
period could pose a serious impediment to empirically examining the 
effects of privatization policies in developing and transition economies. 
With the development of state statistical systems and private com­
pany information services, the problems associated with short obser-
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Table 2.1 Comparison of private and state corporate sectors in Hungary, 2002
A. Fully 
private firms B. SOEs
Number of firms 98,367 948
Annual average number of employees (persons)
Total 1,497,832 255,960
Mean 15 270***
Median 4 19f t t
Equity capital
Total (billion HUFs) 4,360 1,592
Mean (thousand HUFs) 44,325 1,679,550* * *
Median (thousand HUFs) 3.000 60.864f t t
Composition by region (actual number/proportion)"
Capital region (Budapest and Pest County) 44.422/0.45 392/0.41
Western region 25.883/0.26 254/0.27
Eastern region 28,062/0.29 302/0.32
Composition by industrial sector (actual number/proportion)1’
Agriculture, forestry, hunting, and fishinning and quarrying 4,095/0.04 226/0.24
Mining and quarrying 192/0.00 3/0.00
Manufacturing 17.490/0.18 116/0.12
Electricity, gas. and water supply 305/0.00 30/0.03
Construction 10.605/0.11 80/0.08
Wholesale and retail trade 30,255/0.31 122/0.13
Hotels and restaurants 4.780/0.05 18/0.02
Transport storage, and communication 4.681/0.05 56/0.06
Financial intermediation 1,004/0.01 30/0.03
Real estate and renting 15,855/0.16 175/0.18
Other industries 9,105/0.09 92/0.10
Share of state ownership (actual number/proportion)
1-25% — 147/0.16
26-50% ■ 101/0.11
51-75% — 83/0.09
76-99% — 118/0.12
100% — 499/0.53
Notes ■ The western region consists of the following nine counties : Gyor-Moson Sopron • 
Komirom-Esztergom: Vas: Veszprem: Fejer: Zala: Somogy: Tolna- and Baranya. The east­
ern region also consists of nine counties : NAgr.'iri: Bacs-Ktskim; Csongrad: Bekes: jasz- 
Nagy kun-Szolnok: Hajdu-Bihar: Szabolcs-Szatmar-Bereg: Borsod-Abauj-Zempl6n: and 
Heves. The composition by industrial sector is based on the Classification of Economic Activ­
ities in the European Community (NACE). Other industries include public administration 
and defense and compulsory social security: education: health and social work: other com* 
munity, social and personal service activities: and household activities,
'Test for equality ■' x2 = 6,7446. p = 0.034. 
bTest for equality '• x2~ 1246.8518. p = 0.000.
* * ’ denotes that the difference between privave firms and SOEs is significant at the 1% 
level by the f-test
t  f  t  denotes that the difference between private firms and SOEs is significant at the 1% 
level by the Wilcoxon rank -sum test 
Source ■ Authors' calculation.
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vation periods and small samples are diminishing because of the 
increasing availability of large-scale sample sets. Although solutions 
are being found to overcome the short observations, the real difficulty 
is with the type of firm to be observed rather than with the observers. 
In other words, the shorter life cycles of firms and the more frequent 
changes in company profiles in developing and transitional countries 
than in developed countries are major obstacles to tracing the effects 
of enterprise privatization from a mid- and long-term perspective. 
The other related issue is the scarcity and distortion of information 
concerning the management and performance of SOEs, especially in 
former socialist states. This defect considerably limits the application 
of the empirical method advocated by Megginson et al. (1994) into 
transition economies for the detection of privatization gains through 
comparing firm performance before and after privatization. Unfortu­
nately, there seems to be no instant solution to this situation.
Researchers often attempt to identify privatization gains by look­
ing at changes in profitability and productivity in a narrow sense. This 
approach makes a lot of sense because those changes are directly 
related to improvements in corporate value and shareholder wealth. 
However, if profitability or productivity is increased as a result of mul­
tifaceted improvements in business strategies, firm organization, and 
production systems, the use of short-term observation data may lead 
to the failure to detect the end products of those managerial efforts. 
With this in mind, an empirical study should be conducted to cover a 
broad range of performance indices, including short-term ones, which 
are more operational for new owners and managers of ex-state com­
panies, focusing on the byproduct of the process of firm restructuring 
at hand. By covering as many performance indices as practicable, the 
statistical power of hypothesis tests is also expected to be enhanced 
due to increased information about the effects of ownership transfor­
mation on firm performance. This is the reason that we perform panel 
data regressions taking a variety of performance indices as dependent 
variables and then synthesize these estimates using meta-analysis 
techniques to examine the testable hypotheses presented in Section 
2.3.
Our empirical analysis broadly consists of five stages. At the first 
stage, as a prerequisite for verifying hypothesis Hi, we conduct com­
parative analysis using descriptive statistics of fully SOEs and 100%
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private firms in order to identify in which aspects of firm performance 
state ownership is inferior or superior to private ownership. This pro­
cedure aims to identify the potential source of privatization gains. The 
comparison is carried out between 499 fully government-funded com­
panies listed on Table 2.1 and approximately 90,000 private firms 
whose distribution of firm sizes, locations, and industrial compositions 
is, for the most part, identical to that of the above fully SOEs. We 
exclude mixed enterprises, in which ownership structure and firm per­
formance are highly likely to be determined endogenously, from all 
stages of our empirical analysis because the main research interest in 
this study lies in how the exogenous privatization decision made by 
the government affects firm performance in the post-privatization 
period.
The comparison is made with respect to a total of 23 financial and 
operating indices from 5 areas routinely utilized by company execu­
tives and investment analysts worldwide, including Hungary. They 
consist of the following: (a) 7 indices of profitability (ordinary income 
to total assets (ROI)/value-added to sales/operating income to sales/ 
ordinary income to sales/return on equity (ROE)/return on total 
assets (ROA)/ordinary income on equity); (b) 7 indices of productiv­
ity (value-added per employee/operating income per employee/ordi­
nary income per employee/sales per employee/sales to employment/ 
sales to total costs/fixed investment efficiency); (c)2 indices of financial 
ability (total assets turnover/fixed assets turnover): (d) 2 indices of finan­
cial soundness (fixed ratio/capital adequacy ratio (CAR)): and (e) 5 
indices of firm growth (sales growth/value-added growth/operating 
income growth/ordinary income growth/total assets growth)7. The 
number of employees and average employee salary are not investi­
gated, since it is theoretically unclear how a change in these two vari­
ables would affect the corporate restructuring of privatized firms in 
contemporary Hungary after the dozen years since the collapse of the 
communist regime.
The second stage traces when and how much ownership of which 
companies was transferred to the private sector among the above 499
' The following indices are defined as shown : fixed investment efficiency = value- 
added/total fixed assets: total (fixed) assets turnover = sales/total assets (fixed 
assets): and fixed ratio = total fixed assets/equity capital.
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SOEs in the 3 years from 2003 to 2005. At this stage, in order to iden­
tify the presence and extent of selection bias regarding the privatiza­
tion decision of the government and foreign participation in the man­
agement of privatized firms, we carry out univariate comparisons of 
the privatized firms and remaining SOEs and the firms acquired by 
domestic investors and those by foreign investors in terms of pre­
privatization company size and firm performance. We also perform 
multivariate regression, taking the probability of privatization and that 
of foreign acquisition as dependent variables.
In the third stage, we conduct a panel estimation of the impact of 
ownership transformation on post-privatization firm performance. The 
23 performance indices reported above are regressed into the scale 
and type of ownership transformation while controlling the other 
potential determinants. We estimate the following regression equa­
tion :
yit=H + axi+y'Zi+di+Ei(, Z, = , (2.1)
where v„ represents firm is  performance for year t, j, is an ownership 
variable. Z,- is a K x 1 vector of control variables, n is a constant term, 
a and y are parameters of interest to be estimated, 5, is the individual 
effects, and £,■, is an error term8. The regression model taking an own­
ership variable with no lower limit to the scale of ownership transfor­
mation is Model I. We use the estimation results of this model to 
examine hypothesis Ht. We also estimate Mode! II, in which limitations 
are placed on the scope of ownership variables to be investigated into 
the impact of the transfer of strategic control rights (i.e.. 50% or more 
ownership), and Model I ,  which is exclusively applied to the cases of 
full privatization. The estimation results of the latter two regression 
models are used for verifying hypothesis H2 with those of Model I. To 
test hypothesis H3 regarding the relationship between types of new 
ownership and firm performance, we estimate Model IV and Model V, 
which regress post-privatization firm performance into an ownership 
transformation ratio to domestic investors and foreign investors, 
respectively, and compare the estimates of these two models.
Further, according to Claessens and Djankov (2002), who docu-
* We hypothesize that no change in ownership structure had been made for two 
years before privatization.
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merited changes in the performance of over 6,000 Firms in seven East­
ern European countries in the early 1990s, it takes several years for 
the privatization benefits at the firm level to become noticeable. The 
panel data used in this study deals with time lags of up to two years. 
Thereupon, with regard to Model I, we estimate a regression equation 
that takes the ownership transformation ratio in the current year (#,-,) 
as an ownership variable and call it Model la. We also perform estima­
tions of Models lb and Ic. which regress firm performance into a one- 
year lag ownership variable (xit-i) and a two-year lag ownership vari­
able respectively. We label these three regression equations as the 
Model I family. The same estimation procedure is adopted for Models 
H to V. Consequently, our panel estimation is based on a total of 15 
types of regression equations classified into one of 5 model families.
In order to fully identify the effects of ownership transformation, 
our regression model controls the following potential determinants of 
firm performance : the sales share of each firm to represent its position 
in the product market: the median of the dependent variable for the 
sector each firm belongs to, calculated from about 10,000 effective 
samples excluding the panel estimation sample, to capture the sector's 
market fluctuation; the sales-based Herfindahl index to proxy for the 
degree of market concentration of the sector each firm belongs to; 
industry fixed effects; time effects; and region-specific fixed effects. 
The firm's market position, the market fluctuation and market concen­
tration level of the sector it belongs to, and industry fixed effects are 
all based on the NACE two-digit level. In addition, to avoid simultane­
ous bias with the dependent variable, a predetermined variable for the 
previous term is used for the firm's market position and the degree of 
market concentration of the sector it belongs to.
We estimate the above regression models using three panel esti­
mators ; fixed effects, random effects, and pooled OLS with cluster 
effects on the NACE two-digit level.
The fourth stage synthesizes the regression coefficients of owner­
ship variables using the estimation results of models selected on the 
basis of the Hausman test to test the random-effects assumption and 
the Breusch-Pagan test to test the null-hypothesis that the variance of 
the individual effects is zero. We set the critical value for both of these 
specification tests at the 10% level of significance.
The following method is applied for synthesizing regression coef­
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ficients. Suppose there are N  independent studies. Here, the effect 
size' estimate of the w-th study is labeled as T„, and the correspond­
ing population and standard deviation, as 6„ and s„, respectively (« =
1....AO. We assume that estimate T„ is normally distributed (T„~-N
(d„, 4)). We also assume that 6\ = 6 2 = ...= 8*t= 6, implying that each 
study in a meta-analysis estimates the common underlying population 
effect and the estimates differ only by random sampling errors. An 
asymptotically efficient estimator of the unknown true population 
parameter 6 is a weighted mean by the inverse variance of each esti­
mate :
(2-2>
where w„ = l/v„ and v„=sf,. The variance of Tis given by :
var(f) = l /S „ = 1v‘,ll- (2.3)
This is the meta fixed-effects model. In order to utilize this 
method, we need to confirm that the estimates are homogeneous, A 
homogeneity test uses the statistic :
HT= ^ w n(Tn~T)\ (2.4)
fl-1
which has a Chi-square distribution with N~l degrees of freedom. The 
nuil-hypothesis is rejected if HT exceeds the critical value. In this 
case, we assume that heterogeneity exists among the studies and 
adapt a random-effects model that incorporates the sampling variation 
due to an underlying population of effect sizes as well as the study- 
level sampling error. If the deviation between estimates is expressed 
as dl), the unconditional variance of the ft-th estimate is given by v“ = 
(v„+dg). In the meta random-effects model, the population 6 is esti­
mated by replacing the weight tv„ with the weight w“= \/va„ in Eq. 
(2.2)9. For the between-studies variance component, we use the 
method-of-moment estimator computed by the next equation using 
the value of the homogeneity test statistic H T obtained from Eq.(2.4):
9 This means that the meta fixed-effect model is a special case based on the 
assumption that Sj = 0.
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Ht - QV-1)
(2.5)
In other words, the fourth stage verifies the testable hypotheses 
on the basis of the value of the synthesized regression coefficients and 
its statistical significance by adopting either the meta fixed-effects 
model or the meta random-effects model according to the results of 
the homogeneity test. At this stage, we also make use of the />-value 
combination method and the vote-counting method, both of which are 
more conventional meta-analysis techniques, to supplement the results 
from the synthesis of regression coefficients.
At the last fifth stage, we conduct a meta-regression analysis10. 
This quantitative method has a great advantage in strictly interpret­
ing the differences in the results of panel estimation, and, thus, it can 
be an effective means for supplementing the results of meta-analysis 
at the fourth stage. We estimate the following meta-regression 
model :
where /?o represents the effects of ownership transformation under 
the default conditions iW„m = 0), W„m is a meta-independent variable 
including the characteristics of the panel regression model and obser­
vations that are considered to create differences in estimation results. 
pm denotes a meta-regression coefficient to be estimated, and e„ is an 
error term.
To reexamine our testable hypotheses, we use dummy variables 
that identify whether the dependent variable y,t in the panel regres­
sion model is a superior or inferior performance index to private firms 
in comparison with fully SOEs as well as dummy variables that cap­
ture the differences in the scale and type of ownership transformation.
10 Called 'the regression analysis of regression analyses' (Stanley and Jarrell, 1989), 
this method is now intensively applied in economics to summarize the empirical 
literature. Among the recent studies using this technique are those by Connor 
and Bolotova (2006), Nelson (2006). Brander et al. (2007), and Doucouliagos and 
Paldam (2008).
M
Tn=Pa + 'EjPmWnm + en.n=l,....N. (2.6)
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In addition, we check the sensitivity of the overall estimation results of 
the panel regressions by incorporating into the meta-regression model 
such independent variables that capture the time lags of the owner­
ship variables, the industrial sector, the qualitative difference in per­
formance indices, and the difference in panel estimators, and a dummy 
variable, which is equal to one if an effect size is obtained from the 
regression model selected according to the model specification tests, as 
well as the number of observations used in the panel estimation.
To estimate meta-regression models, most preceding studies have 
employed one or a combination of a weighted least square (WLS) esti­
mator with the number of observations or standard errors as analyti­
cal weights, a meta random-effects estimator using the restricted 
maximum likelihood (RML) method or the non-iterative moment 
method, or a meta mixed-effects estimator using the RML method. In 
order to check the robustness of the estimation results, we adopt all 
five of these estimators. We also perform regressions by using all 
panel estimates as the dependent variables and by exclusively using 
the estimates of models selected by the specification tests.
2.6 Results
Tables 2.2 through 2.8 present the main results of our empirical 
analyses. In this section, we summarize and interpret these results as 
well as explain the methodological procedure in detail.
2.6.1 Performance Comparison between Private and Full State- 
Owned Enterprises
Table 2.2 shows univariate comparisons between private and 
fully SOEs using 23 performance indices. According to the results cov­
ering the entire corporate sector (Panel A), Hungary’s SOEs are gen­
erally inferior to its private firms. In fact, 18 of the 23 indices demon­
strated the superiority of private firms over SOEs at the 10% or 
lower significance level either by a /-test or a Wilcoxon rank-sum test. 
These indices are hereinafter referred to as the ‘SOE-inferior indices.’ 
This is one of the political reasons that the Hungarian government has 
been and is still promoting the privatization of public firms.
Nevertheless, when looking into the four individual sectors (Panels
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iable 2.Z firm perlormance comparison 01 iuny private ana ruuy siate-ownea enterprises in nangary, £\rv&
. .... . O. ngricuuurB, luresiry. . _  _A. Whole corporate sector . , C. Manufacturing D, Construction E. Serviceshunting, and fishing
Futly private ^  ^  Full, priv ,K  Fu[|y ^  Fully priv .I t  ^  ^  Fully private ^  ^  Fully priva.c 
firms firms firms firms firms
Profitability
Ordinary income to total assets <R0ll Mean -0.311 -0.334 -0.170 -0.467 -0230 0.020 -0502 -0.KM -0305 -0.491
Median A 0,016 0.002' ” A 0.029 0,008' 0.029 0,043 0025 0.010 A 0.010 -0 00 6 '”
Valuer-added lo sales Mean ■A 0.018 -0239 '** -0.135 0229 0.116 0154 A 0112 -0308** 0.003 -0155
Median 0.198 na?? ▼ 0.152 0318' * ' 0255 0305 A 0.190 0.140” 0168 0183
Operating income lo sales Mean -0.344 -0.679 -0.339 0.024 A -0287 -1.662* * -0253 -0.157 -0.372 -0.793
Median 0.016 0.015 0.032 0.017 0.020 0.029 0.014 0017 0.014 0.009
Ordinary income to sales Mean A. -0419 - 1213*** -0.390 0.035 A -0303 -1.159* -0271 -0210 a -0.446 -1.136***
Median A 0.017 0.007' ” A 0.045 0.015' * 0.023 0.029 0.016 0.011 A 0.014 0.002* ”
Return on equity capital (ROE) Mean 6,123 1538 5.338 1.449 5.033 13228 2917 -1.029 4249 2522
Median A 0.089 0.034 ” 0.108 0,036 0.122 0.104 0,099 0.025 0051 0024
Return on total assets (ROA) Mean -0390 -0262 -0222 -0.457 -0339 0.011 -0.683 -0.085 -0392 -0394
Median A 0.019 0.009” 0.020 0.016 0.024 0.037 0.019 0.009 0012 0.007
Ordinary income on equity capital Mean 2.167 1.065 1487 1.384 ▼ 2.062 12.062* ** 0.808 -1.410 1542 1273
Median A 0.054 0,003'” A 0.124 0.027' 0.120 0.127 A 0100 0 0 1 5 " A 0032 -0010’ ”
’roductivity
Value-added per employee1 Mean A 2287 1233*** 1375 1660 2232 2541 A 1784 867* * A 2389 1215***
Median 1327 1426 ▼ 1107 1670'+ 1451 2147 A 1215 1046** 1318 1354
Operating income per employee" Mean A 590 -392*** 525 -84 467 1099 340 580 A 643 -1209***
Median 86 86 196 90 85 241 62 137 69 52
Ordinary income per employee' Mean A 540 -483*** 658 -213 490 1010 393 94 A 610 -763***
Median A 105 2 9 '+ t A 328 6 6 * " 128 75 101 91 A 90 1”  +
Sales per employee" Mean A 14681 12636* A 13852 7643* 11502 12540 12420 12616 16673 14386
Median A 6088 5597' A 7123 5792* 5721 6822 A S969 4344* 6727 5903
Sales to employment Mean 42.421 25271 49282 14.788 27.692 7394 37.611 11280 46587 35.686
Median A 6.780 3325*” A 7370 3.176*” A 5345 3.410*” A 6578 2.614*” A 7.746 4278* ”
Sales to total costs Mean A 1.133 1,003* * * 1.066 1.007 A 1088 0-997* A 1.079 0538* ** A 1,130 1.049***
Median A 1.051 1518*” 1.014 0.998 1.063 1.054 A 1.046 0.935* ” A 1.045 1.026* ”
Fixed investment efficiency Mean A 2576 1.446** 0.649 0.065 2.698 3.471 A 3269 0319* * A 2748 1.423*
Median A 0.932 0.592* • * ▼ 0309 0536* f 1.191 1347 A 1.444 0.119* ” A 0.893 0.775*
Financial ability
Total assets turnover Mean 3.622 3236 2.348 2.868 2551 2236 5.756 5312 3.609 3.425
Median A 1545 1.127* ” 0871 0591 1593 1.393 A 2544 0.788*” A 1558 1235'
Fixed assets turnover Mean A 15.362 8237*** 5115 2485 10548 11329 A 17.487 3043* * * 19,405 12223
Median A 4.610 1.946'” 2.159 1580 4.456 4.648 A 7397 0.615* ” A 5529 2.008' ”
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Table 2.2 (continued)
B. Agriculture, forestry.A. Whole corporate sector . . C. Manufacturing D. Construction E. Services
hunting, and fishing
Fully private FuUy private Fully private Fully private Fully privateFully SOEs Fully SOEs _ Fully SOEs . Fully SOEs _ Fully SOEs
firms firms firms firms firms
Financial soundness
Fixed ratio Mean A 19.426 7.997* * 18796 2.742 15.334 1.846 15528 1.198 21.692 17203
Median A 2.485 1,328"** A 2.781 1.802"r A 2302 0,879’ r 1 A 2485 1185*r T 2309 1.730
Capital adequacy ratio (CAR) Mean ▼ 0.184 0281""* ▼ 0.189 0318** * 0.184 0.282*** ▼ 0.177 0419* * • ▼ 0.190 0245***
Median ▼ 0.092 0.2311 ' 1 ▼ 0.103 0-283’ t f ▼ 0.100 0242’ f * ▼ 0.088 0.448’ tT ▼ 0.097 0-178’ t f
Firm growth"
Sales growth Mean 2.040 0902 1.079 0.011 1.397 -0.030 2.157 -0233 2.174 2321
Median A 0.051 o.no2 ’ t1 -0.022 0025 0.021 -0.005 A 0.058 0239t f t 0.051 0.024
Value-added growth Mean A 1.488 - 1244*** 0.910 - 0.011 1.174 - 1,074 A 2.063 -4155*** A 1500 - 0.980*
Median A 0.063 - 0.034*t + -0.035 - 0D01 A 0.032 - 0.034’ A 0,038 -0432’ r ’ 0.063 0052
Operating income growth Mean 0.190 - 0.815 -0.154 0240 A 0223 -9-835* 0248 -0.636 0.052 - 4.972
Median 0.023 0.044 ▼ -0.192 0.085’ 0.010 -0285 -0.033 -0282 0.030 0.046
Ordinary income growth Mean 0.121 - 0420 -0.078 0456 0276 -4368 0232 -0348 -0037 0320
Median 0.038 - 0.055 ▼ -0.166 - 0.041’ A 0,025 -0.451f t -0.046 -0.103 0.054 0.1%
Total assets growth Mean 1292 0.116 1.021 0.034 0.844 0.085 1.722 0.051 1290 0.104
Median 0.021 0.007 0.008 0028 0.026 0.004 0.040 0.071 A 01109 -■0.015'
Classification of performance indices (actual number/proportion)
SOE-inferior indices (A) 18/078 7/0.30 8/035 12/032 13/037
SOE-superior indices <▼) 1/0.04 6/026 2/0.09 1/0.04 1/0.04
Difference-insignificant indices (no sign) 4/0.17 10/0.43 13/037 10/0.43 9/039
Soles ■ The following indices are defined as follows ' fixed investment efficiency *  value-added/total fixed assets: total (fixed) assets turnover = sales/total assets (fixed assets): and fixed ratio "to tal fixed 
assets/equity capital. All nominal values are deflated with the base year being 2002 using the consumer price index, the industrial producer price index* and the investment price index reported by the 
Hungarian Central Statistical Office as deflators when we compute the firm growth indices The service sector includes wholesale and retail trade: hotels and restaurants: transport, storage, and communi­
cations: and real estate and renting. The SOE-inferior (SOE-superior) indices denote the financial and operating performance indices in which the mean or median for fully SOEs regarding the relevant 
indices are inferior (superior) to those for private firms with statistical significance at the 10% or lower level. The difference-insignificant indices refer to those that do not satisfy these conditions 
'The unit is one thousand HUFs.
‘'Real growth rate for 2002-03.
* * * * *  'Significant at the 1. 5. and 10% levels, respectively.-by the /-test.
+ t  t .  t  t .  tSignificant at the 1,5. and 10% levels, respectively, by the Wikoxon rank-sum test.
A denotes that private firms are superior to full SOEs with statistical significance at the 10% or lower level ▼ denotes that private firms are inferior to full SOEs with statistical significance at the 10% or 
lower level.
Source '■ Authors' calculation and estimation.
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B-E), performance gaps between fully SOEs and private firms vary 
significantly from industry to industry. For example, in the service 
sector, 13 of the 23 performance indices apply to the SOE-inferior 
indices, whereas, in the agriculture, forestry, hunting, and fishing sec­
tor, only 7 indices apply. In addition, no particular common trend is 
observed among the four sectors regarding the structure of the com­
parison results. On the other hand, turning to the performance indices 
showing the statistically significant superiority of SOEs over private 
firms (hereinafter ‘SOE~superior indices'), the capital adequacy ratio 
for SOEs is much higher than that for private firms in al! sectors. Fur­
thermore, in the agriculture, forestry, hunting, and fishing sector, SOEs 
outperform private firms in six performance indices, and, in the manu­
facturing sector, SOEs perform better than private firms in terms of 
the ordinary income-to-equity ratio. Moreover, there are 42 test 
results demonstrating no statistically significant performance gaps 
between the two corporate sectors (hereinafter 'difference-insignifi­
cant indices' ), accounting for 46% of all results. As discussed in Sec­
tion 2.3, if a privatization gain can be attributed to the comparative 
inefficiency of public firms, the effects of enterprise privatization are 
considered to have become noticeable in more limited situations than 
expected in Hungary of the early 2000s.
2.6.2 P rivatisa tion  Process o f  State-O wned E nterprises and 
Selection Bias
Table 2.3 shows that, of 499 companies that were fully govern­
ment-owned as of the end of 2002, 313, or 62.7%, partially or entirely 
transferred their property rights to the private sector over the three 
years up to 2005. This table also shows that most of these firms were 
privatized in 2003. This is probably due to the policies adopted by the 
Hungarian government11 facing the need to restructure public finance
11 In May 2002, Petel Medgyessy formed a coalition government of the Hungarian 
Socialist Party (MSZP) and the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) as a result 
of the fourth post-communist parliamentary elections. Aiming at early fulfill­
ment of Hungary's EU accession and entry into the EURO zone, the Medgyessy 
administration took political measures to promote market-oriented structural 
reform and tight fiscal policies.
65
Privatization, Foreign Acquisition, and Firm Performance
Table 2.3 Privatization process of state-owned enterprises in Hungary, 2002-2005
2002 2003 2004 2005
Number of fully SOEs 499 223 203 186
Number of privatized firms 0 276 23 18
Number of firms acquired by domestic investors 0 262 21 17
Number of firms acquired by foreign investors 0 20 3 1
Number of firms that experienced privatization twice 0 0 3 1
Accumulated number of privatized firms 0 276 296 313
Scale of ownership transformation
All privatized firms Mean — 0.99 0.84 0.82
Median — 1.00 1.00 1.00
Firms acquired by domestic investors Mean 0.98 0.81 0.81
Median 1.00 1.00 1.00
Firms acquired by foreign investors Mean — 0.80 0.83 1.00
Median — LOO 1.00 1.00
Frequency distribution of the scale of ownership transformation (actual number/proportion)
1-10% — 0/0.00 2/0.09 2/0.11
11-25% — 2/0.01 0/0.00 1/0.06
26-50% _ 1/0.00 1/0.04 0/0.00
51-75% — 1/0.00 2/0.09 2/0,11
76-99% — 0/0.00 4/0.17 1/0.06
100% — 272/0.99 14/0.61 12/0.67
Composition of privatized firms by region (actual number/proportion)1
Capital region (Budapest and Pest County) 287/0.58 160/0.58 11/0.48 10/0.56
Western region 95/0.19 55/0.20 9/0.39 1/0.06
Eastern region 117/0.23 61/0.22 3/0.13 7/0.39
Composition of privatized firms by industrial sector (actual number/proportion)a
Agriculture, forestry, hunting, and fishing 43/0.09 12/0.04 1/0.04 2/0.11
Mining and quarrying 3/0.01 0/0.00 0/0.00 1/0.06
Manufacturing 63/0.13 32/0.12 4/0.17 4/0.22
Electricity, gas, and water supply 5/0.01 1/0.00 0/0.00 1/0.06
Construction 72/0,14 29/0.11 3/0.13 2/0.11
Wholesale and retail trade 86/0.17 79/0.29 4/0.17 0/0.00
Hotels and restaurants 16/0.03 16/0.06 0/0.00 0/0,00
Transport, storage, and communications 19/0.04 11/0.04 0/0.00 1/0.06
Financial intermediation 11/0.02 3/0.01 1/0.04 0/0.00
Real estate and renting 112/0.22 63/0.23 7/0.30 7/0.39
Other industries 69/0.14 30/0.11 3/0.13 0/0.00
Notes ■ The western region consists of the following nine counties : Gyor-Moson-Sopron: 
Komarom-Esztergom: Vas: Veszprem : Fejer: Zala: Somogy: Tolna: and Baranya. The eastern 
region also consists of nine counties : Nograd: Bacs-Kiskun: Csongrad: Bekes: J&sz-Nagykun- 
Szolnok: Hajdu-Bihar; Szabolcs-Szatmar-Bereg: Borsod-Abauj-Zemplen: and Heves. The 
composition by industrial sector is based on the Classification of Economic Activities in the 
European Community (NACE). Other industries include public administration and defense and 
compulsory social security: education: health and social work: other community, social, and per­
sonal service activities: and household activities. 
aThe data for 2002 are the breakdown of state enterprises.
Source : Authors’ calculation.
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and to further promote deregulation in the domestic market toward 
EU accession in 20041". This provides a favorable condition for measur­
ing the time-lag effects of ownership transformation for two consecu­
tive terms.
The statistics on the scale of ownership transformation indicate 
that a vast majority of these 313 SOEs, including 24, or 7.7%. acquired 
by foreign investors, are fully privatized. Looking at the regional and 
industrial compositions of privatized firms, we confirm that the sales of 
public enterprises were conducted in all industries on a nationwide 
scale. This reveals that the Hungarian government had been consis­
tent in actively pursuing ownership transformation to strategic inves­
tors beyond industrial and regional boundaries.
Nevertheless, because the government's privatization decision is a 
highly political matter and because the sale of SOEs is also influenced 
by bidding private investors, a statistically significant bias may occur 
between privatized firms and the remaining SOEs. Hence, in measur­
ing the effects of ownership transformation on firm performance in the 
post-privatization period, it is indispensable to know the presence and 
extent of the selection bias. In the case of this research, we should also 
consider possible differences in behavioral patterns between domestic 
and foreign investors.
To evaluate these aspects, we compare privatized firms and 
remaining SOEs and privatized firms acquired by domestic investors 
and those acquired by foreign investors in 2003 in terms of company 
size and firm performance in the previous year. According to the 
results presented in Table 2.4, the company size of privatized firms is 
much smaller than that of the remaining SOEs, while the firm perfor­
mance of the former is better than that of the latter, especially in 
terms of productivity and financial ability indices (Panel A). Similarly, 
firms acquired by foreign investors are larger in size than firms 
acquired by domestic investors, while, by and large, the latter outper­
form the former (Panel B).
To test whether the above relationships can appear when control-
12 All four enterprises, which had experienced privatizations twice unti) 2005, 
transferred more than 50% of their property rights to private investors at the 
first privatization, whereas they sold a much smaller percentage (8-12%) at the 
second privatization.
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Table 2.4 Comparison between privatized firms and remaining state-owned 
enterprises and between firms acquired by domestic investors and 
those acquired by foreign investors
A. Comparison of privatized 
firms and remaining SOEs
Privatized
firms SOEs
B. Comparison of firms acquired 
by domestic investors and those 
acquired by foreign investors
Firms acquired Firms acquired 
by domestic by foreign
Company size
Total number of employees (persons) Mean ▼ 16.558 677.833* * ▼ 14863 16.909*
Median ▼ 3 6 1 ™ 3 5
Total sales4 Mean ▼ 143304 3420213* * * 138589 226004
Median ▼ 18917 355055™ 18652 36188
Total assets* Mean ▼ 167591 UOOOOOO*" ▼ 129251 658348***
Median ▼ 10093 569656™ ▼ 9322 27826™
Profitability
Ordinary income to total assets (ROD Mean ▼ -0.319 -0.019* * -0338 -0.084
Median 0.002 0.004 0.010 -0.050
Value-added to sales Mean A 0.050 -5356' 0.029 0.416
Median 0.173 0.274 ▼ 0.165 0356T
Operating income to sales Mean -0.450 -20561 -0.467 -0.155
Median 0.017 0,016 0.017 0.018
Ordinary income to sales Mean -0.472 -20.682 -0.48-1 -0360
Median 0.009 0,008 0.010 -0.006
Return on equity capital (ROE) Mean 7.148 0.410 7.677 0.625
Median 0.096 0.027 A 0.120 - 0.087T
Return on total assets (ROA) Mean ▼ -0.145 -0,003* -0.152 -0.055
Median 0.017 0.009 A 0.024 -0J019t f
Ordinary income on equity capital Mean 3.801 0.219 5.029 -11300
Median 0.014 0.011 A 0.029 -0213T
Productivity
Value-added per employee* Mean 3197 285 3166 3774
Median 1417 1629 1417 986
Operating income per employee* Mean -902 -5952 -987 636
Median 109 92 116 39
Ordinary income per employee*' Mean A 846 - 5244* 1027 -2390
Median 43 31 A 50 -504T
Sales per employee0 Mean A 17152 10376** 17063 18841
Median A 6963 5571f  T 6999 4031
Sales to employment Mean A 48.086 10.622* 50.422 7.025
Median A 6.706 2 .204™ A 6.864 2.550+t
Sales to total costs Mean A 1.149 0.872*** ▼ 1.110 1823***
Median A 1.032 0,9611 f T 1.035 1.017
FLied investment efficiency Mean 1.435 -1.282 1505 0395
Median A 0.825 0372f t 0.947 , 0.024
Financial ability
Total assets turnover Mean A 4.494 1,023** 4.679 1351
Median A 1.778 0 .773™ A 1.847 Q.318™
Fixed assets turnover Mean A 10.200 4.361*** 10.773 0.849
Median A 4.894 1 53 9™ A 5.714 0.127* *
Financial soundness
Fixed ratio Mean A 11550 2-815* * 12,074 6.412
Median A 1.951 1.266™ 1800 6.909
Capital adequacy ratio (CAR) Mean ▼ 0273 0.368*** 0.269 0.330
Median ▼ 0.167 0 .309™ 0.163 0.292
Notes '■ The sample is the same as that in Table 23. 
ilThe unit is thousand HUFs.
* **•**•"Significant at the 1.5. and 10% levels, respectively, by the f-test.
t  t  t . t  +. t  Significant at the 1. 5. and 10% levels, respectively, by the Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
A  denotes that privatized firms(those acquired by domestic investors)are superior to SOEs(those acquired by foreign
investors) with statistical significance at the 10% or lower level. ▼ denotes that privatized firms (those acquired by
domestic investors) are inferior to SOEs (those acquired by foreign investors) with statistical significance at the 10% 
or lower level.
Source ■ Authors' calculation and estimation.
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ling other factors simultaneously, we perform probit regressions tak­
ing a discrete variable, which assigns a value of 1 to privatized firms 
or firms acquired by foreign investors in 2003 as the dependent vari­
able. As independent variables, we employ the natural logarithm of 
total assets for 2002 to proxy for company size before privatization 
and a dummy variable, which takes a value of 1 for firms whose oper­
ating income was negative for 2002. as well as the six performance 
indices which differed at the 10% or lower significance level between 
the groups compared in Table 2.4. We also use dummy variables to 
capture the fixed effects of firm locations in the western and eastern 
regions and a dummy variable with a value of one if the firms operat­
ing in traditional public sectors13 as control variables14. We estimate a 
regression model of the probability of being acquired by foreign inves­
tors using the two-step pro bit maximum likelihood estimator with the 
probability of privatization being the dependent variable at the first 
stage. Table 2.5 presents the results of our regressions. The signs of 
the independent variables estimated with statistical significance at the 
10% or lower level correspond to the results of the univariate com­
parison shown in Table 2.4. These findings strongly suggest the pres­
ence of selection bias in the Hungarian government's privatization 
decision as well as certain differences between domestic and foreign 
investors in terms of their behavior when purchasing state firms15.
13 These sectors refer to the mining of uranium and thorium ores (NACE12K 
electricity, gas, steam, and hot water supply (40); collection, purification, and 
distribution of water (41); transport via railways (60.1); post and courier activ­
ities (64.1): central banking (65.11); public administration and defense and 
compulsory social security (75): education (80); health and social work (85); 
and sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation, and similar activities (90).
u The largest correlation coefficient between these independent variables in all 
combinations, including the 6 performance indices, is 0.41, well below the 
threshold of 0.70 for possible multicollinearity.
1,1 Almost the same results were obtained by conducting the analyses reported in 
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 while excluding all firms privatized in 2004 and onwards 
from the remaining SOEs as of 2003.
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Table 2.5 Regression analysis of privatization decision and acquisition of priva­
tized firms by foreign investors
Dependent variable A. Probability of privatization
B. Probability of being acquired by foreign 
investors
Estimator Probit ML Two-step probit ML
Model [11 [2] [3] [43 [5] [6]
Pre-privaiization company size
Total assets (natural logarithm) -0.409*
(-955)
** -0.470**’  
( - 10.54)
-0.476*** 
(-  588)
0.334*
(2.00)
0.420***
(5.22)
3.817*
(1.78)
Pre-privatization firm performance
Firms with negative operating income 
Value-added to sales
-0.344*
(-L87)
0.082
(073)
0.796* **
(237)
3.787**
(2J0)
Return on total assets (ROA) -1.409
(-L21) 1
-8301**
-2.21)
Ordinary income per employee 0.0001*
(1.77) 1
-0.0002 
: - LOO)
Sales to total costs 0-594*
(185) 1
- 7,655* ** 
: -284)
Total assets turnover 0.274*
(1.95) I
-3^08**
;-2.07)
Fixed ratio 0.056**
(2.19) 1
-0,340 
: -137)
Location
Western region -0.032
(-0.18)
-0.118
(-0,63)
-0.202
(-0.62)
0312
(0,95)
0.320
(122)
0.004
(0.08)
Eastern region 0.051
(030)
-0.034
(-019)
0.209
(0.78)
-0194 
( -072)
-0.220
( -0.83) '
-1,765 
: -1,42)
Industrial sectors
Traditional public sectors -1.036*
(-5.05)
* * -1.009* * *
(-5.12)
-0.838*
(-185)
0.449
(0.51)
0.601 
(1.18) i
-0.177* * 
! -2.27)
Const 4.866*
(9.66)
5.738* ** 
(10.93)
4.348***
(1.68)
0.000
(0.00)
-5503***
(-8.44)
0.682*
(188)
N 499 477 196 499 477 . 196
N  (The second stage) - - - 223 210 124
Pseudo R* 0,41 0.44 0,40 - - -
Log likelihood -203.60 -183.92 -65.09 -26930 -244,58 -12k
Wald test 126.93* * * 124.08* * * 57.94*** 17.09* 48JS5* * * 24.70***
Notes ■ The f-values are reported in parentheses beneath ihe regression coefficients. The Wald test tests the null-hypothesis thai all 
coefficients are zero. All SOE samples used for the estimation of regression models are the same In Table 2.3.
***  ** ’ Significant at the I, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
Source '■ Authors' estimation.
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2.6.3 Panel Estimation of the Effects o f Ownership Transfor­
mation
In performing the panel estimation of the effects of ownership 
transformation, we take four measures to deal with the selection bias 
of privatization decision and acquisition by foreign investors. First, in 
our panel regressions, we do not use the level of firm performance, 
but rather, the rate of its annual change as the dependent variable for 
the 18 indices of profitability, productivity, financial ability, and sound­
ness. Secondly, we control the level of the dependent variable in the 
previous year, since the past performance level may strongly affect 
the range of the growth rate of the relevant performance index as a 
result of management efforts for the current term. Thirdly, to control 
firm size, we use the natural logarithm of total assets as an indepen­
dent variable. Fourthly, we exclude every sample falling outside the 
mean ± 2 standard deviations of all samples with respect to the level of 
the performance index for 2002 to be analyzed16.
We performed regressions using the panel data on 411 firms from 
the agriculture, forestry, hunting, and fishing, the manufacturing, the 
construction, and the service sectors, which made up for 82% of the 
499 SOEs listed in Table 2.1 We carried out a total of 4,140 estimation 
trials (i.e., 15 types of regression equations defined in Section 2.5 x 23 
types of performance indices x 3 types of panel estimators x 4 indus­
trial sectors). Two-hundred and ninety-seven estimations of the 
Model V family were not successful due to the small sample size of 
the firms acquired by foreign investors or lack of data: hence, we did 
not adopt the corresponding estimates of the Model IV family for com­
parison of the two models on the same estimation basis. Consequently, 
we obtained a total of 3,546 estimates of ownership variables. The 
meta-analyses in the following two subsections use these 3,546 esti­
mates. With respect to the composition by the panel estimator of the 
1,182 models selected by the Hausman and Breusch-Pagan specifica­
tion tests, 962, or 81.4%, are pooled OLS estimators, 153, or 12.9%, are
16 The actual number of outliers excluded by this criterion is less than 0.5% of all 
samples in all cases, suggesting the significant homogeneity of Hungarian SOEs 
in firm performance.
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random-effects estimators, and the remaining 67, or 5.7%, are fixed- 
effects estimators. These findings suggest that our panel regression 
model is well formulated in the sense that there is little need for dis­
tinguishing individual firm effects as fixed effects or random effects.
2.6.4 Synthesis o f  Regression Coefficients
Synthesis of regression coefficients is performed using the estima­
tion results of the selected models according to the type of model fam­
ily and the type of investor as well as by each of the three categories 
of performance index : the SOE-inferior, the SOE-superior. and the dif­
ference-insignificant. The results are detailed in Table 2.6. In addition 
to the synthesized values of regression coefficients based on the meta 
fixed-effects models and the meta random-effects models and the val­
ues of homogeneity tests, this table also presents the asymptotic z~ 
values to test the null-hypothesis that the synthesized effect size is 
zero, the combined ^-value obtained using the inverse Chi-square 
method and the inverse normal method17, and the results of the vote- 
counting method.
If hypothesis Hj is true, we expect that the synthesized effect size 
of Model I family based on the SOE-inferior indices is significantly 
positive due to the sources of privatization gains, whereas those based 
on the SOE-superior indices are negative. We also predict that it is 
more difficult to detect the positive effects of ownership transforma­
tion through meta-analyses based on the difference-insignificant indi­
ces than through those based on the SOE-inferior indices. If hypothe­
sis H2 is empirically supported, the synthesized effect size of Model II 
family whose scope of application is limited to the cases of transfer of 
strategic control rights should exceed those of the Model I family, 
which covers the ownership transformation effects without a lower 
limit, and further, the synthesized effect size of the Model ID family, 
which tracks only the effects of full privatization, should be superior to
ll If p\, po...Pn are ^-values of N  estimates, the inverse Chi-square method uses
the statistic : - 2 ^ ^ =1log (/>„), which has a Chi-square distribution with 2N 
degree of freedom, and the inverse normal method uses the statistic : 1 /■/W- 
(p„). which has the normal distribution. $ (  • ) represents the standard 
normal distribution function (Hedges. 1992).
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Table 2.6 Meta-analysis of the effects of ownership transformation on firm performance
Synthesis of regression coefficients /■-value combination method Vote-counting method
N
Meta
fixed-effects
(asymptotic
i-value}*
Meta
random-
effects
(asymptotic
2-value)*
Homogeneity
test
Inverse
Chi-square
method
Inverse
normal
method
Proportion of 
positive to 
negative 
estimates 
(i-value)6
Number of 
positively 
significant 
estimates 
(one-sided 
z-value)*
Number of 
negatively 
significant 
estimates 
(one-sided 
2-value)'
A. AH performance indices
Ownership transformation without a lower limit (Model 1 family) -0.000 0.000 1459.143*** 710.656* ** 5301*** 172/107*** 33/276 24/276 276
(-023) (0.01) (409) (L08) (-072)
Transfer of strategic control rights (Model D family} -0.001 0.002 1490.377* ** 710.000* ** 5.803’ "* 171/105*** 33/276 23/276 276
(-058) (002) (397) (1.08) ( -0.92)
Full privatization (Model ID family) -0.004* 0.052* * 1682,125*** 746*38* ** 5354*** 177/99*** 36/276** 16/276 276
(-1.68) (2.92) (470) (1.69) (-233)
Ownership transformation to domestic investors (Model IV family) -0.000 -0.005 294200*** 489.676*** 4.707’ ** 110/67*** 19/177 9/177 177
(-0.76) (-090) (323) (023) (-2.18)
Ownership transformation to foreign investors (Model V family) -0.041* 0274*** 699.528*** 444.988* * * 4.694*** 107/70*** 28/177*** 11/177 177
(-1.891 (3,75) (278) (2-58) (-168)
B. SOE-inferior indices
Ownership transformation without a lower limit (Model I family) 0.005** 0.069* * 551.471* ** 312.164* ** 3361*** 77/43*"* 16/120 6/120 120
(208) (4.41) (3.10) (122) (-133)
Transfer of strategic control rights (Model D family) 0.009* * * 0.078* ** 530.535’ ” 313.094* ** 3367’ "* 77/43*** 16/120 5/120 120
(3.72) (4.34) (3.10) (122) (-2:13)
Full privatization (Model ID family) 0013*** 0.117*** 499,806*** 311.135* ** 3397 *** 80/40*** 13/120 3/120 120
(408) (4.99) (3£5) (030) (-2.74)
Ownership transformation to domestic investors (Model IV family) -0.000 0.040** 105.037* * 204332*** 3.067* ** 47/29** 7/76 3/76 76
(-076) (220) (2.06) (-023) (-1.76)
Ownership transformation to foreign investors ( Model V family) -0.021 0.466*** 313.841**" 220.219* ** 3.096* ** 49/27** 14/76* * * 6/76 76
(-0.60) (393) (252) (2.45) (-0.61)
C. SOE-superior indices
Ownership transformation without a lower limit (Model I family) -0.036* ** -0,105*** 282294*** 57344 1-744* 13/17 3/30 9/30* ** 30
{-5.67) (-303) (-0.73) (0.00) (3.65)
Transfer of strategic control rights (Model II family) - 0.045 * * * - 0.089* • ' 312985* * * 57.463 1.745* 13/17 3/30 9/30* ’  * 30
(-722 ) (-257) (-0.73) (0.00) (3.65)
Full privatization {Model III family) - 0.069* ** -0.041 539.425* ** 68.870 1.772* 13/17 5/30 9/30* ** 30
(-1220) ( - 1.06) (-073) (122) (3.65)
Ownership transformation to domestic investors (Model IV family) -0.001 “ 0032*** 79.697* ** 28.087 1.094 5/7 1/12 6/12*** 12
(-046) (-2*2) (-058) (-019) (4.62)
Ownership transformation to foreign investors (Model V family) -0.041 -0.044 18374* 19.662 1.125 5/7 1/12 2/12 12
(-121) (-032) (-058) (-019) (077)
(continued)
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Table 2.6 (continued)
Synthesis of regression coefficients A*value combination method Vote-counting method
N
Meta
fixed-effects
(asymptotic
rva lue )'
Meta 
random- 
effects 
(asymptotic 
i-value)*
Homogeneity
test
Inverse
Chi-square
method
Inverse
normal
method
Proportion of 
positive to 
negative 
estimates 
(z-value)*1
Number of 
positively 
significant 
estimates 
(one-sided 
z-value)f
Number of 
negatively 
significant 
estimates 
(one-sided 
z-value)c
D. Difference-insignificant indices
Ownership transformation without a tower limit (Model 1 family) -0.018 -0.044 586449" * * 341.148""" 1967"* * 82/44*** 14/126 9/126 126
(-1.42) (-0.82) (139) (0.42) (-107)
Transfer of strategic control rights (Model U family) 0.009 -0.038 579511"*" 339.442" " " 3462" "* 81/45" "* 14/126 9/126 126
(-056) (-061) (121) (0.42) (-1.07)
Full privatization (Model III family) 0.018* 0.073 476,781*** 366.833*** 3,996* * * B i/42** * 18/126* * 4/126 126
(188) (135) (174) (160) (-255)
Ownership transformation to domestic investors (Model IV family) 0.043" "* 0.148" "* 102.168 257.257* * * 1403*** 58/31*** 11/89 0/89 89
(2.66) (3.42) (286) (0.74) (-114)
Ownership transformation to foreign investors (Model V family) -0087* 0.395" * 366,141**" 206.077" * 3546* "" 53/36* 13/89" 3/89 89
(-171) (256) (140) (1.45) (-2.06)
Notes ■ The SOE-inferior (SOE-superior) indices denote the financial and operating performance indices, in which the means or medians for fully SOEs regarding the relevant indices in Table 22 are 
inferior (superior) to those for private firms with statistical significance at the 10% or lower level. The difference-insignificant indices refer to those indices that do not satisfy these conditions. 
'Null-hypothesis - The synthesized effect size is zera 
hNuU-bypothesis : The proportion of positive to negative estimates is 50/50.
cNulI-hypothesis : The proportion of estimates with statistical significance at the 10% or lower level is less than 10%.
'  * "Significant at the 1.5. and 10% levels respectively.
Source '■ Authors' estimation.
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those of the former two models. In addition, if hypothesis H3 is correct, 
the synthesized effect size of ownership transformation to foreign 
investors (Model V family) will surpass those of ownership transforma­
tion to domestic investors (Model IV family).
The results shown in Table 2.6 strongly support the above pre­
dictions. With the exception of ownership transformation to domestic 
investors using the difference-insignificant indices, we refer to the 
synthesized effect sizes based on the meta random-effects model to 
verify the hypotheses because the null-hypothesis is rejected by the 
homogeneity test at the 5% or lower significance level. The synthe­
sized effect size for the Model I family based on the SOE-inferior 
indices is positively estimated at the 1% level, whereas that based on 
the SOE-superior indices is negative at the 1% level and that based 
on the difference-insignificant indices is statistically insignificant. Simi­
lar results are also obtained when comparing the synthesized effect 
sizes of other models. By comparing the results for the Model I, II, 
and m families, we confirm that the synthesized effect sizes of owner­
ship transformation without a lower limit are always smaller than 
those of transfer of strategic control rights, and those of full privatiza­
tion are larger than those of partial privatization in terms of the SOE- 
inferior indices in particular. Furthermore, the comparison of the syn­
thesized effect sizes of the Model IV and Model V families indicates 
that the effects of ownership transformation to foreign investors are 
greatly superior to those to domestic investors except for the case of 
the SOE-superior indices. Although we do not go into detail here due 
to space limitations, the results from the />-value combination proce­
dure and the vote-counting method also, by and large, support the 
conclusions derived from the meta-analysis of regression coefficients18.
2.6.5 Meta-Regression Analysis
Table 2.7 contains the definitions and descriptive statistics of the 
variables used in the meta-regression analysis. The estimation results 
are presented in Table 2.8. Models [1] through [5] show the estima­
tion results from the meta-regression models covering all panel esti-
18 See Coggin and Hunter (1993) for how to interpret the results from the vote- 
counting method.
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Table 2.7 Definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables used in the meta-regression analysis
Variable name Definition Mean S.D. Median
Effects of ownership transformation (dependent variable) CV Regression coefficients of ownership variables (effect sizes) 0.451 7.748 0.161
SOE-inferior indices BD t = if an SOE-inferior index is used as a dependent variable 0.433 0.496 0
SOE-superior indices BD I = if an SOE-superior index is used as a dependent variable 0.096 0.295 0
Transfer of strategic control rights BD 1 = An estimate of the effects of 50% or higher ownership transformation 0.234 0.423 0
Full privatization BD I = An estimate of the effects of full privatization 0.234 0.423 0
Ownership transformation to domestic investors BD I = An estimate of the effects of ownership transformation to domestic investors 0.150 0-357 0
Ownership transformation to foreign investors BD 1 = An estimate of the effects of ownership transformation to foreign investors 0.150 0357 0
One-year lag BD 1 = An estimate of the one-year lag effects of ownership transformation 0.335 0.472 0
T wo-year lag BD 1 = An estimate of the two-year lag effects of ownership transformation 0.330 0.470 0
Manufacturing BD 1 = if samples are manufacturing enterprises 0.292 0.455 0
Construction BD 1 = if samples are construction enterprises 0.246 0.431 0
Services BD 1 = if samples are service enterprises 0.287 0.452 0
Productivity index group BD 1 = if a productivity index is used as a dependent variable 0.283 0.450 0
Financial ability index group BD 1 = if a financial ability index is used as a dependent variable 0.085 0278 0
Financial soundness index group BD 1 = if a financial soundness index is used as a dependent variable 0.085 0278 0
Firm growth index group BD 1 = if a firm growth index is used as a dependent variable 0228 0.420 0
Fixed-effects estimator BD 1 = if a fixed-effects estimator is used 0233 0.471 0
Random-effects estimator BD 1 = if a random-effects estimator is used 0.333 0.471 0
Selected models BD 1 = An estimate obtained from regression models selected by the model specification 0.333 0.471 0
tests
Number of observations CV A natural logarithm of the number of observations used in a panel estimation 5.352 0.647 5.142
Notes '■ The SOE-inferior (SOE-superior) indices denote the financial and operating performance indices, in which the means or medians for full SOEs regarding the relevant 
indices in Table 22  are inferior (superior) to those for private firms with statistical significance at the 10% or lower level The elements of each of the four index groups corre­
spond with those in Table 22. CV and BD denote a continuous variable and a binary dummy variable, respectively. & D. denotes the standard deviation.
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Table 2.8 Meta-regression analysis
Dependent variable Effects of ownership transformation (all models) Effects of ownership transformation (selected models)
Estimator WLS
m
WLS
[ « J
Random 
effects RML
Random 
effects MM
Mixed 
effects RML
WLS
[AO
WLS
Ue.]
Random 
effects RML
Random
effects MM
Mixed 
effects RML
Independent variable (default catejpiry)/model t a [2] [3] [4] [5] [6) [73 [8] [9] [10]
Effects of ownership transformation in default 2527"“ 17837 0.149“ * * 0.178" * 0.123 2255* * 11.130 0.047 0061 1065
conditions (intercept) (145) (136) (4.70) (2.09) (0.03) (244) (039) (047) (036) (0.60)
Performance differences' difference-insignificant 
indices)
SOE-inferior indices 0.144 0.056 a o io "* " 0.046" * " 1.481"*" 0.707* 2430* *" Q.038"** 0JQ65* * * 0575
(054) (a il) (2.89) (4.42) (4.73) (1.67) (322) (3.46) (296) (133)
SOE-superior indices -0399 -5.192* * -a i37*** -0.149*** -L087* -0759* -2259* -0324*** -0.192*** - 0.946
(-050) ( “ 249) (-884) (-921) (-1.66) (-1.71) (-182) (-981) (-623) (-050)
Scale of ownership transformation (privatization 
without a lower limit}
Transfer of strategic control rights -0.009 1209* 0.008*** 0.005 0.015 0005 0.030 0.001 0.001 0007
( 0.02) (L75) (391) (0.47) (0D4) (0.01) (0.03) (034) (003) (0.01)
Full privatization 0.051 0.425 0.006** 0.021 * * 0.137 0.093 0.792 0.006 0.044 ** 0.184
(0.14) (0.61) (254) (2.12) (037) (016) (0.78) (159) (211) (031)
Types of ownership transformation (no classifica­
tion)
Ownership transformation to domestic inves­ -0229 -a475 -0.015*** 0013 -0079 “ 0-449 -2843"* -0.001 0.008 -0221
tors (-059) (-CX61) (-7.45) (1.07) (-0.19) (-0.72) (-247) (-033) (031) (-032)
Ownership transformation to foreign investors 1.700*"* 2153* ** 0.063*** 0.054** * 1379*** 2622* ** 7.991*** 0.006 0.006** 2390***
(435) (264) (381) (2.62) (325) <4.19) (6.03) (025) (2.18) (3.48)
Time-lag effects (no lag) 
One-year lag -1,860*** -1292*** -01107*" * - 0.075* ** -OJJll* ** -1.658* ** -1.760 - 0.007* * - 0.121* ** -0711
(-633) ( — 5XG1 ( —3.40) (-817) (-266) (-352) (-1.49) (-201) (-651) < - 1.44)
Two-year lag -3.178*"* -14.771**’ 0004* -0021"* -2490*** -2500* ** - 12.784** " -0D06** -0.026 -2564***
<-ars) (-8.07) (1.69' (-225) (-9.44) (-530) (-499) (-216) ( - 134) (-517)
Industrial sector (agriculture, forestry, hunting, 
and fishing)
Manufacturing 0.457 5.154* ** - 0.034* ** -a021* 0.627 0361 4841* 0.066*** 0.102*** 0.111
(0.82) (324) (-408) (-180) (133) (0.40) (184) (658) (400) (a i4)
Construction -1.185*" 0.021 - 0,059* " * -0.091"** -1242** -0.439 -5.696* 0.034* ** 0.026 -0,692
{-2.13) (001) (-754) (-632) (-220) (-0.49) (-1.65) (266) (050) (-0.77)
Services -0215 9.142* * -0.070*** -0.023 -0.708 0257 -8633 0.067" " 0.107* -1310
(-0.43) (L » ) < - 6.76) (-083) (-0.48) (032) (-086) (201) ! 189) (-057)
*<i (continued)
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Table 2.8 (continued)
Dependent variable Effects of ownership transformation (all models) Effects of ownership transformation (selected models)
Estimator WLS WLS Random Random Mixed WLS WLS Random Random Mixed
m fee.] effects RML effects MM effects RML m [&ej effects RML effects MM effects RML
Independent variable (default category)/model t i l [2] [31 14] [5j [6] [7] [8] » ] [10]
Performance index group (profitability index
group)
Productivity index group -0232 -3.159*** 0.028*** 0,010 -0.691 -0278 1329 -0030* ** 0.035 -0200
(-072) (- 4 0 0 (4.84) (054) (-060) (-054) (0.96) (-3.40) (1.15) (-025)
Financial ability index group -0.746 -1017 0.010 -0.103*** -0.930 -0.991 0529 -0.107* * * -0,083** -0.568
(-L46) (-1.03) (155) (-5-08) (-054) (-121) (012) (-682) (-233) (-031)
Financial soundness index group -0512 -5,105 0.104* ** 0.067* ** -L174 -0.718 -3.024 0.142*** 0.085* * -1.023
(-0.75) (-  0.98) (1309) (327) (-0.67) (-0.63) (-024) (10.16! (227) (-053)
Firm growth index group -0383 -2.152*** 0.048* ** 0.016 -0.464 - 0.683 -2220*** -0.030*** 0.017 -0.668
(-122) (-3.43) (7.84) (058) (-027) (-125) (-2.62) (-2.64) (055) (-052)
Estimators (pooled QLS estimator)
Fixed-effects estimator -0333 0390 0.056* ** 0.026*** 0.029 0204 -2.147 0.109* ** 0.139* ** 0.479
(-0.66) (059) (761) (262) (0.07) (0.16) (-058) (7.09) (5.97) (0.45)
Random-effects estimator 0.056 0.963 0.038* ** 0.001 -0002 -0.799 -10.071 *** -0 .137*" -0.100** 0214
(0J1) (0.76) (645) (0.08) C-001) (-0.97) (-652) (-426) (-2.46) (020)
Selected models (non-selected models) 0.003 - 1.063 0.039 -0.005 0012 — — — — —
(017) (-024) (0.77) (-057) (0.03)
Number of observations — -2220 0.021 * * * -0.021 0256 — 3573 -0006 -0.021 1.062
(-0.82) (303) (-120) (028) (060) (-029) (-0.63) (0.76)
N 3546 3546 3546 3546 3546 1182 1182 1182 1182 1182
Adjusted R3 0.042 0214 — — — 0.042 0225 — — —
F- test 957** ' 5166** * — — — 402* 20.10*** — — —
Wald lest — — 113729*** 55526* * * 157.79*** — ~ 111428*** 25757*** 5227***
Notes ■ f-statistks are reported in parentheses. The F-test and the Wald test test the null-hypothesis that all coefficients are zero.
* * * * * * Significant at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
Sourer ' Authors' estimation. The definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables used in the estimations are listed in Table 27.
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mates, and Models [6] through [10] show the estimation results using 
only the estimates of the selected models.
The results strongly support hypothesis Hi. In 7 of the 10 models, 
with the difference-insignificant indices as the default category, the 
dummy variables denoting that an SOE-inferior index is used as a 
dependent variable for the panel estimation have positive signs at the 
10% or lower significance level, while the dummy variables designat­
ing the use of an SOE-superior index are significantly negative in 8 
models. Similarly, hypothesis H3 is supported by the results in which 
the dummy variables identifying the panel estimates on the effects of 
ownership transformation to foreign investors are positively estimated 
in 9 models. On the other hand, although all of the dummy variables 
relating to the effects of transfer of strategic control rights and those 
of full privatization have positive signs excluding one case in Model 
[1], they are not statistically robust enough to be used as supporting 
evidence for hypothesis H2.
The estimation results of other meta-independent variables sug­
gest the following four points with respect to the sensitivity of the 
panel estimation • (1) The effects of ownership transformation tend to 
wane over time. (2) No statistically robust differences are observed in 
the industrial sectors and the qualitative categories of the performance 
indices. (3) Although no apparent bias is seen in the overall estimation 
results arising from the differences among panel estimators, the ran- 
dom-effects estimators in the selected models tend to be more biased 
downward than OLS and the fixed-effects estimators. (4) The esti­
mates of the selected models have no significant bias in comparison to 
those of the unselected models. The second point is particularly inter­
esting from the viewpoint of policy implication.
2.7 Conclusions
In this study, we empirically examined the effects of ownership 
transformation from the state to the private sector on post-privatiza­
tion firm performance focusing on the Hungarian enterprises in the 
early 2000s. We used annual census-type data compiled by the Hun­
garian National Tax Authority for the empirical analyses. Although 
this dataset presents an ample sample size in a cross section, it 
allowed us to trace the performance changes for up to two years after
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privatization. The short observation period is a serious obstacle to the 
detection of the privatization effects. We attempted to overcome this 
data constraint by combining the panel estimation and regressing var­
ious performance indices into the scale and type of ownership trans­
formation with the meta-analysis of the regression coefficients. 
Namely, we successfully performed 3,546 panel regression analyses 
dealing with possible selection bias and integrated this large correction 
of estimation results by meta-analysis methods to test our testable 
hypotheses on enterprise privatization and foreign acquisition stated in 
Section 2.3. This empirical methodology made it possible to wholly 
capture restructuring efforts of new owners and managers, leading to 
the successful detection of the statistically significant effects of owner­
ship transformation. In other words, the synthesis of the regression 
coefficients of the ownership variables provided supporting evidence 
for all three testable hypotheses presented in Section 2.3, and the 
results of the meta-regression analysis verified hypotheses Hi and H3.
The most important finding from this research is that to detect 
the effects of ownership transformation, it is necessary to identify the 
potential sources of privatization gains. It was revealed that, in Hun­
gary at the beginning of the 21st Century, the performance gaps 
between public and private enterprises were more limited than had 
been anticipated. This fact in itself is considered to be on the positive 
side of this country's systemic transformation to a market economy. 
Yet. if it is impossible to know in advance in what aspects SOEs are 
inferior to private firms in performance, we might have overlooked the 
effects of ownership transformation that actually existed. In fact 
according to Table 2.6, the null hypothesis, in which the synthesized 
effect size of the Model I family is zero, cannot be rejected (z = 0.01) 
when covering all performance indices. We expect that the feasibility 
of detecting the privatization effects will improve significantly if the 
potential source of privatization gains can be identified beforehand.
Another interesting finding in this chapter is the fact that foreign 
investors outperform domestic investors in a short period of time with 
regard to medium and small-sized SOEs sold in the early 2000s. which 
is reminiscent of the large-scale privatization period when foreign 
direct investment (FDI) made a critical contribution to the restructur­
ing of large Hungarian corporations (Mako and Illessy, 2007). The 
privatization drive in the early 2000s was forced on the Hungarian
no
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government to get rid of what was left over from previous rounds of 
privatization. As we argued in Section 2.2, in this period, private inves­
tors could not cherry-pick because the best assets had already been 
sold and, in fact often went for the less profitable SOEs. There is no 
doubt that this condition also applied to foreign investors19. Neverthe­
less, according to the empirical results reported in the previous sec­
tion, unlike in the 1990s, foreign investors bought and successfully 
restructured the public enterprises that had not been in good financial 
condition before privatization. This constitutes counterevidence to the 
view that the effects of foreign participation in the management of 
privatized firms are overestimated due to a selection bias that drives 
foreign investors to select good companies for investment. If an appro­
priate policy framework is in place, there may be still plenty of room 
left for Hungary, one of the largest foreign capital recipients among 
the former socialist countries, to be able to receive further benefits 
from FDI.
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.
Multinational Enterprise, Technology Transfer,
and Productivity Growth
3.1 Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) draws attention as a driving force 
of economic growth in recipient countries mainly due to two factors. 
One is its macroeconomic effect of boosting the effective demand of a 
given host country owing to the intensive capital investment and 
employment activity carried out by incoming foreign firms. This 
aspect of inward FDI has such critical significance for developing 
countries and post-socialist transitional states experiencing serious 
capital shortages that plenty of studies have been conducted on it. The 
other factor is its external effects on domestic firms, that is, FDI spill­
overs arising from the new entry into the production market of host 
countries and subsequent business expansion of multinational enter­
prises (MNEs) that have superior management know-how and 
advanced production technology. Because the FDI spillover effects 
represent a unique social phenomenon, economists have been paying 
considerable attention to this characteristic of FDI from theoretical 
and empirical perspectives. In fact, the issues concerning the relation­
ship between MNEs and domestic firms in the host countries raised in 
the 1960s witnessing the advent of the age of internationalization by 
Brash (1966) and Katz (1969) are still stimulating many researchers 
today, as is obviously demonstrated by the fact that a number of
85
microeconomic research works that empirically examine FDI spillover 
effects have been published in recent years with the remarkable 
enhancement of firm-level datasets worldwide (Gorg and StrobI, 
2001: Crespo and Fontoura, 2007: Meyer and Sinani, 2009).
Many economists agree that domestic firms in recipient countries 
gain positive externalities from FDI via the four main routes that fol­
low, The first one is the imitation of the management system and pro­
duction of MNEs. One transmission mechanism often reported in this 
regard is reverse engineering. Nowadays, industrial espionage is also 
considered to be an extreme form of imitation. The second route is the 
intermediate input of goods and services supplied by MNEs, which 
contributes to quality improvement and cost reductions in in-house 
products. The third route is the feedback of marketing information 
and transfer of techniques for quality control, inventory, and standard­
ization through the provision of goods and services to MNEs. These 
foreign customers tend to actively encourage local suppliers in the 
form of sending experts to the latter, implementing joint research 
projects, and holding joint drills. The fourth route is the acquisition of 
human capital in the form of movement of experienced managers, 
engineers, and other skilled workers from MNEs to domestic firms, 
including not only voluntary career changes but also the active 
recruitment and headhunting of talent by local competitors that are 
quite common, in particular, in countries with a poor market for skilled 
labor. Now that the role of intangible assets and tacit knowledge is 
becoming increasingly important (Csaba, 2009), the latter two routes 
have the same degree of significance as the former two in order for 
FDI to make positive productivity spillovers to domestic firms.
On the other hand, many researchers unanimously assert that 
FDI can also have a negative impact on domestic firms in the recipient 
countries, namely crowding-out effects, which may surpass its positive 
competitive effect by breaking down ineffective, monopolized domestic 
markets and improving the managerial discipline of indigenous compa­
nies. This is especially true when MNEs strategically attempt an all- 
out effort to gain a significant share in the production markets of host 
countries with relatively closed economies, where the level of manage­
ment skills and production technology of domestic firms is significantly 
poorer by international standards. In this way, FDI has pros and cons 
for domestic firms. Thus, substantial direct capital inflows from abroad
Multinational Enterprise, Technology Transfer, and Productivity Growth
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do not necessarily guarantee positive spillover effects for domestic 
companies1.
It is easy to imagine that post-socialist transitional countries met 
almost all of the above conditions to generate negative externalities 
from inward FDI. There have been a wide variety of empirical studies 
carried out regarding FDI productivity spillover effects in transition 
economies, including those by Kinoshita (2001) on the Czech Republic, 
Dries and Swinnen (2004), Jensen (2004), and Marcin (2008) on Poland. 
Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008) and Altomonte and Pennings (2009) 
on Romania, Sinai and Meyer (2004) on Estonia, Javorcik (2004) on 
Lithuania, Yudaeva et al. (2003) on Russia, Lutz et al. (2008) on Ukraine, 
Hu and Jefferson (2002), Liu (2002), and Wang and Yu (2007) on China, 
and Konings (2001), Sabirianova et al. (2005), Gorodnichenko et al. 
(2007), and Kravtsova (2008)on the international comparison of several 
transitional countries. Nevertheless, the same conclusions were not 
reached in these studies regarding the roles of FDI in the restructur­
ing process of domestic firms, probably because, in many transition 
economies, former socialist enterprises experience an enormous 
amount of damage from fierce competition with foreign companies 
and, consequently, positive externalities that domestic firms gain from 
MNEs through the above four routes are considerably offset by the 
negative effects of market competition between the two. Preceding 
studies on Hungary referred to later suggest that it is also the case in 
this country.
The studies listed above presented different but interesting con­
clusions by turning their attention to such factors as the level of mar­
ket orientation and the type of business of foreign companies (depend­
ing on whether they were foreign-owned subsidiaries or joint-venture 
firms), the ownership structure and the technology absorption capabil­
ity of domestic firms, the geographical relationship between MNEs and 
domestic firms, and the market concentration, labor intensiveness, and 
other characteristics of each target industry in an attempt to deter­
1 We do not go into the details of this issue, on which many researchers have been 
working for years. For more details, see excellent survey articles by Blomstrom 
and Kokko (1998) and Gorg and Greenaway (2004) as well as thorough litera­
ture reviews by Javorcik (2004), Sinani and Meyer (2004), Halpern and 
Murakozy (2007). and Kneller and Pisu (2007).
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mine why statistically significant spillover effects cannot be detected 
from the estimations of baseline models. On the other hand, these 
studies do not consider any relationship between the multi-layered 
structure of industrial classifications and FDI productivity spillover 
effects, which are the focus of this chapter. To the best of our knowl­
edge, the same can be said for preceding studies on industrialized and 
developing economies.
In this chapter, we present a new empirical model regarding the 
productivity spillover effects of horizontal FDI and an estimate of the 
model using large-scale panel data of Hungarian firms of the early 
2000s. We argue that it is not necessary for domestic firms to treat all 
foreign firms that come under the same category of the 2-digit level of 
industrial classification in a homogenous manner. The market relation­
ship between a domestic firm and foreign counterparts has a multi­
layered structure arising from the sectoral differences among firms 
according to the lower levels of the classification. In contrast to the 
conventional model to capture the market presence of horizontal FDI 
using a single variable, the empirical model proposed in this chapter is 
designed to identify horizontal spillover effects on the productivity of 
domestic firms according to the industrial sector with different depths 
by expressing the FDI presence using multiple variables with a nested 
structure corresponding to the aggregated level of industrial classifica­
tion2. As a result of the estimation of the econometric model with the 
nested spillover variables in the right-hand side, which is called the 
nested variable mode! in this chapter, we confirmed the horizontal 
spillover effects in Hungary simultaneously taking place in sectors 
with a different depth that cannot be captured with the conventional 
model. In other words, foreign firms in Hungary have statistically sig­
nificant spillover effects on the productivity of domestic firms in the 
same industry, but their direction and degree differ greatly depending 
on proximity in product and technological space (hereinafter referred 
to as industrial-technological proximity' ) between MNEs and domes­
2 It is noteworthy that Ruane and Ugur (2004) and Haskel et al. (2007) found 
that the differences in the aggregate level of horizontal FDI resulted in a statis­
tically significant gap between the estimation results of individual productivity 
spillover effects. Differently from the approach taken in this chapter, however, 
they do not pay attention to the nested structure of the industrial classification.
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tic companies. Moreover, we found that, firstly, FDI productivity spill­
over effects are generated in patterns that are completely different 
between the manufacturing and service industries, even during the 
same period in the same country. Secondly, FDI exhibits different 
spillover effects on different productivity indicators, and thirdly, the 
estimation of productivity spillover effects is sensitive to the selection 
of business scale indices as the basis for calculating the market pres­
ence of FDI. In this sense, our empirical evidence may suggest new 
insights for the studies of both industrial organization and transna­
tional investment.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 
examines the relationship between the multi-layered structure of 
industrial classifications and productivity spillover effects of horizontal 
FDI. Section 3.3 specifies the objective and period of empirical analysis. 
Section 3.4 describes the data employed for this study. Section 3.5 dis­
cusses the empirical methodology. Section 3,6 presents the estimation 
results. Section 3.7 summarizes the major findings and concludes.
3.2 Mulli-Layered Structure of Industrial Classifications 
and Productivity Spillover Effects of Horizontal FDI
To examine the productivity spillover effects of inward FDI to 
Hungary, we propose a new analytical framework, the essence of 
which is to refine the empirical methodology for estimating the exter­
nalities of horizontal FDI on the productivity of domestic firms by tak­
ing into account the multi-layered structure of industrial classifications 
arising from the sectoral differences among firms within an industry at 
the 2-digit classification level. The fundamental concept is based on 
our interview surveys of company managers and other executive offi­
cers of Central and Eastern European enterprises conducted in recent 
years in the framework of our Hungary-Japan joint research project 
and others. The empirical model developed in this study is based on 
our finding that domestic firms tend to have a substantially different 
scope of management interest and attitude towards MNEs operating 
in the same industry according to the 2-digit industrial classification, if
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these foreign counterparts are distinguished at a lower classification3.
Using census-type data of Hungarian firms4, we provide a con­
crete example of the multi-layered structure of industrial classifica­
tions as we assume it to be. In Figure 3.1, we focus on a manufactur­
ing firm (hereinafter ‘Company A’ ) that is categorized as a manufac­
turer of plastics in primary forms according to Code 2416 of the Gen­
eral Industrial Classification of Economic Activities within the Euro­
pean Communities (NACE2416). Company A is a typical medium­
sized Hungarian enterprise with 16 employees, a total turnover of 640 
million Hungarian forints (HUF), and total assets of 3,200 million HUF, 
and 57.1 % of its equity capital came from foreign investors as of 2003.
As Figure 3.1 shows. Company A is surrounded by 41 firms that 
are also categorized as manufacturers of plastics in primary forms, of 
which 13 are foreign firms, including 7 fully foreign-owned companies. 
These firms are hereinafter collectively referred to as ‘Enterprise 
Layer I ' for brevity. The total assets, number of employees, and turn­
over for Enterprise Layer I. excluding Company A, are 203 billion 
HUF, 3,055 employees, and 173 billion HUF. and firms with foreign 
participation account for 25.7%, 23.1%, and 33.5% of these figures, 
respectively. These 42 firms engaged in the manufacture of plastics in 
primary forms, including Company A, are encompassed by ‘Enterprise 
Layer I Iwh i ch  consists of 125 firms involved in the manufacture of 
basic chemicals (NACE24I). Of these 125 firms, 25 are foreign, which 
account for 78.7%, 48.6%, and 68.9% of the total assets, number of 
employees, and turnover for Enterprise Layer D, respectively. These 
percentages are much larger than those for firms engaged in the man­
ufacture of plastics in primary forms. Furthermore, Enterprise Layer
II is also externally surrounded by ‘Enterprise Layer HI,' consisting 
of 328 firms categorized as manufacturers of chemicals and chemical 
products (NACE 24). Of these 328 firms, 78 are foreign firms, which 
account for 60.7%, 56.5%. and 60.2% of the total assets, number of 
employees, and turnover for firms engaged in the manufacture of
Multinational Enterprise, Technology Transfer, and Productivity Growth
3 We also received relevant suggestions from field studies conducted by other 
researchers w ith respect to former state-owned enterprises privatized by 
Western MNEs and other foreign investors in transition economies. See Estrin 
et al. (2000) and Stephan (2006), for instance.
4 We describe the details of the data in Section 3.4.
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Firms classified as NACE24 engaged in the manufacture o f  chemicals and chemical products 
(except for those engaged in the manufacture o f  basic chemicals)
Number o f firms: 328 (o f  which 39 arc fully foreign-owned firms and 39 are foreign JV  firms) 
Total assets: 945 billion HUF <60.7% o f  which is owned by foreign firms)
Total number o f employees: 19.173 <56.5% o f  whom are employed by foreign firms)
Total rum over: 518 billion HUF (60.2%  o f  which comes from foreign firms)
Firms classified as NACE241 engaged in the manufacture o f basic chemicals (except for those 
engaged in the manufacture o f plastics in primary forms)
Number o f firms: 125 (o f  which 17 are fiilly foreign-owned firms and 8 are foreign JV  firms) 
Total assets: 283 billion HUF (78.7% o f  which is owned by foreign firms)
Total number o f  employees: 8,289 (48.6% o f  whom are employed by foreign firms)
Total turnover: 238 billion HUF (68-9% o f  which comes from foretgn firms)_________________
Company A engaged in the manufacture o f plastics in primary forms 
Total assets: 320 m illion HUF 
Foreign ownership share: 57.1%
Annual average number o f  employees: 16
Figure 3.1 Multi-layered structure of industrial classifications ! Example of Company A engaged in the manufacture of 
plastics in primary forms for 2003
Firms classified as NACE2416 engaged in the manufacture o f plastics in primary forms (except 
for Company A)
Number o f  firms: 4 1 (o f  which 7 are fully foreign-owned firms and 6 arc foreign JV  firms) 
Total assets: 203 billion HUF (25.7% o f  which is owned by foreign firms)
Total number o f employees: 3,055 (23.1% o f  whom are employed by foreign firms)
Total turnover 173 billion HUF (33.5% o f  which comes from foreign firms)
Source ' Authors' illustration.
Table 3,1 Relationship between industrial-technological proximity and degree of 
competiti veness between MNEs and domestic firms in product markets 
and probability of technology/knowledge transfer from MNEs to 
domestic firms
Multinational Enterprise, Technology Transfer, and Productivity Growth
Degree of 
competitiveness 
between 
MNEs and 
domestic firms 
in product markets
Probability of technology/knowledge transfer 
from MNEs to domestic firms
Industrial-
technological
proximity Probability of transfer of 
human capital
Probability of 
transfer of 
industry-specific 
technology and 
knowledge
Probability of 
transfer of 
genera! 
technology and 
knowledge
Close
Moderate
Far
Strong
Moderate
Weak
High
Moderate
Low
High
Moderate
Low
Homogenous
chemicals and chemical products, respectively, excluding those in the 
manufacture of basic chemicals.
As of 2003, Company A was involved in the manufacture of chem­
icals and chemical products in Hungary, together with 378 domestic 
firms and 116 companies with foreign participation. As indicated in 
Figure 3.1, however. Company A and these 494 enterprises outline 
clear boundaries differentiating the industrial groups by industrial- 
technological proximity. It is also clear that the FDI presence in Enter­
prise Layers I, II. and 1C is quite diverse.
The industrial-technological proximity of MNEs and domestic 
firms is closely related with the degree of competitiveness between 
the two in the product market and with the probability of the technol­
ogy and knowledge transfer from the former to the latter even focus­
ing solely on the relationship between the two operating in the same 
sector (Table 3.1). The closer the industrial sector of a domestic firm 
is to that of an MNE, the fiercer the market competition between the 
two will be, but, at the same time, the greater the possibility will be 
for the domestic firm to improve its productivity by acquiring good 
human resources through voluntary career changes and headhunting 
of the employees hired by the foreign firm as well as by imitating its 
industry-specific technology and knowledge. On the other hand, the 
more remote the industrial sector of a domestic firm is to that of an 
MNE, the more moderate the competition between the two will be, 
but at the same time, the lesser the possibility will be for the domestic
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firm to gain industry-specific technology and knowledge and transfer 
of human capital from the foreign firm5. Nevertheless, it may be possi- 
ble for a domestic firm to significantly improve its productivity by imi­
tating the general technology and knowledge of a sectorally remote 
MNE if its technology and knowledge are high level and can be uti­
lized for wider applications to company management than those of 
domestic enterprises. To sum up. the spillover effects of horizontal 
FDI on the productivity of domestic firms emerge as the complex 
agglomeration effects of all of these factors.
From the theoretical point of view presented above, it is easy to 
predict that domestic firms may receive different productivity spill­
over effects from horizontal FDI with different degrees of industrial- 
technological proximity. For instance, if market competition with 
MNEs operating in an outer circle (e.g.. Enterprise Layer ID) is in fact 
lower but more general technology and knowledge are transferable 
from these foreign companies to domestic firms, it is highly likely that 
positive FDI spillover effects emerge from this circle in the aggregate. 
In contrast, if there is significant industry-specific technology and 
knowledge that domestic firms can absorb from MNEs operating in 
Enterprise Layer I but market competition between them is so 
strong that this crowding-out effect offsets the benefits of technology 
and knowledge transfer, negative spillover effects may take place in 
this enterprise layer as a whole. Needless to say, the complete opposite 
situation is possible, and we can also anticipate a non-linear relation­
ship between the FDI spillover effects and industrial-technological 
proximity between a domestic firm and MNEs.
In the real world, the market relationships and industrial linkages 
between MNEs and domestic firms are quite diverse and vary from 
country to country as well as industry to industry. Unless the 
research target is small enough, it is quite difficult, therefore, to theo­
retically predict the direction and degree of such external effects, and
5 In comparison with blue-collar workers, however, it may be easier for manage­
ment and white-collar workers to move from one company to another beyond 
the strictly defined boundaries of a 4-digit sector. Therefore, when we analyze 
an industry with a higher proportion of administrative staff in the total work­
force, it is more likely that positive horizontal FDI spillovers from outer circles 
will be observed (i.e., Enterprise Layer II and 1 in Figure 3.1).
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the issue has been the subject of empirical studies. Hungary is not an 
exceptional case.
3.3 Objective and Period of Empirical Analysis
In this section, we specify the objective and period of our empiri­
cal analysis by overlooking inward FDI to Hungary during the transi­
tion period and reviewing the preceding studies on the FDI productiv­
ity spillovers in the country.
As stressed in Chapter 1, Hungary is well known for having 
received a comparatively large amount of direct investment from 
abroad for its economic scale since the very first stage of its systemic 
transformation to a market economy. In fact, Hungary received the 
largest FDI among the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries 
on an accumulated total amount basis from 1990 through 1997 due to 
such factors as its proactive open market policy, privatization of state- 
owned enterprises focusing on direct sales to strategic foreign inves­
tors, and geographical proximity to Western markets. Although Hun­
gary was overtaken by Poland as the largest FDI-recipient country in 
the region from 1998 onward, it received 62.7 billion USD, or 17.8% of 
the total FDI that flowed into the ten CEE countries from 1990 to 
2007, and its per-capita cumulative FDI for that 18-year period was 
9,711 USD, the second highest after the 9,923 USD for the Czech 
Republic among these ten countries6.
This vast inflow of FDI led to the emergence of a mega foreign 
sector within the Hungarian economy. The number of firms with for­
eign participation almost tripled from 9,117 to 27,177, and the total 
amount of FDI invested in those companies jumped from 215 billion 
HUF to 14.810 trillion HUF from 1991 to 2007. Foreign capital actively 
participated not only in the manufacturing sector but also in the ser­
vice sector. In 2007, the manufacturing sector had 3,264 foreign firms, 
or 12% of the total number of foreign firms in all industries, and 
attracted 5.451 trillion HUF from foreign investors, or 36.8% of the 
total prescribed capital amount contributed by foreign investors in all 
industries, whereas the service sector had 21,015 foreign firms (or
Multinational Enterprise, Technology Transfer, and Productivity Growth
6 Authors’ calculation based on UNCTAD official data (http://stats.unctad.org/ 
fdi/) .
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77.3% of the total) and attracted 6.436 trillion HUF (or 43.4% of the 
total)7.
As discussed above, inward FDI to Hungary has contributed to 
the emergence of many foreign companies in a relatively short time, 
especially those in the manufacturing and services industries. The 
investment and business mode for MNEs has also continued to evolve 
over the years (Kiss, 2007). This movement may have had a significant 
impact on the direction and degree of the external effects of FDI on 
the productivity of domestic firms along with the dynamic changes in 
the presence of foreign companies in the domestic market and their 
relationship with domestic counterparts.
On the other hand, most researchers negatively evaluate the rela­
tionship between MNEs and domestic firms in Hungary by looking at 
the considerable disparities in financial standing and technological lev­
els between the two and the low local procurement rate of entering 
firms8. The results of quantitative analyses concerning FDI spillover 
effects are also used to back up such negative assessments. As far as 
we surveyed with regard to this issue, 11 papers have been published 
in the past either devoted solely to the case study of Hungary or 
reporting empirical results limiting the scope of any estimation of Hun­
gary as part of international comparative research. Table 3.2 contains 
a summary of empirical methods and estimation results in these 
research works. It is difficult to determine from this table that the pre­
ceding studies as a whole strongly suggest the positive spillover 
effects of inward FDI to Hungary on the productivity of domestic 
firms i this is because the estimation results of the proxies for the mar­
ket presence of FDI, that is, the spillover variables representing the 
comparative business scale of foreign companies within each industrial 
sector they belong to, are mixed. There is no denial that the non-uni­
formity of the empirical results is largely dependent upon the differ­
ences not only in the structure of the regression models and dataset 
used but also in the estimation period applied because the presence of
7 Authors' calculation based on KSH, the Statistical Year Book of Hungary(various 
years), and the official statistics of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office 
available at : http://portal.ksh.hu/.
8 For instance, see Farkas (2000). Szanyi (2004), Fink (2006), Acs et al. (2007), 
and Rugraff (2008).
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tO Table 3.2 Empirical studies on FDI productivity spillover effects in Hungary
FDI spillover variable Estimation result*
Author Sector Period Data
Productivity
variable Basic index Aggregation
level
Horizontal
effects
Vertical effects Control variables and their
(dependent variable) for Backward Forward
estimation results*
computation effects effects
Bosco (2001) NA 1993-1997 Panel Turnover Turnover NACE2 no NA NA Employment ( + ). capital ( + ). foreign 
ownership share ( +)
Sgard (20011 Manufacturing/
construction
1992-1999 Panel T urnover Capital/turn­
over
NACE2 no/ + NA NA Employment ( +). capital ( + ). inter­
mediate material ( +). foreign owner­
ship share (+ >
Schoors and van der Tol All industries 1997-1998 Cross-sec­ Labor productivity Turnover NACE2 + - + Tangible assets to labor ratio (+ ),
(2002) tional intangible assets to labor ratio (~ ), 
turnover to industrial average ratio 
( +), square of turnover to industrial 
average ratio ( - ). credit interest ( - ). 
foreign ownership share ( +)
Damijan et al. (2003aI6 Manufacturing 1994-1998 Panel Turnover Turnover NACE2 no NA NA Employment (no), capital ( +). inter­
mediate material ( + ). R&D expendi­
ture (no)
Damijan et aL (2003b)fc Manufacturing 1995-1999 Panel Turnover T urnover NACE2 no no no Employment (results not reported), 
capital (results not reported), interme­
diate material (results not reported). 
FD I dummy (+ ). dummy for firms 
dominated by foreign investors (no). 
R&D expenditure ( +)
Torlak (2004) Manufacturing 1994-2000 Panel T urnover Turnover NACE2 + NA NA Employment ( + ), capital ( + )■ inter­
mediate material (+ )
Ualpern and Murakozy Manufacturing 1996-2001 Panel Added-value T urnover NACE2 +■ ■f no One-term lag in added-value (+ ).
(20051 employment (results not reported), 
capital (results not reported), interme­
diate material (results not reported)
Murakozy (2007) Manufacturing 1995-2003 Panel Price-cost margin T urnover NACE2 no Herfindahl index ( — ). market share 
(no), capital productivity (no), employ­
ment {- ). share of imports by indus­
try (no)
Halpem and Murakozy Manufacturing 1996-2003 Panel Added-value. TFP (Levinson T urnover NACE2 no/ no +/+ no/no Employment (results not reported),
(2007) and Petrin estimator) capital (results not reported)
BekesetaL (2009) Manufacturing 1992-2003 Panel TFP(01ley and Pokes estima­
tor)
T urnover ■ NACE2 + no no Herfindahl index (- ) .  private owner­
ship share ( + )
Gorg et al. (2009) Manufacturing 1992-2003 Panel Added-value. TFP (Levinson 
and Petrin estimator)
Turnover NACE4 - / - NA NA Employment ( + ). capital ( + )
Notes : Tiesults are obtained from the estimation of baseline models, which include a single linear-term variable on the right-hand side of the regression equation and have- no sample constraints, * +" denotes 
that the estimated results are positive and statistically significant. *— denotes that the estimated results are negative and statistically significant, ‘ no* denotes that the estimated results are not 
significant- 'N A “ denotes that no estimation is made.
‘‘Study of international comparison.
Sourer '• Authors' compilation.
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FDI and the relationship between MNEs and domestic firms in Hun­
gary are considered to have changed dynamically at each stage of the 
transition to a market economy from the 1990s to the early 2000s.
With this in mind, we reexamine FDI productivity spillover 
effects in Hungary only for the early 2000s, during which the business 
activity of foreign firms entered its mature, stable stage. It is highly 
likely that positive FDI spillover effects during this period exceed 
crowding-out effects for two reasons. First, the business activity of 
many MNEs has taken greater root in local communities, and their alli­
ance with domestic firms has achieved larger scale and depth through 
parts supply and outsourcing than before. Second, many domestic 
firms have improved their management practices, and the weaker 
ones have been forced out of business through severe market competi­
tion over the past 15 years9. We also give great attention to the ser­
vice sector, which has been completely ignored in previous studies, 
because, as reported above, the presence of foreign companies in ser­
vices is just as remarkable as it is in the manufacturing industries and, 
hence, we expect that a significant amount of technology and knowl­
edge has been transferred from MNEs to domestic firms in the service 
industries,
3.4 Data
Same as in Chapter 2, the data underlying the empirical analysis 
in this chapter are annual census-type data of Hungarian incorporated 
enterprises offered from the National Tax Authority of Hungary for 
academic research purposes. The data were compiled from financial 
statements associated with tax reporting submitted to the tax office 
by legal entities performing accounting and tax procedures by dou­
ble-entry bookkeeping. The observation period was from 2002 
through 2005. The data cover all industries, including manufacturing 
and service industries10, and contain basic information for each sample
9 Studies suggesting this possibility include those by Inzelt (2008), Mako et 
al. (2009). and Sass et al. (2009).
111 The manufacturing industries include food products and beverages through 
recycling (NACE 15-37). The service sector refers to wholesale and retail 
trade - repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles, and personal and household goods
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firm, including the NACE 4-digit codes, annual average number of 
employees, total assets, turnover, and other financial indices. In addi­
tion, the locations of the sample firms are identifiable to the extent 
that they are divided into the capital region, the western region, and 
the eastern region11.
Information about the ownership structure includes the total 
amount of equity capital (prescribed capital) at the end of the term 
and its share of state, domestic private investors, and foreign inves­
tors. Thus, the data allow us to know whether a given sample firm is a 
fully domestically owned or a foreign firm and, when it is a foreign 
firm, whether it is a foreign joint-venture firm or a fully foreign- 
own ed firm according to the ownership share of foreign investors in 
the total amount of subscribed equity.
All nominal values are deflated with the base year being 2002 to 
use the data12. As Sgard (2001) and Claessens and Djankov (2002) 
indicate, firm-specific price deflators, which are the most desirable for 
deflation, are not available in Hungary. Hence, following the steps 
taken by these two studies, the consumer price index, the industrial 
producer price index, and the investment price index reported by the 
Hungarian Central Statistical Office are used as alternative deflators 
for every aspect of the empirical analysis in this chapter. In addition, 
for using the data, samples including unrealistic and inconsistent input 
and missing values that pose an impediment to our empirical analysis 
are removed, and cleansing procedures are performed with due atten­
tion.
The data form an unbalanced panel with the new entry and exit
(NACE 50^52), hotels and restaurants (NACE 55), transport, storage, and com­
munication (NACE 60-64), and real estate, renting, and business activities 
(NACE 71-74).
11 The individual regions consist of the following city and counties : the capital 
region consists of Budapest and Pest County: the western region consists of the 
following nine counties : Gyor-Moson-Sopron, Komarom-Esztergom, Vas, Vesz- 
prem, Fejer, Zala, Somogy. Tolna, and Baranya; and the eastern region also 
consists of nine counties : Nograd, Bacs-Kiskun, Csongrad, Bekes, jasz- 
Nagykun-Szolnok. Hajdu- Bihar, Szabolcs-Szatmar-Bereg, Borsod-Abauj-Zem- 
plen, and Heves.
12 Unless otherwise specified, the unit used for the price data is 1,000 HUF.
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of enterprises during the observation period. All of the effective data 
values concerning these newly entering and exiting Firms are used for 
the computation of industry-level aggregated values, such as FDI 
spillover variables and Herfindahl indices reported later. The observa­
tions used for our empirical analysis are limited to those concerning 
companies with an average number of employees of five or more and 
to those available in the data at least for two terms in the analysis 
period in order to control a firm’s individual effects using panel data 
estimators and to exclude so-called 'one-man companies’ and micro 
firms from our estimation. Following many previous studies, we also 
exclude those companies that belong to industries with less than 5 
active firms at the 4-digit level from the observations used in the 
empirical analysis.
The original data include almost the same number of sample firms 
as the official statistics. As a result of data cleaning and the exclusion 
of small-scale companies, with respect to 2003, 8,505 manufacturing 
firms and 17,232 service firms remain in our dataset. According to the 
data and official statistics, the proportions of these sample firms in the 
total number of incorporated enterprises and employees for 2003 
account for 23.0% and 58.4% (540,146 employees) for manufacturing 
firms and 9.3% and 44.9% (567,078 employees) for service firms, 
respectively. Furthermore, the sample of manufacturing firms includes 
1,520 foreign firms (of which 886 are fully foreign-owned firms), and 
that for service firms includes 1,825 foreign firms (of which 994 are 
fully foreign-owned firms). The proportion of these foreign firms in 
the total number of samples (13.0%) is almost identical to that of the 
official statistics if the company size is considered. The same has also 
been confirmed for the observations for the other years. In other 
words, the panel data used for our empirical analysis consist of sam­
ples representative for the manufacturing and service industries in 
Hungary.
3.5 Empirical Methodology
In this section, an empirical model is developed on the basis of the 
discussion in Section 3.2 regarding the relationship between the multi­
layered structure of industrial classifications and the spillover effects 
of horizontal FDI on the productivity of domestic firms. The model is
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designed to estimate multiple variables representing the market pres­
ence of horizontal FDI according to the degree of difference in indus­
trial-technological proximity to a domestic firm to be analyzed. As in 
many preceding works, our sample firms include both fully domesti­
cally owned firms and foreign joint-venture companies. In the empiri­
cal analysis, the direct effects of foreign participation on productivity 
of a joint-venture company are controlled by the foreign ownership 
share in the total amount of subscribed equity of the company.
As demonstrated in Figure 3.1, in the case of Hungary, which 
adopts the NACE industrial classifications, the presence of FDI in the 
manufacturing and service industries is calculated at three classifica­
tion levels for each industry, and the productivity of the z‘-th domestic 
firm is then regressed into these horizontal spillover variables using a 
panel data estimator. More specifically, if the i-th domestic firm 
belongs to NACE with sector P for the 4-digit level, sector Q for the 
3-digit level, and sector R for the 2-digit level (PE  Q e  R), the mar­
ket presence of FDI for the z'-th domestic firm in sector P is defined as 
follows •
where the subscript t refers to the year, x represents the business 
scale at the firm level, and FS stands for the ownership share held by 
foreign investors. As Equation (3.1) shows, if the z-th domestic firm is 
operating as a foreign joint-venture company, the business scale of the 
firm weighed by its foreign ownership share is subtracted from the 
numerator on the right-hand side.
The presence of foreign firms in the 3-digit aggregated level sec­
tor 0, excluding those categorized in the lower subsector P. is mea­
sured using the following formula :
HORFDI4h (3.1)
HORFDI3Nu = (3.2)
Similarly, the presence of FDI in the highest aggregated level sec­
tor R, excluding those categorized in the lower subsector Q, is given 
by :
Chapter 3
H0RFDI2Nit =
As is the case with the relationships among the three different 
enterprise layers drawn in Figure 3.1, the above horizontal spillover 
variables have a nested structure that varies depending on the level of 
aggregation. Namely, the numbers 2, 3, and 4 included in the names of 
the variables stand for the levels of aggregation in NACE, and N  at 
the end denotes that the variable has a nested structure in the rela­
tionship with the lower categories. Empirical models that comprise 
these nested spillover variables of horizontal FDI in the right-hand 
side of the estimation equation are hereinafter called 'nested variable 
models' to distinguish them from the models with a single horizontal
To compare the estimation results from the two different empiri­
cal approaches, we also estimate an additional horizontal spillover vari­
able without giving any consideration to the multi-layered structure of 
industrial classifications. Specifically, the productivity variable of the i~ 
th domestic firm is regressed into the market presence of FDI in sec­
tor R as a whole, which is expressed in the following formula •
Furthermore, as Schoors and van der Tol (2002) and Damijan et 
al. (2003b) do, we also pay attention to the externalities of the vertical 
FDI, which consist of the backward and forward spillover effects gen­
erated by downstream industries and upstream industries, respec­
tively. The backward spillover variable for the i-th domestic firm 
takes the presence of the foreign firms as its value after being 
weight-averaged by the share of each downstream industry in the 
total inputs supplied from sector R as follows :
where aSR represents the proportion of sector R’s output supplied to 
downstream industry S at the 2-digit aggregated level. Likewise, the 
values of the forward spillover variable (F0RFDI2it) are calculated by 
weight-averaging the market presence of FDI with the proportion of
variable.
(3.4)
for ali rEfi^rt
BACFD12,, - Es s*KasR' '^ -‘s for all sfES^st ■F S „ (3.5)
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each upstream industry in the total inputs of sector Rvi.
We adopt three indices for the H h  domestic firm’s productivity 
as the dependent variables of our regression models. As summarized 
in Table 3.2. the estimation results of the previous studies suggest the 
possibility that FDI has a different impact on productivity of a differ­
ent nature. In this chapter, we evaluate this point in detail. The first 
productivity variable is the output scale (Y) measured using the natu­
ral logarithm of the total annual turnover. The second productivity 
variable is a proxy for labor productivity (VA/L) using the natural 
logarithm of the total value added per employee. The third productiv­
ity variable is the total factor productivity (TFP) obtained as the 
residual of a Cobb-Douglas production function estimated using the 
semi-parametric method first contrived by Olley and Pakes (1996) and 
then developed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)1 Although the techni­
cal details are not given here due to space limitations, the Levinsohn- 
Petrin estimator is accepted as the means to accurately measure total 
factor productivity since it treats simultaneous bias arising from the 
endogenous relationship between factor inputs and productivity by 
adopting intermediate inputs as the firm-specific proxy of the produc­
tivity shock, which is unobservable for econometricians. By controlling 
for the shock, this method also solves the problem of endogeneity of 
input choices1:\
FDI spillover effects on the productivity of domestic firms are 
generated on the condition that MNEs have significantly better pro­
ductivity than domestic firms. Table 3.3 shows the results of univari­
ate analysis regarding the productivity gap between different com­
pany groups in terms of ownership structure in the manufacturing 
and service industries using the above three productivity variables. 
We confirm that, as of 2003, foreign firms are superior to fully domesti­
cally owned firms in both sectors and in all three of the productivity
Multinational Enterprise, Technology Transfer, and Productivity Growth
u These backward and forward spillover variables are computed using the input- 
output table for 2005 compiled by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH, 
2009).
14 Petrin et al. (2004) describe how to estimate TFP using econometric software.
15 According to Ackerberg et at. (2006), however, the Levinsohn-Petrin estimator 
may undergo collinearity problems, and. hence, there is still room for the devel­
opment of the TFP estimation technique.
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Table 3.3 Univariate analysis of productivity gaps among different types of firm ownership, 2003
Industrial sector Manufacturing Services
Productivity variable Y VA/L TfP Y VA/L TFP
AH firms 11.966 7.640 0.025 11.997 7.754 0.025
(11-736) (7.603) (0006) (11.924) (7.725) (0.005)
Fully domestically owned firms 11.714 7.540 0.016 11.891 7,676 0.021
(11.554) (7.528) (-0.001) (11.834) (7.656) (0.003)
Foreign firms 13.144 8.096 0.065 12.900 8.411 0.059
(13.115) (8.012) (0.039) (12.911) (8.476) (0.029)
Foreign joint-venture firms 12.806 7.979 0.061 12.652 8280 0.054
(12.749) (7.904) (0.031) (12.585) (8.307) (0.023)
Fully foreign-owned firms 13.390 8.180 0.066 13.106 8.522 0.D64
(13.363) (8.091) (0.048) (13.165) (8.673) (0.033)
N 8505 8499 8461 17232 17200 17211
Comparative analysis between fully domestically owned and for­
eign firms
f-test on the equality of means -36.342*** -24.672*** -&769* * * -29.818’ ** -34394*** -7.517’ ”
Wilcoxon rank-sum test (i) -29.933'** -22.837*** -9.366* * * -25.889*** -30.775*** -8.786***
Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality-of-distributions test (combined D) 0.381*** 0.276*** 0.132*** 0.298* * * 0.360*** 0.131***
Multiple group comparison of the three company groups
ANOVA if). 698.280* * * 317.100*“ * 38.470* * * 470.770* * * 610.500*** 28.760***
Bartlett test ( /") 179.823* * * 23.859*** 33.230* ** 210.567*** 320.518*** 235.091***
Kruskal-Wallis test </2) 933.501*** 539,389*** 88.913*** 698.953* * * 960.198’ ** 78.999’ **
Sdieffe multiple comparison of the three company groups
Differences between fully domestically owned firms and foreign 1.092* * * 0.438*** 0.048* * * 0.762*** 0.603* * * 0.033* * *
JV firms
Differences between fully domestically owned firms and fully OI * * • 0.640* * * 0.050* * * 1.215*** 0.845* * * 0.043***
foreign-owned firms
Differences between foreign JV firms and fully foreign-owned 0584*** 0.202* * * 0.002 0.453*** 0.242* * * 0.010
firms
Notes '■ The upper values are means, and the lower values in parenthesis are medians. ***. **. and * denote statistical significance at the 1%. 5%. and 10% 
level, respectively.
Source : Authors' estimation. For definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables, see Table 3.8.
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variables with, statistical significance at the 1% level. Moreover, the 
results of the analysis of variance and the Scheffe multiple comparison 
of the three company groups indicate that fully foreign-owned firms 
are superior to foreign joint-venture firms in terms of productivity in 
general. In both industries, however, no statistically significant differ­
ences are evident between fully foreign-owned firms and foreign 
joint-venture firms in terms of total factor productivity. Almost the 
same results as those shown in Table 3.3 are obtained from the analy­
sis using 2004 and 2005 observations. Hence, we predict that FDI in 
Hungary had considerable potential for generating positive productiv­
ity spillover effects on domestic firms in the early 2000s.
The observations in our regressions are limited to those of fully 
domestically owned firms and foreign joint-venture firms since we 
focus on FDI productivity spillover effects on firms established by 
domestic investment. To avoid possible endogeneity between firm- 
level productivity and the market presence of FDI that may cause the 
simultaneous bias on the estimation results, the total asset at the end 
of year t~l preceding the production activity for year t is used as the 
business scale index at the firm level, on the basis of which the FDI 
spillover variables are calculated. Table 3.4 contains the correlation 
matrices of six FDI spillover variables computed using the formula 
reported earlier. We confirm from the table that the maximum corre­
lation coefficient among the nested horizontal spillover variables of 
H0RFDI2N, HORFDI3N, and HORFDI4 is 0.234. suggesting that it is 
unlikely for the simultaneous estimation of these three variables to 
bring about serious multicollinearity to the estimation results. On the 
other hand, as is shown in Panel (a) of Table 3.4, the correlation coef­
ficient for the manufacturing industry among the vertical spillover 
variables of BACFDI2 and F0RFDI2 is 0.780, which is greater than 
the threshold of 0.700 for possible multicollinearity (Lind et al., 2004). 
Therefore, these vertical FDI spillover variables are estimated one by 
one. The correlation coefficient of vertical FDI spillover variables for 
the service industry is 0.246. Although it is not necessary to follow the 
same estimation procedure as that for the manufacturing industry, we 
estimate the vertical spillover variables separately for the service 
industry in order to compare the estimation results of the two types of 
industry.
Along with FDI spillover variables, we introduce three indepen-
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Table 3.4 Correlation matrices of FDI spillover variables
(a) Manufacturing (./V=22736)
HORFDI2 H0RFDI2N HORFDI3N HORFDI4 BACFDI2 F0RFDI2
H0RFDI2 1.000
H0RFDI2N 0.742 1.000
HORFDI3N 0.087 - 0.029 1.000
HORFDI4 0.516 0.234 - 0.089 1.000
BACFDI2 0.240 0.213 -0.184 0.259 1.000
F0RFDI2 0.264 0.261 -0.126 0.201 0.780 1.000
(b) Services (N= 48782)
H0RFDI2 H0RFDI2N HORFDI3N HORFDI4 BACFDI2 FORFDI2
H0RFDI2 1.000
H0RFDI2N 0.752 1.000
HORFDI3N 0.283 -0.015 1.000
HORFDI4 0.291 -0.047 0.094 1.000
BACFDI2 -0.395 -0.323 -0.490 -0.002 1.000
F0RFDI2 0.013 -0.062 -0.111 0.018 0.246 1.000
Source ■ Authors’ calculation. For definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables, see 
Table 3.8.
dent variables representing the input of capital stock (K ), labor (L), 
and materials (M) into the right-hand side of the regression model, 
taking the production scale as the dependent variable, and the capital- 
labor ratio (K/L) into that of the regression model, taking labor pro­
ductivity as the dependent variable. In addition to these input vari­
ables, we also adopt the firm’s foreign ownership share CFS), govern­
ment ownership share (GS), export propensity (export/total turnover) 
(EXPPRO) , Herfindahl index at the NACE 4-digit level as the proxy 
for the market concentration of the sector the firm belongs to (HH1), 
location fixed-effects (i.e., the fixed effects of the western region and 
the eastern region), and year fixed-effects for all regression models as 
the control variables. It is natural to assume that ownership structure 
and export experience will exert actual influence on the firm produc­
tivity with a certain time-lag interval. Hence, we lag all these firm- 
level independent variables one year. We expect that factor inputs, 
foreign ownership, and the linkage with the international market 
through export activity have a positive impact on the firm's productiv­
ity, whereas state ownership and higher market concentration of the
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industry the firm belongs to are negatively related to its productiv­
ity16.
To control the firms' individual effects, we used three panel data 
estimators : pooling OLS. random-effects, and fixed-effects estimators. 
The selection of the estimation results reported in this chapter is car­
ried out in accordance with the results of two model specification 
tests. One is the Breusch-Pagan test to examine the null hypothesis 
that the variance of the individual effects is zero, and the other is the 
Hausman test to examine the random-effects assumption (Greene, 
2008). Furthermore, following Boschini and Olofsg&rd (2007), Taylor 
(2007), Geishecker and Gorg(2008), and many others, we compute the 
standard errors for all specifications using the Huber-White sandwich 
estimator1'.
3.6 Estimation Results
The estimation results using all observations are shown in Table 
3.5, The definitions and the descriptive statistics of the variables used 
for estimation are listed in Table 3,8. Table 3.5 contains the 24 regres­
sion models to deal with all combinations of the two industrial sectors, 
the three dependent variables, and the four sets of the FDI spillover 
variables. Both the Breusch-Pagan and the Hausman tests rejected 
the null hypothesis in all cases at the 1% significance level18. There­
fore, estimates of the fixed-effects models are exclusively reported in 
Table 3.5.
16 Girma et al. (2004) examine the causality between the export activity of British 
firms and their productivity and confirm that export is an important channel for 
improving the productivity of domestic firms. In Chapter 2, we verified the 
superiority of foreign ownership over domestic private ownership and the infe­
riority of government ownership compared to domestic private ownership in 
terms of productivity using the same data in this chapter.
17 As a supplementary regression analysis, we estimated the effect of each FDI 
spillover variable separately and computed the standard errors of its coefficient 
adjusted for clustering on aggregated industry and confirmed that these esti­
mation results do not significantly differ from those reported in Section 3.6.
18 These specification test results apply to all the other estimation results reported 
in this chapter.
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Table 3.5 Panel data analysis of FDI productivity spillover effects: Comparison of the conventional model and the nested 
variable model
(a) Manufacturing
Dependent variable Y VA/L TFP
Model1 [1] [23 [3] [4] t5] [63 [7] [8] ' m [10] [113 [12]
Spillover variable*1
H0RFD12 0,0159 0.0168 0.0920* 0.0919* 00235 0.0230
(0.015) (0.015) (0.054) (0.054) (0.014) (0.014)
HORFD12N 0.0236* 0.0239* 0.0722 0.0716 00236* 0.0230*
(0013) (0013) (0j046) (0.046) (0012) (0.012)
HORFD13N -0.0225* -00215* -0.0222 -0.0219 -0.0194* -0.0197*
(0012) (0012) (0.0431 10D44} (0.012) 10.012)
HORFDI4 0.0215* * 0.0218“ 0.0731* • 0.0732* * 0.0266*1 0.0265* **
(0.011) (0011) (0.037) (0.037) (0010) 10.010)
BACFD12 0.0053 00091 0.0125 0.0196 0.0072 0.0103
(0.029) (0.029) (0.102) (0.103) (0J027) (0.027)
FORFDI2 -0.0242 -0.0225 -0.0021 -0.0008 0.0089 0.0108
(0.033) (0.033) (0.117) (0.118) (0.031) (0.031)
Input variable
K 0.1328“ ** 0.1326* 0.1328* ** 0.1326’ **
(0.004) (0,004) (0.004) (0004)
L 0.1525*** 0.1526* ** 01525*** 0.1526* **
(0.004) (0,004) (0.004) (0004)
M 0.7014** • 0.7014* ** 0.7013*** 0.7014* **
(0.003) (0,003) (0003) (0003)
K /L 0.4770* ** 0,4767* 0.4770* ** 0.4767***
(0011) (0011) (OOU) (0.011)
Control variable
0,0399* * * 0,0399* ** 0.0400*** 0.0401* • * 01292** 0.1290* 0.1292** 0.1290* * 0.0282* * 0.0282* ‘ 0.0281** 0.0282* *
(0.015) (0,015) (0015) (0.015) (0.052) (0.052) 10.052) (0052) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
G& 0.0145 0.0131 0.0145 0.0132 0.0452 0.0423 0.0452 0.0423 -0.0001 -0.0015 -0.0001 -0.0015
(0.022) (0.022) (0022) (0.022) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
E X P P R & - 0.0098 -0.0165 -0.0105 -0.0172 0.0281 0.0131 00279 0.0128 -0.0129 -0.0195 -0.0128 -0.0194
(0.017) (0,017) (0017) (0.017) (0.060) (0.060) 10.060) (0060) (0.016) (0016) (0.016) (0,016)
H H ! »0i>120 -0.0121 -0.0119 -00121 -0,0282 -0.0284 -00282 -0,0283 -0.0132 -0.0134 -00133 -0,0134
<0,011) (0011) (0011) (0.011) (0038) (0.038) 10038) (0.038) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Const L8484*** 15435* ** 18609*** 1.8568* * * 3.4707* * * 3.4595* ** 3,4772* ** 34688*** -0.0090 -0.0136 -0.0093 -0.0132
f0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.014) (0015) (0.015) (0015)
Location fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 22677 22677 22677 22677 22716 22716 22716 22716 22677 22677 22677 22677
R* 0973 0,973 0,973 0973 0.382 0383 0.382 0383 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.011
F-testr 612289*** 531052* "  6123.14*** 531037*** 187.90*** 15936* ** 187.90*** 15935*** 1251* * * 11.44*''*  1251*** 11.44***
Breuscb-Pagan test1 1127236* * * 11254.11* ** 11203.96*** 1117924* ** 7436.66* * * 7420.40* * * 728583* * * 7266j89* * * 1075130*** 10742.74“ ’ * 1061821*** 10606.77***
Hausman leslr 17888* * * 18926* * * 19525* * * 22199*** 63.22*** 67.94* • *  6523*** 75J37*** 95.18* ** 9056" 9 I£3 *“ * 9838***
(Continued)
Table 3.5 (continued)
fb) Services
Dependent variable Y VA/L TFP
Model* [13] C14] CIS] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24]
Spillover variable1
H ORFD I2 - 0.0391 ** -00355’ -0.0683 -00676 -0.0412* * -0X1375**
(0020) (0.020) (0.074) (0X174) (0018) (0X118)
H 0RFD I2N -0.0251* -0.0225 00037 0.0062 -0.0178 -0.0149
(0015) (0.015) (0055) (0055) (0013) (0.013)
H OFFDI3N 00046 00069 00486’ 0.0535* -00072 - 0.0046
(0008) (0.008) (0029) (0.031) (0008) (0.008)
HORFDI4 -0.0062 (LOOM -0.0154 -0.0194 -0.0117 -0.0122
(0.009) (0.009) (0.034) (0.034) (0.008) (0.008)
8ACFD12 - 0.0939* * -0.0885* -0.1892 -0.1367 - 0.0989* * -0.1002*
(0.046) (0.046) (0172) (0.175) (0.042) (0.042)
FORFD12 -0.0436 -0.0434 0.1186 0.1226 -00415 -00417
(0.039) (0.039) (0.147) (0.147) (0X136) (0.036)
Input variable
K 0.1064* •* 0.1064* ** 0.1064* ** 0.1064* **
(0XH2) (00021 (0.002) (0X102)
L 0.1399* * * 0.1399* * ’ 0.1400* ** 0.1400***
(OiXW) (0.003) (0003) (0.003)
M 0.7339* * * 0.7338* * * 0.7338* * * 0.7337* **
10.002) (0.002) •0.0021 (0.002)
K /L 0.4440* * * 0.4440* 0.4438* ** 0.4439* **
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Control variable
F& 0.0206* 0.0208* 0.0207* <u no- 0.0553 0.0565 0XJ551 0.0564 00170 0.0168 00171 0.0170
(0.012) (0.012) (0X112) 10.012) (0.045) (0045) (0XM5) (0.045) (0.011) (0011) (0X111) (0.011)
G& -00169 -00172 -0.0167 - 0.0171 0.0692 0.0677 0.0696 0.0679 -0.0034 -00033 -0.0032 -0.0032
(0015) (0015) (0X>15) (0015) (0.057) (0057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.014) (0014) (0D14) (0.014)
E X P P R & -0D309 -0.02% -0.0291 -0.0274 0.0916 01034 00914 01046 -0.0027 -0.0018 -0.0010 0X1007
(0X122) (0023) (0.022) (0023) (0.084) (0.085) (0.0841 (0.085) (0.020) (0X721) (0.020) (0.021)
H H I 0.0010 0.0039 0.0047 00046 0.0516 0.0516 0.0532 0.0527 -0.0035 -0.0036 -0.0028 -0.0028
(0D09I (0009) (0009) (0.009) (0.035) (0.035) (0035) (0.035) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0,008)
Const. 19094*** 1.9032* ** 1.8869*** 1.8828* * * 38996* ** 38476* 37836*** 37502*** 0.0594*** 0.0560* 00335** 0.0295* *
(0.033) (0.034) 10.031 • (0.031) (0.096) (0.096) (0X383) (0.082) (0018) (0018) (0014) <0.0141
Location fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 48690 48690 48690 48690 48585 48585 48585 48585 48690 48690 48690 48690
R* 0.967 0.967 0.%7 0967 0398 0398 0.401 0.401 0.001 0.001 000! 0.001
F-test‘ 1700155* * * 14733.73* ** 16999.75* ** 14732.47* ** 376.82* ** 31896* 376.76* * * 31897*** 27.94*** 2323* 27.51*** 2288***
Breusch-Pagan testd 2984406"* 29456.88* ** 29393.10*** 29157.38* * * 17620.28* * * 17016.20* ** 17112.15*** 16557.33*** 26671 95* ** 2618933* ** 2585819*** 25510.96* **
Hausman teat* 599.80* ** 73086*** -71734* ** 794.54* * * 117.05* ** 620XJ1* "  22817*** 82839* ** 17235*** 33039* • *  386.16* ** 18366* **
Notes : 'All models are estimated using the fixed-effects estimator. The Huber-White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses beneath the regression coefficients 
**. and * denote statistical significance at the 1%. 5%. and 10% level respectively. 
bLagged variable.
cNul! hypothesis : AD coefficients are zero.
'‘Null hypothesis : The variance of firm-independent effects is zero.
'Null hypothesis • The nuidom-effects estimation is effective and consistent.
Sourer ■ Authors’ estimation For definition!, and descriptive statistics of the variable*, sec Tabic J ik
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The nested variable model succeeds in identifying the horizontal 
spillover effects originating from the different depths of the industrial 
sector that cannot be captured with the model having a single hori­
zontal variable. In fact, as is shown in Panel (a) of Table 3.5, Model 
[1], which adopts the conventional empirical approach, detects no sta­
tistically significant horizontal effects. The coefficient of H0RFDI2 is 
positive, but its significance is not at the 10% level or below. On the 
other hand, when using Figure 3.1 reported earlier as the basis for the 
explanation, the estimation results of Mode! [2], which gives consider­
ation to the multi-layered structure of industrial classifications, demon­
strate that positive horizontal effects are observed for Enterprise Lay­
ers I (HORFDI4) and IH (H0RFDI2N) at the 10% or less significance 
level, whereas negative horizontal effects are generated at intermedi­
ate Enterprise Layer II {HORFDI3N) with significance at the 10% 
level. This outcome demonstrates that the offset phenomenon between 
different enterprise layers is one of the main reasons that no signifi­
cant spillover effects can be captured with the market presence of 
horizontal FDI aggregated at the NACE 2-digit level. Similar offset 
effects are evident in the estimation results of Models [9] through [12] 
regarding horizontal spillover effects on the total factor productivity of 
manufacturing firms. The estimation results of Models [5] through [8] 
suggest that the overall horizontal FDI has positive spillover effects on 
the labor productivity of manufacturing firms at the NACE 2-digit 
level with statistical significance at the 10% level, and, when these 
effects are decomposed into those from each enterprise layer, the 
impact from Enterprise Layer I, as well as that on production scale 
and labor productivity, is solely found to be positive and significant at 
the 5% level, indicating that the nested variable model is effective to 
identify the more particular source of external effects of horizontal 
FDI.
The estimation results in Panel (a) of Table 3.5 as a whole strongly 
demonstrate that there is a non-linear correlation between the indus­
trial-technological proximity between a domestic firm and MNEs and 
the spillover effects of horizontal FDI in the Hungarian manufacturing 
sector. Based on the empirical evidence that the FDI presence has a 
positive effect in Enterprise Layers I and Dl and a negative effect in 
Enterprise Layer II , we conjecture that there is a relationship, as illus­
trated in Figure 3.2, between the positive external effects on the pro-
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Figure 3.2 Likely relationship between MNEs and domestic companies in the Hun­
garian manufacturing sector from the viewpoint of productivity spill­
over effects of horizontal FDI
Far *— industrial-technological proximity
Source '■ Authors' illustration.
Close
ductivity of domestic companies originated from technology and 
knowledge transfer from MNEs and the negative external effects 
caused by market competition with MNEs1m. As the figure shows, if
19 Positive external effects on productivity of domestic firms can also be anticipated 
from market competition with MNEs through the managerial discipline of local 
companies and other channels. Therefore, here, we refer to the negative effects 
of market competition in net terms. As presented in the Introduction, in former 
socialist economies, market competition with foreign companies tends to bear 
heavily on domestic counterparts, Hungary is not an exception. Thus, in Figure 
3.2, we assume that competition with MNEs has a net negative effect on the
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both effects are an increasing function of industrial-technological prox­
imity between a domestic firm and MNEs, on the one hand, the exter­
nal effects of technology and knowledge transfer draw an upward 
convex curve (/'Or) >0, /'Or) >0), and. on the other, the external 
effects of market competition give a down-ward convex curve (/'Or) 
>0. /'Or) <0). In that case, it is possible that the net positive FDI 
spillover effects explicitly emerge in a range in which industrial-tech­
nological proximity is far enough or very close between a domestic 
firm and MNEs (i.e., zone P in Figure 3.2) while the net negative spill­
over effects clearly appear in an internal range of industrial-techno­
logical proximity between the two (i.e., zone N). the threshold values 
of which are defined by the intersections of the two curves. It is likely 
that the nested variable model empirically captured such circum­
stances in the manufacturing sector of Hungary. Needless to say, these 
arguments are only an inductive inference derived from our empirical 
results. The theoretical and empirical foundations for understanding 
the relationship between the industrial-technological proximity 
between a domestic firm and MNEs and the FDI spillover effects 
remain to be discussed further.
On the other hand, as indicated in Pane! (b) of Table 3.5, the 
horizontal FDI spillover effects on service firms are generated in a 
completely different pattern from those on manufacturing firms. We 
found that foreign competitors generally have negative impacts on the 
production scale and total factor productivity of domestic firms in the 
same sectors they belong to. whereas, in Enterprise Layer II, they 
have a positive spillover effect on the labor productivity of domestic 
firms with statistical significance at the 10% level. These estimation 
results are quite interesting, as they suggest that the market behavior 
of MNEs may have diverse impacts on the production performance of 
indigenous companies in recipient countries20.
With regard to the vertical FDI spillover effects, we did not
productivity of domestic firms.
20 In some cases, such as Models [21] through [24] in Panel (b) of Table 3,5, 
insignificant estimation results can be obtained if the horizontal effects are dis­
solved for each enterprise layer. Thus, it would be desirable to estimate con­
ventional models as well and compare the results with the estimation results of 
nested variable models.
1)1
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detect in our regression analysis any statistically significant backward 
spillover effects on manufacturing firms, whereas the analysis confirms 
significantly negative effects on the production scale and total factor 
productivity of service firms, suggesting that, in the Hungarian service 
sector, advancement of MNEs into downstream industries tends to 
result in downsizing and a loss of efficiency in production of domestic 
firms operating in upstream industries. It is likely that intense market 
competition between MNEs and domestic firms negatively affects the 
production activities of local suppliers as a result of management dete­
rioration and/or exit of their traditional client companies. As for for­
ward FDI spillovers, their impacts are insignificant for both manufac­
turing and service firms.
Our estimations have produced positive and significant coeffi­
cients on the input variables. Among the control variables, as has been 
confirmed in many studies regarding FDI into Hungary, FS shows 
positive and robust estimates, particularly for manufacturing firms, 
suggesting that foreign participation is a crucial channel for Hungarian 
domestic firms to improve their productivity in the manufacturing sec­
tor. The statistical significance of other control variables, namely, 
EXPPRO, GS, and HHI, never reaches the 10% level.
Table 3.6 shows the estimation results when classifying the 
observations into those for fully domestically owned firms and those 
for foreign joint-venture firms. The estimates reported in this table 
are those for FDI spillover variables only using regression models with 
the backward variable on the right-hand side. Table 3.6 reveals that 
fully domestically owned firms are the main recipients of external 
effects originating from inward FDI, whether they are positive or 
negative. We presume that, on average, the chances of a Hungarian 
foreign joint-venture firm acquiring the technology and knowledge 
from other MNEs are greatly diminished due to the existence of for­
eign ownership as a direct endogenous channel for improving its pro­
ductivity and to the relatively small productivity gap with fully for­
eign-owned firms, as confirmed in Table 3.3.
As explained in the preceding section, the FDI spillover variables 
estimated in Table 3.5 are calculated on the basis of total assets. In 
most previous studies, however, the market presence of FDI is 
expressed using an index other than assets. With this in mind, we also 
estimate the FDI spillover variables using the next four indices : (a)
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Table 3.6 Estimation results by differentiating observations between fully domesti­
cally owned firms and foreign joint-venture firms
(a) Fully domestically owned firms
Industrial sector Manufacturing Services
Dependent variable Y VA/L TFP Y VA/L TFP
HORFDI2N 0.0244* 0.0632 0.0226* -0.0282* -0.0083 -0.0191
(0.014) (0.050) (0.013) (0.015) (0.056) (0.014)
HORFDI3N -0.0273** -0.0146 -0.0217* 0.0079 0.0631* -0.0058
(0.013) (0.046) (0.012) (0.009) (0.033) (0.008)
HORFDI4 0.0270** 0.0654*
•*CO©o -0,0080 -0.0166 -0.0117
(0.011) (0.038) (0.011) (0.009) (0.035) (0.008)
BACFDI2 0.0098 0.0122 0.0105 -0.0938* -0.1336 -0.0975**
(0.030) (0.109) (0.029) (0.049) (0.183) (0.044)
N 20902 20906 20902 46357 46254 46357
R* 0.972 0.363 0.007 0.966 0.391 0.001
(b) Foreign joint-venture firms
Industrial sector Manufacturing Services
Dependent variable Y VA/L TFP Y VA/L TFP
HORFDI2N 0.0682 0.2304** 0.0711* -0.0181 0.1447 0.0029
(0,044) (0.113) (0.037) (0.067) (0.299) (0.062)
HORFDI3N 0.0045 -0.0458 -0.0128 -0.0166 -0.0248 -0.0273
(0.041) (0.105) (0.035) (0.032) (0.135) (0.030)
HORFDI4 -0.0046 0.0978 -0.0053 -0.0112 0.0463 -0.0372
(0.036) (0.090) (0.031) (0.041) (0.171) (0.038)
BACFDI2 -0.1418 -0.0785 -0.0105 -0.0435 0.2991 -0.1049
(0.111) (0.285) (0.095) (0.165) (0.701) (0.155)
N 1775 1810 1775 2333 2331 2333
R2 0.972 0.446 0.001 0.971 0.365 0.003
Notes • All models are estimated using the fixed-effects estimator. FDI spillover variables are 
lagged variables. For brevity, the coefficient estimates of other independent variables are not 
reported here, All specifications include a constant and location, year, and firm fixed-effects. The 
Huber-White beteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses beneath 
the regression coefficients. ***. **. and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively.
Source '■ Authors' estimation. For definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables, see Table 
3.8.
total turnover, (b) total added-value, (c) total equity capital, and (d) 
annual average number of employees. Table 3.7 shows the results. 
The table reveals that there are certain differences among individual
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Table 3.7 Estimation results of FDI spillover variables computed using total turn­
over, total added-value, total equity capital, and annual average number 
of employees
(a) Total turnover
Multinational Enterprise, Technology Transfer, and Productivity Growth
Industrial sector Manufacturing Services
Dependent variable Y VA/L TFP Y VA/L TFP
HORFDI2TN 0.0274*' 0.0640 0.0254** -0.0332** -0.0848 -0.0309**
(0.013) (0.046) (0.012) (0.015) (0.057) (0.014)
HORFDI3TN -0.0200 -0.0150 -0.0176 0.0047 0.0681“ -0.0047
(0.012) (0.043) (0.012) (0.009) (0.035) (0.009)
HORFDI4 T 0.0082 0.0603* 0.0156* 0.0043 -0.0178 0.0012
(0.011) (0.036) (0.009) (0.010) (0.038) (0.009)
BACFDI2T -0.0079 -0.0438 -0.0086 -0.0426 0.0393 -0.0725*
(0.028) (0.100) (0.027) (0.041) (0.156) (0.038)
N 22677 22716 22677 48690 48585 48690
R2 0.973 0.381 0.006 0.967 0.400 0.001
(b) Total added-value
Industrial sector Manufacturing Services
Dependent variable Y VA/L TFP Y VA/L TFP
HORFDI2VN 0.0294“ 0.0531 0.0264* * 0.0084 0,0582 -0.0033
(0.012) (0.042) (0.011) (0.013) (0.050) (0.012)
HORFDT3VN -0.0280*** -0.0668** -0.0235*** 0.0087 0.0675** 0.0018
(0.009) (0.032) (0.009) (0.008) (0.028) (0.007)
HOR FDI4 V -0.0052 -0.0111 -0.0007 0.0040 -0.0083 -0.0059
(0.009) (0.031) (0.008) (0.009) (0.032) (0.008)
BACFDI2V 0.0203 0.0516 0.0130 -0.0405 0.0547 -0.0645
(0.028) (0.100) (0.027) (0.045) (0.169) (0.041)
N 22677 22716 22677 48690 48585 48690
R* 0.973 0.382 0.005 0.967 0,398 . 0.001
(Continued)
estimation results in terms of how FDI spillover effects are generated. 
For instance, according to the estimation results for manufacturing 
firms, the productivity spillover effects of horizontal FDI are stronger 
within the external enterprise layers (i.e., at the Enterprise Layers H 
and ID) than within the sector of the firms to be analyzed when turn­
over and added-value are used as the basic indices for the computa­
tion of FDI spillover variables. On the other hand, when equity capital 
and the number of employees are used as the basis to calculate the
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Table 3.7 (continued)
(c) Total equity capital
Industrial sector Manufacturing Services
Dependent variable r VA/L TFP Y VA/L TFP
H0RFDI2EN 0.0208 0.0427 0.0170 -0.0265“ -0.0670 -0.0233**
(0.013) (0.047) (0.013) (0.011) (0.042) (0.010)
HORFDI3EN -0.0116 -0.0333 -0.0094 -0.0025 -0.0155 -0.0080
(0.011) (0.039) (0.010) (0.008) (0.031) (0,007)
HORFDI4E 0.0280* ** 0.0917*** 0.0266*** -0.0086 -0.0449 -0.0149”
(0.009) (0.033) (0.009) (0.008) (0,030) (0.007)
BACFDI2E -0.0503 -0.2304** -0.0463* -0,1048** -0.1881 -0.1045***
(0.031) (0.110) (0.027) (0.042) (0.157) (0.038)
N 22677 22716 22677 48690 48585 48690
0.973 0.377 0.001 0.967 0.402 0.007
(d) Annual average number of employees
Industrial sector Manufacturing Services
Dependent variable y VA/L TFP Y VA/L TFP
HORFDI2WN 0.0179 0.0385 0.0136 0.0140 0,15%* * -0.0048
(0,018) (0.063) (0.017) (0.021) (0.078) (0.019)
HORFDI3WN -0.0267* -0.0333 -0.0227 -0.0069 -0.0140 -0.0107
(0.015) (0.052) (0.014) (0.015) (0.055) (0.014)
HQRFDI4W 0.0308** 0.0987* * 0.0325* * 0.0240 0.0007 0.0030
(0.014) (0.049) (0.013) (0.015) (0.055) (0.013)
BACFDI2W -0.0101 -0.0364 -0.0187 -0.1586*** -0.4843**’ -0.1595***
(0.037) (0.133) (0.035) (0.048) (0.179) (0.043)
N 22677 22716 22677 48690 48585 48690
R2 0.973 0.382 0.006 0.967 0.393 0.001
Notes '■ All models are estimated using the fixed-effects estimator. FDI spillover variables are lagged vari­
ables. For brevity, the coefficient estimates of other independent variables are not reported here. All specifi­
cations include a constant and location, year, and firm fixed-effects. The Huber-White heteroskedasticity- 
consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses beneath the regression coefficients. ***. **. and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Source '■ Authors’ estimation. For definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables, see Table 3.8.
market presence of FDI, the horizontal effects generated closer (i.e., at 
Enterprise Layer I ) to the firms to be analyzed are emphasized. As 
for the service industry, there are significant differences in the statisti­
cal evaluation of the spillover effects on labor productivity between 
cases in which turnover and added-value are used as the basic indices 
and those in which the number of employees is used. Different man-
115
Table 3.8 Definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables used for empirical analysis
Descriptive statistics
Variable name Definition Manufacturing Services
N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D.
Productivity variable (dependent variable)
Y  Annual total turnover (natural logarithm) 22684 11.790 1395 -18719 11.927 1365
VA/L Value-added per employee (natural logarithm) 22722 7566 0.799 48642 7-694 0863
TFP Total factor productivity {Levinsohn-Petrin semi-parametric estimation method) 22677 0012 0303 48690 0.014 0202
Spillover variable 
H0RFD IQ2 Share of foreign capital in assets ownership in the industry the firm belongs to (NACE 2-digit level) 22736 0.499 0127 48782 0.356 0.128
H0RFDIG2N Share of foreign capital in assets ownership in the industry the firm belongs to I NACE 2-digit level: nested variable) 22736 0520 0.170 48782 0.345 0.154
HURFDI03N Share of foreign capital in assets ownership in the industry the firm belongs to (NACE 3-digit level ■ nested variable) 22738 0347 0251 48782 0203 0223
HORFDIQ4 Share of foreign capital in assets ownership in the industry the firm belongs to (NACE 4-digit level) 22736 0384 0229 48782 0.265 0.191
BACFDI02 Share of foreign capital in assets ownership in downstream industries (NACE 2-digit level) 22736 0.453 0.086 48782 0.408 0.049
F0RFDIQ2 Share of foreign capital in assets ownership in upstream industries (NACE 2-digit level) 22736 0.441 0.129 48782 0367 0053
H QRFD I02TS Share of foreign capital in turnover in the industry the firm belongs to (NACE 2-digit level : nested variable) 22736 0.492 0.183 48782 0290 0.122
HORFDI03TN Share of foreign capital in turnover in the industry the firm belongs to (NACE 3-digit level ' nested variable) 22736 0332 0250 48782 0.178 0.199
H 0RFD I04T Share of foreign capital in turnover in the industry the firm belongs to (NACE 4-digit level) 22736 0367 0241 48782 0243 0173
BACFD102T Share of foreign capital in turnover in downstream industries (NACE 2-digit level) 22736 0.421 0.083 48782 0362 0,045
HORFDIOZVS Share of foreign capital in added-value in the industry the firm belongs to (NACE 2-digit level: nested variable) 22736 0.490 a u i 48782 0307 0.143
HGRFDI03VN Share of foreign capital in added-value in the industry the firm belongs to (NACE 3-digit level : nested variable) 22736 0346 0255 48782 0205 0225
HGRFDI04V Share of foreign capital in added-value in the industry the firm belongs to (NACE 4-digit level) 22736 0,364 1.415 48782 0258 0,184
BACFD102V Share of foreign capital in added-value in downstream industries (NACE 2-digit level) 22736 0.440 0.083 48782 0380 0.045
H0RFD102EN Share of foreign capital in equity capital in the industry the firm belongs to (NACE 2-digit level • nested variable.) 22736 0.572 0.194 48782 0.385 0.199
H0RFDIQ3EN Share of foreign capital in equity capital in the industry the firm belongs to (NACE 3-digit level ' nested variable) 22736 0406 0286 48782 0218 0241
H ()RFD/04E Share of foreign capital in equity capital in the industry the firm belongs to (NACE 4-digit level) 22736 0.406 0245 48782 0280 0227
BACFDI02E Share of foreign capital in equity capital in downstream industries (NACE 2-digit level) 22736 0.475 0.101 48782 0397 0.052
HORFD1Q2WN Share of foreign capital in employment in the industry the Grm belongs to (NACE 2-digit level - nested variable) 22736 0,337 ai67 48782 0L156 0077
HGRFD103WN Share of foreign capital in employment in the industry the firm belongs to (NACE 3-digit level ' nested variable) 22736 0.219 0.189 48782 0.112 0.128
HORFDIQ4W Share of foreign capital in employment in the industry the firm belongs to (NACE 4-digit level) 22736 0.259 0.188 48782 0.140 0.114
BACFD102W Share of foreign capital in employment in downstream industries (NACE 2-digit level) 22736 0311 0.078 48782 0247 a043
Input variable 
K Total assets (natural logarithm) 22696 11321 1513 48737 11.185 1.451
L Annual average number of employees (natural logarithm) 22736 3.027 1.043 48782 2.609 0.836
M Total amount of intermediate materials (natural logarithm) 22690 11349 1519 48712 11590 1329
K /L Total assets per employee (natural logarithm) 22730 8382 1026 48673 8673 1.162
Control variable 
FS Ownership share of foreign investors 22736 0.047 0.182 48782 0.027 0J36
GS Government ownership share 22736 0.006 0.070 48782 0.006 0.072
EXPPRO Proportion of exports in total turnover 22736 0124 0260 48782 0.035 0.142
u r n Herfindahl index (NACE 4-digit level! 22736 0.104 0.148 48782 0.038 0.062
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agement indices capture different aspects of firm activity. The regres­
sion results reported in Table 3.7 indicate that the empirical evalua­
tion of FDI spillover effects on the productivity of domestic firms 
greatly differs depending on what aspect of the activity of MNEs the 
researcher focuses on most suggesting that careful attention should be 
given to the selection of the proxy variable for the marker presence of 
FDI in the recipient country as well as to the productivity indices of 
domestic firms21.
As discussed above, our estimation results are sensitive to the 
selection of indices as the basis for computation of FDI spillover vari­
ables. Yet the signs of the FDI spillover variables estimated at the 
10% or less significance level are exactly the same among the differ­
ent estimation results reported in Tables 3.5 and 3.7. Therefore, we 
can safely say that the FDI spillover effects repeatedly detected in dif­
ferent model specifications with 10% or less significance level are 
highly robust estimates.
3.7 Conclusions
It is not necessary for domestic firms to treat all foreign compa­
nies that come under the same category of industrial classification in a 
homogenous fashion. In fact, local company managers are looking at 
the structure of their industries in a more multi-layered manner and 
paying strong attention to how close or far their firms are to and from 
foreign counterparts in the context of industrial-technological proxim­
ity. This is our conviction, acquired through several field surveys, and 
it provides the basic concept for this study.
Previous empirical works on the spillover effects of inward FDI 
have given significant attention to the differences between horizontal 
and vertical FDI. whereas they have not given sufficient consideration
21 In particular, the estimation results when added-value is used to compute pro­
ductivity or market presence of horizontal FDI are entirely different from other 
results. This may relate to the transfer pricing operation by MNEs with the aim 
of reducing the tax burden. The strong influence of this factor possibly leads to 
over- or underestimation of the activity level of foreign companies based on 
added-value, and this type of measurement error may result in biased estima­
tions.
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to the internal structure of horizontal FDI itself. In this chapter, a new 
empirical framework is presented by looking at the multi-layered 
structure of industrial classifications arising from the sectoral differ­
ences among firms. The essence is that the market presence of hori­
zontal FDI, which has been traditionally treated using a single vari­
able. is expressed as multiple variables with the nested structure cor­
responding to the depth of industrial classification in order to identify 
the horizontal spillover effects on domestic firms by the enterprise 
layer illustrated in Figure 3.1. As explained in Section 3.5, our empiri­
cal methodology is simple and can be used for a wide range of applica­
tions.
We estimated the new empirical model using large-scale panel 
data of Hungarian manufacturing and service firms for the early 2000s 
and succeeded in detecting FDI horizontal effects that could not be 
captured with the conventional model. The estimation results of the 
nested variable model proposed in this chapter strongly suggest that 
foreign firms in Hungary have statistically significant spillover effects 
on production scale and labor productivity as well as total factor pro­
ductivity of domestic firms in the same industry, but their direction 
and degree differ greatly between individual enterprise layers. It is 
impossible for the single spillover variable, which is aggregated at a 
certain industrial classification level, to capture such complex effects of 
horizontal FDI22. In this sense, this chapter sheds light on a blind spot 
in the empirical study regarding the external effects of horizontal FDI 
and proposes a solution to overcome this problem.
Moreover, this chapter presents the following estimation results. 
First, FDI productivity spillover effects are generated in patterns that 
are completely different in different industries, that is, the manufactur­
ing and service industries, even during the same period in the same 
country. Secondly, FDI exhibits different spillover effects on different 
productivity indicators. Thirdly, the estimation of productivity spill­
over effects is sensitive to the selection of business scale indices as the
11 As almost all preceding studies, which divide FDI into the horizontal type and 
the vertical type by simply using the industry classification code, the empirical 
analysis in this chapter cannot strictly distinguish between the spillover effects 
of the two types of FD I either. Reconsideration of the empirical strategy is a 
topic reserved for future research.
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basis for calculating the market presence of FDI. We conclude, on the 
basis of the above empirical results, that the transfer of technology 
and knowledge from MNEs to domestic firms in a recipient country 
occurs on the basis of a very complex economic mechanism. There­
fore, careful attention should be given to the selection of variables and 
the model specifications so that they fit well into the scope of a micro- 
economic empirical examination of FDI spillover effects.
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(. Chapter 4 )
Do Domestic Firms Learn to Export 
from Multinational Enterprises?
4.1 Introduction
Export promotion for domestic firms enriches the nation’s foreign 
reserves. It also contributes to stability in the management and 
employment of these firms by obtaining a broad and diversified prod­
uct market (Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Das et al.. 2007). This is an 
important policy effect, especially for developing and post-communist 
transition economies that suffer from a great shortage of capital and 
the vulnerability of domestic economies. It is, therefore, natural for 
these countries to intently seek the benefits of export promotion. In 
the context of linkages with the global market, another economic pol­
icy intensely promoted by the governments of developing and transi­
tional countries is the attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI). 
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) from developed economies not only 
contribute to the creation of new markets and jobs in the host coun­
ties but also have great potential to vitalize the domestic economies 
through the cross-border transfer of advanced technology and knowl­
edge.
A number of recent studies have revealed that these two policy 
measures for deepening integration with the world economy are 
closely connected to each other in the sense that the attraction of FDI 
stimulates the export activity of local firms. It is argued that there are
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two main channels that tie FDI and the overseas advancement of 
domestic companies through the export of products and services. One 
is the direct participation of foreign investors in company manage­
ment. This works as an internal channel that increases the trading 
business-related information and know-how of a domestic firm with 
foreign participation and has the effect of significantly increasing the 
company’s export potential. Another is an externality that is brought 
to indigenous firms by the export activity of MNEs. Domestic firms 
might be able to more easily overcome various barriers associated 
with new entry into export markets by observing and imitating the 
sophisticated export operations of foreign companies. This positive 
externality of FDI is considered to have originated mainly in the 
reduction of information costs that domestic firms would have had to 
bear without the MNEs, and it is, consequently, called the 'information 
spillover effect’ (Aitken et al., 1997: Kneller and Pisu, 2007).
The export-promoting effect of FDI through the two channels 
above has greatly attracted academic interest. The number of empiri­
cal analyses on this topic, however, remains at a low level compared to 
that of studies concerning the productivity spillover effect (Gorg and 
Greenaway, 2004). Studies on transition economies are even more lim­
ited, and they tend to concentrate on China (Ma, 2006; Swenson. 
2007: Sun, 2009). Lutz et al. (2008), who analyzed the effect of FDI on 
the export activity of Ukrainian manufacturing firms, is probably the 
only previous study on an Eastern European country. However, as the 
authors recognize, their study does not discriminate externalities from 
the export-promoting effects of direct investment due to data limita­
tions.
In this chapter, we empirically examine the direct and indirect 
impacts of FDI on the export decision of domestic firms using census- 
type data of Hungarian firms and make a contribution to this research 
field from the standpoint of European transition economies. Hungary 
has received quite massive direct investment from the early stages of 
its transition to a market economy. With its drastic market liberaliza­
tion and the open privatization of state-owned enterprises, many for­
eign joint-venture (JV) firms as well as wholly-owned subsidiaries of 
MNEs were established in Hungary (Kiss, 2007). As of 2002, 1,718 
firms (7.0%) out of a total of 24,555 manufacturing firms were operat­
ing as firms that were 100 percent owned by foreign investors (fully
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foreign-owned firms), and 1,447 firms (5.9%), as foreign JV firms. In 
Hungary, direct investment in the service industry is also very vigor­
ous. In fact, the 114,313 firms in the service industry included 8,777 
(7.7%) fully foreign-owned firms and 4.576 (4.0%) foreign JV firms in 
20021. With regard to the export-promoting effect of FDI on domestic 
firms, it is a more notable fact that the foreign companies in Hungary 
have a substantia! export orientation compared to local firms. Table
4.1 reports the export intensity by ownership structure in 2002. As the 
table shows, the percentage of export firms in the total number of for­
eign companies substantially surpasses that of fully domestically 
owned firms in almost all subsectors constituting the manufacturing 
and service industries. This fact suggests that Hungary is an ideal 
research subject to assess the effects of FDI on the export behavior of 
domestic firms under systemic transformation. As we expected, the 
empirical analysis in this chapter detected a statistically significant 
positive effect of FDI on the entry of domestic firms into export mar­
kets.
This chapter also makes a contribution from a methodological 
aspect by proposing and estimating a new empirical model focusing on 
the multi-layered structure of the NACE industrial classification. Our 
new model is designed to identify the externality of the export pro­
pensity of MNEs in relation to domestic firms according to the indus­
trial sector at different depths using multiple variables corresponding 
to the nested structure of NACE. We confirmed that the new model 
makes it possible to detect an information spillover effect that is diffi­
cult to identify using a conventional model expressing the presence of 
FDI in the export market with a single variable.
Furthermore, in this chapter, we examine the relationship of the 
heterogeneity of FDI and domestic firms with regard to the informa­
tion spillover. The transferability of knowledge and technology from 
MNEs to domestic firms greatly depends on the firm-level character­
istics of both sides. This fact has been repeatedly demonstrated by 
Blomstrom and Kokko (1998) and other preceding studies on the pro­
ductivity spillover effect of FDI. It is an important viewpoint also for 
the empirical examination of FDI externality with respect to the 
export activity of domestic firms. We found that the investment mode
1 Authors’ calculation based on the census data reported in Section 4.2.
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Table 4.1 Export intensity by ownership structure in the Hungarian manufacturing and 
service industries, 2002
(a) Manufacturing (JV=24555)
NACE industry Percent of firms
Percent of export firms
Foreign firm
Fully 
domestically 
owned firm
All firms Fully 
foreign- 
owned firm
Foreign
oint-venture
firm
15 Food products and beverages 1231 1955 52.69 5557 15.45
16 Tobacco products 0.02 83.33 100.00 100.00 50X0
17 Textiles 3.32 35.17 74.00 68.75 25.92
18 Apparel 5.77 29.10 6759 68.12 2151
19 Leather tanning and dressing 149 4458 76.92 69.70 3333
20 Wood wood products, and cork, except furniture 638 22.92 6958 6351 1809
21 Pulp, paper, and paper products 138 2958 8750 55.56 2188
22 Publishing, printing, and reproduction of recorded media 1431 1155 3650 30.77 9.64
23 Coke, refined petroleum products, and nuclear fuel 0.03 3750 100.00 100.00 0.00
24 Chemicals and chemical products 2.20 43.70 75.71 8255 3165
2S Rubber and plastic products 5.03 4258 8037 74.75 3350
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 3.92 20.06 64.06 46.15 1465
27 Bask metals 1.02 51.60 87.10 77.78 4178
28 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 1488 29.41 80.66 68.97
29 Machinery and equipment 8.98 31.16 7037 74.48 2454
30 Office machinery and computers 0.83 1537 5355 41.67 10.67
31 Electrical machinery and apparatuses 3.03 3159 8256 85.11 2039
32 Radio, television, and communication equipment and apparatus 245 33.39 8939 8158 19.79
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches, and clocks 3.99 23.06 72,09 71.43 17.59
34 Motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers 0.91 52.91 85.42 80.00 38.00
35 Other transport equipment 0.68 3153 100.00 72.73 26.49
36 Furniture 656 20.79 5757 6638 1635
37 Recycling 0.52 19.69 50.00 66.67 1491
Manufacturing total 100.00 26.07 7057 6141 19.92
(b) Services 114313)
Percent of export firms
Percent Foreign firmNACE industry of firms "
Fully
All firms Fully Foreign domestically
foreign- oint-venture owned firm
owned firm firm
50 Sale, maintenance, and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 6.64 838 37.78 30.73 6.77
51 Wholesale trade and commission trade, except for motor vehicles and motorcycles 18.68 22.46 3452 4232 1839
52 Retail trade, except for motor vehicles and motorcycles: repair 19.87 4.04 6.00 1957 3.49
55 Hotels and restaurants 643 1.10 358 518 0.78
60 Land transport: transport via pipelines 3.70 2152 6458 5135 19.96
61 Water transport 0.07 17.11 10050 4256 11.94
62 Air transport 0.04 34.78 75.00 2857 31.43
63 Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of travel agencies 230 23.65 49.03 44.00 1952
64 Post and telecommunications 054 859 50.00 40.91 4.65
70 Real estate activities 930 3.10 6,14 558 2.35
71 Rental of machinery, equipment, and personal and household goods 057 5.92 2857 1632 429
72 Computer and related activities 557 853 47,11 4150 6.14
73 Research and development 0.79 20.33 41.94 4732 18.38
74 Other business activities 2551 5.76 35.60 26.01 423
Service industry total" 100.00 9.45 2257 2852 7.43
Note ■ ‘Excluding financial intermediation. 
Source '■ Authors' calculation.
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and size of a foreign organization and ownership structure and size of 
a domestic organization, as well as differences in the human resource 
and organizational capacity, are closely associated with the potential 
for information spillover from MNEs to local firms.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows  ^Section 4.2 
describes the data employed for this study. Section 4.3 discusses the 
empirical methodology. Section 4.4 examines the characteristics of 
export firms and their possible endogeneity with the export market 
entry. Section 4.5 reports the baseline estimation results of the export 
decision model. Section 4.6 looks at the relationship between the het­
erogeneity of FDI and domestic firms with the information spillover 
effect. Sfection 4.7 summarizes the major findings and concludes.
4.2 Data
Same as in Chapter 2 and 3, the data underlying the empirical 
analysis in this chapter are the annual census-type data of Hungarian 
firms, which were compiled from financial statements associated with 
tax reporting submitted to the National Tax Authority in Hungary by 
legal entities performing accounting and tax procedures using double- 
entry bookkeeping. The observation period covers four years from
2002 through 2005. The data includes all industries from manufactur­
ing and service and contains basic information for each sample firm, 
including the NACE 4-digit codes, the annual average number of 
employees, overseas turnover, and other major financial indices. In 
addition, the locations of the sample firms are identifiable to the extent 
that they are divided into the capital, western, and eastern regions2.
Information about the ownership structure includes the total 
amount of equity capital (prescribed capital) at the end of the term 
and the proportional share held by the state, domestic private inves­
2 The individual regions consist of the following city and counties, respectively ■ 
the capital region consists of Budapest and Pest County, The western region 
consists of the following nine counties : GySr-Moson-Sopron: Komarom-Eszter- 
gom: Vas: Veszprem; Fejer; Zala; Somogy: Tolna: and Baranya. The eastern 
region consists of nine counties as well : Nograd; Bacs-Kiskun; Csongrad: 
Bekes: Jasz-Nagykun-Szolnok: Hajdu-Bihar: Szabolcs-Szatmar-Bereg: Bor- 
sod-Abauj-Zemplen: and Heves.
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tors, and foreign investors.
Al! nominal values in the Hungarian forint are deflated with the 
base year being 20023. The consumer price index, the industrial pro­
ducer price index, and the investment price index reported by the 
Hungarian Central Statistical Office are used as deflators. In addition, 
sample firms with unrealistic and inconsistent input and missing val­
ues that are impediments to our empirical analysis have been 
removed, and the cleansing procedures have been diligently per­
formed.
The data form an unbalanced panel with the new entry and exit 
of firms during the observation period. All of the effective data values 
concerning these newly entering and exiting firms are used for the 
computation of industry-level aggregated values including the FDI 
spillover variables discussed later. The observations used for our esti­
mation of empirical models are limited to those concerning foreign JV 
firms and fully domestically owned firms available in the data for two 
or more consecutive terms in the observation period with an average 
number of employees of five or more. This aims to exclude so-called 
one-man companies’ and micro firms from the panel data estimation 
of the export decision model for domestic firms.
As a result of data cleaning and the exclusion of small-scale com­
panies, our final sample consists of 12,854 firm-year observations in the 
manufacturing industry and 26.692 firm-year observations in the ser­
vice industry. According to the official statistics, the proportion of our 
sample in the total number of employees in 2003 is 35.0% for manufac­
turing firms (4,276 companies including 456 foreign JV firms with 
261,837 employees) and 33.9% for service firms (8,916 companies 
including 576 foreign JV firms with 261,958 employees). An almost 
identical proportion had been confirmed for the other years. In other 
words, the panel data used for our empirical analysis consist of sample 
firms that are representative of the manufacturing and service indus­
tries in Hungary.
4.3 Empirical Methodology
The export of products and services to overseas markets requires
I)o Domestic Firms Learn to Export from Multinational Enterprises?
3 The unit used for the price data is 1,000 HUF. 
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an initial investment which cannot be diverted or recouped, including 
the development of distribution channels and customers, research and 
expertise in trading and customs business, and the development of 
products and product packages adapted to foreign markets (Baldwin, 
1989: Dixit 1989). The disregard of this aspect of export activity may 
lead to a serious omitted-variable bias when estimating the impact of 
FDI on export decisions made by domestic firms. Thus, we adopt a 
model of exporting with sunk costs of market entry to underlie the 
empirical analysis in this chapter.
We assume that a firm always selects the volume of exports that 
maximizes its profits depending on the market conditions once it 
enters foreign markets and can consequently achieve sales s*. The 
firm may engage in exports (y = l) when the sales exceed the total 
costs consisting of fixed costs F for market entry and variable costs c. 
We also assume that the firm does not need to bear fixed costs F 
again in the current year when it has actual experience of exporting in 
the previous year. The net profit of the *-th firm in year t is '
n*t =sft -ib-Fil-yu-i) =*(V,) -c(Xit, Z„\s*)-F{ 1 -yu. i), (4.1)
where V, is a vector of the exogenous factors that affect overseas 
sales, Xu and Z„ are vectors of the exogenous market conditions and 
firm-specific factors that determine variable costs, respectively.
The i-th firm implements exports if the expected net profit is 
positive, namely.
In the empirical analysis, we estimate a binary-choice model of 
the form :
where pv fix and ftz are vectors of the parameters, and slt is an error 
term'1.
+ This simple model that restricts the company managers' time horizon to one 
year can be easily generalized by adopting a profit function that maximizes the 
unlimited profit stream facing the future. For details, see Roberts and Tybout
(4.2)
* ’ = l o
1 if/TyV, + irxX„ + IVzZ„ - Fi 1 - ,) + >0.
otherwise.
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In this chapter, we focus on two factors as exogenous factors that 
affect the overseas sales of Hungarian domestic firms. One is the 
terms of trade (TT) defined as the ratio of the export price index to 
the import price index. The other is the annual GDP real growth rate 
of 15 EU countries (EU15) weighted according to the market size of 
those countries, which are major destinations for Hungarian exports. 
Hereinafter, we refer to these two variables as the ‘trade environment 
variables’ for simplicity.
The market environment determining the variable costs for prod­
uct and service exports denotes the presence of MNEs in an export 
market, which is one of the main research interests in this chapter. 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the relationship between the share of the foreign 
firms, which is weighted according to the foreign ownership share, of 
the total export volume for (he NACE 2-digit level sectors for 2002 
through 2005 and the proportion of export firms in the total number of 
domestic firms. As shown in Panels (a) to (d) of Figure 4.1, in the 
manufacturing industry, there is a relationship in which the greater 
the FDI presence in export markets, the higher the probability that 
domestic firms in the same sector will export their products. In fact 
the correlation coefficient is always positive through the four years, 
and all the approximation lines slope upwards from left to right On 
the other hand. Panels (e) to (h) of the same figure indicate that, in 
the service industry, there is a negative correlation between the FDI 
presence in the export market and the probability that domestic firms 
will enter foreign markets.
To examine this relationship by multivariate regression analysis, 
we use the so-called 'FDI spillover variable.' It is argued that the 
greater the presence of MNEs in the export market the greater the 
information spillover effect brought to domestic firms by MNEs 
(Ruane and Sutherland. 2004). To capture this externality, it is appro­
priate to use the degree of the contribution of foreign capital to the 
total export volume in the entire industrial sector to which the t'-th 
firm belongs as the proxy for the FDI presence in the export market 
In particular, if the i‘-th firm belongs in NACE with sector R for the
(1997)and Cierides et al.(1998). Nevertheless, the empirical model derived from 
a generalized theoretical model also results in the same estimation model as for­
mula (4.3).
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Figure 4.1 Correlation between the export propensity of foreign firms and the probability of export market entry of 
domestic firms, 2002-2005
(a) Manufacturing, 2002 (fl-22837) (b) Manufacturing, 2003 (#=23536) (c) Manufacturing, 2004 (N= 29151) (d) Manufacturing, 2005 (AN30743)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 0 10 20 30 40 SO 60 70 80 90 100 0  10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
(e) Services, 2002 (AM05536) (f)Services, 2003 (AM 11724) ^ ( 8 ) Services, 2004 (AN135821) ^ (h )
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Note '■ The vertical axis is the share of foreign firms weighted by the foreign ownership share of the total export volume in each of the 
NACE 2-digit level sectors, and the horizontal axis is the percentage of export firms in the total number of domestic firms in that sector. 
Source '■ Authors' illustration.
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Table 4.2 Relationships among industrial-technological proximity, probability 
of export-related knowledge/technology transfer from MNEs to 
domestic firms, and degree of competitiveness between both sides in 
export markets
Do Domestic Firms Learn to Export from Multinational Enterprises?
Industrial-
technologica!
proximity
Probability of export-related technology/ 
knowledge transfer from MNEs to domestic 
firms
Degree of competi­
tiveness between 
MNEs and domestic 
firms in export 
markets
Probability of industry- 
specific technology and 
knowledge transfer
Probability of general 
technology and 
knowledge transfer
Close High Strong
Moderate Moderate Homogenous Moderate
Far Low Weak
2-digit level, the presence of FDI for the z'-th firm in year t is defined
by :
SPILL2a = I ‘rt‘xMr'ERSr,'FSr,- s il'FSi, ' (4  4 )
“ r for all r&R $rt $it
where FS stands for the foreign ownership share of the total equity 
capital.
The originality of this study is, in addition to the spillover variable 
computed using formula (4.4), to estimate different types of the FDI 
spillover variable that considers the multi-layered structure of the 
NACE industrial classification. We argue that there is a close relation­
ship between proximity in product and technological space (hereinaf­
ter ‘industrial-technological proximity’ ) between the MNEs and 
domestic firms and the transferability of export-related technology 
and knowledge from the former to the latter (Table 4.2). The closer 
the position of a domestic firm to an MNE in terms of business type, 
the more likely that the domestic firm can obtain industry (sector)- 
specific information on foreign markets from the MNE. On the other 
hand, if the MNE has a significantly higher level of general technology 
and knowledge concerning export operation than the domestic firms, 
even though the MNE is in a remote position in terms of business 
type, an indigenous firm can still greatly increase its chances for 
exporting its products or services by emulating such an MNE, At the 
same time, we also expect that the more homogenous an MNE is with
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respect to a domestic counterpart in terms of business type, the 
greater and more intense the competition between them will be in 
export markets. Hence, the possibility cannot be ruled out that the 
crowding-out effect of the competition between MNEs and domestic 
companies may eliminate all or part of the FDI export-promoting 
effect due to the transfer of industry-specific technology and knowl­
edge.
The externality brought to domestic firms by the export activity 
of MNEs will be actualized as an accumulation effect of all the factors 
described above. In other words, it is possible that FDI with a differ­
ent industrial-technological proximity may have a different impact in 
terms of not only extent but also direction. Standing on this premise, 
we adapt a set of FDI spillover variables reflecting the multi-layered 
structure of the industrial classification to detect the source of the 
information spillover effect more effectively and precisely. Specifically, 
if the z-th firm belongs in NACE with sector P for the 4-digit level 
and sector Q for the 3-digit level, the export propensity of foreign 
firms in sector P for the a'-th firm is defined as :
In addition, the export propensity of foreign firms in sector Q, 
excluding the lower subsector P. is measured using the following for­
mula :
Similarly, the export propensity of foreign firms in sector R, 
excluding lower subsector Q, is given by :
As shown in Figure 4.2, the above spillover variables express the 
triple nested structure with boundaries set by the difference in the 
industrial classification of the foreign firm group surrounding the j-th 
firm. Namely, the numbers 2. 3, and 4 included in the variable names 
stand for the levels of aggregation in NACE, and N at the end denotes 
that the variable has a nested structure in the relationship with the
SPIUAi, (4.5)
S P lL U N u (4.6)
SPILL2N„ = (4.7)
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Figure 4.2 The nested structure of FDI spillover variables
Enterprise Layer [11
Enterprise Layer II
Enterprise Laver 1 The ('.th domestic
fir™
HnW
SPUJ.4
SPJLL3N
SPILL2N
Source ■ Authors' illustration.
Table 4.3 Correlation matrices of FDI spillover variables
(a) Manufacturing {iV= 12854}
SPILL2 SP1LL2N SPILL3N SPILL4
SPILL2 1.000
SPILL2N 0,691 1.000
SPILL3N 0.023 -0.087 1.000
SPILL4 0.495 0.228 -0.107 1.000
(b) Services (Ar=26692)
SPILL2 SPILL2N SPILL3N SPILL4
SPILL2 1.000
SPILL2N 0.683 1.000
SPILL3N 0.025 0.054 1.000
SPILL4 0.457 0.105 0.107 1.000
Source '■ Authors' calculation. For definitions and descriptive 
statistics of the variables, see Table 4.10.
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lower categories. As we defined in Chapter 3, the empirical model 
including these three nested spillover variables in the right-hand side 
is hereinafter called the nested variable model’ and is distinguished 
from the conventional model expressing the export propensity of for­
eign firms with only a single variable, namely, SPILL2. Table 4.3 
reports the correlation matrices of the four types of FDI spillover vari­
ables that are actually calculated using the census data described in 
the previous section. As the table shows, the correlation coefficient of 
the nested variables, SPILL2N, SPILL3N, and SPILL4, is a little 
under 0.228 even with the maximum combination. It is. hence, unlikely 
that the simultaneous estimation of these spillover variables may 
cause a serious multicollinearity problem.
Together with the direct management participation of foreign 
investors, which is another matter of concern in this chapter, we pay 
attention to the organizational and technological innovativeness, capital 
intensity, quality of human capital research and development capacity, 
organization size, and company location as firm-specific factors affect­
ing the level of variable costs. The extent of management participation 
by foreign investors is captured using the aforementioned foreign 
ownership share (PS). The organizational and technological innovative­
ness is measured by the total factor productivity (TFP) estimated 
using the semi-parametric method first developed by Olley and Pakes 
(1996) and further improved by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)5. The 
Levinsohn-Petrin estimator is widely used as the means to accurately 
measure TFP, since it treats simultaneous bias arising from the endog­
enous relationship between factor inputs and productivity by adopting 
intermediate inputs as the firm-specific proxy of the productivity 
shock, which is unobservable for econometricians6. As proxies for the 
capital intensity, the human capital quality, and the research and 
development capacity, we use the total assets per employee (K/L ), 
labor costs per employee (LC), and intangible assets per employee 
(R&D), respectively. The organizational size is measured by the
0 Petrin et al. (2004) describe a specific estimation method using econometric 
software.
6 According to Ackerberg et al. (2006), however, the Levinsohn-Petrin estimator 
may undergo collinearity problems, and. hence, there is still room for the devel­
opment of the TFP estimation technique.
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annual average number of employees (SIZE). In the empirical analysis, 
the natural logarithms of these four variables are used. As for the 
company location, the fixed-effects of the capital region and the east­
ern region are controlled by the capital region location dummy vari­
able (CAPITAL) and the eastern region location dummy variable 
(EAST), respectively. The default category consists of the firms 
located in the western region. Hereinafter, FS and the other seven 
variables are collectively called the ‘firm characteristics variable' for 
brevity.
When estimating formula (4.3), in addition to the three groups of 
independent variables specified above, the time fixed-effects dummy 
variable and industry fixed-effects dummy variable are also included 
in the right-hand side of the estimation equation. The firm-level indi­
vidual effects are controlled by using the random-effects probit panel 
estimator following Heckman (1981)7.
Our empirical analysis proceeds through a three-step approach : 
first, we identify the specific characteristics of export firms and check 
the possibility of reverse causality between such firm-level character­
istics and the probability of export market entry. Second, we estimate 
the baseline model of export decision. Finally, by extending the empiri­
cal model, we analyze the relationship of the heterogeneity of FDI and 
domestic firms to the information spillover effect.
4.4 Export Premia and Market Entry
A series of previous studies repeatedly confirms the predomi­
nance of export firms over non-export firms, beyond the difference of 
countries and industrial sector, in terms of productivity, capital and 
technology intensity, human capital, and firm size. In addition, accord­
ing to Bernard et al. (2007), such differences in firm characteristics
7 The dynamic bivariate dichotomous choice model can be estimated by the fixed- 
effects linear probability model besides the random-effects probit model pro­
pounded by Heckman (1981). However, the former is an estimation method 
using two terms of the lagged value of independent variables as instruments, 
and it is difficult to use this method with data with an insufficient length of 
time-series. Therefore, as in other previous studies, we apply the random- 
effects probit estimator to all export decision models reported in this chapter.
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between the two firm categories precede entry into foreign markets. 
In addition, some empirical studies strongly suggest that foreign own­
ership is one of the outstanding characteristics of exporters (Willmore, 
1992; Kimura and Kiyota, 2006; Blanes-Cristobal et al„ 2008).
Using the firm characteristics variables mentioned in the previous 
section, we examine whether the above relationship can also be 
observed in Hungarian firms. Table 4.4 presents the results. Here, 
sample firms are divided into the 'exporters' (yaoce = 1) and tire ‘non­
exporters' (jV2oo2 = 0) depending on an actual export experience in the 
current term (i.e., 2002 in the case of Table 4.4). Furthermore, the 
exporters are split into two subgroups depending on their actual 
export experience in the subsequent term (i.e., in 2003), the ‘always 
exporters,’ which continued their export business for two consecutive 
terms Cyt2002= 1: yi2003 - 1) and the 'export stoppers,' which exited the 
export market in the subsequent term {yam = 1 > -Vam = 0) • Similarly, 
the nonexporters are split into two subgroups, the ‘never exporters,’ 
which have had no actual export experience for two consecutive 
terms (y^ occ = 0: Jr2oo3 - 0) and the export starters.’ which entered 
foreign markets in the subsequent term (y;2oo2 = 0: J t-2oo3- 1)-
Table 4.4 shows that with the only exception of the compari­
son based on the TFP variable in the manufacturing industry, export­
ers significantly outperform nonexporters in terms of firm characteris­
tics variables. The difference between the two groups of firms is sta­
tistically significant at the 1% level according to the Mest or Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test Among the four subgroups, the always exporters out­
strip the three remaining groups of firms in all cases excluding the 
comparative results on the basis of the TFP variable in the manufac­
turing industry and the R&D variable in the service industry. On the 
other hand, the never exporters are inferior to the other groups of 
firms. The export stoppers and export starters lie between the always 
exporters and the never exporters, and it is difficult to determine 
which is better. According to the results of the ANOVA or Kruskal- 
Waliis test, this relationship is also statistically significant at levels of 
5% or less. In addition, regarding the R&D variable in the service 
industry, the difference between the export starters and the always 
exporters is very narrow (2.6925 versus 2.6673).
Next we examine whether the relationship indicated in Table 4.4 
between the actual export experience and the firm characteristics can
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Table 4.4 Univariate analysis of the relationship between the actual export 
experience of domestic firms and the firm-specific factors, 2002
(a) Manufacturing (N =  4276)
Export status FS TFP K /L LC R&D SIZE
All firms 0.0696 0,0299 8,4650 73312 1.9522 33877
(0.000) (0,015) (8.452) (7.171) (L700) (3.091)
Exporters 0.1201 0.0254 8.6081 7.3373 2.1791 3.7497
(0.000) <0.013) (8.622) (7307) (2.003) (3.638)
Always exporters 01302 0.0245 8.6273 73542 23051 38376
(0.000) (0.011) (8.641) (7323) (2.031) (3.738)
Export stoppers 00391 0.0323 8.4542 73028 1,9714 31)471
(0,000) (0.027) (8.445) (7.131) (1.674) (2890)
Nonexporters 0.0204 0.0344 8.3253 7.1276 1.7307 2.8369
(0.000) (0.017) (8398) (7.046) (1.488) (1708)
Never exporters 0.0158 0.0349 83820 7.1134 1.6996 18144
(0.000) (0.017) (8343) ( 7j037) (1.447) (1708)
Export starters 0.0606 0.0297 8.7025 73512 2.0008 3.0326
(0,000) (0 .018) (8.672) (7J47) (1.692) (1944)
Comparative analysis between exporters and nonexporters
(-test on the equality of means 15386* * * -1573 9880*'" 15.352*** 11.020'** 28.796***
Wilcoxon rank-sum test 16588** * -1.935* 10.619*' 15553* * * 10.778'*' 26,301***
Multipul comparison of four subcategories
ANOVA (F) 95.800*** 1.000 48.900*''* 93.810* ** 46300'** 329,780***
Bartlett test (/*) 1700.000'" 11885* * * 1865 12.133'** 31,717**' 241603***
Kruskal-Wallis test (/■) 3 1 8 3 1 6 " ' 4.105 160.331*'" 292.426*** 131589*** 796,148'**
(b) Services (A^—8916)
Export status FS TFP K /L LC R&D SIZE
All firms 0.0367 0.0349 8.8100 73463 23336 2.6979
(0,000) (0.013) (8.828) (7.165) (2.028) (1485)
Exporters 0.0918 0.0391 93105 7.4639 2.6491 18836
(0.000) (0.019) (9344) (7.421) (2.485) (1708)
Always exporters 0.1010 0.0392 9.3532 7.4935 2.6673 2.9317
(0.000) (0.020) (9.374) (7.462) (2.494) (2.773)
Export stoppers 0.0490 0.0387 9.1130 7,3270 2.5649 2.6610
(0.000) (0.014) (9.176) (7325) (2.451) (2565)
Nonexporters 0.0203 0.0336 86614 7.1817 2.1102 2.6428
(0.000) (0.011) (8665) (7,104) (1.904) • (2398)
Never exporters 00181 0.0335 86274 7.1719 2.0750 2.6423
(0,000) (0.011) (8638) (7.094) (1865) (2398)
Export starters 0.0571 0.0360 93244 73441 2.6925 2,6513
(0,000) (0.015) (9328) (7386) (2555) (2.485)
Comparative analysis between exporters and nonexporters
/-test on the equality of means 18,320* * * 1.104 25.442“ 21.757** * 15.461 * * * 10554"*
Wilcoxon rank-sum test 19.488*** 3.205*** 26.682* *'* 21,477*** 15580*** 11,152* **
Multipul comparison of four subcategories
ANOVA (T) 131.780*** 0.430 268420*' 183.420* * * 105,590*** 46.160"*
Bartlett test (**) 2400,000*** 27809** 81311*''* 43.523*** 21.423'** 44316* "
KruskaJ-Wallis test ( * z) 434.977*** 10869* * 853.706**'* 534,409*** 312372*** 146.998*"
Notes '■ The upper values are means, and the lower values in parentheses are medians. * * \ " ,  and'denote statistical significance at 
the 1%. 5%. and 10% levels, respectively.
Source '■ Authors' estimation.
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be confirmed for the whole analysis period. To this end, we regress 
the pooled firm characteristics variable (zit) into the export statuses 
defined above while controlling the firm size {SIZE) (except for those 
cases in which the firm size itself is a dependent variable), location 
fixed-effects (CAPITAL and .EAST), industry fixed-effects, and time 
fixed-effects, as in '
zu = U + yy« + a' Wi+<t>i+ £u, (4.8)
and in :
zi=M + SALWAYSi +dSTOPit+9STARTi +a' (4.9)
where
AL WA YS, = 1 if (yu =  1) and(y*+1 =  1 ) ,
STOPft -1 if (y« = 1) and (yit+1 = 0),
STARTu = 1 if {yu = 0) and (y,-(+i = 1),
and ft is a constant term, y, S, 8 and <9 are parameters of the export 
statuses, a is a parameter vector of the control variables, W,• is a vec­
tor of the control variables, and <j>i is the firm-level individual effects.
Panel (a) of Table 4.5 shows the estimation results. We use White’s 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors for all specifications. As 
the time-invariant variables are contained in the part of the control 
variables of Equations (4.8) and (4.9), the pooling OLS or random- 
effects model are the available estimation methods for them. Because 
the Breusch-Pagan test rejected the null hypothesis that the variance 
of the individual effects is zero for ail models at the 5% significance 
level, the estimation results of the random-effects model are reported 
in Table 4.5.
The estimation results of Equation (4.8) show that the exporters 
in both the manufacturing and service industries have a significantly 
higher value of all the six firm characteristics variables than the non­
exporters. Furthermore, according to the estimation results of Equa­
tion (4.9), the firms with actual export experience either in the current 
term or the subsequent term outperform the never exporters in all 
cases except the TFP variable of the export stoppers and export 
starters. Moreover, we confirm that the always exporters have vari­
able values that leave those in other firm categories far behind. The 
estimation results, in which a clear relationship of superiority or inferi-
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Table 4.5 Panel data analysis of the characteristics of export firms and endogeneous 
relationship between firm characteristics and actual export experience, 
2002-2005
(a) Level
Industrial sector Manufacturing (.V* 12854) Services (A’- 26592)
Estimation equation (4.9) (4.10) (4.9) (4.10)
Export status Export firms
Always
exporters
Export
stoppers
Export
starters
Export firms
Always
exporters
Export
stoppers
Export
starters
FS 0D106** * 0.0238* * * 0.0091*** 0.0110*** 0.0108* * * 0.0239* * * 0.0087*** 0.0101***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002! (0.002)
TFP 0.0065* 0,0079* -0,0013 -0.0059 0.0084**' 0.0111* * 0.0022 0.0027
(0,004) (0,005) (0,005) 10.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
K /L 0.0848*** 02088*** 0,0871"** 0.1147* ** 0.1027**’ 02165* * 0.1127"** 0.1133* ”
(0.011) (0.015) (0014) (0.013) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012) (0011)
LC 0.0664"* 0.1117*** 0 0536*** 0.0363* ** 0.0736* ** 0.1453** 0.0636"** 0.0701" "*
(0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
R& D 0.1536**" 02911* • * 0.1335*** 0.1558*** 02038*** 02749* * 02020* * * 02297***
(0.024) (0.031) (0.033) (0.031) (0.020) (0.026) (0028) (0.026)
S IZE 0.1246" *" 02S13*** 0.1042* "  * 0.0926” " 00733*"* 0.1380” 0.0723*** 00688*"*
(0.01 J) (0.017) (0.014) (0,013) (0.008) (0.012) (0i)U) (OjOIO)
(b) Ex-post change
Industrial sector Manufacturing (JV= 12854) Services (N — 26692)
Estimation equation (45) (4.10) (49) (4.10)
Export status Export firms
Always
exporters
Export
stoppers
Export
starters
Export firms
Always
exporters
Export
stoppers
Export
starters
bFS 0,1109" 0.1168* 0.0730 0.0018 0.0001 0.0268 0.0201 0.1071
(0.057) (0.066) (0,058) (0,061) (0.036) (0,034) (0.047) (0.083)
LT FP 0.4147 0.3644 -0.1164 -08776 -0.6674 -15015 3.4386 1.0879
(0641) (01748) (0-848) (0.719) (3-847) (4545) (3573) (L426)
\K/L -0.0041*"" -0.0048* ** 0.0005 0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0010 -0.0024 -0.0061*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0003)
1LC -0.0015 -0.0009 -0.0013 0.0035* 0.0020 0.0047 -0.0149 -0.0109
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.007) (0.012) (0012)
Cl RA D -0.0478 -0.0378 0.0393 0.1545* -0.0811** -0.0962* • -00576 -0,0841**
(0035) (0.039) (0.064) C0.0H1) (0.035) (0.040) (0.054) (0.043)
\SIZE 0,0126* * * 0.0193*** -0.0007 00130* * 0.0069* * * 0.0136* * * -00005 002284**
(0003) (0.003) (0j005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
Notes ■ All models are estimated using the random-effects estimator. The estimation results of control variables are not reported here. The robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses, ***. **. and*denote statistical significance al the !% . 5%, and 10% levels, respectively
Source ■ Authors' estimation.
ority cannot be observed between the export stoppers and the export 
starters, also closely correspond to the results of the univariate analy­
sis reported in Table 4.4.
The estimation results above support the self-selection hypothesis 
in the sense that, with respect to Hungarian firms in the early 2000s,
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the better the organization and human capital, the higher the produc­
tivity, and the larger the firm size, the greater the probability of 
export market entry (Clerides et al„ 1998: Bernard and Jensen. 1999). 
In theory, however, the learning-by-exporting hypothesis, according 
to which the export activity triggers fierce market competition over­
seas and contact with the foreign firms and customers and, conse­
quently, such activity brings ex-post positive changes to the exporter’s 
firm organization and management, can also hold true (Wagner, 2002: 
Girma et al., 2004). It is conceivable that the larger the ex-ante gap in 
productivity and technological level is between the domestic firms and 
their counterparts in foreign countries, the more the potential learn­
ing-by-exporting effect is enhanced. In this sense, it is not a coinci­
dence that studies of developing economies provide strong supporting 
evidence for the learning“by-exporting hypothesis (Biesebroeck, 
2005: Yasar and Rejesus, 2005).
The learning-by-exporting hypothesis can also be applied to Hun­
gary, which belongs to the former communist bloc, which was 
regarded as a technologically underdeveloped region. In addition, there 
may be a reverse causality between the actual export experience and 
the ownership structure in the sense that the foreign investors will­
ingly sink their capital into prospective firms entering foreign markets 
by overcoming the significant sunk costs. To examine this possibility, 
we re-estimate Equations (4.8) and (4.9) by replacing their left-hand 
side with the ex-post change in the firm characteristics variable. From 
the estimation results in Panel (b) of Table 4.5. it is difficult to deter­
mine whether the start of an export business by a Hungarian local 
firm brings about a notable ex-post improvement in the firm's charac­
teristics, including the foreign ownership share8. The only exception is 
firm size measured by the annual average number of employees, sug­
gesting that Hungarian exporters tend to keep increasing employment 
after an overseas advance.
8 Namely, the results indicate that it is less likely that foreigners cherry pick the 
best, most productive and profitable domestic firms, which are also more likely 
to export. A lthough the details are om itted due to space lim itations, we 
obtained a similar result from a comparative analysis of export firms and non­
expert firms using the propensity score matching method practiced by Yasar 
and Rejesus (2005) and Wagner (2002).
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In contrast to the self-selection hypothesis, we cannot obtain 
strong supporting evidence for the learning-by-exporting hypothesis 
in the case of Hungary. However, an endogenous relationship between 
the export activity and the firm characteristics is not completely ruled 
out. In addition, it is natural to assume that an information transfer 
from an MNE to a local firm will exert actual influence on the latter's 
export activity with a certain time-lag interval. Thus, in order to avoid 
the endogeneity of export market entry and the firm characteristics 
and other possible simultaneity problems and to take the possible 
time-lag effect of information spillover into consideration, we lag all 
the independent variables one year following Bernard and Jensen 
(2004). Accordingly, the goal of our empirical analysis is to estimate 
the export decision model of the form :
Pr[yif= 1] = a+PvV^i+PxXn-1 + PzZit-i + Fyt,-X + <]>,+ sih (4.10) 
where a is a constant term.
4.5 Determinants of Export Decision : Baseline Estimation
We first present the estimation results of the baseline model. 
Table 4.6 contains the estimated parameters for the conventional 
model expressing the export propensity of MNEs with a single vari­
able as Models [1] and [3] and those of the nested variable model 
considering the multi-layered structure of the NACE industrial classi­
fication as Models [2] and [4]. Since lagged variables are used as 
independent variables, the dependent variable is limited to the export 
market entry probability of domestic firms for the three years from
2003 through 2005.
From the estimation of the FDI spillover variables, we obtained 
interesting evidence : in the conventional model [1], the spillover vari­
able SPILL2 is estimated with a positive sign with statistical signifi­
cance at the 5% level. In other words, the domestic firms in the manu­
facturing industry enjoy a positive externality promoting the export of 
products from MNEs belonging to the same sector of the industrial 
classification at the 2-digit level. In other words, the export activity of 
foreign-owned manufacturing firms, as a whole, brings to domestically 
owned companies an information spillover effect that overtops the 
crowding-out effect arising from interfirm competition. The nested
no
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Table 4.6 Baseline estimation of the export decision model
Industrial sector Manufacturing Services
Model3 [1] [2] [3] [4]
Trade environment variables
TTh 0.0117 0.0085 -0.0470 - 0.0222
(0.074) (0.075) (0.061) (0.057)
EU15fi 0.0519 0.0456 -0.0334 -0.0040
(0.070) (0.070) (0.057) (0.054)
FDI spillover variables
SPILL2iH 0.5639**
(0233)
0.0230
(0.266)
SPILL2Nit-i 0.6907***
(0.192)
0.6859***
(0.131)
SPILL3NiH -0.1458**
(0.072)
-0.0489
(0.050)
SPILLS 0.1315*
(0.068)
0.0564
(0,054)
Firm characteristics variables
fSu., 0.5665*** 0.5655*** 05194*** 0,5142***
(0.09V) (0.092) (0.070) (0.070)
TFP,t-i -0.0930 -0.0985 -0.1627** -0.1569**
(0.095) (0.095) (0.075) (0.075)
K/L*., 02101*** 02060*** 0.1862*** 0,1877***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.015) (0.015)
LCu-i 0.0789* 0.0872* 0.1046*** 0.1107***
(0.045) (0.046) (0.029) (0.029)
R&Du-i 0.0304** 0.0320** 0.0395* * * 0.0387* * *
(0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009)
SIZE,,-, 0.3375*** 0.3360* * * 0.1266*** 0.1318***
(0.018) (0.018) <0.013) (0.013)
CAPITAL,H -0.0665* -0.0658* 0.0688** 0.0679* *
(0.038) (0.038) <0.029) (0.029)
EASTM -0,0850** - 0,0860* * -0.0441 -0.0459
(0.040) (0.040) <0.033) (0.033)
Lagged endogenous dependent variable
yu-i 20504*** 2,0466* * * 2.1804* ** 2.1723***
(0.031) (0.032) (0.025) <0.025)
Const -6.3453 -6.0569 0.3227 -2.7008
(7.523) (7.534) (6217) (5.812)
Time fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-level individual effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 12854 12854 26692 26692
Log likelihood -4259.46 - 425150 - 7147.02 -7131.27
Wald test1' 6196.55* * * 6188.17* * * 10669.01*** 10648.19* * *
Notes - “All models are estimated using the random-effects probit estimator. The robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. ** *, **. and*denote statistical significance at the 1%. 5%. and 10% 
levels, respectively.
'’Null hypothesis : All coefficients are zero.
Source '■ Authors’ estimation. For definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables, see Table 4.10.
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variable model [2] presents more detailed information about its source. 
The information spillover effect on domestic firms comes not only 
from the foreign firms belonging to the same sector at the NACE 4~ 
digit level (Enterprise Layer I in Figure 4.2) but also from the foreign 
firms operating at the most peripheral position in the industrial classi­
fication (Enterprise Layer IH). At the same time, Model [2] also indi­
cates that the foreign firms covered, by SPILL3N variables (Enter­
prise Layer II) have a negative externality on domestic firms. How­
ever, we confirmed that the FDI externalities coming from these three 
different enterprise layers are positive by rejecting the null hypothesis 
that the sum of the coefficients of the nested FDI spillover variables is 
zero at the 1% significance level according to the Wald test (x2~7.93, 
p = 0.005).
Meanwhile, a statistically significant FDI externality is not 
detected by the conventional model [3] that deals with the service 
industry. However, according to the estimation result of the nested 
variable model [4], domestic firms enjoy a positive export-promoting 
effect from the foreign firms with the most distant proximity in terms 
of industrial classification, and, in addition, the Wald test strongly 
rejects the null hypothesis that the FDI spillover effect is zero as a 
whole ix 2 = 16.35, p = 0.000). We interpret these results as evidence 
that the information spillover effect originating from the export activ­
ity of MNEs certainly exists in both the manufacturing and service 
industries in Hungary even though the channels and extent are 
largely different.
We also obtained supporting evidence for another FDI export- 
promoting effect which is examined in this chapter, namely, the effect 
of direct participation of foreign investors in company management. 
Indeed, the foreign ownership share (FS) is positive and significant at 
the 1 % level in all specifications, and its regression coefficient presents 
an economically meaningful value, suggesting that FDI into Hungary 
also plays a very important role as an internal channel for converting 
domestic firms into exporters9.
The trade environment variables do not exert a significant impact 
on the export activity of domestic firms in either the manufacturing or
‘J However, in our preliminary estimation work, the state ownership share did not 
produce a significant estimate for the manufacturing and service industries.
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the service industries. On the other hand, among the firm characteris­
tics variables, in addition to foreign ownership share, the K/L, LC, 
R&D, and SIZE variables, which are the proxies for capital intensity, 
human capital quality, research and development capacity, and organi­
zational size, respectively, obtain relatively robust and positive esti­
mates, These results are consistent with the large majority of previous 
studies on developed and developing economies. However, the TFP 
variable, which reflects the organizational and technological innova­
tiveness, contrary to our expectations, is insignificant for the manufac­
turing industry and negative at the 5% significance level for the ser­
vice industry.
The-location fixed-effects presented by the CAPITAL and EAST 
variables vary considerably between manufacturing firms and service 
firms : in the case of the manufacturing industry, the further west in 
the country a firm is located, the greater the potential for product 
export is, ceteris paribus, fn the service industry, the export market 
entry probability of firms located in the capital region is significantly 
higher than that of firms located in the western and eastern regions. 
The physical accessibility to the EU market, the most important mar­
ket for Hungarian exports, may exercise a considerable effect on the 
export activity of manufacturing firms, probably through the impact 
on logistics costs. In contrast, service firms are relatively free from 
such physical restraints, and the possibility of having a home base in 
the capital region suggests an advantageous effect on the acquisition 
of market information and customers of foreign countries. This is an 
interesting empirical finding from the viewpoint of firm location the­
ory.
The estimation results reported in Table 4.6 further demonstrate 
that the burden of an initial investment concerning export market 
entry is a critical management issue to be overcome for Hungarian 
domestic firms. In both industries, the estimate of the lagged endoge­
nous dependent variable is positive and significant at the 1% level, and 
its coefficient exceeds the value of 2,00 in all specifications. The coeffi­
cient of the lagged endogenous dependent variable in the export deci­
sion model of U. S. firms estimated by Bernard and Jensen (2004) is 
from 0.203 through 0.665(Table 5. p. 567). The estimate in the study of 
Blanes-Cristobal et al. (2008) concerning the sunk costs for Spanish 
exporters is 1.316 (Table 2, p. 112). Therefore, although it is not a pre­
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cise comparison, we conjecture that the sunk costs of export market 
entry, which Hungarian domestic firms face, are likely to be much 
higher than those in the U. S. and Western Europe, The relatively high 
initial cost of advancing overseas may be a characteristic of former 
socialist transition economies, where the market economy was still 
underdeveloped even in the early 2000s.
4.6 Information Spillover and Heterogeneity of FDI and 
Domestic Firms
The estimation results of the baseline models reported in the pre­
vious section strongly suggest a close association between the indus­
trial-technological proximity of MNEs to domestic firms and the infor­
mation spillover effect. The emergence of the FDI spillover, however, 
can also be greatly influenced by the heterogeneity of the foreign 
firms, as originators of the externality, and domestic firms, as benefit 
recipients. In this section, we empirically examine this issue through 
the extension of the empirical model.
4.6.1 Heterogeneity o f  FDI
From the viewpoint of the heterogeneity of foreign firms, we pay 
attention to their investment mode and organizational size. Compared 
to a wholly-owned local subsidiary, it is relatively difficult for a joint 
venture with domestic investors to maintain secrecy with respect to 
its technology or information provided by the parent firm. In addition, 
JV firms tend to have a stronger organizational and human connection 
with the local business community. Consequently, as a channel for 
information diffusion from MNEs to domestic firms, a JV firm is 
assumed to play a more active role than that played by a wholly- 
owned local subsidiary, ceteris paribus. Indeed, Javorcik and Spatare- 
anu (2008) found a strong positive externality of JV firms in compari­
son with fully foreign-owned firms from their empirical analysis on the 
FDI productivity spillover effect in Romania.
The firm size is also relevant to the information spillover effect. If 
other conditions are equal, the possibility of the leakage of internal 
knowledge and information may increase along with the expansion of 
the firm organization and operation. In addition, it is believed that
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because of its major presence in business communities and the strong 
social disclosure requirements, including government regulations in 
incoming countries, a large firm can easily become the target of infor­
mation extraction by local firms.
To examine the above hypothesis, we divide foreign firm samples 
into two groups depending on investment mode or organizational size 
and estimate the FDI spillover variables calculated for each individual 
sample group. The division by investment mode is based on whether 
the foreign ownership share is 100%. and that by organizational size is 
based on the 75 percentile of the annua! average number of employees.
The estimation results are shown in Table 4.7. Although all mod­
els include the same trade environment variables, firm characteristics 
variables, lagged endogenous dependent variable, and time and indus­
try fixed-effects dummy variables as the baseline model in their 
right-hand sides, the table reports solely the estimated parameters of 
the FDI spillover variables for brevity. Panel (a) of Table 4.7 shows 
the estimate of the spillover variables of fully foreign-owned firms and 
foreign JV firms; FUL is added to the variable name of the former, 
and JV  is added to that of the latter. Panel (b)of the same table reports 
the estimation results of the spillover variables of large MNEs and 
small MNEs in terms of the total number of employees: BIG is added 
to the variable name of the upper group, and SME is added to that of 
the lower one.
From these results, we confirm that an information spillover effect 
in the manufacturing industry, regardless of its extent and direction, is 
strongly originated from fully foreign-owned large firms. In the case of 
Hungary, these firms represent the fully-owned subsidiaries of the 
world's major international enterprises. However, Panel (a) of Table 
4.7 indicates that foreign JV firms also generate a significant positive 
externality. According to the estimation results of the nested variable 
model [2], this is mainly brought about by firms with the most distant 
proximity in terms of industrial classification (Enterprise Layer 10 in 
Figure 4,2). In the service industry, as compared to manufacturing 
firms, the role of small and medium-sized foreign companies is very 
distinctive as the economic entities promoting the export activity of 
domestic firms. According to the estimation results of Model [8]. the 
foreign firms belonging to the lower group in terms of the organiza­
tional size produce a significantly positive information spillover effect
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Table 4.7 FDI heterogeneity and information spillover effect
(a) Investment mode
Industrial sector Manufacturing Services
Model8 [1] [2] [3] [4]
SPILLZFUL,,., 0.6102** 0.0349
(0.239) (0.280)
SPILL2FULNiM 0.7182“ * 0.6676***
(0,193) (0.134),
SPILL3FULNm -0.1715** 0,0029
(0.074) (0.053)
SPILL4FULu-i 0.1348** 0.0362
(0.069) (0.054)
SPILL2JVu-1 0.8337** 0.1206
(0.403) (0.753)
SPILL2JVN,,., 0.8113*** 1.0034***
(0.256) (0.261)
SPILL3JVN 0.1330 -0.6782***
(0.154) (0.188)
SPILL4JVit-i 0.1120 0.1589
(0.138) (0.138)
N 12854 12854 26692 26692
Log likelihood -4259.12 - 4249.51 -7147.01 - 7122.42
Wald testb 6196.68*** 6185.31*** 10668.98*** 10622.53* * *
(b) Organizational size
Industrial sector Manufacturing Services
Model” [5] [6] [7] [8]
SPILL2BIGlhJ 0.5523* * 0.4618
(0.235) (0.371)
SPILL2BIGNiM 0.6472*** 0.5621” *
(0.199) (0.135)
SPILUBIGNu-, -0.1928** — 0.2668***
(0.076) (0.073)
SPJLL4BIG,,., 0.1787** -0.0100
(0.071) (0.057)
SPILL2SME,,, 0.7689 0.7403"
(0.682) (0.442)
SPILL2SMENn-i 0.4302 0.5886***
(0.366) (0.207)
SPILL3SMENlt., 0.0060 0.1748*
(0.118) (0.091)
SPILL4SME,,., -0,0816 0.3151***
(0.127) (0,087)
N 12854 12854 26692 26692
Log likelihood -4259.41 -4247,22 -7146.80 -7118.48
Wald test6 6196.45*** 6180.82*** 10668.32*** 10626.65***
Notes ■ “All models are estimated using the random-effects probit estimator. The esti­
mates of the constant term and other independent variables are not reported 
here. The robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and* 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
bNull hypothesis : All coefficients are zero.
Source ' Authors' estimation. For definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables, 
see Table 4.10.
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in each and every enterprise layer comprising the 2-digit level indus­
trial classification. This result demonstrates that, in the case of the 
service industry, it is much easier for domestic firms to understand 
and imitate the export operation of small and medium-sized foreign 
companies than that of larger ones. In sum, we found that the source 
and extent of the information spillover effect may vary greatly 
depending on the industrial sector, even in the same country.
4.6.2 Heterogeneity o f  Domestic Firms
Next we look at the relationship of the heterogeneity of domestic 
firms to the information spillover effect. Here, we focus on the pres­
ence of a foreign investor (s) as a business partner, the firm size, and 
the human resource and organizationai capacity. We expect that these 
factors will positively affect the export potential of domestic firms by 
improving their ability to collect external information and their adap­
tive capacity in the export business.
To validate this hypothesis, we estimated the interacted terms of 
the firm characteristics variables reflecting the above three factors 
and the FDI spillover variables. As with the baseline model, we use 
foreign ownership share IFS) and the annual average number of 
employees {SIZE) to represent the management participation of foreign 
investors and the firm size, respectively. On the other hand, it is diffi­
cult to express the human resource and organizational capacity of a 
domestic firm using any one of the firm characteristics variables. 
Thus, we perform the principal component analysis of the TFP, K/L, 
LC, and R&D variables and use its first component score (ORG} as a 
proxy of a firm's capacity for human resources and organization. As 
shown in Table 4.8, the ORG variable explains nearly 50% of the total 
variance of the four variables in both industries and adds original vari­
ables in a balanced manner.
The estimation results of the extension model, containing the 
interacted terms of FS, SIZE, and the newly introduced ORG variable 
and the FDI spillover variable (s) in its right-hand side, are listed in 
Table 4.910. The results demonstrate that each factor, i.e., foreign own-
10 To avoid multicollinearity, four firm characteristics variables are removed from 
the right-hand side of the regression model with the ORG variable.
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Table 4.8 Principal component analysis of the human resource and organizational capacity of 
domestic firms
(a) Manufacturing (JV= 12854)
Eigenvalue of the correlation matrix Eigenvectors and component loadings of the first component
Component
no. Eigenvalue
Accounted 
for variance
Cumulative 
percentage of 
total variance
Variables Eigenvector Componentloading
1 1.9589 48.97 48.97 TFP 0.2066 0.2892
2 1.0988 27.47 76.44 K/L 0.5008 0.5249
3 0.5599 14.00 90.44 LC 0.8018 0.6000
4 0.3825 9.56 100.00 R&D 0.8570 0.5300
(b) Services (JV= 22692)
Eigenvalue of the correlation matrix Eigenvectors and component loadings of the first component
Component
no. Eigenvalue
Accounted 
for variance
Cumulative 
percentage of 
total variance
Variables Eigenvector Componentloading
1 1.8617 46.54 46.54 TFP 0.2660 0.3629
2 1.1044 27.61 74.15 K/L 0.4261 0.4478
3 0.6413 16.03 90.19 LC 0.7761 0.6215
4 0.3926 9.81 100.00 R&D 0.8468 0.5306
Source '■ Authors' estimation. For definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables, see Table 4.10.
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ership, firm size, and human resource and organizational capacity, is 
effective in the absorption of know-how and technology diffusing from 
the export activity of MNEs. However, there is a significant difference 
in the extent among factors and industrial sectors. For instance, in 
Models [1] and [2] reported in Panel (a) of Table 4.9, the interacted 
terms of the FS. SPILL2. and SPILL2N variables produce statistically 
significant and positive coefficients. The information suggests that the 
participation of foreign investors in the management of a manufactur­
ing firm is an effective means of enjoying FDI externality more effi­
ciently. However, the same effect cannot be observed in the service 
industry. On the other hand, it is highly probable that human resource 
and organizational capacity are more critical for service firms than for 
manufacturing firms to absorb the information spillover effect and 
apply it to export business. Indeed, Panel (c) of Table 4.8 shows that 
all interacted terms of ORG variable and FDI spillover variables in 
Models [11] and [12] dealing with the service industry are estimated 
with a positive sign, and the statistical significance of their estimates is 
substantially higher than that for manufacturing firms reported in 
Models [9] and [10].
As described above, although the heterogeneity of domestic firms 
is closely related to the information spillover from MNEs, there is a 
difference in its extent depending on the nature of the heterogeneity 
or the industrial sector,
4.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we empirically examined the determinants of 
export market entry by domestic firms using large-scale panel data on 
Hungarian firms for the early 2000s. We found that direct transna­
tional investment greatly stimulates the export activity of domestic 
firms in Hungary through two channels, that is, direct management 
participation by foreign investors and the information spillover origi­
nated from incoming MNEs. The nested variable model, which has a 
set of spillover variables reflecting the multi-layered structure of the 
NACE industrial classification in its right-hand side, can more pre­
cisely specify the source, extent, and direction of the FDI externality 
affecting the export decision of domestic firms than the conventional 
model, which expresses the export propensity of foreign firms with a
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Table 4.9 Heterogeneity of domestic firms and information spillover effect 
(a) Foreign ownership share
Industrial sector Manufacturing Services
Model1 [1] [2] [31 [4]
FSit. , -0.2993 0.0039 0.4876** 0.3424
(0.314) (0.351) (0.241) (0.262)
SP IIJ.2 ^ , 0.4769" * 0.0201
(0.235) (0.267)
SPILL2N!H 0.6442* * * 0,6979” *
(0.193) (0.133)
SPILL3Nihi -0.1512** -0.0653
(0.073) (0.051)
SPILL4&J 0.1327* 0.0434
(0.070) (0.055)
FS x SPILL2ihi 1.4244*** 0.0561
(0.500) (0.406)
FSxSPILL2NiH 0.8027* -0.1120
(0.420) (0-370)
FS x SPILL3N/i-j 0.1124 0.2857
(0.280) (0231)
FS * SPILL4,,, 0.0351 0.3094
(0.335) (0.270)
N 12854 12854 26692 26692
Log likelihood -4255.33 -4249.87 -7147.01 -7129.57
Wald testb 6171.22*** 6173.04*'* 10669.67**’ 10647.84***
(b) Organizational size
Industrial sector Manufacturing Services
Model’ [5] [6] [7] [8]
SIZE,,., 0.2225*** 0.1690*** 0.0638* 0.0541
(0.065) (0.063) (0.038) (0.035)
SPILL2i,-i -0.0114 -0.3198
(0.390) (0.329)
SPILL2N!H 0.3592 0.4522* *
(0.311) (0,224)
SPILL3Na-j -0.1836 -0.1682
(0.174) (0.138)
SPILL4ihI -0.4308** -0.1257
(0.197) (0.139)
SIZE x SPILL2,, i 0.1814* 0.1215*
(0.099) (0.068)
SIZE x SPILL2N,,: 0.1051 0.0817
(0.078) (0.064)
SIZE* SPILL3Nit-i 0.0119 0.0468
(0.049) (0.047)
SIZE * SPILL4,,, 0.1769*** 0,0647
(0.058) (0.046)
N 12854 12854 26692 26692
Log likelihood - 4257.77 -4245.63 -7145,43 -7127.98
Wald testb 6189.36*** 6170.94*** 10670.33” * 10647.25*”
(Continued)
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Table 4.9 (continued)
(c) Human resource and organizational capacity
Industrial sector Manufacturing Services
Model* [9] [10] [11] [12]
ORGit-i 0.0549 0.0930* 0.0472 0.1069***
(0.049) (0.050) (0.033) (0.031)
SPlLL2,hi 0.5533** -0.0048
(0.232) (0.266)
SPILL2N,,-i 0.7333*** 0.6481***
(0.191) (0.130)
SPILL3N,,-! -0.1396* -0.1052**
(0.072) (0.051)
SPILLS, 0.1359** 0.0972*
(0.068) (0.053)
ORG xSPJLL2ji-i 0.1450* 0.1683***
(0.075) (0.057)
ORG x SPILL2Nihi 0.0709 0.1484***
(0.063) (0.048)
ORG x SPILL3N^i 0.0594 0.0198
(0.039) (0.032)
ORG x SPILL4irl -0.0350 0.1037***
(0.046) (0.035)
N 12854 12854 26692 26692
Log likelihood -4294.10 - 4284.57 - 7213.15 -7191.27
Wald test11 6249.71*** 6240.32*** 10766.66*** 10719.27“ *
Notes '■ 8AU models are estimated using the random-effects probit estimator. The estimates 
of the constant term and other independent variables are not reported here. The 
robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***. **, and*denote statisti­
cal significance at the 1%. 5%. and 10% levels, respectively. 
bNull hypothesis : All coefficients are zero.
Source '■ Authors' estimation. For definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables, see 
Table 4.10.
single variable.
The estimation results of the nested variable mode! reported in 
Section 4.5 strongly suggest that there is a close causality between the 
industrial-technological proximity of MNEs to domestic firms and the 
information spillover effect. In addition, the empirical analysis con­
ducted in the previous section reveals that the investment mode and 
organizational size of foreign firms and the ownership structure and 
organizational size of domestic firms as well as the human resource 
and organizational capacity greatly affect the possibility and extent of 
the information spillover effect.
We also confirmed that the findings of previous studies on devel­
oped and developing economies are generally applicable to Hungary, a 
post-socialist transitional country. Specifically, the exporters in Hun­
gary possess superior characteristics in terms of capital intensity.
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Table 4.10 Definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables used Ín the empirical analysis
Descriptive statistics
Variable r Definition Manufacturing {N= 12854)
Services 
{N= 26692)
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Fi mi category variable
y Exporter dummy variable 0.491 0.500 0233 0.423
ALWAYS Always exporter dummy variable (yfr= l: _Vj(. / - 1) 0.434 0.496 0.192 0.394
STOP Export stopper dummy variable (yv = t: vü - / = 0) 0.057 0.232 0.041 0.199
STAST Export starter dummy variable (jv, = 0: / — 1J 0.061 0.239 0.048 0315
Trade environment variables
TT Terms of trade (export price index/import price index x 100) 99.434 0.190 99.435 0.491
EU15 Annual GDP reál growth rate of 15 EU countries 1.567 0.519 1.566 0.518
FDI spillover variables
SPILL2 Share of foreign firms in tile export volume (NACE 2-digit level) 0.642 0.166 0.529 0.174
SPILL2N Share of foreign firms in the export volume (NACE 2-digit level - nested variable > 0.638 0.207 0.532 0.178
SPILL3N Share of foreign firms in the expón volume (NACE 3-digit level : nested variable) 0.490 0.331 0.240 0283
SPILL4 Share oí foreign firms in the export volume (NACE 4-dígit level) 0.557 0.281 0.436 0292
FLrm characteristics variables 0.064 0209 0.036 0.157
FS Foreign ownership share of the totál equity capital
TFP Totál factor productivity estimated using the Levinsohn-Petrin semi-parame tric 
method
0.025 0.187 0.029 0.190
K/L Assets per employee (naiural logarithm) 8.544 0.952 8870 1.05!
LC Labor costs per employee (natural logarithm) 7.269 0.465 7.291 0.526
R&D Intangibie assets per employee (natural logarithm) 2.010 1.372 2256 1.423
SIZE Annual average number of employees (natural logarithm) 3.293 1.105 2.739 0.897
CAPITAL Dummy variable fór firms located in the capital region 0.394 0.489 0.463 0.499
EAST Dummy variable fór firms localed in the eastern region 0.332 0.471 0278 0.448
ORG Humán resource and organizational capacíty (flrst principal component of TFP, K/L, 
LC and R&D variables)
-0.140 1333 -0.089 1.308
Source ‘ TT and EU15 are from the Hungárián Central Statistical Offices website (http://portal.ksh.hu/) and Statistical Office of the European Union's 
website (http;//epp,eurostat.ec.europa.eu/). respectively. The other variables come from census data of Hungárián firms.
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quality of human capital, research and development capacity, and firm 
size in comparison to nonexporters. In addition, we found that Hungar­
ian domestic firms face substantial sunk costs incurred by new entries 
into export markets.
By subjecting not only the manufacturing industry, which has 
been addressed in the large majority of previous studies, but also the 
service industry to empirical analysis, this study gave great attention 
to the differences a distinction in the industrial sector brings to the 
structure of the export decision model. The empirical analysis in this 
chapter revealed that the mechanisms generating the information 
spillover effect and the effects of firm location are very different 
between the two industries. The cost-benefit performance of export 
promotion policies for domestic firms can be improved through modifi­
cation of their institutional frameworks by taking this empirical evi­
dence into account.
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Emergence of a Service Economy: The Case of 
Knowledge-Intensive Business Services- 
Hungary vs. Slovakia
5.1 Historical Shift in Economic Structure and Growing 
Importance of the Services
5.1.1 Growing Role o f  the Service Sector
Since the last decades of the 20th Century, the growth of the ser­
vice sector has been unprecedented, considerably outpacing manufac­
turing and agriculture. Some researchers refer to this change as a 
service sector revolution {Chesbrough and Shphrer, 2006). In a simplis­
tic way. the wealth of nations can be attributed to agriculture two cen­
turies ago, to manufacturing a century ago, and to the service sector 
now, producing 70-80% of GDP in developed economies. In contrast, 
the share of the service sector in the GDP in developing countries is 
52% and that in the Central and Eastern European Post-Sociaiist 
countries ranges from 58.4% to 62.9%. Another noteworthy feature of 
these changes is the different developmental dynamics in the manu­
facturing and service sectors. For example, in the UK, between 1998 
and 2004. the knowledge-intensive business service (KIBS) sector 
experienced 23.6% productivity growth, accompanying a 20.2% 
employment increase. On the other hand, 28.8% productivity growth 
and 22.8% employment decline were reported in the manufacturing
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Table 5.1 Contributions of economic sectors in the GDP : Comparison of some 
CEE economies to various groups of EU countries, 1995 and 2007
1995 2007
Agriculture Industry Service Agriculture Industry Service
EU-27 8.4% 28.6% 63.0% 5.8% 24.9% 69.2%
EU-15 5.0% 27.5% 67.5% 3.4% 23.5% 73.1%
Czech Republic 6.4% 40.5% 53.1% 3.5% 38.1% 58.4%
Hungary 8.2% 33.1% 58.7% 4.7% 32.5% 62.8%
Poland 26.9% 29.7% 43.5% n.a. n.a. n.a.
Slovakia 9.3% 37.1% 53.9% 3.6% 34.3% 62.1%
Source '■ EUROSTAT, European Union Labor Force Survey (http://epp.eurostat. 
ec.europa.en/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/)
sector (Sako, 2006, p. 500).
Similarly to international trends, the economic performance of the 
service sector increased significantly in the last decade in Hungary 
and Slovakia. In 2007, as shown in Table 5.1, almost two-thirds of the 
GDP was generated by the service sector in both countries. These 
findings bolster a previous analysis of the importance of the service 
sector in both countries.
In addition, it is noteworthy that, in the case of Hungary, between 
1992 and 2006, the productivity growth in the service sector (mea­
sured by the share of the gross value added/capital) was higher than 
that in manufacturing. In addition, the service sector played a crucial 
role in employment generation. Between 1995 and 2006, every second 
new job (46%) was created in the service sector, and, interestingly, 
more than every second new job (57%) was established in KIBS (ERM 
Report, 2008)
With regard to the unbundling of corporate functions relative to 
support activities in a firm’s infrastructure and administration, global­
ization of the service sector is a rather new phenomenon in compari­
son to manufacturing and is driven by the factors presented below :
(1) Globalization of the labor market or the Great Doubling in the 
international labor market. After 1989, rather than 1.48 billion 
people, 2.93 billion are competing and intensifying wage competi-
1 The composition of the KIBS is presented in detail in Section 5.2.
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tion globally (Freeman, 2006).
(2) General use (due to radical cost reduction) of the Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICT) in company practices speeded 
up the delocalization (outsourcing/off shoring) of not only the 
‘primary activities’ (e.g., production) in the global value chain 
(GVC) but also the ‘support activities' in administrative functions 
(Gospel and Sako, 2010) or services. In this relation it is worth not­
ing that Austrian and German firms could radically reduce their 
labor costs (by 37-73%) by outsourcing research activities to 
Eastern European countries (Marin, 2010, p. 10).
(3) In the emerging markets, the social and economic actors (govern­
ments) are looking for new development strategies (a new path 
of the economic development) aimed to improve their position in 
GVC in supplying higher-value-added products and services. 
With the help of this new policy orientation, the CEE countries, 
including Hungary, intend to get rid of the situation of “locking 
(...) into economic activities with low-value-added/productivity 
growth and, thus, undermining future sustainable growth" (Kattel 
et ai., 2009, p. 2).
(4) Fast development of ‘modularization' or 'networking' via various 
types of organizational and managerial innovations in global cor­
porations is continuing. This process is driven by both the cost- 
reduction and the transformation of the firms (e.g., focusing on the 
core competences in both the ‘primary' and the ‘support’ 
activities)2.
Radical changes in the nature of the global labor market are 
regarded as a key factor for the high speed of internationalization of 
services. As a result of the participation of China, India, and former 
Soviet-bloc countries in the global labor market, today, 2.93 billion 
people are in competition, while only 1,46 billion workers were active 
in the global labor market before these historical changes. Richard B. 
Freeman labeled this enormous shift in the global labor market as a 
'great doubling’ with a far reaching impact on labor in both the devel­
z According to Sako (2009b), in the 'modular corporation,’ the labor process in 
practically every large corporate department can be delocalized by outsourcing 
or off shoring and can be driven both by cost- and knowledge efficiencies, using 
what she calls new locations with a talent pool’ (p. 4).
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oped and developing economies (Freeman, 2006). In the countries 
mentioned above, before the collapse of the state-socialist political-eco­
nomic system and before the end of their economic isolations (e.g., 
India), the workforce rarely competed directly with those in the 
developed countries. One of the most important impacts of this histori­
cal change in the global labor market is increased wage competition, 
not only in the low-level blue-collar jobs in the manufacturing sector 
but also in the best- and worst-paid white-collar jobs. Contrary to 
widespread public belief, these developing (or emerging) economies 
are increasing their highly skilled tabor force rather fast with the 
future aspiration to improve their present position in the GVC of both 
manufacturing and services. In this regard, the following is notewor­
thy • even before the 2008 global financial and economic crisis, China 
launched various initiatives to increase the share of high value-added 
products in total exports and made remarkable progress in R&D (e.g., 
more than 750 MNCs created R&D capacity in the nanotechnology 
industry). In addition, by 2010. the number of Chinese PhD students in 
engineering and natural sciences was expected to outstrip that of simi­
lar categories in the U. S. A. Finally, it is noteworthy that, besides 
China, Indonesia and Brazil doubled the number of university gradu­
ates between 1980 and 1990. In this relation, we are noting a new pat­
terns of outsourcing has recently emerged as German firms started to 
outsource their core or head office activities to Eastern Europe. As a 
result of the delocalization, “Germany is losing high-paying jobs in 
R&D and IT not just the bad and low skilled jobs. (...) Siemens praised 
the high quality of skilled workers in Eastern Europe, (which is) a 
particularly attractive location for Siemens compared to India and 
China because of its proximity to Germany and because of the culture 
and time zone" (Marin, 2010, p. 17).
ICT and modularization (or networking) of business organizations 
are important drivers and/or enablers of delocalization (outsourcing/ 
off shoring) of services. The dramatic decline in the telecommunication 
costs, decreasing importance of the physical distance ( ‘death of dis­
tance' ), and extensive use of ICT assist in the geographical redistri­
bution of data storage and processing (e.g., outsourcing the data pro­
cessing activities of accounting and wage departments, medical diag­
nosis, and logistical activities). Finally, ICT facilitates the standardiza­
tion of services. This is the process of ‘productizing services' in the
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Table 5.2 Moving of the value chain of business services
IT Services -> BPO KPO
IT infrastructure. Soft­
ware applications devel­
opment, Hosting, Data 
entry and conversion
Call centers. Horizontal back- 
office processes (e.g., payroll 
administration, accounts pay­
able), Vertical business pro­
cess (e.g., claims handling in 
insurance)
Research and development. 
Engineering design. Data 
analysis and data mining, 
Advanced processes in legal, 
medical, biotechnical, and 
pharmaceutical sectors
Note '■ BPO and KPO denote business process outsourcing and knowledge process 
outsourcing, respectively.
Source '■ Sako (2009b, p. 17),
service sector. However, the infiltration of servicing is also evident in 
the manufacturing sector. For example, among such globally well- 
known manufacturers as the American IBM or the German Siemens, 
the fastest growing aspect of their turnover is generated from service 
activities. This process is often called ‘servicing products.
In spite of the fact that the service sector covers a greater variety 
of activities than the manufacturing one, only 10% of the service sec­
tor is involved in international trade, while it is more than 50% in the 
case of manufacturing (UNCTAD, 2004), The smaller share of the ser­
vice sector in international trade may be explained by the special 
characteristics of its products. In the majority of cases, it is difficult to 
store a significant part of the service sector’s product due to the fact 
that the production and consumption of services take place simultane­
ously. This feature of the service sector results in weak tradability: 
therefore, at the beginning of the 21st Century (2003), despite the 
heavy reliance on the use of ICT, services represented only 1.8 billion 
USD in the work trade, in contrast to the 7,4 billion USD share of the 
manufacturing sector (WTO, 2005). Despite these difficulties, the share 
of foreign direct investments (FDI) in the service activities increased 
in the last decades of the 20Ul Century. For example, in the 1970s, the 
sector represented only 25% of the total inward FDI: in 2002, this 
share increased to 60% (UNCTAD, 2004). The role of FDI is especially 
important in business services (e.g., in such sub-sectors as transporta­
tion. telecommunications, real estate, catering, and hotels).
Governments in the emerging markets are designing new devel­
opment (modernization) strategies aimed at moving up on the GVC
Mil
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and shifting from a 'low-skilf to a high—skill equilibrium growth 
model in the CEE countries. Table 5.2 illustrates the possible steps of 
moving up in the GVC in the field of business service activities.
It is quite probable that the radical changes in the global labor 
market and the impact of the global financial and economic crisis in 
spite of the temptation of ‘economic nationalism' in some countries 
may result in only a temporary slowdown and stronger competition 
and not a reversal of the trend of delocalization of business services. In 
this context, the organizational innovations and the knowledge devel­
opment practice in the KIBS firms are playing a key role in improving 
the competitiveness and moving up the GVC of business services.
5.1.2 Heterogeneous Character o f  Services and Innovation
Characterizing the service activities in general, Korczynski (2002) 
(cited by Flecker et al. (2008, p. 103)) identifies the following basic 
features of services :
(1) ‘Intangibility’ — the product of service work is not at all or only 
partially tangible;
(2) ‘Perishability’ — the product is 'ephemeral' and cannot be stored:
(3) ‘Variability’ — the recipients of services may vary according to 
their expectations and actions:
(4) ‘Simultaneous production and consumption' — the service is pro­
duced and consumed in one and the same situation ( 'uno-actu' 
principle): and
(5) ‘Inseparability’ — the product is produced by both a service pro­
vider and a receiver (co-production).
According to Salther and Tether (2006). the fundamental charac­
teristics of innovation activities in the knowledge-intensive and profes­
sional service firms are as follows : (1) the role of highly skilled labor 
in the creation and exploitation of new solutions; (2) the importance of 
new organizational practices, such as the use of knowledge manage­
ment (KM) systems in supporting the realization of new innovative 
opportunities: (3) the 'generative dance' between clients and produc­
ers as new solutions are negotiated and co-produced between differ­
ent actors: (4) the key role of social networks in generating and sup­
porting knowledge creation and exchange through brokerage and clo­
sure: (5) the ad hoc or 'informal' organizational form of most
1«2
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knowledge-intensive service firms (p. 17).
The characteristics of the innovation of the KIBS firms reported 
above reflect the features of an open innovation system in which 
reciprocal training is an essential part In such a system, KIBS firms 
increase their knowledge base each time they work with new clients. 
Furthermore, client firms benefit from the expertise of the KIBS pro­
viders, which is established from their experience with other firms 
(Basset et al., 2011, p. 21).
The fast development of information and communication technolo­
gies, which has fundamentally transformed knowledge management in 
general (e.g., handling, storing, and transferring information) did not 
question the importance of the ‘proximity paradox . Toivonen reported 
the following : "The empirical studies made until now indicate that, 
even though there is growing potential for the electronic delivery of 
graphic, numerical, and text-based information, no part of the KIBS 
transactions can be carried out without local presence of face-to-face 
contacts" (Basset et al., 2011. p. 9).
5.2 A Brief Overview of the Diffusion of Learning/Inno­
vative Organizations in Europe
Before reporting the outcome of the organizational innovation and 
knowledge development in the KIBS firms in Hungary and Slovakia, a 
brief overview of similar practices in Europe is presented.
The economy in Europe has a characteristic variety of forms of 
work organization, reflecting various capacities of learning and innova­
tion. The findings of the 4lh European Working Conditions Survey 
(EWCS-2005) in the EU-27 countries (Vateyre et al.. 2009) indicate 
that almost two fifths (38%) of the European employees surveyed are 
working in a discretionary learning organization (innovative organiza­
tion). In this class of work organization, the job structure is character­
ized by a high level of autonomy in work, a need to learn, and prob­
lem-solving, task complexity, and self-assessment of the quality of 
work. Such characteristics of work as monotony, repetitiveness, and 
pace constraints are under-represented'*. The discretionary learning
3 The discretionary learning form of work organization is comparable to the oper­
ating adhocracy’ model of Minztberg (1979; 1983) and has many of the common
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forms of work organization are highly developed in such sectors of the 
national economies as service, mainly in financial and insurance activi­
ties (63% of employees), business services (50%), community, recre­
ational, cultural, and personal services (49%), and in the utility sector 
of gas. electricity, and water (56%), This type of organization is used 
less in manufacturing: however, there is a concern with the large 
share of employees in the mechanical engineering sector (44%), which 
is characterized by complex production processes and important 
research-development activities. A comparison of the diffusion of inno­
vative or learning-oriented forms of work organization clearly indi­
cates that these forms of work organization are more widespread in 
Northern Europe than in other parts.
Another type, referred to as 'lean organization, is typified by good 
learning and innovation potential4. This class of work organization, in 
which more than one fourth (26%) of the employees participate, is 
defined primarily by an overrepresentation of teamwork (autonomous 
or not) and job rotation (particularly multi-skilling), autonomy in qual­
ity supervision (self assessment of quality of work and quality norms), 
and various factors constraining the speed of work or pace. However, 
work autonomy is only slightly higher than the average and limited by 
the importance of pace constraints linked to the collective nature of 
the work and the requirement of respecting strict quantitative pro­
Emergence of a Service Economy: The Case of Knowledge-Intensive Business Scrvices-Hungary vs. Slovakia
features of the 'Social-Technical System Design' (STSD) model. Nielsen (2007) 
makes a distinction between the traditional social-technical approach of the 
Tavistock Institute and the Scandinavian STSD in which, in early socio-techni- 
cal studies, attention was focused on the improvement of the quality of working 
life at the level of work groups within the organization. In the modern STSD. 
the attention shifts from the working group to the organization as a whole. As a 
result a set of design rules for a division of labor is created, having a positive 
effect on the quality of working life as well as on the performance of the organi­
zation (Nielsen, 2007, p. 67).
The ‘lean wave' and the lean principle have been popular since the 1990s. and 
"the practical use of lean strategies includes issues of cost reductions, employee 
empowerment, value chain orientation, customer focus, and product innovation" 
(MEADOW Consortium. 2010, p. 26). In our use, a lean organization emphasizes 
the importance of the ‘employee empowerment’ from the various features of 
lean production. The original description of the lean principles or lean wave is 
related to the work of Womack and Jones (2003).
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duction norms. Thus, this model of work organization has much in 
common with ‘controlled autonomy,’ which reflects the employers' 
contradictory concern for balancing the needs of exercising control 
over employees while encouraging creativity.
The lean production forms of work organization are most preva­
lent in the manufacturing industries (31%) and in the construction 
sector, but significant numbers of employees (20%) are in other service 
sectors, Taylorist forms of work organization (or the organization of 
work for mass production) occur most frequently in manufacturing 
(28%). especially in such mature industries as textiles, clothing, and 
leather (47%), but to a much lesser degree in the mechanical, electri­
cal, and electronic engineering industries(17% and 19%). These forms 
are generally less present in the service sectors, except in hotels and 
restaurants (26%) and post and telecommunications (22%), with a 
higher level than the average(16.4%). Finally, the traditional or simple 
structure of work organization grouped in the fourth class is prevalent 
in the service sectors, mainly in transport (27%), wholesale and retail 
trade (25%), community, recreational, cultural, and personal services 
(22%), and hotels and restaurants (21%), but is also diffused, higher 
than the average rate (16.4%), in the food and beverage industries 
(19%). Table 5.3 indicates the distribution of forms or models of work 
organization and is a comparison of the old’ and ‘new’ member states 
in the European Union.
The positions of Hungary and Slovakia within the EU-27 coun­
tries are rather unbalanced. For example, on the one hand, among 
such new member state (NMS) countries as Hungary, Estonia, and 
Cyprus, the share of learning’ or 'innovative' organization is among 
the highest On the other hand, the Taylorist model of mass produc­
tion is near or exceeds the EU average. The same pattern of distribu­
tion of forms of work organization is true for Slovakia. This country 
belongs to the country cluster in which a ‘lean organization' has a 
higher rate than the EU average. At the same time in Slovakia, the 
share of Taylorist work organizations exceeds the EU average. Unfor­
tunately. these aggregated country-level data do not provide informa­
tion about the distribution of various forms of work organization 
( ‘learning,' 'lean.' 'Taylorist,' and ‘simple’ versions) by sectors 
within the countries surveyed. The core motif in designing and carry­
ing out a comparative company survey in the Hungarian and Slovak
!G5
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Table 5.3 Share of work organization models in the EU-27 countries : EWCS- 
2005
Models of work organization NMS+ 2 EU-15
Discretionary learning orga­
nization (post-Fordism)
Hungary. Estonia, and 
Malta
Austria. Belgium. Germany, 
Sweden, Denmark. The 
Netherlands, France, Lux­
emburg, and Finland
Lean organization (Neo- 
Fordist work organization)
Estonia. Latvia. Lithuania. 
Czech Republic, Poland, 
Romania, Slovenia, Slova­
kia, and Cyprus
Belgium. Luxemburg, UK. 
Ireland, Spain, Denmark. 
Finland, Malta, Portugal, and 
Greece
T ay lorist/Ford is t work 
organization {mass produc­
tion)
Bulgaria. Czech Republic, 
Hungary. Lithuania, Roma­
nia, Slovakia, and Cyprus
Greece, Spain, Italy, and 
Portugal
Traditional or non-coded 
work organization
Bulgaria, Czech Republic. 
Hungary. Lithuania, Slova­
kia, and Cyprus
Ireland. Greece. UK, Portu­
gal, and Spain
Source '■ Mako et al. (2008. p. 1080).
KIBS sector was to overcome knowledge deficiency’ in that field.
_
5.3 Share and Changes in the KIBS Sector Employment in 
Europe : Special Focus on Hungary and Slovakia
Following a brief presentation of the distribution of the forms of 
work organization in Europe, we intend to locate the various branches 
of the KIBS sector within the European employment structure (see 
Table 5.4 for details) and the development of this sector in Hungary 
and Slovakia and compare them with the EU-27 average over the last 
decade (2000-2007).
In Hungary and other post-socialist countries, the share of KIBS 
in employment is below the EU-27 average (33%), and these econo­
mies are lagging considerably behind such countries as Sweden (48%), 
the UK(43%), and Finland(41%). Among the post-socialist economies 
of the NMS countries, in a comparison of the knowledge-intensive 
(business) services (KIS or KIBS), the highest level of employment 
was registered in Hungary (28.2%). When evaluating the employment 
shares in the sub-sectors of the KIBS (e.g., KIHTS and KIMS), visible
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Table 5.4 Share of knowledge-intensive service sectors in employment in some EU 
countries, 2007
(%)
Knowledge-
intensive
high-technology
services
(KIHTS)
Knowledge-
intensive
market
services
(KIMS)
Knowledge-
intensive
financial
services
(KIFS)
Other
knowledge-
intensive
services
(OKIS)
Knowledge-
intensive
services
(KIS)
(Total)
EU-27 3.29 8,27 2.97 18.43 32.96
Czech Republic 2.99 5.86 2.07 14.74 25.66
Hungary 3.28 5.91 2.16 16.85 28.20
Poland 2.57 5.38 2.38 14.49 24.81
Romania 1.52 2.70 1.04 9.15 14.40
Slovenia 2.80 5.64 2.45 15.38 26.27
Slovakia 2,89 4.95 2.02 14.87 24.74
Finland 4,56 9.92 2.01 24.24 40.73
Sweden 5.07 11.43 1.95 29.38 47.83
France 3.40 9.24 3.09 21.16 36.89
Germany 3.44 8.64 3.50 19.21 34.79
United Kingdom 4.36 10.02 4.35 24.12 42.85
Ireland 3.70 7.92 4.43 19.43 35.48
Spain 2.95 8.87 2.40 13.98 28.19
Italy 3.12 9.58 2.87 11.15 30.67
Source ■ Eurostat Data Explorer {http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/ 
statistics/themes).
variations were registered within this country group. In the case of 
the ‘knowledge-intensive high-tech services' (KIHTS), the Hungarian 
employment share is the highest (3.28%) among the post-socialist 
countries, followed by the Czech Republic (3.99%). Slovakia (2.89%), 
and Slovenia (2.80%), and the lowest in Romania (1.52%). In the case 
of the 'knowledge-intensive market services' (KIMS), Estonia (7.03%) 
and Latvia (6.17%) occupy the first two positions, and Hungary is the 
third in rank (5.91%), followed by the Czech Republic (5.86%), Slove­
nia (5.64%), Poland (5.38%). and Slovakia (4.95%). Identifying the 
share of employment in the ‘knowledge-intensive financial services’ 
(KIFS), Slovenia has a leading position (2.45%), followed by Poland 
(2.38%), Hungary (2.16%), the Czech Republic (2.07%), and Slovakia 
(2.02%). Concerning the ‘other knowledge-intensive services’ (OKIS). 
Lithuania has the leading position (17.78%), and Hungary occupies the 
second position (16.85%), followed by Estonia (16.83%), Slovenia
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Figure 5.1 Share of total service sector in employment in Hungary, Slovakia, and 
EU-27 countries, 2000-2008
(%)
Source '■ Authors’ illustration based on Eurostat Data Explorer (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/ 
portat/page/portal/statistics/lhemes).
(15.38%), and then Slovakia (14.86%). Romania has the weakest posi­
tion among the post-socialist countries3.
In a dynamic perspective (from 2000 to 2008), looking at the 
growth rates of employment in the total service sector and in both the 
'knowledge-intensive' and ‘less-knowledge-intensive’ service sectors, 
the following patterns were identified. As shown in Figure 5.1, the 
share and the growth rates of the total service sector were the high­
est in the EU-27 countries, followed by Hungary, and Slovakia has a 
visibly weaker position.
Assessment of the aggregated data of the 'total service sector,' 
‘knowledge-intensive service’ (KIS), and 'less-knowledge-intensive 
service’ (LKIS) shows that Hungary is in a better position than Slova­
kia, both from a static and a dynamic perspective. In addition, it is of 
value to map the employment share and its growth by sub-sectors of 
the KIS. In other words, our focus is on country contrasts in employ-
5 In relation to the 'less-knowledge-intensive services.' Hungary has a higher 
share of employment (34.67%) than Slovakia (31.78%). In addition, the Hungar­
ian share of employment in this type of service (34.67%) was higher than the 
EU-27 average (33.7%) in 2007.
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Table 5.5 Share of knowledge-intensive service sectors in employment in Hun­
gary, Slovakia, and the EU, 2000-2008
(%)
Types of services
Hungary Slovakia EU-27 average '
2000 2005 2008 2000 2005 2008 2000 2005 2007
Knowledge-inten­
sive high-technology 
services (KIHTS)
3.09 3.15 3.28 2.97 2.67 2.77 3.21 3.28 3.29
Knowledge-inten­
sive market services 
(KIMS)
4.68 5.95 6.45 3.31 4.72 5.44 6.81 7.79 8.27
Knowledge-inten­
sive financial ser­
vices (KIFS)b
2.23 2.06 2.44 1.77 2.17 2.27 3.11 2.% 2.97
Other knowledge- 
intensive services 
(OKIS)
16.5 17,07 16.55 16.43 15.87 14.24 17.22 18.45 18.43
Knowledge-inten­
sive services total
26.5 28.22 28.73 24.48 25.43 24.71 30.36 32.47 32.96
Less-knowledge- 
intensive services 
(LKIS)
33.27 34.44 34.67 31.35 31.08 31.78 33.45 33.89 33.77
Service sector total 59.77 62.66 63.40 55.83 56.51 56.49 63.81 66.36 66.73
Notes '■ 8 As there are no data on the EU average available for 2008, the data in the last 
column refer to 2007. 
b Excluding financial intermediation and high-tech services.
Source '■ Eurostat Data Explorer (http://epp.eurQstat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/ 
statistics/themes).
ment share and employment growth by such sub-sectors as KIHTS, 
KIMS, KIFS, and LK1S. Tables 5.5 and 5.6 provide information about 
these differentials between the two post-socialist Central European 
countries in comparison to the EU-27.
The share of the service sector total (KIS + LKIS)in the two post­
socialist countries was weaker than that of the EU-27 average in both 
2000 and 2008 or 2007. However, there were differences. In the case of 
Hungary, the differences in the service sector employment share 
between 2000 and 2008 or 2007 decreased (from 4.04% in 2000 to 
3.33% in 2008). In the case of Slovakia, the differences were more visi­
ble and increased more than the EU-27 average (from 7.98% in 2000 
to 10.24% in 2008).
The picture is clearly different in a comparison of the growth
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Table 5.6 Growth rate of overall and sub-sector service sector employment 
between 2000 and 2008 (2007) in Hungary, Slovakia, and the EU-27
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average
T ypes of services Hungary(2008/2000)
Slovakia
(2008/2000)
EU-27 average 
(2007/2000)
KIHS 6.1% -6.7% 2.5%
KIMS 37.8% 64.4% 21.4%
KIFS 9.4% 28.2% -4.5%
OKIS 0.3% -13.3% 7.0%
KIS total 6.4% 0.9% 8.6%
Service total 6.1% 1.4% 1.0%
Note ■ See Table 5.5 for definitions of type of service.
Source '■ Eurostat Data Explorer(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/ 
statistics/themes).
potential of the service sector in general and, especially, in its sub-sec­
tors (see Table 5.5).
Looking at the growth rates of the overall service employment, in 
both post-socialist countries, but particularly in Hungary ( + 6.1%) and, 
to a lesser extent in Slovakia (+1.4%), the growth rate between 2000 
and 2008 (2007) was stronger than the EU-27 average (+1%).
By evaluating the employment growth between 2000 and 2008 by 
sub-sectors of KIS (or KIBS) services, a more nuanced picture may 
be obtained. The growth rate of the overall KIS in Hungary (+ 8.4%) 
was close to the EU-27 average ( + 8,6%), but it was much weaker in 
Slovakia( + 0.9%). The employment growth in the KIHS was higher in 
Hungary ( + 6.1%) than the EU-27 average ( + 2.5%) and declined in 
Slovakia ( -6.7%). In the KIMS, the employment growth rates in Hun­
gary (+ 37.8%) and, especially, in Slovakia (+ 64.4%) were higher than 
the EU-27 average( + 21.4%). Similarly, the employment growth rates 
in the KIFS, in Hungary(+ 9.4%), and, again, especially, in Stovakia( + 
28.2%) were significant while, in the EU-27 (-4.5%), there was a 
reduction in employment In the case of the OKIS, the employment 
growth rate was stronger in the EU-27 countries ( + 7.0%) and very 
weak in Hungary ( + 0.3%), and a significant decline was observed in 
Slovakia (-13.3%).
The improvement of economic performance was rather unequal in 
the very heterogeneous service sector. For example, such firm level 
performance indicators as gross value-added per capita, turnover,
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export, profitability, and employment growth were higher than the 
average in the KIBS (Hamar, 2005) in comparison to the traditional 
and system firms.
The next section focuses on the research design and methods of 
company surveys carried out in the Hungarian (2008) and Slovakian 
(2008-2009) KIBS sectors on the diffusion of organizational innovations 
and the knowledge-development practices. Detailed empirical data on 
the diffusion of organizational innovation and the knowledge develop­
ment practices of the firms surveyed are presented in the next chap­
ter.
5.4 Research Design, Sampling, and Research Method
5.4.1 Organisational Innovation ' A Neglected Area o f  Research
In relation with the innovation performance of the economy, there 
is an abundance of information on technologically related product and 
process innovation, especially, in the manufacturing sector (Schien- 
stock and Hamalainen, 2001). Since the 1980s, renewed interest has 
been registered to better understand, from both the theoretical and 
empirical perspectives, the complex, dynamic, and multilevel relation­
ship between organizational development and innovation, especially in 
the KIBS sector (Lam, 2005: Salter and Tether, 2006). In this context, 
it is necessary to call attention to the similarities and differences of the 
organizational innovation and patterns of knowledge use between the 
KIBS and manufacturing firms. The literature dealing with service 
sector innovation can be classified into two contrasting schools of 
thought. First, a theoretical approach stresses the particular character 
of innovation in the service sector (e.g., the key role of organizational 
development extensive use of an external knowledge source, higher 
priority of training, collective practice of knowledge development, 
interactive working practices, client-specific specialization, and gener­
alized use of cooperative work) in comparison with the manufacturing 
sector (Leiponen, 2001: Leiponen. 2004: Salter and Tether, 2006: 
Toivonen. 2006). The second approach emphasizes the similarity of 
innovation in the service and manufacturing sectors and refuses 
black-and-white views (Pavitt, 1984: Evangelista, 2000: Miozzo and
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Soete, 2001; Evangelista and Savona, 2003) on the sector's character of 
innovation.
In the Hungarian academic community, there is a scarcity of sys­
tematic research on organizational innovation in general and. espe­
cially. with regard to the KIBS sector. To overcome this deficiency, 
the Research Group of Sociology of Organization and Work at the 
Institute of Sociology of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (Buda­
pest) recently initiated desk-top research on the diffusion of organiza­
tional innovation and gathered empirical materials learned from its 
participation in several EU-funded projects6.
This chapter and the next are a presentation of the first analysis 
of systematically collected company-level data with the objective of 
better understanding the diffusion and drivers of organizational inno­
vation and the practice of knowledge development by comparing the 
KIBS sectors in Hungary (2008) and Slovakia (2008-2009).
5.4.2 Sample o f  the Company Survey and Sampling Method
The cross-country company survey was designed to collect sys­
tematic information on the innovation and learning practices of busi­
ness service firms operating in Hungary and Slovakia'. There is no 
generally accepted definition for 'business service: ' this category 
includes heterogeneous economic activities. In our study, based on 
screening of the literature and with the intention to produce interna­
tionally comparable data, the knowledge-intensive professional ser­
vices offered for other companies are defined as ‘business services.’ 
such as IT services (both software and hardware), administrative and
Emergence of a Service Economy: The Case of Knowledge-Intensive Business Services-Hungary vs, Slovakia
6 In this respect, our involvement in the following projects is noteworthy : EU- 
funded projects • 'Work Organization and Restructuring in the Knowledge 
Society' (WORKS, Integrating and Strengthening the European Research 
Area— CIT3/CT/2005-006193. 6lh FP. 2005/2009, 'Measuring the Dynamics of 
Organization and Work' (MEADOW —Priority 7 : Citizens and Governance in a 
Knowledge-based Society—028336, 6th FP. 2007-2010).
‘ Regarding the service sector, the following classifications were often used (Salter 
and Tether. 2006) • (a) traditional service (e.g.. personal service), (b) system 
service (e.g., airlines and banking), and (c) KIBS. The main focus of our research 
is on activities classified under the KIBS.
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Table 5.7 Share of KIBS firms by types of activities (NACE codes) in Hungary
and Slovakia
Activity Hungary Slovakia
Accounting, finance, and legai services (NACE codes : K 66.1, 
Activities auxiliary to financial services, except insurance and 
pension funding: K 66.2. Activities auxiliary to insurance and 
pension funding: K 64.9, Other financial service activities, except 
insurance and pension funding: M 69, Legal and accounting 
activities: M 70. Activities of head offices: management consul­
tancy activities)
20.9 22.7
Human resources management(NACE codes : N 78, Employment 
activities: P 85.5. Other education) 19.4 20.7
Technical engineering, consultancy (NACE codes : M 71, Archi­
tectural and engineering activities: technical testing and analy­
sis: M 72, Scientific research and development)
25.2 18.5
Information- and computer-related activities (NACE codes : J 62, 
Computer programming, consultancy, and related activities: J 63, 
Information service activities)
21.9 21.6
Advertising, marketing, customer service, other services (NACE 
codes : M 73, Advertising, market research: M 74.3, Translation 
and interpretation activities: N 77.3. Renting and leasing of other 
machinery, equipment, and tangible goods: N 81.1, Combined 
facilities support activities: N 81.2.2, Other building and industrial 
cleaning activities: N 82.2. Activities of call centers)
12.6 16.5
Total 100.0 100.0
Source ■ The joint company survey.
legai services, financial services, and R&D*. Table 5.7 contains the 
activities selected for the purpose of company surveys in both Hun­
gary and Slovakia.
In the first quarter of 2008. according to the National Register of 
Economic Organizations compiled by the Hungarian Central Statistical 
Office, 4,049 companies with 10 or more employees were registered in 
the field of business services, while 2,714 were registered in Slovakia9. 
To design a statistically representative sample of firms, 200 companies
8 For more details, see Mako et ai. (2008).
!i Bajzikova et a). (2009. pp. 5-6).
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and 100 companies were selected from Hungary and Slovakia, respec­
tively, using a multi-stage stratified sampling method. The basic eco­
nomic activity of the firms classified by the NACE code (the statistical 
classification of economic activities in the European Community) was 
used as the stratification variable. This sampling method ensured 
equal chances for all companies belonging to the population surveyed 
to be selected in the sample and reflected the heterogeneity of the 
organizational population as well. The sampling frame was restricted 
for companies employing at least 10 persons: micro-firms were 
excluded because, according to previous research experiences, these 
firms are hardly available for surveys and also because the division of 
labor within these firms is rather underdeveloped, making it difficult 
to find and compare the forms of organizational innovation with other 
size categories of firms (Valeyre et al., 2009).
5.4.3 Structure o f  the Questionnaire and Characteristics o f Data 
Collection
In designing the questionnaire, we created a ‘benchmarking exer­
cise' to review the Hungarian and international surveys dealing with 
various features of organizational innovation. Among other things, we 
have learned extensively from such projects as the Danish Innovation 
System in Comparative Perspective Survey (DISKO) carried out five 
times between 1993 and 2006 by the Aalborg University Business 
School, the Community Innovation Surveys (CIS) carried out six times 
by Eurostat, the Continuous Vocational Training Survey (CVTS) car­
ried out in 1999 and in 2005 by Eurostat, and several Europe-wide 
surveys organized by the European Foundation for the Improvement 
of Living and Working Conditions (Dublin). Finally, in designing our 
organizational survey methods, the members of the international 
research team relied substantially on ‘The MEADOW Guidelines’ , 
which “set out guidelines for collecting and interpreting information 
on both organizational states and organizational change. The guide­
lines are concerned with collecting data at the workplace and 
employee level providing relevant definitions and indicators for cap­
turing general characteristics of organizations, such as the nature of 
authority relations and the method of coordination and control"
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(MEADOW Consortium, 2010)10.
In addition, designing the research tools of the Hungarian and Slo­
vak company surveys, in 2007. the Research Group of Sociology of 
Organization and Work (Institute of Sociology) of the Hungarian Acad­
emy of Sciences launched a national survey to test concepts and ques­
tions measuring the diffusion of new organizational values or institu­
tional standards in more than 500 industrial firms (Mako et al., 2007).
The questionnaire used in the company survey in both countries 
in the KIBS sectors was finalized after the pilot study, which aimed to 
test the validity of the questionnaire within the cluster of firms (N= 
36) belonging to the Hungarian Outsourcing Association (Magyar Out­
sourcing Szovetseg) comprising leading-edge firms in the KIBS sec­
tor. The finalized questionnaire, composed of 43 questions, has the fol­
lowing four thematic sections :
(1) General characteristics of firms '■ This section contains a description 
of the architecture of the organization (e.g.. length of operation and 
size), ownership, market structure, types of activities, and type of 
technology employed.
(2) Composition of Management and Institutional Transfer of Business 
Practices '■ This section includes a subsection on firms in which 
foreign managers are employed and an examination of the share 
of foreign vs. local managers, the recruitment practice of foreign 
managers, and the generic business functions occupied by them. 
In addition, this section indicates the degree of autonomy in the 
local subsidiaries in developing their business practices.
(3) Diffusion and Drivers of Organizational Innovation '■ In addition to 
mapping the differences and/or similarities of forms of organiza­
tional innovation, this section contains an examination of the 
degree of embeddedness of the ICT in the business practices in 
the sectors surveyed. Regarding the forms of organizational inno­
vation, the drivers of innovation are also identified.
(4) Characteristics of Knowledge Development Practice in the Firm '■ In 
this section, the dominant combination of the required skills or 
competencies is identified. In assessing the training practices of
MEADOW is the Measuring the Dynamics of Organization and Work Project 
funded within the 6th Framework Program of the European Commission DG 
Research. More information is available at '■ http://www.meadow-project.eu/.
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the firms surveyed, we tried to understand not only the roles of 
the formal training and education in the skill formation of employ­
ees but the importance of the so-called on-site (in situ) learning. 
In addition, particular attention was given to the role of the vari­
ous external knowledge sources in skill development.
5.5 Organizational Demography and Networking Activity 
of the Firms
The empirical outcomes are based on data collected during 2008 
and 2009 company surveys that involved firms employing more than 
10 persons in the KIBS sector in both Hungary and Slovakia. This sec­
tion presents a preliminary descriptive statistical analysis of the sur­
vey results using variables such as ownership, company size, year of 
establishment, market structure, and company group membership 
(networking). In contrast, in the next chapter, the focus is on the dif­
fusion of organizational innovation and the practice of knowledge 
development.
One-fifth (21.1%) of the firms in the Hungarian KIBS sector were 
incorporated (established) in the last four years, and one-fourth 
(24.7%), from 2000 to 2003. Only a tiny minority of the firms (6.5%) 
were established in the period of state socialism (i.e„ before 1990). The 
peak year of the company establishment in the KIBS sector was at the 
beginning of the new millennium, when the growth rates of the firms 
were as follows : 9.8% in 2004, 7.2% in 2003, and 7.9% in 2000. A simi­
lar pattern of company creation was identified in Slovakia as well. The 
overwhelming majority of business service companies in Slovakia 
were established after 1990, and, as in Hungary, only a tiny share of 
them (6.5%) existed during the period of state socialism.
With regard to the ownership structure of the surveyed firms, in 
both countries, the domestically owned firms dominate. However, the 
share of foreign-owned firms is almost three times higher in Slovakia 
than in Hungary. Similarly, the share of mixed ownership is visibly 
higher in the Slovakia than in Hungary. The composition of firm own­
ership is shown in Table 5.8.
The KIBS firms are very young and dominated by domestically 
owned firms. However, in Slovakia, the share of foreign or mixed own­
ership is significantly higher than it is in Hungarian business service
Emergence of a Service Economy: The Case of Knowledge-Intensive Business Services-Hnngary vs. Slovakia
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Table 5.8 Ownership compositions of firms in the
KIBS sectors
Types of ownership Hungary UV= 196)
Slovakia 
(JV= 97)
Domestic or national ownership 77.5% 52.6%
Foreign ownership 9.5% 26.8%
Mixed ownership 13.0% 20.6%
Source '■ The joint company survey.
sector firms. In summary, the majority of the surveyed firms, espe­
cially in Hungary, belong to the de novo segment (Martin, 2008) of the 
economy in both countries. They were created following the collapse 
of the state-socialist economy and are domestically owned.
Membership in a company group or company networking plays 
an important role in developing learning and innovation capacity of 
business organizations due to access to an extended and varied knowl­
edge pool and facilitated knowledge sharing and transfer. Firms 
belonging to a company group tend to be more innovative than single 
firms. In this field, we found visible differences in the two countries. 
Company groups or network firms represent the minority of the Hun­
garian business service firms (18.2%), while, in Slovakia, every second 
firm surveyed (50.5%) is in this category. In addition, looking at the 
headquarters ownership, again, the differences are striking. More than 
three-quarters of the Slovak business service firms belong to groups 
located in 10 countries, the USA being the most frequent location 
(28.6%): the remaining 30% of firms have headquarters in Germany, 
UK, and the Czech Republic. An important percentage of the business 
service firms’ headquarters (14.3%) were located in such countries as 
Austria, Ireland, France, Netherlands, and Slovenia. In the case of the 
Hungarian KIBS sector, domestically (or Hungarian) based headquar­
ters dominate. The foreign headquarters are dispersed in 10 countries, 
and Austria is the dominant location for the company headquarters.
In relation with the important innovation generating impacts of 
company networking, the following empirical example is illuminating. 
According to the Danish innovation surveys (DISKO). manufacturing 
firms operating as a member of company groups, especially foreign 
owned groups, have visibly higher innovation activity than single 
firms (see Table 5.9 for details).
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Tabic 5.9 Product or service innovation in 1993 95 and/or 1998-2000 
ownership/company group membership
P/S innovation 
1993-95 and 
1998-2000
P/S innovation 
1993-95 or 
1998-2000
Not P/S 
innova tioti N
Danish group member 33.1% 39.6% 27.2% 169
Foreign group member 51.0% 27.5% 21.6% 102
Single firm 22.2% 32.9% 44.9% 216
All firms 32.0% 34.1% 33.9% 487
Note '■ P and S denote product innovation and service innovation, respec­
tively.
Source - Nielsen (2006, p. 42).
Table 5.10 Size of the firms in the KIBS sector
Size of the firms Hungary(JV=t96)
Slovakia
(JV=97)
Small firm (9-49 persons) 78.7% 56.7%
Medium firm (50-249 persons) 16.6% 26.8%
Large firm (250 and over) 4.6% 165%
Source ■ The joint company survey.
Nielsen (2006) emphasizes that "single firms have the largest 
group of the firms with no product innovation in the periods surveyed. 
Danish group firms have the largest share of one-time innovators and 
foreign group Firms have the largest proportion of firms with innova­
tion in both periods. This distribution may be an indication of the 
importance of economic resources or international influence, and not 
least of the importance of the international or global dimension, on the 
propensity to innovate among firms’* (p. 4-2).
Table 5.10 shows the size distribution of the surveyed firms. In 
both the Hungarian and the Slovak business service sectors, the share 
of small firms is high : almost four-fifths of the Hungarian KIBS firms 
are in this category, and, in Slovakia, slightly more than half. It is also 
noteworthy that there are three times as many large firms in the Slo­
vak KIBS sector than in the Hungarian one. In addition, there are 
more Slovak companies in the medium category than in Hungary. 
Indeed, the Slovak KIBS firms are more balanced than those in Hun­
gary.
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In addition to size, we examined the organizational architecture of 
the firm. There is a consensus among management specialists on the 
impact of organizational levels separating the highest and lowest job 
positions on the flexibility and learning capacity of the firms. In both 
countries, slightly more than half of the business service firms (Hun­
gary : 56.8% and Slovakia : 56.6%) have only one or no separate hier­
archical levels. Besides this similarity in organizational architecture, 
the share of Hungarian firms with 2 or 3 hierarchical levels is slightly 
higher than that in Slovakia (38.1% vs. 29.9%). However, firms having 
4 or more hierarchical levels represent a slightly higher share in the 
Slovak than the Hungarian KIBS sector (10.5% vs. 13.4%), which can 
be explained by a significant share of larger firms in the Slovak KIBS 
sector (16.5%) than the Hungarian one (4.6%).
Regarding the types of business services, similar basic patterns 
were identified. In relation with the scale of services, ‘customer-tai­
lored’ solutions are dominant in both countries. However, in Hungary, 
they represent a visibly higher share of the services than in Slovakia. 
The standard solutions score minimally and have a roughly similar 
share in both countries. Similarly, the high value-added content of ser­
vices is dominant in both countries, although it has a slightly higher 
share in Slovakia. The low value-added services represent less than 
one-third of all services in both countries. In addition, it is noteworthy 
that almost one-third of the Hungarian and Slovak firms produce 
exclusively high value-added services. However, a significantly higher 
share of the Hungarian firms than of the Slovakian firms does not offer 
high value-added services (14.4% vs. 3.1%, respectively). The compo­
sition of services by degree of standardization and value-added con­
tent is illustrated in Table 5.11.
During the survey, managers/owners were asked to locate their 
market share in relation to their primary and secondary markets. 
Table 5,12 shows the geographical location of the firms' primary and 
secondary markets.
Although to a significantly different degree, the domestic product 
market is playing a crucial role in both countries. However, the domes­
tic market as the primary market is playing a more important role for 
Hungary (94,7%) than for Slovakia (55.4%). The market structure is 
more balanced in the Slovak KIBS sector, where the international 
market (both primary and secondary) is playing a more central role
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Table 5.11 Types of business services by 
value-added content
Characteristics of services Hungary (JV= 196)
Slovakia
(N-97)
Customer-tailored 83.7% 66.3%
Standardized 32.4% 33.7%
High value-added 65.8% 70.8%
Low value-added 32,8% 29.2%
Source '• The joint company survey.
Table 5.12 Market distribution : Primary and secondary markets
Types of markets
Hungary
196)
Slovakia
{N~97)
Primary
market
Secondary
market
Primary
market
Secondary
market
National market 94.7% 3.4% 55.4% 39,9%
EU-15 countries 10.5% 4.8% 22.8% 38.6%
New Member States (NMS) 6.5% 8.0% 23.3% 46.7%
North America 2.4% 1.5% 25.6% 16.3%
Russia and Ukraine 1.5% 1.5% 12.8% 29.8%
Asia 1.9% 2.3% 11.6% 25.6%
Others 1.5% — 16.7% 12.5%
Source ■ The joint company survey.
than in Hungary. A higher share of Slovak firms is focusing on both 
the North American (25.6%) and the EU-15 (22.8%) markets than in 
Hungary. In other words, the Slovak firms are more internationalized 
than the Hungarian ones.
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Organizational Innovation and the Company 
Practice of Knowledge Use : Hungarian vs. Slovak 
Knowledge-Intensive Business Service Sector
6.1 Developing Typology of Organizational Innovation : 
A Brief Theoretical Overview
Europe's weakness in competitiveness compared to the US and 
Southeast Asia does not iie in basic research and R&D but in the low 
capability to transform research results into market advantage or. as 
Coriat (1995) notes, "it is in the process from scientific discovery and 
invention to innovation, and from innovation to the market" (p. 12). The 
missing link seems to be represented by those organizational and 
managerial practices that, on the one hand, are preconditions of inno­
vative activities and, on the other, help organizations adapt to the 
technological changes. These practices are usually referred as 'organi­
zational innovation’ . This syndrome is the so-called “European para­
dox, i.e„ the discrepancy between European scientific output and com­
mercially successful innovations, and the low number of high growth 
companies (compared to the number of SMEs). (...) The Innovation 
Union Scoreboard (2010) discloses an unsatisfactory level of return on 
R&D spending, especially for public spending. As a matter of fact, too 
little policy focus has been put on hidden and non-technological inno­
vation, especially in low tech industries and services" (Basset et al., 
2011, p. 31). Organizational and technological innovations are in inter­
action. Even before the Second World War, Joseph Schumpeter (1934)
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recognized the interrelatedness of various forms of innovation and 
went beyond that to focus exclusively on the technical side of innova­
tion. In his view, technological and organizational innovations were 
interrelated, and Lam (2005) wrote that Schumpeter “saw organiza­
tional changes, alongside new products and processes, as well as mar­
kets as factors of ‘creative destruction’ ” (p. 115). Schumpeter made a 
distinction among the five following types of innovation. That is : (1) 
new product! (2) new production methods: (3) new markets: (4) new 
sources of supply: and (5) new forms of organization.
Other innovation researchers, following the Schumpeterian intel­
lectual heritage, are looking at innovation as “a complex phenomenon 
including technical (e.g., new products and new production methods) 
and non-technical aspects (e.g., new markets and new forms of organi­
zation) as well as product innovation (e.g., new products or services) 
and process innovation (e.g., new production methods or new forms of 
organization) ” (Armbruster et al„ 2008, pp. 644-645).
In spite of the abundance of literature on organizational innova­
tion. there is no consensus among innovation researchers regarding 
the definition of ‘organizational innovation.’ In this respect, Lam (2005, 
p. 116) categorized the literature as follows :
(1) Organizational design theories deal primarily with relationships 
between structural forms and the capacity of an organization to 
innovate (Mintzberg. 1979: Teece, 1998):
(2) The organizational change and adaptation (development) theory 
is used to understand the ability of an organization to overcome 
the forces of stability (inertia) and adaptation/change in the con­
text of a radical shift in its environment and technological setting. 
Innovation represents the capacity to answer or respond to the 
challenges created by radical shifts in an organization’s external 
environment (Hannan and Freeman, 1984: Child, 1997):
(3) The third theoretical stream focuses on the micro-process level of 
how an organization understands the characteristics of knowledge 
creation and learning within an organization. This cognitive 
approach explains the interplay between learning and organiza­
tional innovation (Argyris and Schon. 1978: Amiable, 1988: Senge, 
1990: Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995).
Another perspective on organizational innovation is represented 
by Schienstock (2004), whose innovation matrix intends to integrate
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Table 6.1 Typology of organizational innovation
Relations between the Core components of the organization
core components of the 
organization Not changing Changing
Not changing
Incremental innovation 
(e.g. participation of employ­
ees in quality control)
Modular innovation 
(e.g. cross-functional or 
interdisciplinary project team)
Changing Architectural innovation (e.g. lean organizations)
Radical innovation 
(e.g. lean organization, proj­
ect-based firms, PBF)
Source '■ Schienstoek (2004, p. 18).
the key dimensions of organizational innovations. In Schienstock's clas­
sification attempt one dimension of classification relates to the core’ 
components of an organization, and the other refers to the changes in 
the 'relations* of the core components. Using these two dimensions, 
the matrix shown in Table 6.1 describes the possible types of organi­
zational innovation from both a static and a dynamic perspective.
In this perspective, the cumulative or incremental type of organi­
zational innovation does not produce changes in the core components 
and in their relations within an organization. For example, job rotation 
and job enrichment belong to this type of organizational innovation. A 
modular version of organizational innovation, such as cross-functional 
project teams, changes the content of the core component of an orga­
nization but does not modify the relations between them. Contrary to 
the incremental and modular types of organizational changes, architec­
tural innovation, for instance, the decentralization of responsibilities 
and decision making within an organization, may result in a significant 
shift in the existing balance of interest and power relations. Similarly, 
such radical innovation as the creation of project-based firms (PBF) 
may modify both the core components and their relations within the 
firms. In translating these major forms of innovation into the language 
of organizational learning, the incremental or modular forms of innova­
tions require a single-loop or a first-level mode of learning, and radical 
innovation represents a double-loop or a second-level (holistic) form 
of organizational learning.
Armbruster et al. (2008), implicitly adopting Schienstock's (2004)
183
theoretical classification of organizational innovation, have developed 
an item-oriented typology of organizational innovation. In their defini­
tion of ‘organizational innovation as the use of new managerial and 
working concepts and practices' (Armbruster et al.. 2008. p. 646). the 
item-oriented typology of organizational innovation makes a distinc- 
tion between structural and procedural organizational innovations and 
their intra-organizational and inter-organizational dimensions (using 
Schienstock’s categories, the incremental and modular innovations are 
classified into the category of process innovation, and the architectural 
and radical innovations belong to the category of structural organiza­
tional innovation).
The item-oriented typology of organizational innovation, devel­
oped by Armbruster et al. (2008), is convenient to empirically measure 
(monitor) organizational innovation using organizational surveys. The 
groups of an ‘item-oriented typology of organizational innovation' are 
as follows :
(1) Structural organizational innovation, which may modify the divi­
sional structure of organizational functions, hierarchical levels, and 
information flow or, in general, the organizational architecture of 
the firm. This type of innovation requires changes in the existing 
status quo (and the related interest) and power relations within 
the organization ;
(2) Procedural organizational innovation, which may change the pro­
cess and operation routines within the firms, such as improving 
the flexibility of manpower and the use of knowledge through the 
implementation of teamwork, just-in-time production systems 
(Kan-Ban in Japanese), or quality circles \
(3) Intra-organizational innovation that is taking place within an orga­
nization :
(4) Inter-organizational aspects of innovation, which refer to new orga­
nizational forms and processes that exist beyond the organiza­
tional border of the firm.
In our empirical study, our objective was to identify structural 
and procedural forms of organizational innovations and not to deal 
with their inter-organizational or network-type versions.
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6.2 Diffusion and Drivers of Organizational Innovation
The Hungarian and Slovak company survey conducted in 2008-09 
was designed to focus exclusively on intra-organizational innovation 
without the goal of covering new inter-organizational forms (e.g. proj­
ect-based firms), which are beyond the scope of the individual firm's 
organization. Regarding the various forms of intra-organizational inno­
vation, the diffusion of both structural and procedural organizational 
innovation was our primary interest. The following forms of structural 
and procedural organizational innovation were assessed by managers/ 
leaders of the firms surveyed :
I . Structural organizational innovation :
- Project-based work;
- Lean or flat organizationI and
- Inter-professional (functional) working groups.
II. Procedural organizational innovation :
- Quality-assurance or continuous improvement process (e.g., ISO, 
TQM);
- Collecting suggestions from workers;
- Teamwork1;
- Benchmarking:
- job rotation: and
- Delegation of quality assurance to workers (decentralization). 
Among the organizational or managerial practices listed above,
‘structural organizational innovation’ is less often used than its 'proce­
dural' version. This is not by chance, because structural organizational 
innovation affects both the ‘core’ components and their relationships 
within the organization. These types of changes require significant 
modification in the existing interest and power relations and more 
intensive participation in the collective learning of various actors. Suc­
cessful procedural innovation can be carried out without a radical shift
1 Both teamwork and job rotation are key components of lean production and 
‘high-performance work systems,’ and the use of teams, in particular, has been 
the subject of many studies concerned with the impact of new managerial prac­
tices on enterprise performance and the quality of work, including worker satis­
faction (Kyzlinkov et al.. 2007).
185
Organizational lnuna iion  awl ike Company Practice of Kiowleise Use: Hungarian vs. Slovak Knowledge-Intensive Business Service Sector
Table 6.2 Diffusion of leading edge managerial practices in the KIBS sector
Types of organizational innovation Hungary (N~ 196)
Slovakia 
(N= 97)
1 . Structural organizational innovation -
Project-based work 34.8% 69.1%
Plat or lean organization 10.7% 13.4%
Inter-professional (inter-discipLinary) working groups 13.4% 36.1%
II. Procedural organizational innovation :
Quality assurance and auditing systems (e.g., ISO and TQM) 21.9% 33.0%
Collecting suggestions from employees 49.7% 412%
Teamwork 41.7% 89.6%
Benchmarking 37.3% 21.6%
Quality control carried out by rank-and-file employees 23.7% 14.4%
Job rotation 9.7% 28.9%
Notes '■ The classification of different types of organizational innovation is based on 
the approach developed by Armbruster et aJL (2008. pp. 646-647). See Section 62 for 
more details.
Source '■ The joint company survey.
in the core components and their relationships within an organization 
and requires rather limited collective learning activity from the actors 
concerned.
It is clear from the empirical data collected from our joint com­
pany surveys that strong differences are characterizing the diffusion 
of organizational innovations in the Hungarian and Slovak knowledge- 
intensive business service (KIBS) sectors. For example, such forms of 
structural organizational innovation as project-based work, lean orga­
nization, and inter-professional working groups are more widely used 
in Slovak than Hungarian company practices.
In the case of the diffusion of procedural organizational innova­
tions, the contrast between the two countries diminishes. Teamwork, 
quality management and, particularly, job rotation are more often 
used in Slovak than Hungarian firms. However, in Hungarian firms, in 
comparison with the Slovak practice, the quality circles, benchmark­
ing, and collecting suggestions of employees are more prevalent 
(Table 6.2).
In mapping the diffusion of organizational innovation, in addition 
to grouping nine forms of organizational innovation into 'structural' 
and 'procedural' categories, we used the four larger classes of organi­
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zational innovation listed below :
(1) New methods of organizing work Cue., employee suggestions, team­
work, job rotation, and lean organization):
(2) Creating new methods to renew external relations (networking)2 
with other firms and public institutions:
(3) Implementing new business practices3 that have an impact on the 
organizational and labor process: and
(4) Introducing new knowledge management methods to improve the 
quality of information processing and facilitate knowledge sharing. 
There are visible differences in the Hungarian and Slovak com­
pany practices in the KIBS sectors. In the case of Slovakia, the share 
of firms implementing new business practices and new methods of 
knowledge management is higher than that in Hungary. In this rela­
tion. it is noteworthy that a key challenge for the high-quality knowl­
edge management (KM) in the KIBS firms is the codification and 
formalization of the working experiences of project-level learning into 
organizational knowledge.
In this context several options are available. As Salter and Tether 
(2006) reported, “in order to help ameliorate some of these problems 
and to increase the effectiveness of their project performance and 
knowledge sharing between projects, professional service firms have 
invested considerable resources in knowledge management (KM). This 
approach to KM varies, with some organizations investing heavily in 
technology to capture knowledge through documentation and data, 
find others introducing cultural change initiatives to encourage knowl­
edge sharing within organization. These KM systems include elec­
tronic networks of practice, expert yellow pages, communities of prac­
tice, project repositories, searchable internal records, images libraries, 
and mentoring. They are an important part of the infrastructure sup­
porting innovation in professional service firms, allowing them to cap­
ture knowledge from past projects and use this knowledge in the 
future projects’ (p. 16).
2 The content of external relations or networking was as follows : alliances, part­
nerships. and delocalization of business functions.
3 The new business practices covered activities such as supply change manage­
ment, reengineering business process, learning organization, renewal education, 
and training system.
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Table 6.3 Diffusion of bundles of organizational innovation in the KIBS sector
Types of organizational innovation Hungary (N= 196)
26.1%
39.3%
29.9%
Slovakia 
(N= 97)
New business practices for organizing work or procedures (i.e., 
supply chain management, business re-engineering, lean pro­
duction, quality management, education/training systems, etc.) 
New methods of workplace organization for distributing respon­
sibilities and decision making (i.e., first use of a new system of 
employee responsibilities, teamwork, decentralization, integra­
tion or de-integration of departments, etc.)
New methods of organizing external relations with other firms 
or public institutions (i.e„ first use of alliances, partnerships, out­
sourcing or sub-contracting, etc.)
44.3%
40.3%
29.9%
Note '■ Multiple answers.
Source ' The joint company survey.
The rate of diffusion of new methods of organizing work and cre­
ating new methods to renew external relations of the firms are similar 
in both countries. Table 6.3 provides more details of the survey results 
on this matter.
To compare organizational innovations from a wider or European 
perspective, it would be worthwhile to use some results from the Com­
munity Innovation Survey (CIS) 2008. There are differences in the two 
countries in terms of the diffusion of different types of organizational 
innovations with respect to all economic sectors. As the data pre­
sented in Table 6.4 indicate, 20.1% of Slovak firms implemented some 
form of organizational innovation in 2008, while this share remained 
14% for Hungarian firms. The ratio of implementation of new business 
practices and. new methods of workplace organization is about 5% 
higher in Slovakia than in Hungary, while the use of new practices for 
organizing firms’ external relations is prevalent to the same extent in 
both countries.
After identifying various forms of organizational innovation, the 
respondents were asked to assess the drivers of implementation of the 
new organizational concepts and practices. In both countries, the most, 
important driver is the improvement of the efficiency of daily opera­
tions. This factor is followed by the motives to renew the existing 
knowledge base, adapting to environmental changes, strengthening 
cooperation within an organization, improving quality and customer
1S8
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Table 6.4 Diffusion of different types of organizational innovations in Hungary 
and Slovakia
Types of organizational innovation Hungary (N= 1%)
Slovakia 
(N= 97)
Implementing some form of organizational innovations 14.6% 20.1%
In detail :
New business practices for organizing work or procedures
(i.e., supply chain management, business re-engineering. 9.5% 14.8%lean production, quality management, education/training
systems, etc.)
New methods of workplace organization for distributing
responsibilities and decision making (Le„ first use of a new 9.7% 14.0%system of employee responsibilities, teamwork, decentraliza­
tion/integration or de-integration of departments, etc.)
New methods of organizing external relations with other
firms or public institutions (i.e.. first use of alliances, partner­ 7.0% 7.7%
ships, outsourcing or sub-contracting, etc.)
Source '■ The joint company survey.
service, and increasing the size of the firms. Surprisingly, the out­
sourcing or delocalizing business services received the lowest assess­
ment among the driver of organizational changes in both countries. It 
is noteworthy that such drivers of organizational changes as the 
renewal of product and services, the renewal of existing knowledge, 
the increasing size of the firm, and, especially, the outsourcing of busi­
ness functions play weaker roles in Slovak company practices than in 
Hungarian ones (Table 6.5).
Finally, regarding the drivers of organizational innovation, the 
main reasons for the lack of organizational innovation are presented in 
Table 6.6. In the case of Hungary, an important percentage of the 
firms (43% and 12.4% in Slovakia) carried out organizational changes 
before the reference period (2005-2007); therefore, no further efforts 
were necessary to modernize the organizational practice. In addition, 
one-third of the Hungarian and only one-tenth of the Slovak firm rep­
resentatives said that, even in the reference period (2005-2007), there 
was no need for organizational innovation.
In the literature dealing with technological and organizational 
changes, resistance of employees/managers and skill shortage are fre­
quently reported as constraints for these changes. It is noteworthy 
that, in the present study, such factors were reported by a small frac-
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Table 6.5 Driving forces behind important organizational 
changes in the KIBS sector
Drivers of organizational changes Hungary CiV= 196)
Slovakia
(N= 97)
Improving daily work efficiency 73.9% 67.0%
Strengthening cooperation within the firm 61.5% 53.6%
Adapting to environmental changes 62.8% 62.9%
Renewal of product and services 54.3% 36.0%
Renewal of the existing knowledge base 63.5% 33.0%
Outsourcing business functions 36.8% 16.5%
Improving quality and customer service 65.9% 44.4%
Increasing the size of the firm 42.5% 37.2%
Note '■ Drivers of organizational changes were assessed by man­
agers on a 5 point-scaie. where 1 = the least important and 5 = 
the most important factor.
Source '■ The joint company survey.
Table 6.6 Reasons for the absence of organizational innovation in the KIBS sec­
tor
Factors responsible for the lack of organizational innovation Hungary (N= 196)
Slovakia
(vV=97)
No need for organizational innovation from 2005 to 2007 33.0% 10.3%
Implementation of organizational innovation before 2005-2007: 
since then, no need for further changes
43.0% 12.4%
Lack of financial resources 6.9% 6.2%
Skill shortage 6.9% 6.2%
Resistance of employees and managers to change 5.4% 7.3%
Note '■ Employers interviewed assessed these factors on a 5 point-scale. where 1 = 
least important and 5 = most important with regard to the absence of organizational 
innovation.
Source '■ The joint company survey.
tion of the respondents, and they attributed the problems to a short­
age of financial resources.
Due to the fact that the KIBS service sector is characterized by 
one of the most important concentrations of the so-called ‘knowledge 
workers,’ particular attention was given in the company survey to the 
sector-level distribution of such forms of organizational and contrac­
tual innovations as 'part-time employment,- ‘working time flexibility,’ 
‘mobile work,’ and ‘home-based telework.’ The data summarized in
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Table 6.7 Tools to improve the flexibility of manpower and knowl­
edge use in the KIBS sector
Forms of organizational and contractual innovation Hungary(jV=196)
Slovakia
(jV=97)
Part-time employment 35.1% 58.8%
Flexible working time arrangement 26.1% 76.3%
Mobile work 15.6% 39.2%
Home-based telework 15.4% 51.5%
Source '■ The joint company survey.
Table 6.7 indicate that these forms of organizational innovation are 
better integrated into Slovakian than Hungarian employment and 
working practices.
6.3 The Practice of Information and Communication Tech­
nology (ICT) Use in the Firm
It is a commonly shared view among scholars of organizational 
innovation that, since the last decades of the 20th century, the term 
'knowledge economy’ has become a catch phrase for identifying new 
trends of development. This shift was attributed in the pattern of eco­
nomic development to the forces of globalization and the growing use 
of information and communication technology (ICT). According to 
Ramioul et al.(2006), in contrast to previous technological changes (e.g., 
automatization) and due to its integrative character, ICT represents an 
‘organizational technology' that offers to the actors concerned excep­
tional opportunities to shape the division of labor and the practices of 
knowledge use. Nielsen (2006) added that, during the so-called 'take­
off' period of the ICT tn the mid-1980s, “the more narrow rationaliza­
tion phase dominated up to the end of eighties: than in the early nine­
ties a more organic, pervasive and information-oriented approach to 
the use of ICT started to emerge. The importance of thinking new 
ICT into, as an integrative part of, new managerial and organization 
forms became more widely recognized. Even though rationalization 
was still an important function, information and communication came 
to be seen as more and more important functions (pp. 15-16).
As did Nielsen (2006), we are calling attention to the use to vary­
ing degrees of ICT in the everyday working and management prac-
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Table 6.8 Use of ICT by function and location in the business process in the KIBS 
sector
Function/location of business process Hungary (N= 192)
Slovakia
(N=97)
Information processing and communication 68.7% 42.9%
Rationalization of labor process and reengineering company 34.3% 29.3%
development
Development activities (e.g., development of knowledge base) 44.9% 27.8%
Source '• The joint company survey.
tices of the firm. It is widely known that ICT is crucial in the every­
day fife of a firm, especially in the service sector4. ICT is implemented 
and used in a multitude of functions, such as information processing 
and communication, and in different fields of a firm’s activity, such as 
routine production, research, and development within the business 
process. The goal of our survey was to identify the functions in which 
ICT is employed in KIBS firms in both countries. A crucial rote of ICT 
in the organizational changes or, more precisely, in the diffusion of 
organizational innovation is widely supported by the results of a 
recent international study on the restructuring of the value chain in 
both the manufacturing and service sectors (Flecker et al, 2008). 
According to our experience, ICT is more extensively used in the 
KIBS than in the manufacturing sector. This could be explained by the 
fact that “ICT process innovation is often a necessary prerequisite for 
the service innovation in this industry” (Nielsen, 2006, p. 56).
Table 6.8 indicates that ICT is used more extensively in Hungar­
ian than in Slovakian company practices. This is especially true in 
such basic functions as information processing and communication. In 
addition, in the development activities, which are emblematic fields for 
the deeper and more extensive use of ICT, Hungarian firms are again 
in a better position than Slovakian business service firms.
4 For example, in the U. S. A., more than 70% of the ICT equipment is purchased 
by service companies. The selection, implementation, and integration of this 
technology are key factors in their business success (Chesborough and Shphrer. 
2006).
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6.4 Knowledge Use Practice in Comparison : Dominance o f  
the Experience-Based Competence Development
In this section, we examine knowledge development practices of 
the firms investigated. In our interpretation, organizational learning 
indicates “the capacity (or process) within an organization to maintain 
or improve performance based on experience. This activity involves 
knowledge acquisition (the development or creation of skills, insights, 
relationships), knowledge sharing (the dissemination to others of what 
has been acquired by some), and knowledge utilization (integration of 
the learning so that it is assimilated, broadly available, and can also be 
generalized to new situations’ (DiBella et al„ 1996, p. 363). There is a 
strong interplay between innovation and the learning process within 
the organization, and, in this respect, it is noteworthy that the comple­
mentary character of the formal education and experience-based 
learning is as Nielsen (2006) summarized : "To make learning com­
plete and sufficient, with the innovative mode in focus, it is necessary 
to combine experience-based and reflective learning with the new 
knowledge achieved from formal training and education. Only in this 
way does learning become both knowledge-based and experience- 
based, and may evolve dynamically in the context of the organization" 
(p. 117).
Skill development and formal training are important preconditions 
for innovation. However, what really matters is the ability of a person 
to mobilize his/her qualification in a real job situation, “While qualifica­
tions are individually adopted characteristics, built into and carried out 
by a person, competence as a concept has to do with specific job situa­
tions and assignments, and concerns the capacity of an employee to 
use his or her qualifications in the job situation. (•••) In line with this 
definition, competence development as a concept in this context will be 
defined as continuous development of experiences, skills, influence, 
possibilities and responsibilities, related to the job situation, tasks and 
context of the employees” (Nielsen, 2006, p. 124).
Prior to describing the knowledge development practices of the 
firms surveyed, we identified the types of knowledge and skills 
required by the employers. The most important types of knowledge 
evaluated by the employers interviewed in both countries are as fol-
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lows :
(1) Professional-technical skills (Hungary : 93.7%; and Slovakia; 
98.1%);
(2) Reliability in work (Hungary : 97.5%; and Slovakia : 89.1%);
(3) Customer-centered attitude (Hungary : 90.3%; and Slovakia : 
86.5%).
Evaluating the importance of the various methods of knowledge 
development in the firm, the following classification was used ;
(1) Participation in formal education:
(2) Competence development; and
(3) Improving social skills3.
In both countries, such forms of experience-based ( on-site’ ) 
knowledge or competence development as consulting with manage­
ment/other employees' and on-the-job training (OJT)' play more 
important roles than participation in formal education (e.g., participa­
tion in courses/educational schemes and involvement in further train­
ing tailored for the needs of the firm)6. In spite of this common pat­
tern, it is noteworthy that formal training (e.g., standard educational 
schemes and further training) plays a relatively more significant role 
in the Slovak business service firms than in the Hungarian ones.
The importance of training aimed to improve the social skills of 
employees (e.g.. motivation of cooperation between various organiza­
tional units and teamwork) is between ‘competence development' and 
'participation in formal education.’
5 Besides the briefly presented classifications of knowledge preconditions for 
learning or innovative organization, another strand of the labor process school 
makes a distinction between 'learning as acquisition' and ‘learning as participa­
tion.' According to Felstead et al. (2010). the former refers to a conceptualiza­
tion, which views learning as a product with a visible, identifiable outcome, 
often accompanied by certification or proof of attendance. The latter perspec­
tive, on the other hand, views learning as a process in which learners improve 
their work performance by carrying out daily activities. This distinction is simi­
lar to the distinction between 'formal education* and 'competence development,'
15 According to the experiences from a project conducted in 13 European countries 
on outsourcing software development in leading IT firms, only 10% of training 
activities were based on a training program, and the remaining 90% were 
based on OJT (Flecker et al., 2008. p. 57).
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Table 6.9 Methods of knowledge development in the KIBS sector
Methods of knowledge development Hungary (N= 196)
Slovakia 
(AT=97)
I . Participation in formal education -
Standard courses/educational schemes 45.5% 60.4%
Further training designed according to the needs of the firm 64.3% 69.6%
11. Experience-based learning or competence development :
Consulting with management/other employees 80.3% 75,5%
On-the-job training (OJT) 74.1% 70.3%
Attending professional fairs and expositions 67.5% 44.3%
Job rotation 31.1% 40.1%
ID, Improving social skills :
Supporting cooperation between organizational units 62.6% 63.3%
T eamWork 57.1% 74,0%
Source '■ The joint company survey.
In both countries, ‘consulting with managers and other employ­
ees' and ‘on-the-job training’ (or ‘learning by participation’ ) were 
more often used as tools of knowledge development than ‘participation 
in formal training’ (or ‘learning by acquisition’ ). In addition to this 
common pattern of knowledge development, we identified slight differ­
ences as well. Such sources of experience-based learning as ‘attending 
professional fairs and expositions' are playing more important role in 
Hungary than in Slovakia: however, job rotation’ is organized more 
frequently in the Slovak business firms than in the Hungarian ones. In 
relation with the development of social skills, the cooperation between 
organizational units has a similarly important role in both countries, 
but teamwork as a widely recognized source of social skill develop­
ment is more widely used in the Slovak business service firms than in 
the Hungarian ones. In Table 6.9 the methods of knowledge develop­
ment in company practices are illustrated.
6.5 Com pany T ra in in g  P ra ctice  : M ore T ra in in g  and 
Stronger Reliance on the External Knowledge Sources 
in Slovakia than Hungary
While the former section focused on the identification of various 
forms of knowledge development (i.e., participation in formal education, 
experience-based learning, and improvement of social skills), this sec­
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tion focuses on the issue of company in-house training practices and 
the role of externa! knowledge sources.
According to the data stemming from the European Continuing 
Vocational Survey 2005 (CVTS)', European countries vary remarkably 
in terms of their company training practices (Figure 6.1).
As Figure 6.2 indicates, on the average. 60% of European compa­
nies provided formal and/or informal training courses to their employ­
ees in 2005. The UK, the Nordic countries (Norway, Denmark, Sweden, 
and Finland), and some continental countries (Austria and the Nether­
lands) have the largest share of training providers. Among the post­
socialist countries, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, and Estonia are in a 
better position than the EU average. Romania. Latvia, Poland, Italy. 
Bulgaria, and Greece lag far behind the EU average. Slovakia performs 
around the average, while Hungary is in a weaker position (49%). 
These data, however, should be interpreted carefully, since there are 
large differences between the given national institutional contexts of 
education and training systems (e.g., in the UK, firm-specific company 
training plays an important role in the vocational training system, 
which is not the case in France or in most of the post-socialist coun­
tries).
If we broaden the scope and take not just the proportion of com­
panies that provide training but also the percentage of the employees 
participating in training activities into consideration, the picture 
becomes more complex. Approximately every third employee partici­
pated in company training in Europe in 2005; there are. however, 
remarkable differences among the European countries. In the Czech 
Republic, almost 60% of all employees participated in training courses, 
and Slovenia, Ireland, Luxembourg, France, and Sweden also per­
formed far above the EU average in this respect Romania, Hungary, 
Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, and Greece are in the worst position within 
the EU-27. In Slovakia, 38% of all employees took part in formal and/ 
or informal company training, while this proportion in Hungary was
' The Continuing Vocational Training Survey is a European Union-wide represen­
tative employer survey on vocational training practice of the European enter­
prises and carried out by Eurostat. The survey data is available at : http://epp. 
eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Glossary • Continuing_ 
vocationaLtraining_survey_ (CVTS).
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Figure 6.1 Distribution of enterprises providing training courses in % of the all 
enterprises by European countries, 2005
(JK DK AT 5E F[ NL FR SL C ? DE IE BE EU-27 SK HU ES FT RO PL IT BO EL
Notes '■ Training courses include both formal and informal trainings. EU-27 includes Norway. 
Source '■ Authors' illustration based on the Continuing Vocational Training Survey 2005.
Figure 6.2 Percentage of employees participating in continuing vocational training 
(CVT) courses by European countries. 2005
PL RO HU BG ELCZ SL IE FR SE BE R  SK DK N l  EU-27 ES AT UK DE IT
Note ■ CVT courses include both formal and informal trainings.
Source '■ Authors' illustration based on the Continuing Vocational Training Survey 2005.
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Table 6.10 The rates of company-supported training
Forms of training and support Hungary (N= 196)
Slovakia
(JV=97)
Courses organized and financed by the firm
Courses selected by an employee but financed by the firm
Courses supported by work time reduction
31.2%
16.1%
5.4%
50.7%
24.5%
10.8%
Source '■ The joint company survey.
only 16%, far below the European average. The low participation rate 
indicates that access to and transfer of knowledge within companies, 
which are prerequisites of innovation and high-value-added economic 
activities, are limited.
The findings of the joint survey provide deeper insight into the 
company practice of the Hungarian and Slovak KIBS firms. Empirical 
outcomes indicate visible differences between the company practices 
of the two countries. As shown in Table 6.10, in the Slovak business 
service firms, every second employee (50.7%) participated in a training 
course organized and financed by the firms (in 2007). In the Hungarian 
case, less than one third of the firms organized and financed training 
for their employees. Employee autonomy in participating in training, 
again, is stronger in the Slovak than in the Hungarian firms. Even, in 
the case of training supported by non-financial means (e.g.. work time 
reduction), the Slovak firms are performing better than their Hungar­
ian counterparts.
With respect to the content of the training, in both countries, 
almost one half of the training courses were aimed to improve job- 
related specific knowledge and two-fifths of the employees were 
involved in job-specific or general training. In both sectors, fewer than 
10% of employees had a chance to participate in training activities to 
improve their generic knowledge and competencies (e.g., language and 
communication skills).
Finally, in relation with the knowledge development practices of 
the firms, we gave special attention to the role of external knowledge 
sources. There is a consensus among the scholars dealing with innova­
tion that organizational differences in generating innovation are inti­
mately related to the absorption or to the dynamic capabilities of com­
panies. “The dynamic capabilities indicate the ‘firms’ ability to inte-
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Table 6.11 External sources of knowledge development in the Hun­
garian and Slovak KIBS firms
Externa! knowledge sources Hungary(N= 196)
Slovakia
(jV=97)
Customers 79.2% 61.9%
Suppliers and service providers 62.1% 59.8%
External consulting 54.2% 68.0%
Higher educational institutions 27.4% 55.7%
Educational (training) institutions 29.0% 66.0%
Research institutes 19.7% 28.9%
Development agencies 26.5% 23.7%
Labor market agencies and professional associations 25.9% 43.3%
Note ■ Multiple answers.
Source '■ The joint company survey.
grate, buiid, and reconfigure internal and external competences to 
address rapidly changing environments" (Lazonick, 2006, p. 33). In rela­
tion with the particular importance of external knowledge in the radical 
innovation generation processes within the KIBS sector, Salter and 
Tether (2006) stressed that “radical innovations in these industries will 
typically involve changes more than one of the triumvirate of the 
employees' division of labour, technologies, and organization, as their 
complex intertwining can create powerful barriers to innovation 
among incumbents. Outsiders and newcomers are therefore the main 
source of more radical innovation. When incumbents do initiate the 
change (...) this is typically through a new and separate organisation” 
(p. 13). Identifying the importance of the external knowledge sources, 
managers participating in the company surveys were asked to assess 
the role of these sources. Table 6.11 is an illustration of the impor­
tance of the external knowledge sources used by the Hungarian and 
Slovak business service firms.
Ranking in order the experience and knowledge of customers, 
suppliers and external consultants are the most important external 
knowledge sources in both countries in comparison to such external 
knowledge sources as 'higher education institutions,' ‘training institu­
tions,’ and labor market institutions.' However, these institutions, 
especially educational (training) institutions and labor market agencies, 
are still playing a more important role in Slovak than in Hungarian 
company practices. Other factors (e.g., R&D expenditure, access to a
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highly educated and skilled population, and quality of institutions) need 
to be included to better understand the systematic prerequisites for 
the knowledge-based growth in the countries investigated (Veugefers, 
2010). However, the relatively stronger reliance on the variety of 
external knowledge sources in the Slovak KIBS than in the Hungarian 
ones indicates the Slovak KIBS firms’ better innovation and learning 
potential.
In the KIBS sector, the various forms of external knowledge 
sources are fulfilling a more important role than the aggregated 
national data. As Basset et al. (2011) emphasize, “15 out of 29 European 
countries, the most common form of cooperation reported is with sup­
pliers. In addition, 20 percent of innovative enterprises cooperate with 
their clients or customers. This average rate hides great discrepancy 
between EU countries : in Spain only 4 percent of enterprises with 
innovative activities collaborate in these ways, while in Finland the fig­
ure is 41 percent (•••) Apart from Finland, most EU countries show 
very low percentages (less than 15 percent on average for cooperation 
with higher education and less than 10 percent for cooperation with 
government or public institutes). More enterprises cooperate with 
consultants, commercial labs or private R&D institutes (e.g. KIBS)" 
(pp. 21-22).
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Part IV
Industry Cluster and Economic 
Development


( Chapter ? )
Emergence and Development of Industry 
Clusters: Searching for a ‘Critical Mass’ of 
Business via Cluster Mapping
7.1 Introduction
Industry clusters (ICs) have attracted much attention in the recent 
past Besides the ever-growing academic interest, ICs have become 
primary targets of development policy. Various documents of the 
European Commission (EC) have expressed strong confidence in ICs 
as exceptionally suitable drivers of economic growth, innovation, and 
competitiveness (EC. 2003; EC. 2008a: EC, 2008b). National govern­
ments and EC-supported policies were designed to promote the pro­
cess of clustering and the establishment of cluster organizations. 
Another important string of literature and policy practice is foreign 
direct investment (FDI) attraction and the development of local link­
ages (for example, supplier networks) of foreign investment enter­
prises (FIEs). Both structures, ICs and widespread supplier networks, 
have common features. Most importantly, both need a sufficient num­
ber of potential collaborators. Both can be developed most successfully 
in regions where economic activity is vivid and enterprising and coop­
eration have traditions. It is therefore of special interest to learn what 
should and could be the relationship between the two cooperation sys­
tems. what are their common features, and what are the differences?
Agglomeration of economic activity is a phenomenon that is as 
long as human history. Centers of active and vibrant economic devel­
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opment and welfare have attracted various businesses for centuries. 
As early as the work of Alfred Marshall (1890), there has been an 
awareness of the importance of geographical proximity in determining 
the location of industrial activity. Marshall argued that clusters 
develop as a consequence of three factors: (a) the presence of a skilled 
local labor market: (b) key inputs from suppliers: and (c) rapid know­
how transfer between firms, leading to technological spillover. Hence, 
regional concentration is not a new phenomenon. What is then new in 
clusters?
The industrial clustering work by Michael Porter (1990: 1998:
2003) is regarded as seminal. He emphasized that firm competitiveness 
was determined by multiple factors only partly endogenous to them. 
In his ‘diamond model,' four sets of interrelated forces are introduced 
to explain industrial dynamics and competitiveness. These are associ­
ated with factor input conditions, sophisticated local demand condi­
tions, related and supported industries, and firm structure, strategy, 
and rivalry. A core notion arose around his model, stressing that a col­
laborative, mutually supportive group of actors could enhance regional 
competitiveness in global markets and, thus, create growth and other 
benefits. In addition, the significance of face-to-face contacts and per­
sonal demonstration, exchange of experience, and role of geographical 
proximity for knowledge transfers and innovation has been explored 
and emphasized. Another string of related economic thought elabo­
rated on knowledge creation and innovation as a social process engag­
ing individuals that exchange tacit and explicit knowledge. Trust- 
based relationships and social capital may, thus, be important for 
enabling horizontal cooperation between individuals within and across 
firms and institutions (Saxenian, 1994: Pouder and St. John, 1996).
ICs are spatial concentrations of business and related institutions 
with activity specialization and active cooperation linkages among 
cluster members1. IC activity may be facilitated by cluster organiza­
Emergence and Development of Industry Clusters-Searching for a'Critical Mass’of Business via Cluster Mapping
1 Michael Porters original definition for clusters is as follows : "Clusters are geo­
graphic concentrations of interconnected companies, specialized suppliers and 
service providers, firms in related industries, and associated institutions (for 
example universities, standards agencies, and trade associations) in particular 
fields that compete but also co-operate" (Porter, 1990, p, 199). The main aim of 
this cooperation is enhancing the competitiveness of regions and actors in the
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tions (cluster initiatives). Nevertheless, the latter are institutions 
rather than an economic phenomenon, and we make a clear distinction 
between them. The essence of ICs is member cooperation, and the 
main benefits that they obtain stem from joint actions. FIEs may also 
benefit from cooperation with ICs related to their core activity. Never­
theless, the linkage is more often the opposite. Local companies and, 
more importantly, governments promote joint actions sometimes orga­
nized as ICs in order to facilitate cooperation with FIEs. One of the 
main FDI-related policy aims is to promote their embeddedness into 
local economic environments and loosen their island-like appearance in 
the host economy. Developing local linkages, however, requires actions 
from both sides of the FIEs and the local firms. Governments usually 
have greater influence on local small and medium-sized firms and can 
better facilitate their efforts to become suppliers of FIEs. An interest­
ing new tool in this effort is cluster promotion and their potential role 
in facilitating FIE local supplier networks2.
For the study of cluster emergence and their further develop­
ment, the Hungarian experience has potential to be taken as the best 
laboratory case in the context of transition economies. It is well- 
known that Hungary has been a leader among Central European 
states in terms of the total accumulated FDI inflows during the early 
1990s. As argued in Chapter 1, this vast influx of foreign capital 
formed a mega economic sector of FIEs within the country. As dis­
cussed iater, there is considerable room for the development of pro­
duction networks between incoming multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
and local companies (Acs et al., 2007). Nevertheless, it is also true that 
the business activity of FIEs has taken greater root in local communi­
ties and their alliance with indigenous companies, especially in manu­
facturing and service industries, has achieved larger scale and depth 
through parts supply and outsourcing than before. This recent prog­
ress is empirically supported by our studies, which confirmed the posi­
tive and statistically significant FDI spillover effects on the productiv­
ity and export propensity of domestic firms for the early 2000s (see 
Chapter 3 and 4 in this book). As a result, newly emerged clusters of
region.
2 For more details on supplier network promotion programs in Hungary, see Sass 
and Szanyi (2004), ICEG (2006), and Sass et aL (2009).
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FDI-led businesses can now be observed in many regions, which 
gives us the opportunity to examine the determinants of cluster devel­
opment and its possible impact on the national and regional economy 
in Hungary.
We can approach ICs on different levels. Since the co-location of 
business in close geographical proximity is an organic development, 
we can focus on a real economic clustering process, i.e., how spatial 
concentrations of certain activities evolve or show up at a given time 
of observation. This is important since benefits of close cooperation 
among firms are expected to arise when cooperating agents exceed a 
certain number, the ‘critical mass3. We can make observations using 
statistical analysis of activities on the local level. First, such an exten­
sive ‘cluster mapping exercise was carried out in the US by Michael 
Porter's team at Harvard Business School (HBS). Since then, several 
similar calculations were made using Porter's original method. In this 
chapter, we review previous mapping exercises and report our own 
results for Hungary.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows : Section 7.2 
briefly summarizes the existing literature on the relationship of sup­
plier networks and cluster development in Hungary, Section 7,3 deals 
with measuring the regional density of economic activity using 
Michael Porter’s measurement idea, the cluster mapping methodology. 
In this section, we introduce the results of previous mapping exercises 
as well as our own research results, which were based on a modified 
measurement method that expanded the number of measures and 
refined the database in geographic terms. Section 7,4 performs cluster 
mapping using the census-type data of Hungarian firms. Section 7.5 
concludes.
3 One main precondition of a successful cluster operation is the presence of a fairly 
large and diverse pool of economic agents specializing in similar or supportive 
activities. The sufficiently large specialized local economic activity is crucial for 
knowledge generation and transfer, for the internal stability of cluster organiza­
tions, for the visibility of clusters, and for the self-sustaining development of 
cluster activities. For more general descriptions and various interpretations of 
the cluster concept see Porter (1998). Solvell et ai. (2003), ICEG (2007), EC 
(2008b), Solvell (2008), and Szanyi (2008b).
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7.2 Supplier Networks and Cluster Development in Hun­
gary
ICs are flexible production platforms with some kind of activity 
specialization. Cluster operation can be targeted directly to consumer 
markets but also to supplies of specific intermediate products. In some 
cases, ICs are organized as an alliance of equal parties (i.e.. firms with 
similar size and importance). In other cases, an organization is more 
satellite-like, and there is one or a few large companies that determine 
cluster activities according to their input demands. In this latter case, 
cluster participants and activities are organized in order to enhance 
the competitiveness of the whole value chain, on top of which there 
usually are western large-scale MNEs. It is important to emphasize 
that FIE-centered ICs may work properly only on the basis of mutual 
benefits. Cluster cooperation, which is largely sponsored by the FIE. 
must bring benefits for suppliers in terms of technological up-grading, 
market access, and sometimes even financial support. The benefits of 
FIEs may range from access to less expensive and flexible local sup­
plies to a better labor force pool and technology assistance.
The essence of ICs is the mutually beneficial co-operation of vari­
ous economic actors. Hence, true ICs expand beyond the mere FIE 
supplier networks. They include non-business participants, and their 
activity goes beyond the technical organization of supplies. Most com­
mon is the technology and knowledge transfer to facilitate the techni­
cal and managerial capabilities of small suppliers. There is also finan­
cial support to undertake necessary investments. However, in this 
type of cooperation, there is relatively little emphasis on innovation 
and technological cooperation, at least for the time being.
FIEs may also be important players in the innovation process of 
ICs. They were always regarded as primary sources of technology to 
the host transition economy. Whenever their local involvement 
increases, interfaces of technological spillovers also widen. Hence, ICs 
may serve as good platforms of knowledge transfer between FIEs and 
local actors. The concept of dynamic clusters'1 emphasizes innovative
1 Solvell et al. (2003) ran the first major questionnaire-based empirical survey on 
cluster organizations worldwide. Using the survey results, they described a
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cooperation among partners rather than one-way transfers of knowl­
edge. It is not self-evident that FIE strategies exceed the technical 
minimum of knowledge transfer towards suppliers. Their links to local 
universities or research laboratories also depend on many factors that 
are independent from cluster policies (Sass and Szanyi, 2004b).
MNEs are desired participants of ICs (Solvell et al., 2003). They 
may support cluster development in several ways. They are in direct 
contact with world markets and can potentially bring breaking news 
to the cluster first-hand. Through their widespread international link­
ages, these companies may support international activities of the clus­
ter and smaller cluster members. They may even lobby for their part­
ners' interests. Another potential support area is technology. MNEs 
usually have cutting-edge technology and are able to provide technol­
ogy and knowledge transfer to strategic partners. In the case of stable 
supplier contacts, technology transfer and support to enable small 
firms to become suppliers are rather usual. The intensity of such link­
age very much depends on the level of MNEs’ inclination for supplier 
network development with nationality, global strategy as perhaps the 
strongest determinants of this inclination. Another technology-related 
area is R&D. One of the essential cluster functions, especially in the 
case of dynamic clusters, is knowledge generation and distribution 
within the ICs. Should there be intensive R&D linkages within the 
cluster members, including research institutions and universities, it is 
likely that also MNEs will participate in this collaboration. Related to 
knowledge generation is training and education. This is also based on 
cooperation of heterogeneous partners, also including MNEs.
We believe that, at least for the time being, emerging market 
economies do not offer strong conditions for knowledge-based 
dynamic clusters or innovation systems that could provide strategic
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typical or best-practice cluster type : the most common appearance of clusters. 
Because of the overrepresentation of clusters from developed market econo­
mies. this model, which they called a dynamic cluster, basically reflected those 
characteristics, cooperation forms, and structures that were found to be typical 
in more developed economies. Later research, including Ketels and Solvell 
(2005) and Ketels et al. (2006), revealed the fact that, in emerging market 
economies or developing countries, clusters may substantially differ concerning 
their focus of activity and working models.
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innovation inputs for MNEs, though many of them possess strong 
innovation communities that could potentially serve as a knowledge- 
generating network with international importance. Thus, it is highly 
likely that the interest of MNEs in developing deep cooperation net­
works with cluster participation is weaker in emerging market econo­
mies, including Hungary, than in developed countries. Nevertheless, 
similarly to conditions for developing supplier networks, cluster par­
ticipation is plausible and desirable, although the likelihood and modes 
of participation may greatly vary. In the next section, we compare the 
conditions of supplier network development with those of cluster 
establishment from the angle of MNEs. This comparison will also high­
light possible ways of organizing ICs based on existing supplier net­
works of MNEs.
In general, we expect that factors increasing the likelihood of sup­
plier network development also increase the propensity for cluster 
involvement. However, the two phenomena are not identical, and. in 
some cases, interests may differ substantially. Therefore, it is neces­
sary to consider these determinants from a cluster viewpoint These 
are : spatial concentration, specialization, heterogeneity of actors, 
simultaneous competition and cooperation, critical mass, and typical 
cluster activities.
As far as the geographic concentration is concerned, we can 
immediately realize that, in Hungary, the main areas for FDI are iden­
tical with those of intensive cluster development It is mainly the capi­
tal city and the Central and Western Transdanubia regions, where 
both clusters and FDIs accumulate5 In fact, investments started to 
settle in important agglomerations already in the 1990s, while cluster 
development (meaning formal cluster initiatives) started only after 
2000. Causal relations are rather unclear, hence these regions used to 
be rather developed industrial centers prior to the transition period, 
and their production potentials significantly contributed to FDI attrac­
tion. Later, this attraction potential was further strengthened by the 
MNEs themselves. Leading original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) 
attracted their traditional suppliers to invest in the same region in 
order to ensure easy and smooth cooperation. This FDI pattern itself
5 For maps of NUTS-2 and NUTS ,3 administrative geographical units, see Figure 
7.2 at the end of the chapter.
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contributed to a large extent to the creation of sufficient pools of spe­
cialized firms within close vicinity. OEMs also exercised a strong pull­
ing effect on local suppliers. While many of them had their premises in 
these historic industrial districts, new firms also settled in them. This 
process was strengthened by some policy measures as well. For over a 
decade or so. special industrial zones enjoyed privileges in the form of 
tax and customs relief provided that they exported their output in its 
entirety. Tax-free zones became hubs for greenfield investments that 
also incorporated many Hungarian suppliers (Antaloczy and Sass, 
2001: Sass. 2003).
Much of the export-oriented greenfield investment was carried 
out in the tax-free zones: however, it is also worth noting that some 
100 such zones were created in Hungary, since regulations for the 
establishment were rather easy to meet. Therefore, the likely pattern 
of spatial concentration was one OEM and its traditional first tire sup­
pliers, completed by local second and third tire supplier companies. 
Only on rare occasions did OEMs with similar final product settle in 
the same hub. They separated themselves from their competitors and 
seemed to prefer separating their supplier network as welt (Szalavetz. 
2001).
Consequently, significant concentrations of specialized firms were 
created in Hungary's more developed areas. These networks consisted 
of technologically dependent suppliers of the value chain of single 
OEMs. The types of cooperation also contributed to the smooth func­
tioning of the chain. Technology and knowledge transfer were pro­
vided by the OEMs and other major firms to Hungarian smaller sup­
pliers in the areas to the extent it was necessary to improve their 
supply capabilities. This knowledge transfer and, generally speaking, 
all cooperation links were vertical : the OEM was in the center, and 
other firms depended on them as satellites. Not only did OEMs avoid 
contacting other OEMs of their branch, but the horizontal linkages of 
suppliers were also curtailed (or at least not promoted), i.e.. both con­
tacts to other MNEs and linkages among suppliers (for example, in the 
case of Electrolux )fi. There is some evidence that MNEs liked sporadic 
suppliers also because they could bargain for lower prices when han­
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6 For more details, see ICEG (2006).
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dling with separated, individual companies (Szanyi, 2008a). Summing 
up, FDI created hot spots for potential cluster development, but MNEs 
were not really interested in creating cooperation and communication 
platforms among supplier firms, which would be an essential cluster 
function.
We must emphasize the role of the tax-free zones in the spatial 
development of industrial districts in the first phase of the transition 
period. The advantageous regulation was, however, lifted while Hun­
gary was joining the European Union (EU). since it was not regarded 
as compatible with competition rules. In addition, in this period, there 
was another pattern of FDI in Hungary, which was more connected 
with the'privatization process and was regarded as more likely lead­
ing to the development of supplier networks. From the point of view 
of the development of horizontal linkages, and the possibility of becom­
ing suppliers of several firms, (various OEMs) there is anecdotal evi­
dence proving that cooperation linkages were more frequent in this 
second FDI pattern. However, MNEs were in many of the privatiza­
tion cases not more interested in the further development of horizon­
tal linkages among suppliers. Nevertheless, traditional cooperation 
among some of the local based suppliers might remain intact Hence, 
the development of local cooperation linkages around these OEMs can 
be more likely than in the case of greenfield investments.
Another aspect of cluster development is the heterogeneity of 
members. It is rather clear that supplier networks around MNEs 
serve primarily the business interests of the integrating company. 
Anything beyond this interest must be initiated by other parties. The 
day-to-day interest of MNEs is simple : they must run their produc­
tion facilities smoothly and efficiently since many of them are effi­
ciency seeking. They need reliable business partners in the value 
chain. However, basically, and especially in the early years of their 
investments, they do not care much about the broader background. 
Many MNEs regard investment projects as one-off deals that last until 
favorable conditions prevail, but they do not intend to get involved in 
supporting the longer-term provision of the conditions. Therefore, 
institutions of the broader production background (education, infra­
structure, and local development) remain outside of their attention. As 
a result of this, the early-phase local production networks usually lack 
diversity, which would be an important feature of ICs.
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This situation is changing with the age and development of 
investment projects. There is much empirical evidence that shows 
how even greenfield investments changed their nature and behavior 
(Hunya, 2001: Szanyi, 2003: Szalavetz, 2005). This is because it is in 
their own efficiency-seeking interest to tap cheap opportunities 
throughout the whole value chain. Therefore, they expand their activ­
ity from the final assembly of imported parts to increasing the local 
component supply to increasing local participation in corporate func­
tions (from accounting through logistics and even to R&D). This 
expansion of affiliate activity in global corporate networks is in line 
with the current wave of concentrating on core competences and out­
sourcing/off shoring much of the activities (Sass, 2008). The higher the 
number of activities that are carried out locally, the more likely busi­
ness and cooperation links are developed in various directions, exceed­
ing the simple technological cooperation of suppliers. Whenever there 
is more room for contacts among heterogeneous market actors, the 
potential also increases for organizing these contacts and actors in 
some formal ways. The clustering process may also get started from 
the bottom.
Recent experiences with labor shortage in some industrial bases 
in Hungary opened up new frontiers of cooperation with MNEs. 
National Instruments in Debrecen, Siemens in Budapest, Nokia in 
Szeged, and Audi in Gyor are just a few examples of MNEs participat­
ing in shaping and also financing education programs of universities. 
Of course, they do this because they need high quality labor supply 
also in the future. Another welcome development pattern is the 
increasing participation of MNEs in financing and participation in R&D 
projects in Hungary. Some of the leading investors in Hungary estab­
lished R&D laboratories in the country. This also substantially 
increased the clustering potentials of some cities in which sufficient 
educational and innovation background was present. We do not 
believe that dynamic clusters will soon play an important role in Hun­
gary’s economic development. It will be good if MNEs at least realize 
that they may also benefit from cluster cooperation in Hungary and 
become active members of ICs. Nevertheless, the mere fact that uni­
versities, R&D facilities, maybe also other actors raised their interest 
in cooperation also supports the cluster idea and increases chances for 
proper cluster actions.
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Concerning the coexistence of cooperation and competition, Hun­
garian ICs may play a positive role. MNE supplier networks always 
supported intensive competition among local firms. The degree of 
cooperation was insufficient; however, it was clearly demonstrated 
that local firms benefitted when they improved their abilities in joint 
actions rather than individually. ICs may play an important role in 
organizing various programs for the development of participating 
SMEs. This is also in the interest of the MNEs heading the value 
chain. Other forms of cooperation, most importantly, technology and 
knowledge transfer, possibly even generation, are also plausible in sup­
plier-based ICs, especially if cluster members can change their way of 
thinking regarding vertical flows but recognize that there is also room 
for joint horizontal actions. The empirical evidence indicates that this 
is the most difficult task for cluster managers since many of the poten­
tial cluster members are competitors and compete for contracts of the 
top OEMs or first tire foreign suppliers. Promoting MNE interest in 
cluster cooperation is sometimes not any more difficult than building 
trust among competing local suppliers.
As far as the critical mass of ICs is concerned, there is very little 
information on this issue in Hungary. Empirical surveys have indicated 
that formal cluster organizations do not set such targets (Szanyi, 
2008a). Many are in their early stage of development: thus, the ques­
tion is not yet relevant for them. Nevertheless, we can draw some gen­
eral conclusions using guidelines available in the literature (ECOTEC, 
2003: Solvell et al„ 2003: CLOE, 2006). Achieving a critical mass is 
important for three reasons. One is stability, which protecting against 
potential dropouts of large, dominating firms: the second is a finan­
cially self-sustaining cluster and new entry attraction: and the third is 
achieving a critical mass of information flow and activity, which is a 
kind of density of cluster actions that provides the desired synergies. 
MNE supplier networks alone have little opportunity to achieve these 
goals. The membership of competing OEMs is not likely. However, 
there may be ICs that are not initiated and dominated by OEMs but 
are established by other parties, building on suppliers to MNEs. In this 
case, the initial favorable condition of the supplier network is utilized: 
namely, there is a pool of potential cluster members. Drawing on this 
pool, a cluster can be organized with or without the participation of 
the MNE itself. The case of the oldest and largest Hungarian cluster.
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the Pannon Automotive Cluster (PANAC), is a good example of this. 
However, even this cluster could not develop activities away from a 
simple supplier network support for many years. It took time and a 
setback in the cluster activity until cluster management realized that 
proper cluster functioning cannot be solely based on supplier network 
development programs (Grosz. 2006a). Representing the cluster's own 
interests as a separate organization is crucial and cannot be subordi­
nated to one company’s business interests. In addition, professional 
cluster management needs to be employed as well so that regular 
cluster functions are developed.
As reported above, there is little information available on the 
actual concentration of economic activity or the achievement of critical 
mass in Hungary. In the remaining part of this chapter, we try to Fill 
the information gap concerning existing critical mass of firms and eco­
nomic activity in Hungary using large-scale firm-level data. Before 
doing this, we briefly review the results of some otiier cluster-map­
ping studies for comparison.
7.3 Cluster-Mapping Practices
While the origins of clustering included mostly bottom-up organi­
zations, increased interest in cluster development as a policy tool 
resulted in large numbers of ICs that did not have traditional or 
organic spatial development roots. Many times, it was governments 
that boosted the organization of cluster initiatives. If countries wish to 
launch a thoroughly designed program, information has to be gathered 
and evaluated first. For the purpose of the promotion of the clustering 
process or the foundation of cluster organizations, it is necessary to 
check if conditions for clustering are given or not. Two characteristics 
are crucial. The first is spatial concentration, and the second is special­
ization on some core competence. It is obvious that, in the case of a 
top-down initiative, these characteristics can be controlled in advance. 
It is surprising that cluster mapping has not become a general prac­
tice by governments other than that of the USA. where a nationwide 
effort was made in the late 1990s. Some countries also calculated spa­
tial concentration measures, but not even these efforts were always 
given the right attention by policy makers. For example, in Hungary, 
there was such an effort in 2003, but it was conducted when the clus­
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ter promotion program had already been opened for application (Ravn 
and Petersen, 2005). An ex-post survey compared the identified ICs 
with the list of existing cluster initiatives. Only 10 of the then 22 Hun­
garian cluster initiatives matched the hot-spot map that identified 24 
examples of above-average spatial concentration of industries (Geese.
2004).
The above-mentioned weak result of match by actual cluster ini­
tiatives and statistically registered spatial concentrations raises the 
question of how to explain this failure. The question is whether it was 
the inappropriate analytical framework that created distortions in the 
mapping procedure or rather, it was due to a high number of ‘virtual 
cluster initiatives’ ? However, most likely, both explanations are accu­
rate.
A brief overview of methodological problems is presented in the 
following section. The cluster-mapping procedure tries to identify spa­
tial locations where the representation of certain industries or eco­
nomic activities is higher than average, i.e., where they seem to con­
centrate. The logic is simple. In these places, there must be some kind 
of competitive advantage that is perceived by economic actors, and 
they tend to co~locate. There are three types of industries that have 
different reasons to co-locate. A large number of manufacturing 
branches as well as service providers, typically personal services, are 
located right at their markets. The dispersion of such industries is 
roughly even in all regions. Per capita measures, for example, are very 
close to each other in the various geographic regions of a country. 
Natural resource-based industries, on the other hand, tend to concen­
trate mainly at the location of the valuable asset. These industries may 
serve the global market, but they do not have much locational choice. 
The third group of activities is the most important one. These are 
industries that concentrate at locations; hence, they choose among 
many potential sites. These industries are regarded as cluster indus­
tries. In the case of the US economy, their proportional share in 
employment was close to one third, but they recorded higher than 
average wages, productivity, and innovation (Ketels and Solvell. 2005).
Ketels and Solvell (2005) ran a comprehensive statistical survey 
of cluster mapping in the 10 new member states of the EU, including 
Hungary (EU-10). Their methodology was based on the methods of a 
survey that was conducted at the Institute for Strategy and Competi­
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tiveness at HBS led by Michael Porter'. The European survey used 
the amended American industrial classification method when identify­
ing those business activities that belonged to cluster industries. Spatial 
concentration was calculated for the European NUTS-2-level regions. 
Only employment data was readily available at this level of both sec­
toral and geographic disaggregation (38 businesses) and for two com­
paratively recent years (2000 and 2004). Thus, concentration was 
measured with this single data set. However, the authors calculated 
three different measures in order to limit some of the distortions stem­
ming from the special features of employment data. They wanted to 
obtain a balanced picture of regions reaching sufficient specialized 
critical mass to develop the type of spillovers and linkages that create 
positive economic effects that can serve as a base for cluster initia­
tives.
The first measure expressed the size, whether employment 
reached a sufficient absolute level that has the potential to trigger 
strong economic effects of ICs. This level was set for each NUTS-2 
region and every of the 38 branch with 15,000 employees at a location. 
The second measure expressed specialization, meaning that a region is 
more specialized in a specific cluster category than the overall econ­
omy across all regions, and therefore it may provide enough strength 
for the regional cluster to attract related economic activity from other 
regions. This notion was operationalized by regarding as fit those con­
centrations that reached a specialization quotient of more than 1.75, i.e., 
those which had at least 75% more employment within the given clus­
ter than the average of all regions would suggest given their size. The 
third measure expressed dominance, whether branches employ a high 
share of the given region's overall labor. The measure was set at the 
level of 7% of overall regional employment. The level of all three mea­
sures was set to separate the highest 10 percentile of all regional ICs.
As expressed by the authors, the measurement method had sev­
eral shortcomings. The first is the exclusive use of employment fig­
ures, which created a bias towards labor-intensive sectors. Another 
problem is the level of disaggregation in both dimensions. The 38 
activity groups or businesses contain many that are rather heteroge-
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Competitiveness (http:// data.isc.hbs.edu/isc/index.jsp).
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neous. A deeper level of disaggregation was not possible, since the 
original grouping pattern, which was based on more detailed surveys 
of the US economy, could be transformed from the American SIC clas­
sification structure to European NACE only at this level.
With regard to the NUTS-2 regions, they are also too big in at 
least some countries and for some activities. In Hungary, for example, 
NUTS-2 regions were artificially created as requested by the EU, but 
they consist of usually 3 former comitats that, historically, used to be 
the integrating geographic and administrative unit. The new NUTS-2 
regions are so young that their economies could hardly amalgamate. 
On the other hand, there is no convincing evidence on ICs spreading 
according to administrative borders either. Thus, some ICs may have 
escaped mapping because they spread over two or even more NUTS-
2 regions.
A further problem comes from the inheritance of previous indus­
trial structures. In most socialist countries, production was heavily 
concentrated in large state-owned companies. In some cas>es, these 
huge combinates were located in places of arbitrary choice: in other 
cases, firms were created by the governments of these countries in 
their strive for self-supply in practically al! commodities even if pro­
duction inputs were not readily available. In many cases, these giants 
or their remnants survived the turmoil of the transition process. In 
other cases the least mobile production factor labor remained in places 
where it had accumulated during the years of socialist industrializa­
tion. All this experience seriously distorted spatial concentration pat­
terns from the hypothetical optimum, and the old patterns still exer­
cise influence on spatial differences in the supply of production factors. 
Thus, we may have strong reservations as far as the applicability of 
the results of current cluster mapping is concerned.
Ketels and Solvell’s (2005) survey found, nevertheless, interesting 
results : First, 367 regional ICs met at least one of the three hurdle 
rates for absolute size, specialization, and dominance. They repre­
sented 5,86 mn employees, which is about 58% of total employment in 
the cluster sector of the 10 new member states. Second, the capital 
regions of the largest countries led the ranking of regions by cluster 
portfolio strength : Budapest first, Warsaw second, and Prague fourth. 
Third, the largest seven cluster categories were food processing, 
heavy construction services, transportation and logistics, financial ser­
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vices, hospitality and tourism, metal forming, and building fixtures, 
equipment and services, all of which accounted for 50% of all cluster 
sector employment across the EU-10. As is evident, these are mainly 
labor intensive branches with a relatively lower level of productivity 
which provides a clear indication for sample bias. For example, auto­
motive and information and communication technology (ICT) sectors 
employed far fewer individuals, however they used to be considered as 
leading sectors for many ICs.
The research confirmed existing hypotheses concerning the 
development gap between developed countries and transition member 
states in the EU. The 10 EU economies had a specialization profile dis­
tinct from the more advanced economies. Specialization was found to 
have a far stronger natural resource-driven sector (20% share in 
employment) than developed countries. Within the cluster sector (32% 
share in employment), there was a stronger bias towards labor-inten­
sive and manufacturing-driven cluster categories, while these coun­
tries had relatively few ICs in advanced services and knowledge- 
intensive cluster categories. Exceptions were the strongest clustering 
centers around capital cities. In addition, in the case of the Hungarian 
ICs, the bias reported above was less pronounced, and specialization 
towards high-value-added services and industries was stronger (see 
Table 7.1).
There may be several factors affecting the results of the above 
table that seems to underestimate IC potential in the region. For 
example, no Slovenian cluster qualified for all three dimensions. Ketels 
and Solvell (2005) found convincing evidence on the correlation of 
spatial concentration and economic performance using the data of 
developed countries. However, the spatial concentration had different 
historic reasons in practically all of the 10 new EU countries, and these 
traditions seem to have a much weaker causal link to economic 
growth and performance today. For example, in the case of the strong 
position of the Kosice region in the Slovak Republic, we must not for­
get that this is one of the poorest regions of the EU 25 economies. The 
Kosice steel mill and very few other industrial facilities are the single 
most important employer of a region where unemployment rates are 
extraordinarily high. Thus, we may observe cases in which spatial con­
centration of business is the result of an overall meltdown of business 
activity in some regions and not the beneficial outcome of a deliberate
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Table 7.1 Strong regional flusters and their specialization in 
six Central and Eastern European Countries, 2004
Region Field of specialization
Czech Republic
Liberec Automotive
Liberec Textiles
Ostrava Metal manufacturing
Praha city Education and knowledge generation
Praha city Entertainment
Praha city Financial services
Praha region Automotive
Hungary
Gyor Automotive
Szeged Food processing
Szekesfehervar Information technology
Lithuania Appare)
Latvia Entertainment
Poland
Gdansk Transportation and logistics
Katowice Automotive
Lodz Apparel
Warszawa Financial services
Wroclaw Automotive
Slovakia
Bratislava Financial services
Kosice Apparel
Kosice Metal manufacturing
Note '■ This tabie lists ICs qualifying for the top 10% in all three 
measures.
Source '■ Ketels and Solvell (2005, pp. 62-65).
co-location decision of independent cluster actors.
It is perhaps more useful to look at the overall clustering perfor­
mance of regional centers. Table 7.2 contains a list of regional centers 
that attracted the largest cluster portfolio, i.e.. businesses that qualified 
in one or more aspects of cluster measures.
There are large differences within the EU-10 across regions and 
cluster categories regarding their level of specialization and spatial 
concentration. These countries show much lower specialization on spe­
cific regional ICs within regions and much lower spatial concentration
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Table 7.2 Regional clusters with strongest portfolio in EU-10, 2004
Region Total number of qualifications
Average 
qualification per 
regional cluster
Share of qualified 
clusters in total 
regional cluster 
employment (%)
Budapest (Hungary) 23 1.53 77
Warsawa (Poland) 22 1.38 77
Katowice (Poland) 21 1.4 81
Praha city (Czech) 19 1.9 78
Lithuania 19 1.58 70
Krakow (Poland) 18 1.29 68
Liberec (Czech) 17 1.55 62
Lodz (Poland) 16 1.6 71
Wroclaw (Poland) 16 1.45 60
Poznan (Poland) 15 1.15 72
NiLra (Slovakia) 14 1.4 60
Bydgoszcz (Poland) 14 127 58
Slovenia 14 1.27 56
Olomouc (Czech) 14 1.4 45
Latvia 13 1.44 62
Gdansk (Poland) 13 1.44 59
Praha region (Czech) 13 1.63 43
Bratislava (Slovakia) 12 15 65
Brno (Czech) 12 12 56
Miskoic (Hungary) 12 1.09 51
Kosice (Slovakia) 12 1.71 45
Source '■ Ketels and Solvell (2005. p. 26).
on specific regions within cluster categories than the original bench­
mark US economy. If, as is suggested by the authors, higher levels of 
specialization and concentration enable higher productivity and inno­
vation, this is a serious concern. The same concern arises with regard 
to the EU-15 countries in comparison with the US, which is fully con­
sistent with the performance gap relative to the United States.
The EU implemented Porter's idea as extended by Solvel! and 
addressed dynamic clusters, or ‘innovative clusters, as they are 
referred to by the EC. which serves as a cornerstone of the more con­
crete and operative implementation plan targeted by Lisbon in the 
mid-2000s. The emphasis on cluster development in Europe provides 
new impetus for cluster research. Based on previous work at the
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Stockholm School of Economics, new research institutions were cre­
ated. The European Cluster Observatory started to work in 2005. One 
main research output of this institution is its cluster mapping data­
base8. The database contains employment data broken down according 
to Porter's original categorization of traded clusters for the European 
NUTS-2-level regions. Similar measures as those used by Ketels and 
Solvell (2005) were calculated. Thus, the problem of using only one 
indicator (employment), as well as the broad and rather rigid separa­
tion of regions remains in this database. Nevertheless, the availability 
of methodologically comparable data for the whole territory of the EU 
is an important new feature in cluster research. In addition, the data­
base contains some basic evaluation of the registered cluster exports 
and innovative activities that helps readers identify the true innova­
tive clusters.
As far as the actual results are concerned, data of the observed 
Hungarian ICs are summarized in Table 7.3. As is seen, none of the 
spatial concentrations in Hungary qualified in all three measurement 
aspects in 2007 (in 2004, there were three). The number of two-star 
ICs also declined. Some of the 2004 two-star ICs lost one star. but. in 
two cases, i.e., building fixtures and business services in Central Hun­
gary, the 2004 clusters were not reported in the 2007 table. On the 
other hand, 6 new’ two-star ICs appear in the 2007 table. They are 
certainly not new in the sense that these spatial concentrations have 
been known since they used to have a solid and traditional back­
ground and qualified for a one-to-two-star level.
Looking at the 2007 list of Hungarian ICs, the still strong positions 
of traditional sectors are evident. This is despite the less favorable 
development tendencies in the 1990s and 2000s. Strong path depen­
dency is observed here. Despite the massive foreign investments in 
some global industries, such as automotive, electronics, and communi­
cation technology, important features of the Hungarian economy pre­
vailed in the food industry, construction, and light industry, which 
retained important positions despite heavy contractions in the last 20 
years.
Another important piece of information to be gleaned from the
K See the European Cluster Observatory special website (http://www.clusterob- 
servatory.eu).
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T a b le  7.3 E v a lu a t io n  o f  H u n g a r ia n  c lu s te r s ,  2007
A ll reg iona l c lusters in  H ungary
I- and 2-star regional dusters
Region Clustercategory Employees Size Spec. Focus Stars Innovation Exports
K ozep-M agyaro rszag T ransp o rta tio n 50163 0.81% 123 4.00% *  * High Weak
Koze p- Magyarorszag Education 44476 1.00% 1-89 3.00% *  * High N/A
D e l-A lfo id Food 34101 0.68% 2.89 7.00% *  * Low Weak
K ozep-M agyaro rszag IT 30735 1.00% 226 2.00% *  * High Strong
Kozep-Dunantul Automotive 17091 0.66% 2.85 4.00% * # Low SlrtJng
N yugat-D unantu l A u tom o tive 16741 0.64% 2,98 4.00% *  * Low Strong
Kozep-Magyarorszag Biopharma 14197 1.00% 2.61 1.00% * # High Weak
K ozep-Dunantu l IT 12535 0.61% 2.64 2.00% *  * Low Strong
K ozep-D unantu l B u ild ing  F ix tures 11702 0.50% 2.17 2.00% * # Low Strong
N yugat-D unantu l IT 10995 0.54% 2.47 2.00% * * Low Strong
Nyugat-Dunantul Lighting 6888 1.00% 6.17 1.00% * * Low Very strong
Kozep-Magyarorszag Lighting 6832 1.00% 2.00 0.56% *  * High Very strong
Del-Dunantul Leather 3086 1.00% 10.32 0.95% * * Low Weak
K ozep-M agyaro rszag Finance 43439 0.61% 0.92 3.00% # High Weak
K ozep-M agyaro rszag E n te rta inm ent 28559 1.00% 1.96 2.00% * High Very strong
E s z a k A lfo ld Food 22460 0.45% 1.73 4.00% * Low Weak
Eszak-A lfo ld C onstruc tion 18230 0.28% 1.07 3.00% * Low N /A
Kozep-Dunantu l MetaJ 17403 0.44% 1.92 4.00% * Low Weak
Kozep-M agyaro rszag Pub lish in g 16886 1,00% 155 1,00% * High Weak
Eszak-Magy aro rsza g Food 16116 0.32% 151 4,00% * Low Weak
Kozep-Dunantul Construction 16020 024% 1.06 3.00% * Low N/A
Eszak-Magyarorszag Construction 15650 0.24% 1.11 3.00% * Low N/A
K ozep-D unantu l F  ood 15246 0.31% 1.32 3.00% * Low Weak
Nyugat-Dunantul Food 14718 059% 1.36 3.00% * Low Weak
Del-Dunantul Food 14374 029% t.63 4.00% * Low Weak
Del-Alfoid Construction 13783 021% 0.89 3.00% * Low N/A
Eszak-M agyaro rszag M eta l 13190 0.34% 157 3,00% * Low Weak
Nyugat-Dunantul Construction 12918 0.20% 0.91 3.00% * Low N/A
Kozep-Dunantul Transportation 12078 0.20% 0.85 2.00% * Low Weak
N y ugat-Dunantul Hospitality 11702 0.32% 1.17 2.00% * Low Strong
Dei-Dunantul Construction 11151 0.17% 0.96 3.00% * Low N/A
Del-Dunantul Finance 9012 0.13% 0.72 2.00% * Low Weak
Eszak-Magyarorszag Chemical 6130 0.64% 2.97 1.00% * Low Weak
Eszak - M agy aro rszag Communications 5910 0.74% 3.47 1.00% * Low Very strong
Kozep-Dunantul Communications 5890 0.74% 321 1.00% * Low Very strong
Nyugat-Dunantul Heavy Machinery 5341 0.64% 2.97 1.00% ♦ Low Weak
Eszak-Alfold Heavy Machinery 4362 0.52% 2.02 0.92% * Low Weak
Del-Dunantu! Communications 4333 0.54% 3.09 1,00% * Low Very strong
Del-Alfold Constr. Materials 3863 0.64% 2.72 0.89% * Low Weak
Nyugat-Dunantul Communications 3475 0.44% 2.01 0.87% * Low Very sirong
Kozep-Magyarorszag Jewelry 3445 1.00% 1.75 0.28% * High Weak
Eszak-Magyarorszag Lighting 3357 0.65% 3.04 0.85% * Low Very strong
Eszak-Alfold Lighting 308-1 0.60% 2.30 0.65% * Low Very strong
Eszak-Alfold Footwear 3066 0.70% 2.71 0.64% * Low Weak
Del-Alfold Oil and Gas 2372 0.67% 2.84 0,55% * Low Weak
Del-Dunantul Fishing 1369 0,38% 2.16 0.42% * Low Weak
Eszak-Alfold Leather 1167 0.69% 2,65 024% * Low Weak
Nyugat-Dunantul Leather 1041 0.61% 2.83 0.26% * Low Weak
Notes '■ A brief description of the calculation method is provided in the text. In the case of the size, one star was 
given to clusters that belonged to the lop JQ% of all clusters in the EU concerning this feature. The % figure in 
this table shows the actual share of the given Hungarian cluster in Europe's total (total employment in the given 
sector in all European clusters). In the case of specialization, values over 2 earned one star. For the notion of 
focus, those clusters which belonged to those 10% of clusters that contributed the most to the total local cluster 
employment earned one star. The % figure in the table shows the actual share of the cluster in the employment 
of the region. Those clusters that also appeared in Ketels and Sdlvell's (2005) table are shown in bold.
Source : European Cluster Observatory special website (http://www.clusterobservatory.eu}.
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table is that innovation was found to be the strongest mainly in sec­
tors that did not export much and did not belong to traditional high- 
technology activities. The loose relationship of high technology, innova­
tion, and exports calls for caution when designing cluster-promotion 
tools aiming at export-oriented innovative clusters, which are at the 
heart of the current Hungarian and, to some extent, the European 
innovation policy9. Porter stressed the importance of innovation in 
cluster activity, but he never reported that ICs were reserved for 
high-technology activities or for export-oriented industries. The heart 
of his concept is joint action for increasing regional competitiveness in 
general. One tool of this effort is the support of innovative cooperation 
in a wide range of industries and activities. Equally important in the 
cluster concept is its foundation on traditional regional sources and 
areas of competitiveness. These should be promoted by cluster coop­
eration. ICs should not be regarded as a means of capitalist industrial­
ization.
As a conclusion, we can suggest further research in mapping spa­
tial concentrations of business activity in the 'traded cluster’ sectors. 
It seems to be necessary to use alternative indicators, such as sales 
turnover, investments, or paid salaries, rather than the number of 
employees. In addition, the strict administrative boundaries of NUTS-2 
regions should be made more flexibly to allow for the observation of 
'cross-border' clusters, or tighter spatial concentrations that “disap­
pear" from calculations when comparing them with aggregated figures 
of larger areas. Such refinements in methodology will enhance a more 
reliable comparison of functioning cluster organizations and their 
background. This, in turn, would also contribute to a better formula­
tion of cluster policies.
7.4 A New Hungarian Cluster Mapping
In this section, we perform a new cluster mapping exercise based 
on annual census-type data of Hungarian firms. The data were com­
piled from financial statements associated with tax reporting submit­
ted to the National Tax Authority in Hungary by legal entities per­
9 For example, see EC (2008a: 2008b) and European Cluster Observatory (2007).
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forming accounting and tax procedures by double-entry bookkeeping. 
The data contain basic information for each sample firm, including its 
geographical location, the NACE 4-digit codes, annual average number 
of employees, total turnovers, and other financial indices10. First, we 
describe our empirical methodology followed by the results.
7.4,1 Methodology
We employ the 1998 and 2005 datasets to conduct mapping of ICs 
in Hungary using Porter's measurement method, which was described 
in the previous section. When transforming the industry categories of 
the database to the one that was defined in the HBS cluster mapping 
project, we could separate 37 out of the original 38 traded cluster 
activities11. Out of the three measures that were used by Ketels and 
Solvell (2005), we used only one, namely, the specialization quotient. 
The design of the locational quotient is similar to Bela Balassa’s RCA 
(revealed comparative advantage) measure. It expresses the relative 
weight of one single sector in a region to the total weight of the region 
compared to either the national economy or a larger geographical 
area. The calculation is conducted using the following formula (7.1) :
where ey is the number of employees in area j  in branch i, e, is the 
total number of employees in area j, Ej is the number of employees in 
branch i in the whole country (spatial unit of comparison), and E the 
is total number of employees in the whole country (spatial unit of com­
parison). Hence, s$ denotes the share of area j  in total employment of 
branch i, and xj denotes the share of area j  in total employment
We found that the statistical content of the other two measures 
was quite similar. We also found the other two measures to be 
strongly biased by the absolute differences between firms, branches, 
and spatial units. Relative concentration is at the heart of the cluster­
1C See Section 2.4 in Chapter 2 for more details of the dataset.
11 For a thorough description of the traded cluster category, see the website of the 
cluster-mapping project at : http://data.isc.hbs.edu/isc/indexjsp.
(7.1)
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ing process, and this requires relative measures. Comparisons that are 
based on the use of absolute values are. therefore, less applicable, since 
they reflect size biases.
Our calculations are new and more precise in two aspects. We 
could disaggregate our database in spatial terms from NUTS-2 level 
(regions) to NUTS-3 level (comitats)i2. This is important because, on 
a regional level, important concentrations can be neglected due to dif­
ferences in terms of varying significance levels of the different eco­
nomic activities. However, a finer spatial focus also allows for the 
observation of activity concentrations that do not follow the artificial 
boundaries of the regions. The other novelty of our calculation method 
was the’ usage of various measures of economic activity, not just 
employment data. We used employment (number of employed per­
sons), number of enterprises, value added, and cumulated investment 
data (investments of the 1998-2005 period). Thus, the final product of 
the calculations was four measures for each traded cluster branch in 
each NUTS-3-level spatial unit for the year 2005 and three for the 
year 1998, since, for the starting year, no cumulated investment figure 
was available.
7.4.2 Results
The total number of calculation results was 740 (20 spatial units, 
37 branches) for each of the four measures. For an easier overview and 
better analysis, we followed the evaluation method found in Ketels and 
Solvell (2005). We gave one point for all branch-comitat pairs that 
belonged, in terms of the given measure, to the upper 15% of the cal­
culation values. Thus, every branch-comitat pair could receive a maxi' 
mum of 4 points (3 points in 1998)L3. We considered those pairs in 
which at least two measures proved to be significant (they belonged to 
the highest 15% and, therefore, received two points). We also calcu­
lated the Gini coefficients. This measure helps us determine whether 
activity concentration is caused by one or a few large companies or a 
number of medium-sized or several small firms. This is a very impor­
tant aspect, since we want to measure the pool of potential co-opera­
The database allowed even deeper NUTS-4-leve! calculations.
13 We also evaluated the branch-comitat pairs at a lower 30% level.
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tors. and. therefore, the actual size structure is highly relevant for us. 
The Gini coefficient was calculated from employment figures. Values 
over 0.9 reflect a very uneven structure. If the number of firms (obser­
vations) is high (100 or more), then values as high as 0.7-0.8 already 
indicate that a number of medium-sized firms should also be present 
Thus, cooperative structures, such as clusters or supplier networks, 
would have a sufficiently broad pool to serve as a base.
We could spot significant concentration in 22 of the 37 traded 
cluster branches for the year 2005. In the remaining 15 traded cluster 
branches, no branch-comitat pairs received at least two points. The 
results are summarized in Table 7.4. It is noteworthy that no ser- 
vices-centered cluster was captured by our calculations, although 
there is much anecdotal evidence on the existence of even formal clus­
ter organizations based on various service activities (financial services, 
education, and entertainment). Of course, it is possible that this failure 
is related to the shortcomings of the measurement method. However, 
the absolute lack of indication in the whole country may also mean 
that either these ICs operate in an inappropriate environment (too few 
related companies) or may be very young organizations that are not 
yet measurable statistically. In case of the capital city, Budapest, a fur­
ther option is also likely. This city is simply too big and has business 
activity that is too heterogeneous and does not allow statistically out­
standing concentrations. The overall size limits the relative importance 
of sectors that would produce sufficiently targe size in many aspects 
but whose large denominator permits them to go unnoticed. Due to 
this measurement problem, Budapest and Pest County did not show 
significant concentrations at all. Since, however, we could also provide 
the total number of firms in the given branch, high values of this data 
may still deliver the necessary information on spatial concentration.
As is seen in Table 7.4 and also on the amended maps shown as 
Figure 7.1. in many cases, we included several comitats together to 
form a potential cluster. This idea stems from the logic that the spatial 
dispersion of clusters should not necessarily follow administrative 
boundaries. The lower spatial observation level (i.e., NUTS-3) allows 
us to better localize the potential spread of ICs in neighboring comi­
tats. We treated the comitat-branch pair, which showed a significant 
concentration on the 15% level as gravity centers, and added the 
neighboring comitats, which showed concentration on a level of at
Emergence and Development of Industry Clusters: Searching for a'Critical Mass'of Business via Cluster Mapping
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Table 7.4 Results of cluster mapping in Hungary using the 2005 census data
Sector Counties
Number of 
firms
Gini
coefficient
Qualification Note
Automotive Gyfir. Komarom 29: 17 0.81: 0.77 yes one center
Leather Products
Vas, Baranya. Szolnok. 
Sza boles
6: 17 :6 :3
0.66; 0.65: 
0.58: 0.66
7
two centers, spatially dis­
perse
Footware
Vas. Baranya. Tolna. 
Bacs-Kiskun. Szolnok. 
Szabolcs
10: 15: 15; 
19: 14: 27
0.64; 0.70: 
056; 054: 
0.73: 0.67
7 two centers, few firms
Processed Food
BScs-Kiskun. Cson- 
grSd. Bekes. Szabolcs
262: 135: 
141: 201
0.78:0.85: 
0.79: 0.79
yes two centers
Building Fixtures. 
Equipment and Services
Veszprem. Komarom. 
NdgrSd
238: 319: 
119
0.82:0,76:
0.68
yes one center
Furniture Zala. Vas. Gy6r, B£k£s
170: 124: 
186: 117
0.71; 0.78: 
0.81: 0.73
yes two centers
Metal Manufacturing Fej6r. NogrAd 179: 49 0.91; 0.75 yes two centers
Motor Driven Products Zala. Szolnok 62: 63 0.80: 0.86 yes two centers
Biop harmace u ticals Hajdu 6 0.82 ? one center, few firms
Communications
Equipment
Nogr&d. Heves. Szol­
nok
18: 30: 36
0.79:0-89;
0.89
yes one center
Aerospace Heves 3 0.57 ? one center, few firms
Agricultural Products
Veszprem. Baranya. 
Bacs-Kiskun, Borsod
61:59: 141: 
93
0.81; 0.73: 
0.65: 0.76
7
three centers, d ispersed 
activities
Plastics B&cs-Kiskun. Borsod 106: 74 0.78: 0.87 yes two centers
Analytical Instruments Pest 87 0.77 yes one center
Medical Devices Hajdu 57 0.83 yes one center
Publishing and Printing Komarom 16 0.73 7
one center, dispersed activ­
ities
Apparel Vas. Bekes. Hajdu 40 : 54: 115
0.76.0.68;
0.89
yes two centers
Sporting. Recreational and 
Children’s Goods
Baranya. Nograd 17: 6 0.61: 0.75 7 one center, few firms
Information Technology
Veszprem, Komarom, 
Baranya. Pest
13: 25; 23: 
127
0,77:0.91: 
0.94: 0.92
7
quickly  changing spatial 
location
Construction Materials Veszprem, Bekes 12: 10 0.84: 0.63 no
one center, dispersed loca­
tion
Chemical Products Vas. Borsod 5: 18 0.70: 0.70 no
one center, dispersed loca­
tion
L ighting and E lectrical 
Equipment
Tolna 6 0.62 no
d isp e rsed  lo ca tio n , few
firms
Source - Authors' estimation.
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least 33%. In some branches, we could identify 2 and. in some cases, 
even 3 centers, the nucleus of potential cluster formations14. Such 
examples are presented on the amended cluster maps. The last two 
columns of the table provide an evaluation of the branch-comitat pairs 
concerning the likelihood that they may become real ICs. Our objec­
tions were placed in the last column, and they included wide spatial 
dispersion and a shortage of companies.
Fifteen concentrations are found to be strong enough to form ICs. 
In many cases, cluster organizations already work in these centers. In 
14 other cases, we inserted a question mark, indicating that either a 
strong concentration was not supported by a sufficiently high number 
of potential cooperating Firms or the relatively strong comitats were 
not in each other’s immediate neighborhood. That would have limited 
the frequent personal contacts of cluster members, which would also 
be an important aspect of successful cluster operations. In a few cases, 
we found that the original traded cluster categorization is not per­
fectly suitable for the Hungarian economy. For example, in the case of 
the branch agricultural products. Porter’s original category included all 
types of farm products, such as crops and animal products. It also 
included equipment repair and other services. This is highly relevant 
for large and complex American farms, but it does not really apply to 
much smaller, more specialized Hungarian producers. In this case, 
another category could have reflected more precisely those activities 
along which Hungarian agricultural producers could potentially coop­
erate.
7.5 Conclusions
From a summary of the lessons of our cluster-mapping exercise 
for Hungary, we draw some important conclusions. It is necessary to 
show that most spatial concentrations (potential clusters) are located 
in areas where similar industrial activity had been carried out before
Emergence and Development of Indastry Clusters: Searching for a'Critical Mass'of Business via Cluster Mapping
14 It is noteworthy that spatial concentration is just one important condition of 
cluster formation. Hence, even if we call the observed concentrations clusters or 
potential clusters, it does by no means mean that there is an actual cluster 
organization present. HBS documents, as well as the European Cluster Obser­
vatory, also use the term 'cluster' for spatial activity concentrations.
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the transition. This means that, despite the tremendous structural 
changes of the two decades of transition, some basic characteristics of 
spatial and activity structure of the Hungarian economy remained in 
place. This is important evidence that supports an important aspect of 
the IC-related literature, namely, that there is strong path-depen- 
dency in economic development. Path dependency also means, how­
ever, that cluster policies can and should not be treated as a means of 
a new capitalist industrialization. The main aim of clustering is to fur­
ther develop traditional regional strength in order to gain regional 
competitiveness. We do not want to deny the possibility of creating 
new structures in the long run. Indeed, in the case of the automotive 
industry and ICT production, development in Hungary by far 
exceeded previous levels. In these cases, the existing capacities and 
expertise played a relatively small role. However, such examples seem 
to be more the exception than the rule.
Another noteworthy result of the survey follows from the previ­
ous argument. We found ample evidence of the existence of activity 
concentrations in branches and regions that have strong PIE influence, 
such as the automotive and ICT sectors. There is much empirical evi­
dence that shows the impact of important supplier networks1’"1. 
Strengthening the clustering process in such vertically integrated net­
works would require the support for horizontal linkages among cluster 
members. However, we also found branches in which FIE involvement 
was much weaker. We can conclude, therefore, that cluster develop­
ment in such regions and branches in which there is no FIE domi­
nance is also possible. However, the structure and functions of these 
clusters may be very different. They have stronger horizontal and less 
vertical cooperation. In addition, the power relations are different in 
theml(>. In this second type of clusters, the main activity is rather 
smalhbusiness and regional development. This variation of cluster 
types calls for more refined and not uniform solutions in cluster devel­
opment policy.
In the next chapter, we will examine the impact of cluster devel­
opment on regional economic growth using the cluster-mapping
15 For the car industry and the role of PANAC, the Hungarian automotive cluster.
see Grosz (2006a).
1(1 For evidence and case studies, see Szanyi (2008a: 2008b).
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Figure 7.1 Potential clusters in the processed food, apparel, automotive, and communications equipment industries in Hun­
gary, 2005
(a )  Potential Clusters In Processed Food. 3006 (b )  Potential Clusters In Apparel. 200S
(c) Potential Clusters In Autom otive. 2005 (d) Potential Cluster* In Com m unications Equipm ent, 2005
Source '• Authors’ illustration.
Figure 7.2 Regional administration units of Hungary
(a) Regional administration units of Hungary: Comitats (NUTS-3)
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(^Chapter 8 )
Industry Cluster and Regional 
Economic Growth
8.1 Introduction
The geographic concentration of economic activities has attracted 
attention from economists for centuries. Research has been carried out 
on the topic with varying intensity since von Thunen’s early model of 
specialization until the latest, works of the Nobel Prize winner Paul 
Krugman. Some important schools of economic thought have recently 
been examining the topic, such as new growth theories, transaction 
cost economics, and new economic geography.
Knowledge externalities appeared as a key concept in the first 
regional growth theories developed by Alfred Marshall (1890), which 
have been elaborated upon during the 20th Century with an evolving 
intensity in the last decade and at the turn of the millennium. Evi­
dence has been revealed proving the effect of regional specialization 
(Henderson et al„ 1995), local competition (Porter. 1990), and diverse 
urban environment (Glaeser et al.. 1992) on regional growth. However, 
these theories and empirics are mainly based on developed economies, 
and they do not sufficiently consider the experiences in other less 
developed regions.
Transition economies are particularly interesting from this view­
point because most of them underwent at least 4-5 decades of eco­
nomic development earmarked by socialist industrialization. This pro-
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cess meant a forced economic restructuring that also largely altered 
previous spatial patterns of economic activity. In this period, bureau­
cratic coordination of the central government dominated, and the mar­
ket mechanism was put aside. Under the planned economy, production 
was concentrated in large state-owned enterprises in selected loca­
tions. After the change of the political regime, greenfield investments 
by large multinational enterprises (MNEs) were carried out in the 
tradable and service sectors. Foreign direct investment (FDI) usually 
started operation with simpler activities that were mainly based on 
cheap unskilled labor as the local production input However, MNEs 
continued investments using more value-producing resources, includ­
ing skilled labor, local engineering, and research and development 
(R&D) capacities. Domestic companies played only a marginal role in 
the supplier networks of these companies: there was an enormous gap 
between MNEs that were connected directly to the global markets 
and a big number of less mature small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs). As a result, newly emerged industry clusters produced a sig­
nificantly different geographical allocation of workforce and firms from 
that in the socialist period.
Using annual census-type data of Hungarian firms, we empirically 
examine the relationship between industry clustering and regional 
economic growth in the transition period. More specifically, the aim of 
this chapter is to show how geographical concentration of industry 
and market affects employment and production growth in regions of 
Hungary. Our empirical results confirm that both organizational and 
market concentrations have a statistically significant and positive 
impact on production growth, while employment concentration is neg­
atively related to production growth. These findings broadly support 
the Marshall-Arrow-Romer (MAR) model of local knowledge exter­
nalities, suggesting that investment-driven regional development pre­
vails in Hungary.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows '• Section 8.2 
gives an account of regional development patterns in Hungary during 
the transition period. Section 8.3 develops a hypothesis based on the 
theories of agglomeration economies and local knowledge externalities. 
Section 8.4 describes the data utilized for this study and empirical 
methodology. Section 8.5 contains estimation results, and Section 8.6 
summarizes the major findings and concludes.
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8.2 Economic Transition, Regional Development, and 
Industrial Restructuring in Hungary
The determining role of FDI and the remaining presence of some 
state-controlled services and stagnating domestic companies are the 
main features of transition economies that distinguish their current 
development model (Szanyi. 2003). In the first period of transition. 
MNEs carried out large investment projects in the tradable and ser­
vices sectors of Hungary. Automotive and information and communi­
cation technology (ICT) industries present good examples. The activ­
ity of the new facilities developed over time. Simple, cheap unskilled 
labor-based activities were developed by additional investments. New, 
more value-adding activities were launched, which utilized local 
skilled labor and engineering talent as well as, in some cases, R&D 
capacities. Indeed, some of these foreign companies started to locate 
their R&D functions to their Hungarian sites (Lengyel and Cadil, 2009). 
From 1995-2003. the growth rate of business R&D spending by for­
eign affiliates was among the highest in Hungary (UNCTAD, 2005). As 
a result, the total share of foreign affiliates reached approximately 
80% in 2003 (EC, 2005), This process suggests that foreign affiliates 
emerged as pools of potential knowledge spillovers, and. thus, they 
could serve as the main drivers of regional growth.
In Chapter 7. we described a structural process of shifting activity 
of MNEs that was complemented by increasing local sourcing. This 
process contributed to the emergence of some new concentrations of 
production activity. Foreign-owned companies played a crucial role in 
spatial industrial dynamics through their supplier networks with 
indigenous firms. However, decisions about their regional networks 
were usually determined by the parent company headquarter abroad, 
and domestic suppliers played only a marginal role (Sass and Szanyi, 
2004a: Grosz, 2006b). In many cases, suppliers of these MNEs are de~ 
novo foreign firms that had followed their main customers’ advance 
into Hungary. In the previous chapter, we also demonstrated the pos­
sibility of establishing a cooperating network among local supplier 
companies, but their development needs more time and effort. How­
ever, it is more plausible that a dual structure of economy has evolved 
in the transition, in which domestic companies only have a trivial role
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(Farkas, 2000).
The special development of Central European transition econo­
mies might have prevailed in their regional development as well, 
which can be captured mainly by regional industrial dynamics. In this 
regard. Lengyel and Leydesdorff (2011) showed that, in Hungary, 
besides industrial dynamics, foreign-owned firms in high-tech and 
medium-tech industries have restructured regional economic systems. 
On the other hand, universities play a larger role in shaping the local 
organization of high-tech knowledge-intensive services (R&D and 
communication services).
The regional concentration of industries has also evolved accord­
ingly. For example, North-Western Hungary, where most foreign 
firms had located, stands out as a leading area in automotive industry 
concentration (Grosz, 2006b), while the ICT industry is spread on a 
larger scale over the country {Szanyi, 2008a) although it is concen­
trated in Budapest and its neighboring regions (Lengyel, 2010). Szanyi 
and Lengyel (2010) conducted an empirical analysis of the determinants 
of cluster emergence and confirmed that, despite the industrial differ­
ences in regional dynamics, the change in geographic labor concentra­
tion negatively correlated with the initial degree of labor concentra­
tion in all the industries. This result suggests that the more the region 
was specialized in a certain industry, the more slowly the concentra­
tion occurred in terms of employment.
The above arguments indicate that, in Hungary, regional eco­
nomic growth in the transition period was closely associated with the 
spatial concentration of industry and market. Therefore, we make an 
attempt to empirically examine this relationship in the following sec­
tions.
8.3 Spatia l Concentration and Regional Economic 
Growth : Hypothesis Development
The spatial concentration and specialization of economic activities 
have been recognized and analyzed for over a hundred years. Alfred 
Marshall (1890) studied the determinants of industrial agglomerations 
and found three decisive factors, i.e.. (a) access to developed labor 
market, (b) deep supplier background, and (c) the possibility of quick 
knowledge and information transfer among firms. Recent publications
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also have similar arguments (Krugman, 1991: Venables, 2001), and 
Marshall's argument on agglomeration economies is further developed, 
particularly by the new growth theories (Romer, 1986: Rebelo, 1991), 
which try to explain continuous differences in growth rates and lack of 
convergence (which contradict the neoclassical paradigm) with the 
notion of increasing returns on investments in knowledge and technol­
ogy. Returns are increasing in the economy as a whole due to spillover 
effects, while individual economic agents may have production func­
tions with decreasing returns.
This is the basis of the MAR model of local externalities. In this 
view, the regional concentration of specialized industries produces 
positive externalities because specialized labor and knowledge flow 
needs a similar technological and cultural background. On the other 
hand, Jane Jacobs (1969) showed that urban agglomerations provide 
the possibility for inter-industrial knowledge spillover through the 
dense social networks and diverse economy present in large cities.
The rationale of spatial concentration consists of achieving 
agglomeration economies and knowledge spillovers among firms at a 
given location, which are basically distinguished by the type of spatial 
knowledge transfer occurring. The MAR type of agglomeration econo­
mies relates to firms engaged in similar or inter-linked activities 
because these firms can learn from each other. For instance. Antonelli 
(1994) documented that Italian industrial districts provide the base for 
flexible production systems that can serve volatile markets. Similar 
association was reported in the Silicon Valley and Route 128(Saxenian, 
1994) and in the UK (Oxford and Cambridge in particular) (Miller et 
al, 2001).
On the other hand, the Jacobsian type of agglomeration economies 
is rooted much more in the diversity of economic activity and labor 
division in spatial concentrations, such as metropolitan areas (Florida, 
2002). This type of externalities of regional and urban concentration 
concerns all co-located firms and variety of industries in a single loca­
tion because firms might learn from each other in a complex way and 
industry borders might be of secondary importance. In this regard, 
Frenken et al. (2007) suggested that knowledge spillover may emerge 
only among firms operating in technologically related industries that 
are capable to learn effectively from each other.
Nevertheless, the two types of knowledge spillover are not mutu­
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ally exclusive, and they may occur simultaneously in the same area. 
Moreover, agglomeration economies are rooted in functioning pro­
cesses where linkages among firms, institutions, and infrastructure of a 
given location give rise to economies of scale and scope. The develop­
ment of general labor markets and pools of specialized skills, dense 
interactions between local suppliers and customers, shared infrastruc­
ture. and other localized externalities are typical examples. Agglomer­
ation economies arise when such linkages lower the costs and increase 
the returns of the firms taking part in the local exchange. Presence in 
agglomerations improves firm performance by reducing transaction 
costs for both tangible and intangible assets.
Another powerful model that tries to explain existence of spatial 
concentrations of specialized activities (i,e„ industry clusters) is bound 
to Michael Porter's seminal work (Porter, 1990: Porter, 2003). In his 
diamond model, four sets of interrelated forces are brought forward 
to explain industrial dynamics and competitiveness. These are associ­
ated with (a) factor input conditions, (b) sophisticated local demand 
conditions, (c) related and supported industries, and (d) firm structure, 
strategy, and rivalry. A core notion arose around his model, stressing 
that a collaborative, mutually supportive group of actors could 
enhance regional competitiveness in global markets and thus create 
growth and other benefits. The scale and scope economies of agglom­
erations may also be enjoyed by cluster members, but they are com­
pleted by synergies of cooperation. In this view, regional development 
comes from the innovation pressure of local companies, which is 
helped by a competitive environment constituted by a large number of 
SMEs more than by a monopolistic or oligopolistic market environ­
ment with a small number of large-scale companies, including MNEs. 
On the other hand, papers using the concepts of localization economies 
and MAR-type externalities argue that a local monopoly is better for 
regional growth because firms can internalize and exploit innovative 
ideas more easily.
Porter (2003) also emphasizes that regional development goes 
through phases that differ slightly from each other : input-driven, 
investment-driven, and innovation-driven phases mainly depend on 
the maturity of the economy in the region. In his view, while innova­
tion is the key mechanism in developed regions, cost efficiency is the 
leading force in less-developed regions by attracting economic activi­
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ties. Consequently, the explaining power of knowledge externalities 
might vary across regions. Investments coming from outside the 
region and accumulated capital might determine regional growth in 
less-developed regions, where knowledge externalities are much less 
likely to be realized. Accordingly, measuring the impact of knowledge 
spillovers on regional growth is particularly difficult, since positive 
externalities that boost growth in economic concentrations may stem 
from other sources as well and the spillovers' impact on growth may 
change over time.
A significant amount of research has been published on regional 
growth of employment and regional concentration. The current litera­
ture basically goes back to Glaeser et al. (1992), who compared the 
three competing hypotheses on the knowledge spillovers mentioned 
above. Their results supported the Jacobsian idea of employment 
growth due to emerging spillovers in less specialized but diversified 
and competitive environments, such as metropolitan areas in the 
United States of America. On the other hand, Henderson et al. (1995) 
showed that, in some cases, the regional concentration of previous 
years also explained employment growth in subsequent years. They 
argued that growth patterns varied among different industrial sec­
tors : the evolution of new high-tech industries is more bound to a 
diverse environment, while mature capital goods industries tend to 
enjoy MAR-type externalities. These authors found a significant posi­
tive effect of a static value of regional concentration on employment 
growth, which was repeatedly confirmed by many scholars1. These 
findings are also consistent with the notion that new industries pros­
per in large, diverse metropolitan areas but, with maturity, production 
decentralizes to smaller and more specialized cities. Moreover, empiri­
cal analyses with additional dynamic variables conducted by van Oort 
et al. (2005) and Weterings (2005) showed that a static regional con­
centration does not always have a promoting effect on the future 
growth of employment.
To sum up, three distinct features are discussed in the literature 
that may influence the emergence of knowledge spillovers and, hence, 
economic growth in agglomerations. The first is activity concentration.
See McCann and van Oort (2009) for a historical overview,
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the second is market concentration (monopoly versus competitive mar­
ket), and the third is the direction of potential spillovers (intra- or 
inter-industry directions)2. Therefore, the three hypotheses of the 
agglomeration economies' effect on regional growth, namely, the MAR 
hypothesis, the Porter hypothesis, and the Jacobs hypothesis, are 
focused on.
According to the MAR hypothesis, regional growth is strongly 
affected by the co-location of similar or related firms because localiza­
tion externalities and concentration enable knowledge spillovers to 
prevail across firms in the same industry (Marshall, 1890). In an 
empirical test, a statistically significant and positive effect of both 
industrial and market concentrations on regional economic growth 
supports the MAR hypothesis. The Porter hypothesis expects local 
competition among spatially concentrated firms in the same branch 
that forces firms to innovate in order to survive (Porter, 1990). Here, a 
combination of a positive coefficient of industrial concentration and a 
negative coefficient of market concentration supports this hypothesis.
Knowledge might also flow from one industry to the other in loca­
tions with high population density, and agglomeration externalities fol­
low from the diversity of economic activities (Jacobs, 1969). Empiri­
cally, the negative impact of both market concentration and economic 
diversity on regional growth supports the Jacobs hypothesis. However, 
it is unlikely that both economic diversification and the SME network 
had attained a sufficient degree of maturity by the late 1990s and that 
Jacobsian-type local externality in Hungarian regions except for the 
capital Budapest had been realized. Thus, although the empirical anal­
ysis in this chapter treats economic diversification as a potential factor 
affecting regional growth, we focus on the verification of the MAR and 
Porter hypotheses.
2 The impact of knowledge spillovers on economic growth and. most importantly, 
on productivity growth has been examined by many scholars. Greenaway and 
Gorg (2001: 2004) produced an excellent survey of empirical literature on this 
subject. They conclude that, due to various reasons (among them, methodologi­
cal imperfections), very little convincing evidence was found on increasing 
growth or productivity due to spillover effects. Most papers in this review, how­
ever. did not investigate regional differences or the role of agglomerations.
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The information used for the empirical analysis in this chapter 
was collected from the annual census-type data of Hungarian firms, 
which were compiled from financial statements associated with tax 
reporting submitted to the National Tax Authority in Hungary by 
legal entities using double-entry bookkeeping. The observation period 
covers 1998 and 2005. The data includes all industries and contains 
basic information for each sample firm, including the NACE 4-digit 
industrial classification codes, the annual average number of employ­
ees, total turnover, production costs, and other major financial indices. 
The locations of the sample firms are identifiable. Information about 
the ownership structure includes the total amount of equity capital at 
the end of the term and the proportional share held by domestic pri­
vate investors and foreign investors. Tax incentives provided to firms 
are also present in the data3.
To empirically examine the MAR and Porter hypotheses, we 
aggregate the above firm-level data by industry and by region. We 
use the industrial classification following the cluster study by Ketels 
and Solvell (2005). To deal with the whole national economy in our 
study, however, we complement their list of industries with few addi­
tional sectors4. The final list consists of 41 sectors. Regional aggrega­
tion is conducted by Hungarian sub-region (so-called ‘LAU1’ ). LAU1 
accounts for 168 local administrative units in total. We eliminate sam­
ples containing missing values and. hence, posing an impediment to 
our empirical analysis. We also exclude observations if the total annual 
employment includes fewer than 10 persons. As a result, a total of 
2,781 observations remain in our dataset
Several methods are proposed to measure industrial concentra­
tion (Ratanawaraha and Polenske, 2007). Among them, we use the 
location quotient (LQ) indicator of relative concentration of industry. 
The LQ indicator is designed to express the relative weight of one
8.4 Data and Methodology
1 See Section 2.4 in Chapter 2 for more details of the dataset.
4 Newly added industries consist of (a) public services, (b) real estate services, 
(c) healthcare services, (d) other manufacturing, and (e) other consumer 
services.
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single sector in a region to the total weight of the region compared to 
either the national economy or a larger geographical area. It is similar 
to Bela Balassa's RCA (revealed comparative advantage) measure5.
The indicator for employment concentration (LQE) is given by :
LQ« = v f- ’ (&1)
where e,j is the number of employees in the i th industry of the j  th 
region, ej is the number of employees in all industries of the j  th 
region, Ej is the number of employees in the i th industry in the coun­
try. and E  is the number of employees in all industries in the country.
In this chapter, the value of the LQE indicator reflects the rela­
tionship between the share of an industry in a sub-region and the 
share of the industry in the whole Hungarian national economy in 
terms of workforce distribution. If the LQE indicator is higher than 1, 
it implies that the employment share of the concerned industry is 
higher in the sub-region than the country average. Using the same 
formula, we also calculate the LQ indicator for the concentration of 
firms (LQp).
The above LQE and LQF indicators complement each other 
because they report on different aspects of industry clusters. LQE 
describes employment shares without considering firm density of the 
industry in the given region. It has the same value when the labor 
force is employed only by one firm or each employee belongs to sepa­
rate firms. Meanwhile. LQF reflects the organizational structure of an 
industry in the given region compared to the country average • the 
higher the LQF value is. the more the industry is centered in the 
region. In the empirical analysis, we use the value of LQE and LQF 
indicators as variables of the regional employment concentration and 
regional organizational concentration, respectively.
Further, Nakamura and Morrison Paul (2009) suggest comparing 
the LQe and LQF indicators to capture the market environment aspect 
of industry clusters. They argue that, when LQE is higher than LQp, it 
denotes that the region contains relatively large firms. On the con­
trary, when LQe is lower than LQF, the region has a large number of
J See Section 7.4 in Chapter 7 and Szanyi et al. (2009) for more details on the LQ 
indicator.
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relatively small firms. Consequently, when the value of LQE divided by 
LQf is higher than 1, the region has a relatively concentrated market 
structure in terms of firm density, while, when the indicator is lower 
than 1. the region has a relatively competitive market environment. In 
the empirical analysis, we use the LQE/LQF indicator as a proxy of the 
regional market concentration.
In the case of Hungary, LQg (LQf ) has a range from 0.019 (0.071) 
to 114.911 (122.852), and its mean value and standard deviation are 
1.818 (1.811) and 4.158 (3.617), respectively. L Q e / L Q f  takes a value 
from 0.023 to 24.911. and its mean and standard deviation are equal to 
1.066 and 1.438, respectively. Figure 8.1 illustrates the frequency dis­
tribution-of these three variables. As the figure shows, all the variables 
tend to skew towards the left-hand side with a very long tail on the 
right-hand side. In a total of 2,781 observations, the share of samples 
with a value of 1 or more in terms of LQE, LQF> and LQE/LQF, reaches 
43.7%, 58.6%, and 33.6%, respectively. These figures indicate that, in 
1998, most Hungarian sub-regions were homogeneous from the view­
point of employment and organizational concentration and there were 
very few sub-regions with a highly centralized industrial sector (s).
As potential factors affecting economic growth in Hungarian 
regions, we also pay attention to economic diversity, population den­
sity, state support, and capital structure as well as initial conditions. 
The degree of economic diversity in a sub-region is measured by the 
cross-sectoral Gini coefficient. In general, diversification of economic 
activities has the potential to encourage regional growth. We, however, 
expect a positive but statistically weak impact of this factor on the 
basis of the reason reported in the previous section and the very lim­
ited variance of the Gini coefficient6. Population density is calculated as 
the ratio of the total population to the gross administrative area of a 
sub-region to examine the impact of urbanization on regional eco­
nomic growth. With regard to state support, the total tax incentive is 
employed to test its impact on the regional economy. We expect that 
the investment-friendly economic policy in Hungary had a positive
6 In fact, the mean and standard deviation of the coefficient are 0.040 and 0.011, 
respectively, and almost all sub-regions take a value between 0.030 and 0.050. 
This suggests that the deviation of economic diversification was very limited 
among Hungarian regions in 1998.
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Figure 8.1 Distribution of the location quotient indicator of regional employment and 
organizational concentration and the indicator of regional market con­
centration
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effect on regional economic growth. To examine the relationship 
between capital structure and regional economic growth, we use the 
change in registered total domestic private capital and registered total 
foreign capital. As we argued in Chapter 1, previous studies repeat­
edly verified that private capital investment FDI in particular, signifi­
cantly improved the regional economies in Hungary. Moreover, in 
Chapter 3 and 4. using the same data in this study, we empirically 
verified technology and knowledge spillovers from MNEs to domestic 
firms. Hence, we predict that an increase in domestic private capital 
and foreign capital is positively related to regional economic growth.
As initial conditions of regional economic development we control 
total domestic private capital and total foreign capital in 1998 as well 
as the initial level of the dependent variable. We also control the 
regional fixed effects taking the initial productivity gap among differ­
ent counties into consideration.
The goal of our empirical analysis is to regress growth in total 
employment and total value-added of firms operating in the i th indus­
try of the j  th region (Ajy) into the above explanatory (independent) 
variables in the form '■
Ay,j = a + P -LQEy + y -LQp,, + S • j +^ i=1ft'** + <h + (8.2)
where a is a constant term, /?, y, 5. and 6 are parameters of explana­
tory variables, x* is the k th control variable. <£, is the fixed effects of 
the / th county, to which the j  th sub-region belongs, and £ is a error 
term'. We estimate the above regression equation using a Huber- 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent estimator for all specifications. 
Standard errors are adjusted for sectors by the clustering method.
As explained (dependent) variables, we use two kinds of indica­
tors : growth rate and growth speed. The former expresses the rela­
tive scale of incremental growth from the base level ( (yt~yt-\)/yt-\)). 
and the latter is measured by the natural logarithm of the realized 
outcome level divided by that in the base year (In (y/jr-i)8). We use
' Total value-added is computed by total net turnover - (total materia] costs+ 
total amortization).
a If y / y i - 1  takes a negative value, the growth speed indicator is computed using 
the following formula : sign (y/y,-\) ■In (|y1/j',-ii).
245
Industry Cluster and Regional Economic Growth
both of them to examine the impact of spatial concentration of indus­
try and market on regional economy from different angles.
The detailed definition and descriptive statistics of variables used 
in the empirical analysis are reported in Table 8.1. As Table 8.2 
shows, we confirm that the Pearson correlation coefficients for the 
explanatory variables are well below a threshold of 0.700 for possible 
multicollinearity in all combinations. We also confirm that variance 
inflation factors (VIF) for the explanatory variables do not exceed the 
level of possible collinearity with the constant9.
In Table 8.3, we classify samples into eight groups according to 
the industry cluster-related indicators (LQe. LQp, and L Q e /L Q f )  
reported above and compare these sample groups on the basis of the 
four growth performance variables. Panel (a) of the table indicates that 
both the industrial and market concentration are negatively associated 
with employment growth, and this relationship is statistically signifi­
cant according to the results of the ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis test. 
On the other hand. Panel (b) shows that the industrial and market 
concentration are positively related to regional production growth 
measured by total value-added, but the relationship between the two 
elements is ambiguous in comparison to that in Panel (a)10.
The aim of the multivariate regression analysis is to confirm 
whether or not the relationship indicated in Table 8.3 can be repli­
cated while simultaneously controlling the potential determinants, 
including the control variables.
8.5 Estimation Results
In this section, we report the estimation results of the employ­
ment and production growth models formulated in the previous sec­
tion. Estimation is performed by observation type (all observations 
versus observations with positive growth), by the type of growth indi­
cator (growth rate versus growth speed), and by the set of explana­
tory variables (with and without initial conditions) for robustness
9 In fact, V IF for each explanatory variable never exceeds a threshold of 5.00.
10 We also performed a similar multiple comparison using the Gini coefficient of 
economic diversification, but no statistically significant association was found 
with each growth performance variable.
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Table 8.1 Definition and descriptive statistics of the variables used in empirical analysis
Variable name Definition
Descriptive statistics
Mean Medián S. D.
1.307 0.341 3.621
0.200 0.174 0355
166.187 1,873 4143.014
1254 1.190 2.138
1.818 0.829 4.158
1.811 1.120 3.617
1.065 0.716 1.438
0.040
0.030
0,040
-0.170
0.011
0.785
4220 3.466 2.805
5.994 10.316 9,412
1.361 0.000 8.802
10.467 10.593 2.820
6,213 7.170 5.378
4.947
11.483
4852
11.443
1.521
2.293
Employment growth rate*
Employment growth speedb
Production growth rate’
Production growth speed1
Régiónál employment concentra- 
tión (LQe)
Régiónál organizational concen­
tration (LQf)
Régiónál markét concentration 
(LQb/LQf)
Economic diversity 
Population density
Tax incentive 
Domestic capital increase 
Foreign capital increase 
Initial domestic priváté capital
Initiai foreign capital
Initial totál employment 
Initial tDtai value-added
Growth rate of totál employment by sub-region and industry. 1998-2005 
Natural logarithm of the change in totál employment by sub-region and indus- 
try, 1998-2005
Reál growth rate of totál value-added by sub-region and industry, 1998-2005 
Natural logarithm of the reál change in totál value-added by sub-region and 
industry, 1998-2005
Location quotient indicator of relative concentration of employment, 1998 
Location quotient indicator of relative concentration of firm. 1998
The value of LQe divided by LQi
Cross-sectoral Gini coefficient by sub-region, 1998 
Natural logarithm of population density by sub-region. 2001 
Natural logarithm of totál tax incentive given to firms by sub-region and índus- 
try, 1998
Natural logarithm of the change in totál registered domestic priváté capital by 
sub-region and industry. 1998-2005 
Natural logarithm of the change in totál registered foreign capital by region and 
industry. 1998-2005
Natural logarithm of totál registered domestic priváté capital by sub-region and 
industry. 1998
Natural logarithm of totál registered foreign Capital by sub-region and industry. 
1998
Natural logarithm of totál employment by sub-region and industry. 1998 
Natural logarithm of totál value-added by sub-region and industry. 1998
Noles '■ “Given by : (yxnryisst) hisw- where ymsa and ywos are the realized levels in 1998 and 2005, respectively.
''Given by Un (yzoasSyum) ■ If yxne/ymn takes a negative value. the growth speed variable is computed using the formula ’■ sign (y»ws/
yum> ' In (lyaaís/j'jssisl) •
Source ■ Authors' calculation based on the annual census-type data of Hungárián firms in 1998 and 2005.
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Table 8.2 Correlation matrix of explanatory variables
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) <J) (K)
(A) Reg iona l em p loym ent -
concentration (LQE)
(B) Regional organizational 0.428 —
concentration (LQf)
(C) Regional market concen­ 0.508 -0.022 —
tration (LQe/LQ f)
(D) Economic diversity 0.022 0.046 -0036 —
(E) Population density -0.075 -0.113 0.008 -0268 -
(F) Tax incentive 0.132 0.014 0.155 -0.073 0-278 —
(G) Domestic capital increase *0.129 -0.077 -0.082 0.002 0.082 -0.033 —
(H) Foreign capital increase -0.047 -0.038 -0.047 0.018 0.000 -0.057 0.036 -
(I) In itia l domestic private 0.043 0.010 0.036 -0.091 0,274 0.451 -0.199 0.003 —
capital
(J) Initial foreign capital 0.101 0.021 0.123 -0.092 0.319 0.537 -0.017 -0.192 0.368 -
(K) Initial total employment 0.250 0.040 0.330 -0.114 0.326 0.668 -0.112 -0.030 0.588 0.569 -
(L) Initial total value-added -0.085 -0.092 -0.069 -0.096 0295 0.431 0.051 0.038 0.550 0.384 0*541
Source ■ Authors calculation. For definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables, see Table 8.1.
check.
Table 8.4 contains estimation results of the employment growth 
model. As the table shows, neither of the hypotheses stated in Section 
HI is supported by our results concerning regional employment 
growth. In other words, neither the MAR nor the Porter hypothesis 
provides a sufficient explanation about the determinants of employ­
ment growth in the Hungarian sub-regions. As a matter of fact, statis­
tically significant coefficients of the industrial concentration variables 
(both LQe and LQF) and the regional market competition variable 
(LQe/LQf) take a negative value except for the regional employment 
concentration variable (LQe) in Model [2]. Furthermore, in contrast 
to the weak impact of regional employment concentration, regional 
organizational concentration (LQf) has a significant and negative esti­
mate in Models [1], [2], [5], and [6], which take the employment 
growth rate as an explained variable. The regional market concentra­
tion variable produces a strong and negative estimate in Models [1], 
[3], and [5]. However, its statistical power is significantly decreased 
when controlling initial conditions.
The above results are considered to be negative since, based on 
these findings, agglomeration economies cannot be expected to prevail 
in Hungary. However, regional development in transition economies
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Table 8.3 Univariate comparison of growth performance among sample groups 
clustered in terms of the regional employment, organizational, and 
market concentration
fa) Employment growth
Growth performance variable Employment growth rate Employment growth speed
Reference variable for sample grouping
Regional
employment
concentration
(LQ*)
Regional
organizational
concentration
(LOf )
Regional
market
concentration
(LQe/LQf)
Regional
employment
concentration
<LQe)
Regional
organizational
concentration
(LQf)
Regional
market
concentration
(LQe/LQ f )
Sample group ; range of reference vari­
ables
G1 : 0,00-0.25 1815 3526 3.163 3.481 2949 2830
G 2 : 0.25-050 1.914 2.703 2.043 2.826 2.311 2.183
G3 : 050-0,75 1.111 2099 1.163 2.377 2522 1.678
G4 : 0 . 75-1.00 0.912 1583 0894 2116 2.789 1.978
G5 : 1.00-125 0.798 1.167 0453 1-999 1890 1385
G6 : 125-150 0526 1.079 0.472 1.423 1.623 0279
G7 : 1.50-200 0.479 0.865 0.443 0.011 0538 -0.957
G8 : 2.00 or more 0,036 0.449 -0.007 -2080 -0541 -1.788
Multiple comparison of the 8 sample 
groups
ANOVA un 52950* * * 15.730* ** 32.670*** 95.970* ** 42,970* * * 48.130* * *
Bartlett test (**) 1600,000* * * 370819* * * 1800.000* * * 277.095* * * 42.123*** 201.719* *"
Kruskal*Wallis test ( j 1) 711243*** 297236*** 420.977*** 402.989* * * 277.064*** 208779***
(b) Production growth
Growth performance variable Production growth rate Production growth speed
Regional Regional Regional Regional Regional Regional
employment organizational market employment organizational market
Kelerence variable for sample grouping
concentration concentration concentration concentration concentration concentration
(LQe) (LQP) (LQk/LQp) (LQe) (LQ ,) (LQt/LQp)
Sample group ' range of reference vari­
ables
G1 :0.00-025 17289 62.738 22479 3811 5,959 4249
G2 : 025-050 22.097 48.383 314523 4.102 4.068 4.110
G3 :050-0.75 15.042 48546 16.039 4275 4.600 1387
G 4 :0.75-1.00 60.770 119278 16.276 4299 4.771 4.634
G5 :1,00-125 38525 38.692 16.568 5.207 4.947 3.465
G6 : 125-150 29596 610.394 98155 5.045 4266 3629
G7 :150-2.00 22.727 30540 703.089 5.063 5.723 4837
G8 : 2.00 or more 658.097 306599 289.441 5388 3.935 8.964
Multiple comparison of the 8 sample 
groups
ANOVA if ) 1590 0.680 0.930 1,010 0.900 7,640***
Bartlett test (/*) 1300.000*** 670.000* * * 1100.000* ** 3.922 5.945 30525* * *
Kruskal-Wallis test (jrz) 36.273*** 2.475 104576*** 46.102* * • 18.826* ** 109 239* **
Not* : * * '  : Significant at the 1 % level
Source '■ Authors' estimation. For definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables, see Table 8.1.
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to Table 8.4 Estimation of the employment growth model
Observation type Ail observations Observations with positive growth
Growth indicator Growth rate Growth speed Growth rate Growth speed
Model [1] [2] [33 [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Regional employment concen­ 0.009 0.036* - 0.085* -0.060 0,037 0.047 -0.024 -0.025
tration (LQe) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Regional organizational con­ - 0.058* -0.049** —0.054 -0.049 -0.060“ -0,049** -0.009 -0.020**
centration (LQjt) (0.03) (0.02) (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0,01) (0.01)
Regional market concentra­ -0.314*** -0.064 -0.498*** -0.248* -0.559*** -0.163 0.078 -0,045
tion (LQe/LQf) (0.06) (0.04) (0.12) (0,13) (0.13) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05)
Economic diversification - 1.281 -3.063 -3.382 -5.669 0.498 -2.775 -0.772 0.676
(3.95) (3.84) (7.93) (7.50) (5.29) (5.15) (2.55) (2.08)
Population density 0.330* 0.696* * * 0.504** 0.690* 0.477* 0.894* * * 0.551*** 0.253* *
(0.18) (0.23) (0.22) (0.35) (0.26) (0.33) (0.10) (0.11)
Tax incentive -0.208*** 0.039 -0.155 0.001 -0.326*** 0.021 0.204* * * -0.007
(0.05) (0.03) (0.11) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.02)
Domestic capital increase 0.057*“ * 0.048*** 0.182*** 0.180*** 0.040 * * * 0.048* * * 0.040*** 0.042***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Foreign capital increase 0.053*** 0.065*** 0.112*** 0.129*** 0.060*** 0.078* * * 0.038*** 0.038***
(0.01) (0.02) (0,02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0,01)
Initial domestic private capital 0.084 0.179* 0.038 0.057***
(0.05) (0.09) (0,08) (0.02)
Initial foreign capital 0.077** 0.132*** 0.100** 0.042***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0,01)
Initial level of dependent vari­ -1.163*** -1.154*** -1.360*** 0.410***
able (0.18) (0.30) (025) (0.07)
Const. 2.016*** 5.148* ** 1.438*** 3.454* 3.140*** 6.608*** 3203*** 1.299***
(0.37) (0.85) (0.46) (1.74) (0.50) (1.10) (023) (0.34)
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2781 2781 2781 2781 1798 1798 1798 1798
Adjusted if* 0.12 0.20 0,31 0.36 0.10 0.17 0.32 0.44
/'-test 29.42*** 30.18*** 113.53*** 119.55*** 31.43*** 24.61*** 43.50*** 141.66***
Notes '■ All models are estimated using Huber-White heteroskedasticity-consistent estimator. Standard errors are adjusted for 41 sectors and 
reported in parentheses beneath regression coefficients. ***, **. and * denote statistical significance at the 1%. 5%. and 10% levels, respec­
tively. /"-test tests the null hypothesis that all coefficients are zero.
Source ■ Authors' estimation. For definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables, see Table 8.1.
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may differ from developed ones. We argue that the lower maturity of 
the regional economy predominates over the relevance of agglomera­
tion economies in most of the sectors. In Hungary, the major industrial 
sectors are dominated by MNEs. and these foreign firms are highly 
motivated to invest, taking market potentials into account. Conse­
quently, regional spread is much more likely to occur than regional 
agglomeration, which we found in most of the industries in previous 
research (Szanyi and Lengyei, 2010).
As we predicted, economic diversification does not have a signifi­
cant coefficient, suggesting that the Jacobs model of local externalities 
does not excise the driving force in promoting regional employment in 
the case of Hungary. The variable of population density has a positive 
sign with statistical significance at the 10% or less level in all models. 
Hence, we conjecture that employment, is more likely to occur in an 
urban environment than in less populated regions. Tax incentives 
show a significant coefficient in Models [1], [5], and [7]. but the inclu­
sion of initial condition variables into the right-hand side of the regres­
sion equation remarkably reduces its explanatory power. Capital 
investment has a strong positive impact on employment growth in all 
models, and the impact does not depend on the financial source.
The estimation results of the production growth model are 
reported in Table 8.5. Glaeser et al. (1992) stressed the importance of 
using output indicators to measure the effects of industrial concentra­
tion and agglomeration economies on the regional economy. As the 
table shows, contrary to employment growth, the MAR-type local 
externalities seem to visibly prevail in the growth of regional produc­
tion. This statement is underlined by significant and positive estimates 
of the regional organizational concentration and regional market con­
centration variables in most models. At the same time, the estimation 
results in Tabie 8.5 also reveal that regional employment concentra­
tion is negatively related to the production growth rate.
Two aspects of industrial concentration measured by firm and 
workforce density have a counter-effect on regional production 
growth: namely, a relatively high employment concentration does not 
increase production in industry clusters. On the contrary, clusters with 
a relatively high number of firms tend to create appropriate environ­
ments for local knowledge externalities leading in production growth. 
Meanwhile, estimates of the regional market concentration variable
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Table 8.5 Estimation of the production growth model
Observation type All observations Observations with positive growth
Growth indicator Growth rate Growth speed Growth rate Growth speed
Model [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Regional employment concentra­ -169.418*** -171588*** 0.048 -0.030 -176.435*** - 179361 * * * 0.010 0.010
tion (LQe) (26.20) (25.96) (0.07) (0.05) (3257) (31.03) (0.01) (0.01)
Regional organizational concen­ 665.135*** 655.171*** 0.088 -0.075 712.932*** 693.844*** 0.026*** 0.022***
tration (LQF) (177.61) (173.70) (0.07) (0.05) (15232) (147.11) (0.01) (0.01)
Regional market concentration 398.674*** 363.881*** 0.964**’ 0.313 420210*** 371.027*" 0.115"* 0.121*"
(LQe/LQf ) (9722) (87-86) (0.27) (022) (111.72) (97.50) (0.03) (0.03)
Economic diversification 1827.434 495.594 40.429* 18.133 1886.985 191L865 -0.559 -1.616
(1994.39) (1867.71) (23.06) (19.59) (3474.90) (3808.40) (255) (2.24)
Population density 509.739'** 539.930*** 0.950 1.858** 541.082*** 667.872** 0.757*** 0.519* **
(171.80) (189.12) (0.93) (0.84) (19456) (29056) (0.10) (0.12)
Tax incentive -71.533** - 46.052 -0.094 0.482*** -78.166** - 35212 0256*** 0.158*"
(.2922) (41.66) (037) (0.15) (35.06) (51.82) (0.02) (0.02)
Domestic capital increase 20.759** 28225** 0.096 0.171*** 29.464*** 46.717*" 0.024*" 0.027*"
(8.19) (12.50) (0.07) (0.04) (10,64) (19.59) (0.01) (0.00)
Foreign capital increase 0.017 3332 0.052 0.132*** -1.684 5.981 0.037*** 0.042***
(5.00) (538) (0.04) (0.03) (7.89) (7.43) (0.01) (0.01)
Initial domestic private capital 91.737 0.710*“ 138.472 0.075*
(72.19) (021) (104.53) (0.04)
Initial foreign capital 12.012 0 .374 "' 24.037 0.063**'
(22,52) (0.07) (31.14) (0.01)
Initial level of dependent variable -221.426* -3.643*** -431.319 0.066**
(131.53) (0.33) (260.78) (0.03)
Const, -1002.023*'* 443.624 1.144 31.959*" -1102.680'" 1714367 11226*" 9.683***
(27177) (91153) (156) (3.92) (283.97) (1672.70) (020) (0.55)
Regional fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2781 2781 2781 2781 1900 1900 1900 1900
Adjusted i?2 0.27 0.28 0.14 0 34 029 0.31 0.41 0.46
F-test 16614*** 91.21*** 14.96*** 39.51'** 187.95'*' 94.22*” 9329** 151.68***
Notes * AH models are estimated using Huber-White heteroskedasticity-consistent estimator. Standard errors are adjusted for 41 sectors and reported in 
parentheses beneath regression coefficients. ***,  **. and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%. and 10% levels, respectively. F-test tests the null 
hypothesis that all coefficients are zero.
Source * Authors' estimation. For definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables, see Table 8.1.
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suggest that successful clusters have a strong tendency to be consti­
tuted of relatively large companies that enjoy a large market share in 
their specialized segments. In other words, the combination of monop­
olistic market competition and the presence of large-scale companies 
are more likely to increase output than a group of small firms under 
competitive market environments. This finding corresponds with the 
evidence reported in previous literature on the significant impact of 
FDI and monopolistic market structure on economic recovery in tran­
sition economies (Szanyi, 2003: Lengyel and Leydesdorff, 2011). How­
ever, it is clear that industries may vary concerning the characteris­
tics of their spatial organizational structure.
Among control variables, population density and domestic capital 
increase produce a significant and positive estimate, in line with our 
expectations. Tax incentives and foreign capital increase are also posi­
tively related to production growth speed even after controlling initial 
conditions. Economic diversification has a positive coefficient in all 
models, but it is statistically insignificant except in Model [3].
As reported above, the estimation results of the employment 
growth model and the production growth model are inconsistent at 
first sight However, we stress that the two explained variables reflect 
on different aspects of agglomeration economies. Employment growth 
can either be the result of firm growth in a given location or the 
entrance of new firms into the region. Hence, the effect of agglomera­
tions on regional economic performance is unpredictable. On the other 
hand, production growth reflects agglomeration economies much more 
easily. Co-located firms are able to enhance their output for several 
reasons. Economies of space, knowledge spillovers, and local (on-site) 
learning are the most powerful assumptions that encourage production 
growth. The positive coefficient of the regional organizational concen­
tration variable suggests that co-located firms learn intensively from 
each other and enjoy intra-industrial knowledge externalities, making 
the most of geographical proximity advantage.
8.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, using census-type data of Hungarian firms in 1998 
and 2005, we empirically examined hypothesis of local knowledge 
externalities focusing on the impact of industrial and market concen-
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tration on regional economic growth. The results from univariate and 
multivariate regression analyses conducted in the previous sections 
confirm that both organizational and market concentrations are posi­
tively related to production growth in Hungarian sub-regions, while 
employment concentration has a negative impact. These findings 
broadly support the MAR hypothesis of local knowledge externalities 
that stresses the role of large firms in a specialized location. Further­
more, our empirical evidence strongly indicates the possible synergy of 
monopolistic market structure and the presence of big companies for 
regional production growth. On the contrary, we could not obtain any 
supporting evidence that industrial and market concentrations pro­
mote job creation at the sub-region level in the case of Hungary.
The Porter hypothesis is not supported by our empirical results 
perhaps due to the dual structure of the Hungarian industry, where 
foreign companies and their investments are decisive in regional 
employment and production growth. It is likely that regional economic 
development, in terms of the Porter hypothesis, is mostly investment- 
driven, and the motivation to innovate does not significantly influence 
economic growth in Hungarian regions. This argument offers policy 
implications for other transition economies as well because similar 
trends were observed in these countries during transition from the 
planned system to a market economy. However, in this chapter, we do 
not discriminate between the effect of foreign-owned and domestic 
firms in the empirical analysis, This is a topic reserved for future 
research.
Moreover, we confirmed that the Jacobsian-type local externality 
is very hard to identify in small economies, such as Hungary. The 
coefficient of the economic diversity variable is insignificant in both 
the employment and production growth models. In Hungary, most 
sub-regions are lightly populated and have a low firm density; the 
only metropolitan area is Budapest. These circumstances may not per­
mit the empirical detection of the Jacobsian-type local externality 
using a sub-region level dataset. Reconsideration of empirical strategy 
is another issue for further work.
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Conclusions and Future Research
This book explores important aspects of an FDI-driven develop­
ment model in Central Europe focusing on Hungary. The main empha­
sis is on a variety of positive externalities, more specifically, spillovers 
that emerged due to the activity of foreign affiliates in an emerging 
market economy. Impacts on domestic firms in close cooperation or 
technologically more remote positions, and the role of ownership 
change in structural and performance up-grading were explored, as 
well as macro structural aspects such as active development in the 
services sector, and the benefits of organizational innovations. Finally, 
the spatial aspects of FDI-led growth were examined. The main con­
clusion of the book is that foreign investments contributed to the fun­
damental restructuring and change of development path in economies 
of Central Europe. This process led to a new kind of integration of this 
region into the globalized world economic system. We emphasized that 
this reorientation had probably no better alternative, and countries 
and societies (illustrated mainly with the example of Hungary) bene­
fited in a variety of ways.
We examined the development process from all aspects, which, of 
course, includes the negatively perceived tendencies. For example, the 
fundamental restructuring process was coupled with extensive down­
sizing of activities and employment in branches that were not in the 
main stream of the new development model. It was rather difficult, 
however, to separate the impacts of the overall globalization process 
and the restructuring process due to the systemic change. While this 
problem may seem to have lost importance 22 years after the initial 
political turnover, the results, the imprint of the period, and the cur­
rent status of the transition economies cannot be evaluated without 
due regard to the transition process. In addition, the transition may be 
more or less finished on a micro level but not on a mezzo and macro 
level. Macroeconomic institutions continuously evolve, altering the 
working conditions of business. For example, changes in the social 
security systems may have a rather strong influence on the whole 
economy. Global changes and the impacts of the transition process are 
mixed in this regard as well, providing an exciting field of further 
research into the variety of economic systems and development.
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While the broader background of the FDHed development model 
and, mainly, its impact on business is an interesting research topic, the 
topics of this volume also deserve further elaboration. Although we 
dealt with the positive and negative externalities due to FDI, further 
attention should be given to the networks of multinational corpora­
tions, the benefits that these firms enjoy, and those enjoyed by home 
country investors. The model itself can be maintained only if the 
mutual interests of business and societies are maintained. There 
should be a balance in exploring and sharing the benefits of interna­
tional cooperation. Research should figure out this balance of mutual 
interests. Another important aspect of this issue is the role of pan- 
European (maybe also global) business networks in strengthening the 
integration process of Europe. The current monetary and fiscal crisis 
of the European Union suggests that this type of mutually beneficial 
international cooperation has experienced serious bottlenecks in the 
past.
The European aspects lead us back to the problem of the long­
term mutual interests of donor and host economies. In the case of host 
(transition) economies, further research is required to determine the 
long-term development impacts of the FDI-based development model. 
This is because current research focuses on the current status and 
puts little emphasis on the future impact. Structural changes, for 
example, might have led to very important structural up-grading and 
an astonishing increase in productivity. Not much is known, however, 
about other aspects of the new structures, such as income generating 
and sharing. It seems that some of the most rapidly evolving indus­
tries contribute to local value added only marginally. In addition, the 
strict specialization on a few and, in some cases, unskilled labor-inten­
sive handling activities does not provide job opportunities for skilled 
labor. Thus, these activities do not represent demand for skill develop­
ment and education, or for constructive engineering tasks. If this situa­
tion prevails on the long run, it may negatively impact the host coun­
try’s labor reproduction systems. Further examples of long-term con­
tradictions behind short-term benefits should also be analyzed, and 
policy suggestions for their solution should be provided. The same 
applies for donor countries. In other words, new tendencies of interna­
tional labor division in the globalization process have not been thor­
oughly analyzed. Much of the research from developed countries
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seems to be based on politically motivated opinions.
Researchers habitually look for new research topics and problems 
to explore. Sometimes, they have some preoccupation or hypotheses 
that they want to prove (rather than to reject). Researchers are dif­
ferentiated from the public opinion by the ways and tools through 
which they establish and change their perceptions. These approaches 
and toolkits were established and refined over the course of centuries. 
The scientific approach to problems, therefore, leaves less room for 
sentiment, which can be strongly influenced by interest-driven opin­
ion. In pure science, researchers may also change opinion and reject 
hypotheses. They are even expected to do so whenever neutral 
research produces new contradictory information. Therefore, we can­
not stop at this stage, but continue to research the longer-term 
impacts of global cooperation networks on both host and donor econo­
mies.
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